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Choosing Language: Social ServiceFraming and Social JusticeColleen Vojak

Dr. Vojak has a Ph.D. in Educational Policy Studies from the University of Illinois where she holds an Adjunct Professor appointment. In this essay she draws from her experiencesas a Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) and guardian ad litem for children in the state of Illinois. Her research interests include: childrens rights and interests, autonomy facilitating curriculum; religion and education, and the influence of market ideology on student behavior.

Correspondence to Dr Colleen Vojak, Ph.D., 4201 Summer Field Road, Champaign, IL 61822,USA. Email: [email protected]

Summary

Traditional social service language is embedded in an ideological framework that viewsindividuals as the primary source of their predicaments and the solution to their pro-blems, ignoring racism, poverty and other structural inequities. Stigmatizing languageserves to maintain those inequities and reduce the collective sense of responsibility toaddress them. Social service providers who care about social justice, but do not under-stand the relationship between language and the larger social vision they want tohelp create, may unwittingly undermine their own project by reinforcing the languageof hegemony.

Keywords: stigma, language, social justice

Social service language and frames

[T]he institutions of society have systematically blinded and deafenedthemselves by the formalisation of rhetoric, policy, and legislation to thevery existence of [socially marginalized] children (Hollitt, 2003).

Language is seldom neutral; it is infused with meaning, power and status.Language can be a powerful ideological tool that embodies assumptionsabout how our world is ordered, and how it may be changed (Hawkinset al. , 2001). It frames worldviews, sets the parameters of acceptable

# The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Association of Social Workers. All rights reserved.

British Journal of Social Work (2009) 39 , 936949doi:10.1093/ bjsw/ bcm144Advance Access publication January 17, 2008

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this sentiment, declaring that welfare has become a narcotic whichinduces dependency (Mills, 1996, p. 392). In a critique of this narrative,Frederick Mills reveals the hidden assumptions, and shows how languagecan constrain discourse through framing: Notice that [according to the

language of the report] welfare itself and not poverty induces dependence(Mills, 1996, p. 392).

The second framethe therapeutic enterprise portrays the socialconcern as a kind of illness requiring treatment. The social work task is . . .to diagnose and treat, to enable the client to return to societys fold(Gregory and Holloway, 2005, p. 42). Again, there is an implied powerdifferential. [T]he clientworker relationship is one in which the personalsuperiority and professional authority of the worker is confirmed, not leastin the language used to describe that relationship the casework relation-

ship which is a form of treatment(Gregory and Holloway, 2005, p. 42).Psychiatrist Niranjan S. Karnick suggests that therapeutic approachesthemselves can be a form of violence (Karnik, 2001, p. 103). Through theuse of case studies, he demonstrates how the language of pathologyattached to children is often cemented into place through an unrelentingprocess of categorizing and labelling during the therapeutic intervention.Children who have been victims are at risk of being labelled victimizersshould they act out any of the aggression they previously experienced;and children whose lives have been disrupted or turned upside-down are

at risk of becoming labelled disruptive, ADD / HD or behaviour-disordered. It may take only a single incident followed by the attachmentof a pathological label to shift the child from victim to victimizer; andonce a child is labelled as such, the frame for response shifts from one of care to containmentfrom protection of the child to protecting othersfrom the child.

Similar to the moral enterprise frame, the therapeutic frame emphasizesindividual responsibility for problems and solutions. Psychological pro-blems and personal economic instabilities are thought to be the root of the individuals predicament, and treatment involves bringing the individ-uals worldviews, expectations and behaviours into alignment withreality. Absent from this frame and the accompanying language is anyacknowledgement of contributing societal factors, such as structural inequi-ties, poverty and racism; and because this is not part of the discourse,neither is the strong sense of community responsibility and action toaddress these problems.

A third frame the managerial enterprise enlists the language of marketand business management (Gregory and Holloway, 2005, p. 46). Gregoryand Holloway note that the language of risk prediction and management . . .

market economy and care . . . and the language of consumerism domi-nate the social work discourse (Gregory and Holloway, 2005, p. 47).Under this model, care is a commodity to be managed like any other,and the recipients of care are consumers of the product (Gregory and

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Holloway, 2005, p. 48). This tracks with recent trends in education andhealth care, and is marked by an increased emphasis on managing outcomesrather than helping people: Interventions and outcomes are specified asprecisely as possible in order to monitor impact and cost-effectiveness.

