SELECcedilAtildeO DIAacuteRIA DE NOTIacuteCIAS NACIONAIS

01112015

SELECcedilAtildeO DIAacuteRIA DE NOTIacuteCIAS NACIONAIS 1

AMEacuteRICA LATINA E CARIBE 2

Foreign Affairs - The Rise of Vigilantism and the Right Wing in

Peru | Foreign Affairs 2

The Economist - Colombia needs to climb out of its shell 4

The Economist - Colombia is close to a historic peace agreement

that will transform its prospects But to realise its full potential

it will need to make big changes argues Michael Reid 6

Le Monde - A Paris Joseacute Mujica ex-preacutesident de lrsquoUruguay

appelle les eacutetudiants de Sciences Po agrave srsquoengager 9

Stratfor - Paraguay South Americas Economic Bright Spot | 10

UNIAtildeO EUROPEIA 12

Le Monde Diplomatique - Identifiez-vous 12

CHINA 16

The diplomat - What Chinas Militarization of the South China

Sea Would Actually Look Like 16

RUacuteSSIA 19

Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations 19

The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue 22

IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR 25

Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign

Affairs 25

DIREITOS HUMANOS 29

European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human

Rights in Internet Governance 29

AMEacuteRICA LATINA E CARIBE

Foreign Affairs - The Rise of Vigilantism and the Right Wing in

Peru | Foreign Affairs

On September 15 the people of Andas a small community in the mountains of central

Peru caught two men suspected of fatally shooting a local 57-year-old father of six

Since the nearest police station was two hours away the mob took justice into their own

hands they stripped the alleged criminals naked bound their hands and feet drenched

them in gasoline and burned them alive As Andasrsquo mayor later told the newspaper La

Repuacuteblica ldquoLa muerte de ellos fue la solucioacutenrdquomdashTheir death was the solutionThis was

not an isolated incident A new wave of vigilantism has been sweeping Peru since the

late summer starting in the cities and then spreading outward There is even a Twitter

movement ChapaTuChoro a slang term that translates to ldquoCatch Your Thiefrdquo that has

sprung up and encourages citizens to go one step beyond civilian arrestsmdashto take justice

into their own hands and punish suspected criminals through public humiliation and

even mob lynchings Documentation of the gruesome behavior is often uploaded to

YouTubeBut Peruvian citizens feel that their brand of street justice is justified ldquoItrsquos not

that we are barbariansrdquo Someya Rojas Leivas a supporter of the movement told me

ldquoItrsquos that we are tired of being at the mercy of criminals and the bloody authorities do

nothingrdquo Around the time of the Andas incident national support for the movement

hovered at around 53 percent by early October it had soared to 72 percent ldquoRun run

runrdquo singer Rony warns criminals in ldquoChapa Tu Chorordquo a catchy new pop song ldquoThe

village is after yourdquo VIRAL VIGILANTISM By any measure this is a distinctly

twenty-first-century phenomenonmdasha genuinely viral reaction to crime in a country

whose battered mineral-based economy and stagnant minimum wage have made locals

especially in cities feel starkly less safe than they did a year ago According to a survey

released in mid-October 90 percent of people living in Lima do not feel safe walking

the cityrsquos streets Citizens are fed up with their unresponsive state In that sense the

Chapa phenomenon is as much a call for government action as a cry of

helplessnessAnd thatrsquos exactly what the trend was designed for It began earlier this

year in Huancayo one of Perursquos largest cities Cecilia Garciacutea Rodriacuteguez a journalist

and businesswoman started the Chapa movement when she became outraged after

police arrested a man who had broken into her neighborrsquos home with a knife only to

release him 30 minutes later The communityrsquos sense of frustration was so palpable that

Rodriacuteguez had no trouble corralling them to make and post signs around their

neighborhood ldquoCrooks if we catch you we wonrsquot call the policerdquo they read ldquoWe are

going to lynch yourdquoRodriacuteguezrsquos efforts however and the Chapa movement in general

may be a front for more political activitiesmdashit is cleverly timed given Perursquos upcoming

general elections in April 2016 and candidates have already begun campaigning

Although Rodriacuteguez has never sought political office before she is now considering a

run for Congress in the spring She was later revealed to have been a vocal supporter of

Perursquos controversial former right-wing president Alberto Fujimori who was convicted

in 2009 of embezzlement and human rights violationsIf Rodriacuteguez does run she would

find herself in good companymdashFujimorirsquos daughter Keiko Fujimori is running for

president again after having lost to the current left-wing president Ollanta Humala in

2011 Keikorsquos brother Kenji Fujimori a sitting congressman tweeted that the Chapa

movement points to ldquothe ineffectiveness of the government to provide security to the

populationrdquo Not coincidentally Rodriacuteguezrsquos movement feels largely derived from

Fujimorism it relies on right-wing populism brutal pragmatism and the attitude that

Humalarsquos government doesnrsquot know what itrsquos doing Leftist politicians have either

denounced the movement or kept mummdashtheyrsquore on the losing side of the public opinion

battleIndeed this past June a spate of vigilante attacks erupted shortly after Humalarsquos

approval ratings sank to an all-time low of 17 percent in part because of his silence on

raising the $230 monthly minimum wage one of the lowest in Latin America Peruvian

police earn nearly double that but itrsquos still a fraction of copsrsquo salaries in neighboring

Chile and Ecuador To compensate Peruvian officers can be legally hired as private

security guards theoretically working part-time at both jobs in reality many work up to

25 days a month in the private sector thanks to institutional corruption a former interior

minister revealed to The Economist In turn the publicrsquos needs fall by the wayside It is

no wonder that there is such public distrust toward the police especially when the

governmentrsquos official response to Chapa is a tired-sounding plea to stop lynching and

let officers do their jobs ldquoTherersquos been this long history of self-defense forces and

communities responding to either the unwillingness or the inability of the state to

address these thingsrdquo according to Steven T Zech a postdoctoral research fellow at the

University of Denver who has spent the last five years researching Perursquos rural militias

During the late 1980s and early 1990s Peruvian Presidents Alan Garciacutea and Fujimori

armed roughly 4000 willing civilian militias to help fight the Maoist Shining Path

terrorist groupmdasha move widely credited as having been crucial to defeating the Path