Social service programmes aim to target professional interventions toprovide just the right skills and resources, to just the right clients, just intime (Eheart et al. , 2005/ 2007). This minimalist approach focuses exclu-sively on finding and repairing deficits. It is crisis-driven and reactiveremedial rather than preventive. Its implicit goal is to target limited servicesto those most in need (Hopping et al. , 2001, p. 13).

The language of business transmits a concern for efficiency and account-ability, while dulling the concern for real people by objectifying and quan-tifying their lives. For example, risk management prioritizes the avoidance

of high risk, and, by doing so, it suggests that caring about communitymembers who need assistance is not a primary motivating factor; keepingthem from interfering with the lives and economic interests of others is thekey concern. This frame suggests that people with problems requiring com-munity assistance are in a separate category from the rest of the community.Their interests are on one side, while the communitys interests are on theother side, entirely separate. Risk management language fails to appreciatehow individual and community interests are overlapping and interwoven; ittherefore neglects the bigger picture, ignoring possible long-term, systemic

and preventative solutions. It also focuses on immediate and high risks,while ignoring low-risk situations that could later become high-risk(Gregory and Holloway, 2005, p. 48). And it takes a glass-half-emptyapproach by treating people as liabilities to be managed, rather thanresources to be developed or tappedresources that could enrich theentire community (Hopping et al. , 2001, p. 10).

The discourse of business management reduces social problems to econ-omic considerations, rather than concern for people, families and commu-nities. It also mutes discussion about underlying social causes, againlimiting the communitys obligation and ability to fully respond. The 1996Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act(PRWORA) (Pub. L. No. 44103) is a good example of how business /market language is enlisted to do just that. The laws language construct[s]families as independent economic entities rather than as sites for the rearingand protection of children [and] childcare services are constructed as com-modities to be purchased and businesses to be regulated rather than as safehavens for children (Finkelstein et al. , 1998, p. 173). The words personalresponsibility and work opportunity in the Bills title euphemisticallyobscure the fact that the Bill is an instrument of budget reduction thatcuts medical and social benefits, and recalibrates the levels of care towhich children are entitled (Finkelstein et al. , 1998, pp. 173 and 180).PRWORA stipulates that federal grants decline by $55 billion over thefirst six years, after which Congress may slash federal contributions,

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leaving states to bear the brunt of financial support. In one stroke, the Per-sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act(PRWORA) reversed six decades of federal social legislation(Figueira-McDonough, 2007, p. 183).

These are some of the meta-narratives that have historically influencedsocial service vocabulary, and informed social service practices. Strongthreads of individual culpability and limited community responsibility arewoven throughout, as well as implicit support for traditional institutionsand practices. Solutions occur when individuals, not systems, change. Thethemes also evoke a language of exclusionmarginalizing individual devi-ants while keeping the [existing] social order intact (Erickson, 1964,p. 12). Stigma is a social construction that has two componentsthe recog-nition of a difference, and the consequent devaluing of a person(s) due to

that difference (Dovidio et al. , 2000, p. 3). The simple act of assigningsocial service categories and labels is stigmatizing because it recognizesundesirable differences (Abrams et al. , 2005, p. 19).

Exclusionary language and stigma

Many social work professionals and academics today understand thepower of stigmatizing language and avoid its use; nevertheless, such

terms continue to litter the social service, legal and political landscapeand thus serve to reinforce the politics of exclusion. Words commonlyused to refer to peoplerecipient, subject, ward, client, applicant, case,patient, dependent, juvenile and chargeand words used to describetheir concernsbehavior disordered, dysfunctional, deviant, disruptive,disordered, disturbed, delinquent, debased and depraved (Seita, 2000,p. 80)stigmatize and exclude. They separate, objectify, impose hierar-chy, assign blame and create shame.

Even language that, on the surface, does not appear to have negative con-

notations can in fact be stigmatizing. For example, the word foster haspositive connotations outside the realm of social services; however, ittakes on a whole new meaning when attached to a specific child. 1 Theterm foster child may seem innocuous; however, ask such a child whats/ he thinks. In Keeping it Secret: Teens Write about Foster Care Stigma ,young authors write personal stories about the stigma attached to theirfoster label and how they desperately tried to hide this fact from friends:

Hiding my identity, especially from my friends, is difficult, and unlessyouve been in my shoes, you dont know how difficult. You dont know

how many stories and lies Ive told people. Ive had to lie about why meand my foster sister look nothing alike, about why I never talk about myfamily much, and about how I suddenly appeared in my home out of nowhere at the age of 10. (Shaniqua Sockwell, Youth Communications,2005, p. 12).