But the civilians received their arms only after state military and police officials had

been deployed to these rural communities like an occupying force rather than

government aid For many locals the military-police presence soured their relations

with the Peruvian government It was at that time that Peruvians decided theyrsquod rather

handle issues of justice and security themselves ldquoTherersquos this huge pride in resistance

nowrdquo Zech says ldquoThere are these massive movements in rural populations theyrsquore

making demands on the state right now to be recognized and compensated for their

effortsrdquo After the Shining Path threat died down in the mid-1990s the civilian militias

evolved into political forces neighborhood watch groups and on-call security forces

often involving local politicians and community leadersTHE LONG ROAD TO

PEACEIf the government could find a way to work with street justice advocates

ChapaTuChoro could potentially become a productive progressive force for reducing

crime But there are two problems with this approach One is that unlike the countryrsquos

myriad rural militias Chapa supporters are divided on tactics Some mobs turn to

murder others stop short at public humiliation Therersquos little sense of community

among themmdashonly a manic thirst for justice Once theyrsquore done everyone goes

home The second problem with vigilantism is that the government faces a ldquodamned if

you donrsquot damned if you dordquo scenario when responding to the problem To accept

vigilantes is to admit the failure of the police to fight them is to digress from larger

crime-fighting issues such as rampant theft and drug trafficking The Mexican

government is currently struggling with that very dilemma on a much larger scale its

militias ostensibly formed to keep communities safe from cartel wars operate similarly

to Perursquos rural defense forces But with little government intervention those Mexican

groups occasionally spiral into drug trafficking human rights abuses and wanton

murder Many Mexican policymakers and academics condemn these crimes but the

state is helpless to prevent them until their dysfunctional national justice system

modernizesmdasha process that could take decades There are similar instances of

vigilantism elsewhere in Latin America This past May citizens of Riacuteo Bravo

Guatemala chased down and attacked a 16-year-old girl who allegedly shot a

motorcycle taxi driver she was drowned in gasoline and burned alive in the street In

Boliviamdashwhere only 45 percent of municipalities have a judge and three percent have a

public defendermdashthere were 180 public lynchings of alleged criminals between 2005

and 2012 The Brazilian sociologist Joseacute de Souza Martins who has written a book on

the subject suggests that there is at least one lynching attempt every day often in Satildeo

Paulo Each of these governments condemns these actions but none is able to stanch

themmdashif they canrsquot catch criminals how could they catch self-appointed crime fighters

Brazilian officials have tried albeit in a ham-fisted way After a national newscaster

defended a recent example of street justice on the air the countryrsquos public prosecutor

launched a civil complaint against her television network accusing her of violating

human dignity But on the ground with such a glaring lack of police presence

governments are far less effective Across Latin America murder rates have

consistently grown since 2000 while systemic extortion and robberies cost people

untold amounts Few locals have faith in any countryrsquos criminal justice system and for

good reason Latin Americarsquos homicide conviction rate is around 20 out of 100 less

than half the global average Guatemala ranks among the lowest with a meager six

percent conviction rate This summer has proved a breaking point for Peruvians whose

level of trust in their police is the lowest of any other Latin American country

according to a poll taken for the 2012 Latin American Public Opinion Project Itrsquos too

early to tell whether the social mediandashfueled trend will fade away or develop into

something larger and more politically organized Rodriacuteguez may well use it as a

political platform But the tide could also flow in the other direction On October 4 a

25-year-old father of two mistaken for a criminal was beaten for three hours by a mob

of wedding attendees in the rural Chanchamayo Province His aunt a lawyer has since

filed a lawsuit on her nephewrsquos behalf alleging that Rodriacuteguez is condoning crime ldquoFor

the white terrorism that is happening throughout Peru which is punishing the innocent

I have made the complaintrdquo she announced to the press But Rodriacuteguez isnrsquot worried

After all far more Peruvians support her movement than they do the current president

If the situation remains the same come springtime itrsquos likely that Peru will witness

Fujimorism version 20mdashon social media and beyond Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesperu2015-11-02perus-pitchfork-politics

The Economist - Colombia needs to climb out of its shell

From the print edition

MORE THAN 20 YEARS after his death Pablo Escobar has become an object of

fascination ldquoNarcosrdquo a new series from Netflix is just one of a crop of films books

and television shows about Colombiarsquos most notorious drug-trafficker the cause of so

much violence in Medelliacuten in the 1980s and 90s

Escobar was a ruthless mass murderer For anyone who lived through those days the

attention he is receiving is distasteful But if he can now be seen as a mere historical

curiosity that may be an indication of how far Colombia has moved on Outsiders have

often fastened on the countryrsquos failures But over the past quarter-century it has been

surprisingly successful in tackling some of its biggest problems Escobar and his like

were taken down their successors today are ldquounknownrdquo notes Mr Gaviria Medelliacutenrsquos

mayor ldquoThey donrsquot last more than three or four years and canrsquot consolidate their

powerrdquo

The promise of peace

This time is different

AMEacuteRICA LATINA E CARIBE

Foreign Affairs - The Rise of Vigilantism and the Right Wing in

Peru | Foreign Affairs

On September 15 the people of Andas a small community in the mountains of central

Peru caught two men suspected of fatally shooting a local 57-year-old father of six

Since the nearest police station was two hours away the mob took justice into their own

hands they stripped the alleged criminals naked bound their hands and feet drenched

them in gasoline and burned them alive As Andasrsquo mayor later told the newspaper La

Repuacuteblica ldquoLa muerte de ellos fue la solucioacutenrdquomdashTheir death was the solutionThis was

not an isolated incident A new wave of vigilantism has been sweeping Peru since the

late summer starting in the cities and then spreading outward There is even a Twitter

movement ChapaTuChoro a slang term that translates to ldquoCatch Your Thiefrdquo that has

sprung up and encourages citizens to go one step beyond civilian arrestsmdashto take justice

into their own hands and punish suspected criminals through public humiliation and

even mob lynchings Documentation of the gruesome behavior is often uploaded to

YouTubeBut Peruvian citizens feel that their brand of street justice is justified ldquoItrsquos not

that we are barbariansrdquo Someya Rojas Leivas a supporter of the movement told me

ldquoItrsquos that we are tired of being at the mercy of criminals and the bloody authorities do

nothingrdquo Around the time of the Andas incident national support for the movement

hovered at around 53 percent by early October it had soared to 72 percent ldquoRun run

runrdquo singer Rony warns criminals in ldquoChapa Tu Chorordquo a catchy new pop song ldquoThe

village is after yourdquo VIRAL VIGILANTISM By any measure this is a distinctly

twenty-first-century phenomenonmdasha genuinely viral reaction to crime in a country

whose battered mineral-based economy and stagnant minimum wage have made locals

especially in cities feel starkly less safe than they did a year ago According to a survey

released in mid-October 90 percent of people living in Lima do not feel safe walking

the cityrsquos streets Citizens are fed up with their unresponsive state In that sense the

Chapa phenomenon is as much a call for government action as a cry of

helplessnessAnd thatrsquos exactly what the trend was designed for It began earlier this

year in Huancayo one of Perursquos largest cities Cecilia Garciacutea Rodriacuteguez a journalist

and businesswoman started the Chapa movement when she became outraged after

police arrested a man who had broken into her neighborrsquos home with a knife only to

release him 30 minutes later The communityrsquos sense of frustration was so palpable that

Rodriacuteguez had no trouble corralling them to make and post signs around their

neighborhood ldquoCrooks if we catch you we wonrsquot call the policerdquo they read ldquoWe are

going to lynch yourdquoRodriacuteguezrsquos efforts however and the Chapa movement in general

may be a front for more political activitiesmdashit is cleverly timed given Perursquos upcoming

general elections in April 2016 and candidates have already begun campaigning

Although Rodriacuteguez has never sought political office before she is now considering a

run for Congress in the spring She was later revealed to have been a vocal supporter of

Perursquos controversial former right-wing president Alberto Fujimori who was convicted

in 2009 of embezzlement and human rights violationsIf Rodriacuteguez does run she would

find herself in good companymdashFujimorirsquos daughter Keiko Fujimori is running for

president again after having lost to the current left-wing president Ollanta Humala in