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The embarrassment and fear of being found out is not entirely unwarranted:

For as long as Ive been in foster care (which is about four years), Ive beenfaced with comments like, Youre in foster care? You dont look likesomeone in foster care! or Awe, sorry to hear about it, and What didyou do to get put in foster care? These questions make me so furious!(Giselle John, Youth Communications, 2005, p. 28).

In 2004, Pew Charitable Commission on Children in Foster Care commis-sioned a study entitled The Cost of Foster Care. The word cost typicallyevokes monetary images; however, this report focuses on the emotionaland psychological costs of foster-care. The study concludes that the useof the foster label takes a large toll on children. All participants in thefocus groups said they feel stigmatized. Youth previously in foster care

even insisted that a new word be identified to replace foster because theimage and its implications are so negative (Hochman et al. , 2004).The Vera Institute of Justice also conducted a study on children in foster-

care and concluded that:

The perceived stigma of being in foster care prevents many foster childrenfrom interacting normally with other students. Many dont like to reveal totheir peers that they are in care. Some isolate themselves socially because of this. Expectations that foster children will be labeled troublemakers can beself-fulfilling, as these children continue to see that adults expect them tofail (Finkelstein et al., 2002).2

The foster label may suggest that the child is different and possiblydamaged or at fault for his or her foster-care status; or that s / he comesfrom a family that is abnormal, irresponsible, abusive and perhaps criminal.Although the child did nothing to earn the stigma attached to his or herfoster status, the tendency to internalize stigma by association is strong(Page, 1984, p. 39; Becker and Arnold, 1986, p. 48). In an individualisticculture, there is the tendency to assume that all personal misfortune isthe result of personal irresponsibility (Mills, 1996, p. 2), as evidenced inthe Vera Institute of Justices finding that these children tended to blamethemselves (not biological parents, foster-care or the schools) for theirpoor academic achievement (Finkelstein et al. , 2002).

The stigmatized person expends considerable energy either managinginformation in order to conceal the stigma, or managing the stress andtension resulting from public knowledge of the stigma (Goffman, 1963 /1990, p. 161). However, even if the stigma remains hidden, the weight of internalized societal opinion can exact a toll, as explained by ErvingGoffman:

Given that the stigmatized individual in our society acquires identity stan-dards which he applies to himself in spite of failing to conform to them, itis inevitable that he will feel some ambivalence about his own self (Goffman, 1963 / 1990, p. 130).



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The psychological effects of that ambivalence may include contraction of self, a threatened self-concept, lowered self-esteem, anger, frustration,emotional denial and cognitive impairment (Abrams et al. , 2005, p. 15). Arecent overview of more than twenty studies reveals that social exclusion

consistently leads to negative outcomes:Socially excluded people are more aggressive, even toward innocent targets,are less willing to help or cooperate, engage in self-defeating behaviors likerisk-taking and procrastination and perform poorly on analytical reasoningtasks (Twenge and Baumeister, 2005, p. 27).

Furthermore, negative labels often dominate self-perception (Page, 1984,p. 10); a stigma can take on master status, eclipsing all other attributesto become a defining identity (Ainlay et al. , 1986, p. 6).

Children are particularly vulnerable to identity damage from stigmabecause they do not understand the mechanics of stigmatization untillong after it has become a solid feature of their identity. Such individualswould have thoroughly learned the concepts of normal and stigmatizedlong before they came to view themselves as deficient. When they dorealize how stigma has affected them, they must learn to reorganize theirview of the world (Martin, 1986, p. 152)not an easy task. StanleyPinker sums up the insidiousness of stigma:

The imposition of stigma is the commonest form of violence used in demo-

cratic societies. Stigmatization is slow, unobtrusive and genteel in itseffect . . . . Stigmatization is a highly sophisticated form of violence in sofar as it is rarely associated with physical threats or attack. It can best becompared to those forms of psychological torture in which the victim isbroken psychically and physically but left to all outward appearancesunmarked (Pinker, 1971, p. 175).