2011 Keikorsquos brother Kenji Fujimori a sitting congressman tweeted that the Chapa

movement points to ldquothe ineffectiveness of the government to provide security to the

populationrdquo Not coincidentally Rodriacuteguezrsquos movement feels largely derived from

Fujimorism it relies on right-wing populism brutal pragmatism and the attitude that

Humalarsquos government doesnrsquot know what itrsquos doing Leftist politicians have either

denounced the movement or kept mummdashtheyrsquore on the losing side of the public opinion

battleIndeed this past June a spate of vigilante attacks erupted shortly after Humalarsquos

approval ratings sank to an all-time low of 17 percent in part because of his silence on

raising the $230 monthly minimum wage one of the lowest in Latin America Peruvian

police earn nearly double that but itrsquos still a fraction of copsrsquo salaries in neighboring

Chile and Ecuador To compensate Peruvian officers can be legally hired as private

security guards theoretically working part-time at both jobs in reality many work up to

25 days a month in the private sector thanks to institutional corruption a former interior

minister revealed to The Economist In turn the publicrsquos needs fall by the wayside It is

no wonder that there is such public distrust toward the police especially when the

governmentrsquos official response to Chapa is a tired-sounding plea to stop lynching and

let officers do their jobs ldquoTherersquos been this long history of self-defense forces and

communities responding to either the unwillingness or the inability of the state to

address these thingsrdquo according to Steven T Zech a postdoctoral research fellow at the

University of Denver who has spent the last five years researching Perursquos rural militias

During the late 1980s and early 1990s Peruvian Presidents Alan Garciacutea and Fujimori

armed roughly 4000 willing civilian militias to help fight the Maoist Shining Path

terrorist groupmdasha move widely credited as having been crucial to defeating the Path

But the civilians received their arms only after state military and police officials had

been deployed to these rural communities like an occupying force rather than

government aid For many locals the military-police presence soured their relations

with the Peruvian government It was at that time that Peruvians decided theyrsquod rather

handle issues of justice and security themselves ldquoTherersquos this huge pride in resistance

nowrdquo Zech says ldquoThere are these massive movements in rural populations theyrsquore

making demands on the state right now to be recognized and compensated for their

effortsrdquo After the Shining Path threat died down in the mid-1990s the civilian militias

evolved into political forces neighborhood watch groups and on-call security forces

often involving local politicians and community leadersTHE LONG ROAD TO

PEACEIf the government could find a way to work with street justice advocates

ChapaTuChoro could potentially become a productive progressive force for reducing

crime But there are two problems with this approach One is that unlike the countryrsquos

myriad rural militias Chapa supporters are divided on tactics Some mobs turn to

murder others stop short at public humiliation Therersquos little sense of community

among themmdashonly a manic thirst for justice Once theyrsquore done everyone goes

home The second problem with vigilantism is that the government faces a ldquodamned if

you donrsquot damned if you dordquo scenario when responding to the problem To accept

vigilantes is to admit the failure of the police to fight them is to digress from larger

crime-fighting issues such as rampant theft and drug trafficking The Mexican

government is currently struggling with that very dilemma on a much larger scale its

militias ostensibly formed to keep communities safe from cartel wars operate similarly

to Perursquos rural defense forces But with little government intervention those Mexican

groups occasionally spiral into drug trafficking human rights abuses and wanton

murder Many Mexican policymakers and academics condemn these crimes but the

state is helpless to prevent them until their dysfunctional national justice system

modernizesmdasha process that could take decades There are similar instances of

vigilantism elsewhere in Latin America This past May citizens of Riacuteo Bravo

Guatemala chased down and attacked a 16-year-old girl who allegedly shot a

motorcycle taxi driver she was drowned in gasoline and burned alive in the street In

Boliviamdashwhere only 45 percent of municipalities have a judge and three percent have a

public defendermdashthere were 180 public lynchings of alleged criminals between 2005

and 2012 The Brazilian sociologist Joseacute de Souza Martins who has written a book on

the subject suggests that there is at least one lynching attempt every day often in Satildeo

Paulo Each of these governments condemns these actions but none is able to stanch

themmdashif they canrsquot catch criminals how could they catch self-appointed crime fighters

Brazilian officials have tried albeit in a ham-fisted way After a national newscaster

defended a recent example of street justice on the air the countryrsquos public prosecutor

launched a civil complaint against her television network accusing her of violating

human dignity But on the ground with such a glaring lack of police presence

governments are far less effective Across Latin America murder rates have

consistently grown since 2000 while systemic extortion and robberies cost people

untold amounts Few locals have faith in any countryrsquos criminal justice system and for

good reason Latin Americarsquos homicide conviction rate is around 20 out of 100 less

than half the global average Guatemala ranks among the lowest with a meager six

percent conviction rate This summer has proved a breaking point for Peruvians whose

level of trust in their police is the lowest of any other Latin American country

according to a poll taken for the 2012 Latin American Public Opinion Project Itrsquos too

early to tell whether the social mediandashfueled trend will fade away or develop into

something larger and more politically organized Rodriacuteguez may well use it as a

political platform But the tide could also flow in the other direction On October 4 a

25-year-old father of two mistaken for a criminal was beaten for three hours by a mob

of wedding attendees in the rural Chanchamayo Province His aunt a lawyer has since

filed a lawsuit on her nephewrsquos behalf alleging that Rodriacuteguez is condoning crime ldquoFor

the white terrorism that is happening throughout Peru which is punishing the innocent

I have made the complaintrdquo she announced to the press But Rodriacuteguez isnrsquot worried

After all far more Peruvians support her movement than they do the current president

If the situation remains the same come springtime itrsquos likely that Peru will witness

Fujimorism version 20mdashon social media and beyond Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesperu2015-11-02perus-pitchfork-politics

The Economist - Colombia needs to climb out of its shell

From the print edition

MORE THAN 20 YEARS after his death Pablo Escobar has become an object of

fascination ldquoNarcosrdquo a new series from Netflix is just one of a crop of films books

and television shows about Colombiarsquos most notorious drug-trafficker the cause of so

much violence in Medelliacuten in the 1980s and 90s

Escobar was a ruthless mass murderer For anyone who lived through those days the

attention he is receiving is distasteful But if he can now be seen as a mere historical

curiosity that may be an indication of how far Colombia has moved on Outsiders have

often fastened on the countryrsquos failures But over the past quarter-century it has been

surprisingly successful in tackling some of its biggest problems Escobar and his like

were taken down their successors today are ldquounknownrdquo notes Mr Gaviria Medelliacutenrsquos

mayor ldquoThey donrsquot last more than three or four years and canrsquot consolidate their

powerrdquo

The promise of peace

This time is different

Fujimorism it relies on right-wing populism brutal pragmatism and the attitude that

Humalarsquos government doesnrsquot know what itrsquos doing Leftist politicians have either

denounced the movement or kept mummdashtheyrsquore on the losing side of the public opinion

battleIndeed this past June a spate of vigilante attacks erupted shortly after Humalarsquos

approval ratings sank to an all-time low of 17 percent in part because of his silence on

raising the $230 monthly minimum wage one of the lowest in Latin America Peruvian

police earn nearly double that but itrsquos still a fraction of copsrsquo salaries in neighboring