Even seemingly simple terms can be loaded with damaging implicationsbecause they signify that the labelled person is outside of the norm, not aregular member of the community, not one of us. Whether a particularterm is culled from the medical or business field or is a label like foster,the main purpose is to set that person apart for special treatment bysociety. But, as with the term special education, the exceptional status isnot necessarily an asset, for it daily serves to remind the individual andeveryone else that s / he has problemsproblems that exact a cost on therest of the community. Official labelling (labelling by authorities) may beeven more damaging than lay labelling, because it carries the weight of public opinion (Pinker, 1971, p. 11).

In addition to the direct effects of stigmatizing language on its recipi-ents, there are profound indirect effects as well. The psychologicaleffects of such language are not lost on those who make laws, those whomake policies and those who decide how community resources shouldbe allocated. It is difficult to regularly use such language withoutcoming to believe that the language may somehow be true. The underlying

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frame and the language used to reinforce the frame permit communitymembers to think of the person needing services in a different way thanthey would tend to think of themselves, a family member or a closefriend. For example, most parents would not label their own child as

behaviour-disordered, illegitimate, juvenile delinquent or a case, yetthey accept this routine labelling of other peoples children. Nor wouldmost parents put their son or daughter out on the street with few financialresources at age eighteen; however, when children age out of foster-care,this is frequently what happens. 3

For as many as 20,000 teenagers annually who age-out of foster care, thereis little help in meeting the challenges of paying their own rent, affordinghealth care and covering their living expenses. 4

Living expenses are not the only consideration. Successful transition intoadulthood also includes career plans and often post-secondary education.Young people ageing-out of foster-care who do not have adequate financialresources for basic living expenses surely do not have the resources fortuition.

The systematic use of stigmatizing languagelanguage that impliespower and status differences, language that assigns blame or moraldeficiency, language of illness and abnormality and language of other-nesscolours the communitys perceptions and consequent sense of responsibility. For example, language that assigns individual blamelessens the communitys ownership of the problem and its obligation tofully respond. Language that talks of risk management and accountabil-ity encourages the community to view social work as a business, in whichsuccess is measured in dollars rather than the quality of human lives, andin which the allocation of minimal services and resources is deemedsufficient.

The language of social justice

John Rawls envisions a just political system wherein basic freedoms andfundamental goods necessary for equal access to life opportunities areequally distributed. He emphasizes that economic goods . . . are not theonly goods that are subject to considerations of distributive justice. Non-material socially produced goods such as opportunity, power, and thesocial bases of self-respect are important because they are the goodsevery person requires in order to pursue his or her life plan at someminimal level of effectiveness (Wakefield, 1988, pp. 193 and 208). Wehave seen, however, that stigmatizing labels work against the attainmentof primary social goods such as self-respect and empowerment and, there-fore, according to Rawls theory of justice, diminish ones ability to live agood life.



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Rawls singles out self-respect as perhaps the most important primarygood, and describes it as a sense of self-worth and the confidence to fulfilones intentions (Rawls, 1999, p. 386). Stigmas particularly harm childrenslife prospects because they inhibit the development of self-respect, which is

foundational to many other important goods such as success in school, posi-tive peer relationships, future career opportunities, and selection of a lifepartner (Vojak, 2006, p. 101).

Rawls veil of ignorance concept demonstrates how a society might developlaws and policies that are just. He explains that each person finds himself placed at birth in some particular position in some particular society, andthe nature of this position materially affects his life prospects (Rawls, 1999,p. 12). Considering the arbitrariness of this fact, the fairest method for decid-ing the distribution of goods (for example, goods emanating from laws, pol-

icies, services, and the allocation of resources) is to do so as if one had noprior knowledge as to their own particular status or place in society:

The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensuresthat no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by theoutcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. Sinceall are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor hisparticular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agree-ment or bargain (Rawls, 1999, p. 11).

In essence, laws and policies should be such that people from all walks of life and socio-economic statuses would accept them as fair should they beapplied to them. Rawls theory of justice is, in part, derived from Imma-nuel Kants moral maxim of universality: Act only according to thatmaxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become auniversal law (Kant, 1785 / 1993, p. 30). Plainly speaking, Kant believedthat justice would be best served if people behaved only in ways thatthey would wish others to act. Both Rawls and Kant espouse an ethic of reciprocitythe same ethic that has served as the moral basis for allmajor world religions. 5

Language that systematically reinforces the moral superiority and socio-economic advantage of one group over others is neither reciprocal, nor just.As Rawls and Kant suggest, the litmus test for individual and collective justice would be that all community members could readily accept the pol-icies and laws, even if, by some quirk of fate, the tables were suddenlyturned. The labels described earlier in this paper are not ones that mostwould find appropriate if applied to their own family life; therefore, theydo not meet the criteria of reciprocity, universality and social justice.