Chile and Ecuador To compensate Peruvian officers can be legally hired as private

security guards theoretically working part-time at both jobs in reality many work up to

25 days a month in the private sector thanks to institutional corruption a former interior

minister revealed to The Economist In turn the publicrsquos needs fall by the wayside It is

no wonder that there is such public distrust toward the police especially when the

governmentrsquos official response to Chapa is a tired-sounding plea to stop lynching and

let officers do their jobs ldquoTherersquos been this long history of self-defense forces and

communities responding to either the unwillingness or the inability of the state to

address these thingsrdquo according to Steven T Zech a postdoctoral research fellow at the

University of Denver who has spent the last five years researching Perursquos rural militias

During the late 1980s and early 1990s Peruvian Presidents Alan Garciacutea and Fujimori

armed roughly 4000 willing civilian militias to help fight the Maoist Shining Path

terrorist groupmdasha move widely credited as having been crucial to defeating the Path

But the civilians received their arms only after state military and police officials had

been deployed to these rural communities like an occupying force rather than

government aid For many locals the military-police presence soured their relations

with the Peruvian government It was at that time that Peruvians decided theyrsquod rather

handle issues of justice and security themselves ldquoTherersquos this huge pride in resistance

nowrdquo Zech says ldquoThere are these massive movements in rural populations theyrsquore

making demands on the state right now to be recognized and compensated for their

effortsrdquo After the Shining Path threat died down in the mid-1990s the civilian militias

evolved into political forces neighborhood watch groups and on-call security forces

often involving local politicians and community leadersTHE LONG ROAD TO

PEACEIf the government could find a way to work with street justice advocates

ChapaTuChoro could potentially become a productive progressive force for reducing

crime But there are two problems with this approach One is that unlike the countryrsquos

myriad rural militias Chapa supporters are divided on tactics Some mobs turn to

murder others stop short at public humiliation Therersquos little sense of community

among themmdashonly a manic thirst for justice Once theyrsquore done everyone goes

home The second problem with vigilantism is that the government faces a ldquodamned if

you donrsquot damned if you dordquo scenario when responding to the problem To accept

vigilantes is to admit the failure of the police to fight them is to digress from larger

crime-fighting issues such as rampant theft and drug trafficking The Mexican

government is currently struggling with that very dilemma on a much larger scale its

militias ostensibly formed to keep communities safe from cartel wars operate similarly

to Perursquos rural defense forces But with little government intervention those Mexican

groups occasionally spiral into drug trafficking human rights abuses and wanton

murder Many Mexican policymakers and academics condemn these crimes but the

state is helpless to prevent them until their dysfunctional national justice system

modernizesmdasha process that could take decades There are similar instances of

vigilantism elsewhere in Latin America This past May citizens of Riacuteo Bravo

Guatemala chased down and attacked a 16-year-old girl who allegedly shot a

motorcycle taxi driver she was drowned in gasoline and burned alive in the street In

Boliviamdashwhere only 45 percent of municipalities have a judge and three percent have a

public defendermdashthere were 180 public lynchings of alleged criminals between 2005

and 2012 The Brazilian sociologist Joseacute de Souza Martins who has written a book on

the subject suggests that there is at least one lynching attempt every day often in Satildeo

Paulo Each of these governments condemns these actions but none is able to stanch

themmdashif they canrsquot catch criminals how could they catch self-appointed crime fighters

Brazilian officials have tried albeit in a ham-fisted way After a national newscaster

defended a recent example of street justice on the air the countryrsquos public prosecutor

launched a civil complaint against her television network accusing her of violating

human dignity But on the ground with such a glaring lack of police presence

governments are far less effective Across Latin America murder rates have

consistently grown since 2000 while systemic extortion and robberies cost people

untold amounts Few locals have faith in any countryrsquos criminal justice system and for

good reason Latin Americarsquos homicide conviction rate is around 20 out of 100 less

than half the global average Guatemala ranks among the lowest with a meager six

percent conviction rate This summer has proved a breaking point for Peruvians whose

level of trust in their police is the lowest of any other Latin American country

according to a poll taken for the 2012 Latin American Public Opinion Project Itrsquos too

early to tell whether the social mediandashfueled trend will fade away or develop into

something larger and more politically organized Rodriacuteguez may well use it as a

political platform But the tide could also flow in the other direction On October 4 a

25-year-old father of two mistaken for a criminal was beaten for three hours by a mob

of wedding attendees in the rural Chanchamayo Province His aunt a lawyer has since

filed a lawsuit on her nephewrsquos behalf alleging that Rodriacuteguez is condoning crime ldquoFor

the white terrorism that is happening throughout Peru which is punishing the innocent

I have made the complaintrdquo she announced to the press But Rodriacuteguez isnrsquot worried

After all far more Peruvians support her movement than they do the current president

If the situation remains the same come springtime itrsquos likely that Peru will witness

Fujimorism version 20mdashon social media and beyond Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesperu2015-11-02perus-pitchfork-politics

The Economist - Colombia needs to climb out of its shell

From the print edition

MORE THAN 20 YEARS after his death Pablo Escobar has become an object of

fascination ldquoNarcosrdquo a new series from Netflix is just one of a crop of films books

and television shows about Colombiarsquos most notorious drug-trafficker the cause of so

much violence in Medelliacuten in the 1980s and 90s

Escobar was a ruthless mass murderer For anyone who lived through those days the

attention he is receiving is distasteful But if he can now be seen as a mere historical

curiosity that may be an indication of how far Colombia has moved on Outsiders have

often fastened on the countryrsquos failures But over the past quarter-century it has been

surprisingly successful in tackling some of its biggest problems Escobar and his like

were taken down their successors today are ldquounknownrdquo notes Mr Gaviria Medelliacutenrsquos

mayor ldquoThey donrsquot last more than three or four years and canrsquot consolidate their

powerrdquo

The promise of peace

This time is different

Boliviamdashwhere only 45 percent of municipalities have a judge and three percent have a

public defendermdashthere were 180 public lynchings of alleged criminals between 2005

and 2012 The Brazilian sociologist Joseacute de Souza Martins who has written a book on

the subject suggests that there is at least one lynching attempt every day often in Satildeo

Paulo Each of these governments condemns these actions but none is able to stanch

themmdashif they canrsquot catch criminals how could they catch self-appointed crime fighters

Brazilian officials have tried albeit in a ham-fisted way After a national newscaster

defended a recent example of street justice on the air the countryrsquos public prosecutor

launched a civil complaint against her television network accusing her of violating

human dignity But on the ground with such a glaring lack of police presence

governments are far less effective Across Latin America murder rates have

consistently grown since 2000 while systemic extortion and robberies cost people

untold amounts Few locals have faith in any countryrsquos criminal justice system and for

good reason Latin Americarsquos homicide conviction rate is around 20 out of 100 less

than half the global average Guatemala ranks among the lowest with a meager six

percent conviction rate This summer has proved a breaking point for Peruvians whose

level of trust in their police is the lowest of any other Latin American country

according to a poll taken for the 2012 Latin American Public Opinion Project Itrsquos too

early to tell whether the social mediandashfueled trend will fade away or develop into

something larger and more politically organized Rodriacuteguez may well use it as a

political platform But the tide could also flow in the other direction On October 4 a