Stigmatizing language not only erodes self-esteem directly, but it alsoencourages the community to look upon those who are stigmatized withless regard and lowered expectations, which, in turn, impacts the commu-nitys willingness to provide services and resources. The language of exclu-sion works against social justice by reinforcing the legitimacy of a system

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that accords unfair advantage to certain members by marginalizing othermembers. Robert Page summarizes that Clearly, if public welfare servicesbecome tainted by stigma they are unlikely to advance the cause of social justice to any great extent (Page, 1984, p. 131).

The language of social services offers a lens through which communitymembers needing assistance are viewed, and suggests parameters for pro-viding that assistance. 6 Stigmatizing language focuses attention and blameon the individual and / or family unit as the source of the problem, andaway from the idea that institutional and structural inequities can alsocause problems. Locating fault in the individual or family leads to anumber of beliefs and practices that can work against a successful andsocially just outcome. When problems are framed as individual ratherthan collective, the solution is similarly framed as a matter of individual

rather than collective responsibility (Hawkins et al. , 2001, p. 8).Those aimed at social justice must take every opportunity tode-stigmatize and normalize the language. Words denoting hierarchy ormoral superiority may be abandoned in favour of more neutral terms; forexample, the words person or individual could be used instead of client, patient and recipient. Better yet, the actual names of peoplemay be used instead of assigning categories and labels.

Particularly in work with children, labels such as foster-child, ward andcase should be replaced whenever possible with the kind of words one

would use to describe ones own family members, such as girl, boy, child,kid, Amy or John. Labels should not be used in an all-defining manner.For example, a child is not behaviour-disordereds / he is a child exhibit-ing certain behaviours in particular contexts; and children are not placedwith foster-parentsrather, they live with the Smith family. Figure 1shows how exclusive and inclusive language frames differ.

Social worker John Seita, having been through the welfare system as achild, argues that re-naming and reclaiming our children and emphasizing

Figure 1 How exclusive and inclusive language frames differ.



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communities, not agencies are two necessary steps toward helping childrenand families. These steps do not only protect childrens best interests; theyprotect our collective best interests (Seita, 2000, p. 77).

Social justice as an organizing principle

The National Association of Social Workers (NASW) and the Council onSocial Work Education (CSWE) exhort social workers, in their role aschange agents, to correct and undo injustice, and describe the core tasksof social work as: pursuing social justice, challenging oppression, promotingthe personal dignity and worth of individuals, and ensuring equal access toopportunities, services and resources (Figueira-McDonough, 2007, pp. 3

5). Using John Rawls theory, Wakefield similarly argues that distributive justice is the organizing value of social workthat is, social work strivesto ensure that no person is deprived of a fair minimum level of thosebasic social goods to which each person is entitled (Wakefield, 1988,p. 187).

David Gil, noting the tension between social work as an institution andsocial work as a practice, argues that from their early inception, socialwork and social services were never meant to eliminate inequalities,oppression and injustice, and their consequences. They were only meant

to moderate the worst effects without challenging the system withinwhich they operate (Gil, 1998, p. 14). Gil contends that while socialworkers have always worked with victims of injustice and oppression,they often lack theoretical insight into the causes of suffering and intothe strategies necessary to transform oppressive socioeconomic and politi-cal institutions (Figueira-McDonough, 2007, p. 11). Traditional thinkingand social service practices have helped to maintain power inequities,whereas the transformation of unjust and oppressive societies requiresthe disruption of these traditions and behaviours, and the emergence of critical consciousness (Gil, 1998, pp. 39). Gil maintains that critical con-sciousness can be communicated to others, and can lead to collectiveactions aimed at social and cultural transformations (Gil, 1998, p. 41).

While language is primarily constructed by dominant social groups, it isgenerally apprehended by society as a non-constructed objective reality.However, reconstructing social service language from the ground upreverses that knowledge flow, and works toward building a more inclusiveframeworkone that reflects social justice ideals. Social workers are in aparticularly good position to further the cause of social justice by usinglanguage that helps individuals to overcome socially constructed stigmasand other barriers and impediments to freedom and opportunity.