25-year-old father of two mistaken for a criminal was beaten for three hours by a mob

of wedding attendees in the rural Chanchamayo Province His aunt a lawyer has since

filed a lawsuit on her nephewrsquos behalf alleging that Rodriacuteguez is condoning crime ldquoFor

the white terrorism that is happening throughout Peru which is punishing the innocent

I have made the complaintrdquo she announced to the press But Rodriacuteguez isnrsquot worried

After all far more Peruvians support her movement than they do the current president

If the situation remains the same come springtime itrsquos likely that Peru will witness

Fujimorism version 20mdashon social media and beyond Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesperu2015-11-02perus-pitchfork-politics

The Economist - Colombia needs to climb out of its shell

From the print edition

MORE THAN 20 YEARS after his death Pablo Escobar has become an object of

fascination ldquoNarcosrdquo a new series from Netflix is just one of a crop of films books

and television shows about Colombiarsquos most notorious drug-trafficker the cause of so

much violence in Medelliacuten in the 1980s and 90s

Escobar was a ruthless mass murderer For anyone who lived through those days the

attention he is receiving is distasteful But if he can now be seen as a mere historical

curiosity that may be an indication of how far Colombia has moved on Outsiders have

often fastened on the countryrsquos failures But over the past quarter-century it has been

surprisingly successful in tackling some of its biggest problems Escobar and his like

were taken down their successors today are ldquounknownrdquo notes Mr Gaviria Medelliacutenrsquos

mayor ldquoThey donrsquot last more than three or four years and canrsquot consolidate their

powerrdquo

The promise of peace

This time is different

A nation of victims

A tale of three countries

Time to branch out

Halfway to success

Colombiarsquos response to the drug mafias was to reform and strengthen a national police

force that along with Chilersquos is widely regarded as the most professional in Latin

America The 1991 constitution gave new powers to the courts as well as promoting

more inclusive politics and heralding social advances such as the provision of universal

health care

Progress has not always been linear Ten years ago Bogotaacute was a beacon of successful

urban management but under three mediocre mayors from the left it has become more

congested and less efficient Too often local politics is financed by corrupt ties to

construction companies Yet other cities such as Barranquilla are rising

The judiciary too has achieved some successes The removal of parliamentary

immunity by the 1991 constitution combined with powerful new legal instruments that

allow the seizure of illegally obtained assets has curbed the infiltration of politics by

drug money The courts jailed 32 national legislators and five regional governors for

their links with the paramilitaries And in a demonstration of political independence the

Constitutional Court blocked Mr Uribersquos re-election bid

Judging the judges

But the judiciary has itself become politicised and tainted by corruption despitemdashor

perhaps because ofmdasha proliferation of busybodies as well as its fiscal (attorney-

general) Colombia has a procurador (inspector-general) an auditor-general and an

ombudsman All are chosen by the higher courts The office of the fiscal has become an

empire with 29000 staff Instead of dedicating themselves to applying the law both

Eduardo Montealegre the fiscal and Alejandro Ordontildeez the procurador offer almost

daily opinions on political issues

Aside from such flaws though Colombiarsquos political system and its institutions have

proved capable of meeting many of the challenges posed by the crises of the 1980s and

90s Above all the state was able to extend its writ over a much bigger swathe of the

national territory offering greater security and opening the road to peace The bitter

rivalry between Mr Uribe and Mr Santos could yet derail peace but that looks less

likely now Still a government in which many ministers harbour presidential ambitions

will become increasingly distracted as the 2018 election approaches The hatred and

mistrust left by 50 years of conflict will not dissipate quickly even if Colombians come

to accept Mr Santosrsquos compromise between peace and justice

Another unknown concerns the FARCrsquos entry into politics Notwithstanding its recent

electoral success in Bogotaacute the left in Colombia has been extraordinarily weak

politically because part of it embraced violence That along with the effect of the

conflict itself helps explain the countryrsquos yawning socio-economic inequalities Despite

its deep unpopularity the FARC will doubtless get to govern some municipalities The

question is whether it will come to terms with democracy and the modern world

Colombia was forced to engage with the world when it found itself at the centre of the

international illegal-drug business Plan Colombia was one result It has since signed

trade agreements with Europe as well as the United States and it recently formed the

Pacific Alliance with Chile Mexico and Peru countries united by a commitment to free

trade and free-market economies

But most Colombian politicians and businesses remain introverted and the country is

still diplomatically isolated in its region and beyond It failed to join the Asia-Pacific

Co-operation Forum before that body closed its doors to new members thus it is not

part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal And it has yet to take full advantage of

such trade deals as it has struck

Admittedly Colombia has been unlucky with its immediate neighbours Ecuador has

erected protectionist barriers to its exports Under the chavista regime Venezuela has

harboured guerrillas served as a conduit for drug exports and shut down what was once

a big market for Colombian manufacturers In August Venezuelarsquos president Nicolaacutes

Maduro closed the border and summarily expelled 1000 Colombians causing another

20000 to flee He accused them of smuggling a business boosted by Venezuelarsquos price

and exchange controls and without evidence of being ldquoparamilitariesrdquo Yet Venezuela

also played a part in getting the FARC to the table and Colombia has benefited from

the flight of Venezuelan talent and capital

The recent border fracas with Venezuela highlighted Colombiarsquos isolation it narrowly

failed to win the 18 votes needed for a debate on the expulsions at the Organisation of

the American States Colombiarsquos lack of a professional diplomatic service comes at a

high price The countryrsquos problems and achievements are little understood even in its

own region which offered scant solidarity let alone help in the struggle with illegal

armies

Colombia will need the worldrsquos support for whatever peace deal it strikes It will also

need the worldrsquos help to monitor the FARCrsquos disarmament and aid for rural

development But it must do its bit too For example it will never become properly

developed and safe until its middle classes learn to pay taxes

But Colombia too has something to offer the world It already provides security advice

in Central America With luck it should soon be able to provide lessons on how to end

seemingly intractable conflicts Leia na iacutentegra httpwwweconomistcomnewsspecial-report21676958-colombia-needs-climb-out-its-shell-halfway-successfsrc=rss|spr

The Economist - Colombia is close to a historic peace

agreement that will transform its prospects But to realise its full potential it will need to make big changes argues Michael

Reid

From the print edition

LIKE MUCH ELSE in the Colombia of President Juan Manuel Santos the ceremony on

September 23rd started late by an hour and 37 minutes But it was worth waiting for

Negotiators from the government and the FARC guerrillas unveiled an agreement on

the thorniest issue they had had to resolve transitional justice or what sort of penalties

the perpetrators of crimes against humanity in Colombiarsquos long armed conflict should

face

This breakthrough has opened the way to a swift conclusion of the peace talks in Cuba

that began three years ago Shortly before the ceremony in Havana Mr Santos had his

first official meeting with Rodrigo Londontildeo better known to Colombians as

ldquoTimochenkordquo the FARCrsquos top commander (this report will use the guerrillasrsquo noms de

guerre) The two pledged to sign a final agreement within six months and the FARC

undertook to start disarming within 60 days after that Despite some subsequent

bickering these deadlines look plausible

still diplomatically isolated in its region and beyond It failed to join the Asia-Pacific