The idea that a shift in language can reshape longstanding beliefs andhabits may seem like wishful thinking; however, there are examples inwhich this has been the case. We need to only look at recent sexual

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harassment legislation and policy changes to see how language surroundingthis issue, prompted by judicial confirmation hearings in the USA in the late1980s, began a dialogue that powerfully influenced laws and policies(Hawkins et al. , 2001, p. 2). The use of normalizing and inclusive language

may be a small step, but not necessarily an insignificant one. Hawkins, Fookand Martin argue that language is practice in social services since languageis [the] main vehicle for communicating what we do. They also point outthat language is something that is immediately accessible to change(Hawkins et al. , 2001, p. 2).

Service providers who do not understand the relationship betweenlanguage and the larger social vision that they want to help create mayunwittingly undermine their own project by reinforcing the language of hegemony:

[B]eing aware of the terminology we choose, and the way in which we use itcan be critical in determining whose view of reality we are accepting, whatpower relations we wish to reinforce, the sort of world we wish to adopt, andin identifying the type of social work we wish to create (Hawkins et al., 2001,p. 3).

Rejecting stigmatizing terms, whenever possible, and adopting a languageof inclusion are a first step towards the kind of community response thatwe would want for our own families and friends. It is one step towards amore just society.

Accepted: October 2007

Notes

1. To promote the growth or development of; further; encourage; to care for or cherish;to feed or nourish. These definitions were taken from Websters Encyclopedic Unab-ridged Dictionary of the English Language (New York: Gramercy Books, 1996).

2. Summary available online at www.casanet.org / library / foster-care / foster-succeeding- school.htm . Full report available online at www.vera.org / publications

3. A May 2005 documentary entitled Aging Out produced by the Public BroadcastingSystem (PBS) states that of the 500,000 children currently in the foster-care system inthe USA, approximately one-quarter (125,000) will leave foster-care as adults. Seewww.pbs.org / newshour / bb / youth / jan-june05 / foster_care_5-19.html

4. From a report by National Public Radio (NPR) on 23 May 2005. See www.npr.org /templates / story / story.php?storyId=4662990

5. Judaism: What is hurtful to yourself do not to your fellow man (Talmud); Taoism:Regard your neighbors gain as your own gain; and regard your neighbors loss asyour own loss (Tai Shank Kan Ying Pien); Confucianism: Is there one singleword that one can practice throughout ones life? It is perhaps like-hearted consider-ateness. What you do not wish for yourself do not impose on others (Analects 15:24);Christianity: Do to others as you would have them do to you (Luke 6:31); Buddhism:Hurt not others with that which pains yourself (Udanavarga 5:18); Zoroastrianism:



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That nature only is good when it shall not do unto another whatever is not good for itsown self (Dadistan-I-dinik 94:5); Islam: None of you believes until he loves for hisbrother what he loves for himself (Sahih al Bukhari 13 and Sahih Muslim 45).

6. Tozer et al. (2002) describe the relationship between cultural hegemony theory andlanguage: Institutional elites who share common economic and political interestscontrol the dominant political and economic institutions in the United States . . . .Through such institutions as the government, workplace, the school, and the massmedia, the general populace is socialized into accepting [the ideas and interests of the ruling class]. These ideas serve to limit discussion and debate, prevent the for-mation of alternative social explanations, and promote a general acceptance of thestatus quo (Tozer et al., 2002, pp. 2645).

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Ainlay, S., Becker, G. and Coleman, L. (1986) Stigma reconsidered, in Ainlay, S.,Becker, G. and Coleman, L. (eds), The Dilemma of Difference: A MultidisciplinaryView of Stigma , New York, Plenum Press.

Becker, H. (1967) Whose side are we on?, The Society for the Study of Social Problems ,14 (3), pp. 239239.

Becker, G. and Arnold, R. (1986) Stigma as a social and cultural construct, in Ainlay, S.,Becker, G. and Coleman, L. (eds), The Dilemma of Difference: A MultidisciplinaryView of Stigma , New York, Plenum Press.

Dovidio, J., Major, B. and Crocker, J. (2000) Stigma: Introduction and overview, inHeatherton et al. (eds), The Social Psychology of Stigma , New York, GuilfordPress, pp. 130.

Eheart, B., Racine, D., Power, M. and Hopping, D. (2005 / 2007) The Intergenerationalcommunityas interventionwhite paper, availableonlineat www.generationsofhope.org

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