Co-operation Forum before that body closed its doors to new members thus it is not

part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal And it has yet to take full advantage of

such trade deals as it has struck

Admittedly Colombia has been unlucky with its immediate neighbours Ecuador has

erected protectionist barriers to its exports Under the chavista regime Venezuela has

harboured guerrillas served as a conduit for drug exports and shut down what was once

a big market for Colombian manufacturers In August Venezuelarsquos president Nicolaacutes

Maduro closed the border and summarily expelled 1000 Colombians causing another

20000 to flee He accused them of smuggling a business boosted by Venezuelarsquos price

and exchange controls and without evidence of being ldquoparamilitariesrdquo Yet Venezuela

also played a part in getting the FARC to the table and Colombia has benefited from

the flight of Venezuelan talent and capital

The recent border fracas with Venezuela highlighted Colombiarsquos isolation it narrowly

failed to win the 18 votes needed for a debate on the expulsions at the Organisation of

the American States Colombiarsquos lack of a professional diplomatic service comes at a

high price The countryrsquos problems and achievements are little understood even in its

own region which offered scant solidarity let alone help in the struggle with illegal

armies

Colombia will need the worldrsquos support for whatever peace deal it strikes It will also

need the worldrsquos help to monitor the FARCrsquos disarmament and aid for rural

development But it must do its bit too For example it will never become properly

developed and safe until its middle classes learn to pay taxes

But Colombia too has something to offer the world It already provides security advice

in Central America With luck it should soon be able to provide lessons on how to end

seemingly intractable conflicts Leia na iacutentegra httpwwweconomistcomnewsspecial-report21676958-colombia-needs-climb-out-its-shell-halfway-successfsrc=rss|spr

The Economist - Colombia is close to a historic peace

agreement that will transform its prospects But to realise its full potential it will need to make big changes argues Michael

Reid

From the print edition

LIKE MUCH ELSE in the Colombia of President Juan Manuel Santos the ceremony on

September 23rd started late by an hour and 37 minutes But it was worth waiting for

Negotiators from the government and the FARC guerrillas unveiled an agreement on

the thorniest issue they had had to resolve transitional justice or what sort of penalties

the perpetrators of crimes against humanity in Colombiarsquos long armed conflict should

face

This breakthrough has opened the way to a swift conclusion of the peace talks in Cuba

that began three years ago Shortly before the ceremony in Havana Mr Santos had his

first official meeting with Rodrigo Londontildeo better known to Colombians as

ldquoTimochenkordquo the FARCrsquos top commander (this report will use the guerrillasrsquo noms de

guerre) The two pledged to sign a final agreement within six months and the FARC

undertook to start disarming within 60 days after that Despite some subsequent

bickering these deadlines look plausible

The promise of peace

This time is different

A nation of victims

A tale of three countries

Time to branch out

Halfway to success

Mr Santos (pictured left) was visibly uncomfortable when Rauacutel Castro Cubarsquos

president encouraged him to shake hands with Timochenko in front of the cameras

Colombians see the FARC as narco-terrorists who bomb kidnap and extort Mr Santos

knows that many of his countrymen will be angered by an agreement that will allow

most FARC commanders to escape going to jail But he also knows that peace

represents a huge prize for Colombia And because the FARC will be held to account

for their crimes in the countryrsquos own courts the agreement will offer a potential model

for other conflict-ridden countries

Colombiarsquos armed conflict has been remarkably bloody complicated and long-running

According to the National Centre for Historical Memory a public body set up by Mr

Santos in 2011 between 1958 and 2012 around 220000 people died as a result of the

clash between guerrillas right-wing paramilitary groups and security forces Of these

about 80 were civilians The conflict also facilitated a surge in criminal violence (see

chart) And violence or the fear of it dislodged some 6m Colombians from their

homes mainly in the countryside

Over and above the saving in human life Mr Santos has said that peace together with

his infrastructure programme could add more than two percentage points a year to his

countryrsquos economic growth rate from 2018 In 2014 the economy grew by 46 In a

more cautious assessment last year Francisco Rodriacuteguez an economist at Bank of

America put the boost to growth at only 03 percentage points Whatever the precise

figure peace should help Colombia realise its considerable potential in many fields So

the stakes in Havana could hardly be higher

The breakthrough in September followed a near-collapse in the talks earlier in the year

In April a FARC column broke a unilateral ceasefire ambushing an army platoon

killing 11 soldiers and setting off two months of tit-for-tat attacks That and the lack of

progress with the talks prompted Humberto de la Calle the governmentrsquos chief

negotiator to warn the FARC in July that ldquoone day they could well find that we are not

at the tablerdquo

This served to concentrate the FARC leadersrsquo minds but the attack undermined public

confidence in the president and the talks At the start of the negotiations in October

2012 the president had said he hoped for an agreement ldquowithin monthsrdquo In a national

poll published in May Mr Santosrsquos approval rating fell to 29 and 69 of respondents

expressed doubt that the negotiations would succeed

In some ways Colombiansrsquo pessimism is surprising Much of the country has already

benefited from a steep reduction in violence and crime in the past 15 years The

FARCrsquos unilateral ceasefire resumed in Julymdashand matched by government ldquode-

escalationrdquomdashhas brought down conflict-related violence to the lowest level since 1975

according to CERAC a think-tank in Bogotaacute

It does not help that the economy has slowed sharply after a dozen years when incomes

rose by 7 annually in dollar terms the peso has depreciated steeply and the fall in the

oil price has knocked a big hole in government revenues

Exceptional violence

With almost 50m people Colombia is Latin Americarsquos third most populous country

after Brazil and Mexico In many ways it is exceptional It claims to be Latin Americarsquos

oldest democracy with just one four-year military dictatorship in the 20th century

Geography put strong barriers in the way of its development the Andes split into three

chains there with two long valleys between them the countryrsquos Pacific coast is one of

the wettest places on Earth to the south-east almost half the total area is made up of the

llanos (remote tropical lowlands) and a corner of the Amazon rainforest The state has

never been able to control or integrate such difficult territory and its people developed a

deep mistrust of strong government

A reverence for the rule of law went hand in hand with lawlessness unequal land

ownership and a tradition of political violence and guerrilla warfare For a century this

pitted Liberal against Conservative politicians until they agreed to share power in 1956

The Cuban revolution and the cold war bred guerrilla movements of the left The FARC

was founded in 1964 by the Colombian Communist Party and the remnants of Liberal

peasant guerrillas to be followed a year later by the smaller National Liberation Army

(ELN)

Colombia is exceptional too for its avoidance of populism Its elites have favoured

responsible economic policies In the 50 years to 1995 the economy grew at a steady

average of almost 5 a year avoiding the Latin American ills of hyperinflation and

debt default A new constitution in 1991 dismantled power-sharing deepened

democracy and strengthened the courts

Although several smaller guerrilla outfits made peace the FARC and the ELN did not

They had taken to organised crime such as drug trafficking kidnaps and extortion in the

1980s and beleaguered landowners had responded by sponsoring right-wing

paramilitary vigilante groups with the complicity of some army officers By the late

1990s Colombia was on the verge of becoming a failed state with the worldrsquos highest

murder rate and ten kidnappings a day The governmentrsquos writ extended to only half the

country The FARC had about 20000 fighters and the ELN another 5000 They

attacked villages engaged in urban terrorism sowed landmines and recruited child

soldiers Their paramilitary foes massacred whole villages thought to sympathise with

the guerrillas The economy plunged into a deep recession contracting by 45 in 1999

Several banks failed and unemployment climbed to over 20

In desperation Colombians broke with their traditions of self-reliance anti-militarism

and moderate consensual politics Andreacutes Pastrana who was president from 1998 to

2002 sought outside help As part of a project called Plan Colombia the United States

provided the country with $12 billion in 2000 and then around half that amount each

year until 2006 mainly in military aid The money was more than matched by a big

increase in the governmentrsquos own defence spending In 2002 Colombians elected

Aacutelvaro Uribe a cattle rancher from Antioquia His father had been murdered by the

FARC An austere intense figure he campaigned on a platform of ldquodemocratic

securityrdquo He increased the security forces by half and took the war to the FARC killing

several top commanders At the same time he persuaded the paramilitaries to

demobilise

Mr Uribersquos conquest of the FARC transformed Colombia reducing the guerrillas from a

deadly threat to the state to a tactical irritant But there were stains on his record His

obsessive insistence on killing rebel fighters prompted some army units to murder

civilians and pass them off as combatants killed in battle Several of Mr Uribersquos aides

and allies had links to the paramilitaries and his government spied on senior judges and

political opponents He brought in a constitutional change so he could secure a second

term but his attempt to abolish terms limits and run again in 2010 was struck down by

the Constitutional Court

Mr Santos who had been Mr Uribersquos defence minister got his predecessorrsquos reluctant

backing but the two quickly fell out Whereas Mr Santos is cool patrician and

managerial Mr Uribe is volatile a consummate politician who has a rapport with

ordinary Colombians Largely because of Mr Uribersquos opposition Mr Santos only

narrowly won a second term last year

This special report will celebrate Colombiarsquos transformation over the past 15 years But

the job is only half done To achieve lasting peace the country needs to bring security

the rule of law and public services to rural areas reform the justice system and restore

political consensus It must also open up the economy and internationalise a deeply

introverted country But first it must clinch the deal with the FARC Leia na iacutentegra httpwwweconomistcomnewsspecial-report21676955-colombia-close-historic-peace-agreement-will-transform-its-prospectsfsrc=rss|spr

Le Monde - A Paris Joseacute Mujica ex-preacutesident de lrsquoUruguay

appelle les eacutetudiants de Sciences Po agrave srsquoengager

Joseacute Mujica Crsquoeacutetait un cours magistral qui sort de lordinaire lrsquoancien preacutesident

uruguayen Joseacute laquo Pepe raquo Mujica a inaugureacute la troisiegraveme confeacuterence Europe-Ameacuterique

latine organiseacutee par Sciences Po mardi 27 octobre agrave Paris Connu pour son franc-

parler son air deacutebonnaire et informel Pepe Mujica srsquoest adresseacute aux eacutetudiants du haut

de ses 80 ans Face agrave une jeunesse tenteacutee par lrsquoapolitisme il a appeleacute agrave srsquoengager car

lrsquoavenir de lrsquohumaniteacute et de la planegravete est en jeu Le deacutefi ineacutedit est avant tout politique

avant drsquoecirctre eacutecologique ou eacuteconomique Joseacute Mujica a tenu agrave lrsquoeacutegard de lrsquoEurope un

langage inhabituel Drsquoune part il a revendiqueacute lrsquoheacuteritage europeacuteen de lrsquoAmeacuterique

latine laquo Descendants drsquoimmigreacutes nous devons agrave lrsquoEurope nos noms notre culture

notre langue LrsquoUruguay est un Etat laiumlc mais je dois reconnaicirctre notre dette envers le

christianisme Berceau de notre civilisation lrsquoEurope nrsquoest heacutelas pas agrave la hauteur des

deacutefis de la planegravete raquo laquo Notre eacutepoque dispose de ressources ineacutedites drsquoune productiviteacute

jamais vue Nous sommes proches du Ciel alors que nous semblons marcher vers

lrsquoEnfer Aucune nation ne peut faire face seule aux problegravemes de notre temps raquo Pepe

Mujica a eacutevoqueacute lrsquohistoire laquo Les preacuteceacutedentes globalisations Rome ou la Chine avaient

une direction politique alors que la nocirctre est livreacutee agrave la volatiliteacute des marcheacutes a-t-il

deacuteploreacute En Ameacuterique latine le recircve drsquointeacutegration reacutegionale est aussi vieux que les

indeacutependances Mais nous avons tregraves peu avanceacute Une part infime de nos eacutechanges se

fait entre nos pays alors que les exportations restent tourneacutees vers le reste du monde

Aujourdrsquohui la Chine a pris la place preacutepondeacuterante jadis occupeacutee par lrsquoEurope ou les

Etats-Unis raquo laquo Jrsquoai terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope raquo Lrsquoancien preacutesident a loueacute la vision des

pegraveres fondateurs de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne apregraves la seconde guerre mondiale laquo Lrsquoenjeu

eacutetait deacutejagrave politique avant drsquoecirctre commercial ou eacuteconomique Dans un monde bipolaire

face aux Etats-Unis et agrave lrsquoUnion sovieacutetique lrsquoEurope a deacutecideacute de srsquointeacutegrer pour

continuer agrave exister raquo Lrsquoancien gueacuterillero Tupamaro a regretteacute que lrsquoOrganisation

mondiale du commerce (OMC) gage de regravegles du jeu universelles soit mineacutee par la

prolifeacuteration drsquoaccords bilateacuteraux Il a aussi critiqueacute lrsquoaccord transpacifique et lrsquoaccord

transatlantique encore en gestation car ils preacutetendent eacuteriger des barriegraveres contre la

Chine Comment laisser en marge lrsquoInde lrsquoAfrique le Moyen-Orient les reacutegions

pauvres Pepe Mujica procircne plutocirct une solidariteacute planeacutetaire une alliance entre riches et

pauvres laquo La concentration des richesses les ineacutegaliteacutes sont intoleacuterables raquo laquo Jrsquoai

terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope a-t-il affirmeacute Nous Latino-Ameacutericains nous avons besoin

des Europeacuteens pour eacutequilibrer le rapport de forces Cela fait quinze ans que nous

With almost 50m people Colombia is Latin Americarsquos third most populous country

after Brazil and Mexico In many ways it is exceptional It claims to be Latin Americarsquos

oldest democracy with just one four-year military dictatorship in the 20th century

Geography put strong barriers in the way of its development the Andes split into three

chains there with two long valleys between them the countryrsquos Pacific coast is one of

the wettest places on Earth to the south-east almost half the total area is made up of the

llanos (remote tropical lowlands) and a corner of the Amazon rainforest The state has

never been able to control or integrate such difficult territory and its people developed a

deep mistrust of strong government

A reverence for the rule of law went hand in hand with lawlessness unequal land

ownership and a tradition of political violence and guerrilla warfare For a century this

pitted Liberal against Conservative politicians until they agreed to share power in 1956

The Cuban revolution and the cold war bred guerrilla movements of the left The FARC

was founded in 1964 by the Colombian Communist Party and the remnants of Liberal

peasant guerrillas to be followed a year later by the smaller National Liberation Army

(ELN)

Colombia is exceptional too for its avoidance of populism Its elites have favoured

responsible economic policies In the 50 years to 1995 the economy grew at a steady

average of almost 5 a year avoiding the Latin American ills of hyperinflation and

debt default A new constitution in 1991 dismantled power-sharing deepened

democracy and strengthened the courts

Although several smaller guerrilla outfits made peace the FARC and the ELN did not

They had taken to organised crime such as drug trafficking kidnaps and extortion in the

1980s and beleaguered landowners had responded by sponsoring right-wing

paramilitary vigilante groups with the complicity of some army officers By the late

1990s Colombia was on the verge of becoming a failed state with the worldrsquos highest

murder rate and ten kidnappings a day The governmentrsquos writ extended to only half the

country The FARC had about 20000 fighters and the ELN another 5000 They

attacked villages engaged in urban terrorism sowed landmines and recruited child

soldiers Their paramilitary foes massacred whole villages thought to sympathise with

the guerrillas The economy plunged into a deep recession contracting by 45 in 1999

Several banks failed and unemployment climbed to over 20

In desperation Colombians broke with their traditions of self-reliance anti-militarism

and moderate consensual politics Andreacutes Pastrana who was president from 1998 to

2002 sought outside help As part of a project called Plan Colombia the United States

provided the country with $12 billion in 2000 and then around half that amount each

year until 2006 mainly in military aid The money was more than matched by a big

increase in the governmentrsquos own defence spending In 2002 Colombians elected

Aacutelvaro Uribe a cattle rancher from Antioquia His father had been murdered by the

FARC An austere intense figure he campaigned on a platform of ldquodemocratic

securityrdquo He increased the security forces by half and took the war to the FARC killing

several top commanders At the same time he persuaded the paramilitaries to

demobilise

Mr Uribersquos conquest of the FARC transformed Colombia reducing the guerrillas from a

deadly threat to the state to a tactical irritant But there were stains on his record His

obsessive insistence on killing rebel fighters prompted some army units to murder

civilians and pass them off as combatants killed in battle Several of Mr Uribersquos aides

and allies had links to the paramilitaries and his government spied on senior judges and

political opponents He brought in a constitutional change so he could secure a second

term but his attempt to abolish terms limits and run again in 2010 was struck down by

the Constitutional Court

Mr Santos who had been Mr Uribersquos defence minister got his predecessorrsquos reluctant

backing but the two quickly fell out Whereas Mr Santos is cool patrician and

managerial Mr Uribe is volatile a consummate politician who has a rapport with

ordinary Colombians Largely because of Mr Uribersquos opposition Mr Santos only

narrowly won a second term last year

This special report will celebrate Colombiarsquos transformation over the past 15 years But

the job is only half done To achieve lasting peace the country needs to bring security

the rule of law and public services to rural areas reform the justice system and restore

political consensus It must also open up the economy and internationalise a deeply

introverted country But first it must clinch the deal with the FARC Leia na iacutentegra httpwwweconomistcomnewsspecial-report21676955-colombia-close-historic-peace-agreement-will-transform-its-prospectsfsrc=rss|spr

Le Monde - A Paris Joseacute Mujica ex-preacutesident de lrsquoUruguay

appelle les eacutetudiants de Sciences Po agrave srsquoengager

Joseacute Mujica Crsquoeacutetait un cours magistral qui sort de lordinaire lrsquoancien preacutesident

uruguayen Joseacute laquo Pepe raquo Mujica a inaugureacute la troisiegraveme confeacuterence Europe-Ameacuterique

latine organiseacutee par Sciences Po mardi 27 octobre agrave Paris Connu pour son franc-

parler son air deacutebonnaire et informel Pepe Mujica srsquoest adresseacute aux eacutetudiants du haut

de ses 80 ans Face agrave une jeunesse tenteacutee par lrsquoapolitisme il a appeleacute agrave srsquoengager car

lrsquoavenir de lrsquohumaniteacute et de la planegravete est en jeu Le deacutefi ineacutedit est avant tout politique

avant drsquoecirctre eacutecologique ou eacuteconomique Joseacute Mujica a tenu agrave lrsquoeacutegard de lrsquoEurope un

langage inhabituel Drsquoune part il a revendiqueacute lrsquoheacuteritage europeacuteen de lrsquoAmeacuterique

latine laquo Descendants drsquoimmigreacutes nous devons agrave lrsquoEurope nos noms notre culture

notre langue LrsquoUruguay est un Etat laiumlc mais je dois reconnaicirctre notre dette envers le

christianisme Berceau de notre civilisation lrsquoEurope nrsquoest heacutelas pas agrave la hauteur des

deacutefis de la planegravete raquo laquo Notre eacutepoque dispose de ressources ineacutedites drsquoune productiviteacute

jamais vue Nous sommes proches du Ciel alors que nous semblons marcher vers

lrsquoEnfer Aucune nation ne peut faire face seule aux problegravemes de notre temps raquo Pepe

Mujica a eacutevoqueacute lrsquohistoire laquo Les preacuteceacutedentes globalisations Rome ou la Chine avaient

une direction politique alors que la nocirctre est livreacutee agrave la volatiliteacute des marcheacutes a-t-il

deacuteploreacute En Ameacuterique latine le recircve drsquointeacutegration reacutegionale est aussi vieux que les

indeacutependances Mais nous avons tregraves peu avanceacute Une part infime de nos eacutechanges se

fait entre nos pays alors que les exportations restent tourneacutees vers le reste du monde

Aujourdrsquohui la Chine a pris la place preacutepondeacuterante jadis occupeacutee par lrsquoEurope ou les

Etats-Unis raquo laquo Jrsquoai terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope raquo Lrsquoancien preacutesident a loueacute la vision des

pegraveres fondateurs de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne apregraves la seconde guerre mondiale laquo Lrsquoenjeu

eacutetait deacutejagrave politique avant drsquoecirctre commercial ou eacuteconomique Dans un monde bipolaire

face aux Etats-Unis et agrave lrsquoUnion sovieacutetique lrsquoEurope a deacutecideacute de srsquointeacutegrer pour

continuer agrave exister raquo Lrsquoancien gueacuterillero Tupamaro a regretteacute que lrsquoOrganisation

mondiale du commerce (OMC) gage de regravegles du jeu universelles soit mineacutee par la

prolifeacuteration drsquoaccords bilateacuteraux Il a aussi critiqueacute lrsquoaccord transpacifique et lrsquoaccord

transatlantique encore en gestation car ils preacutetendent eacuteriger des barriegraveres contre la

Chine Comment laisser en marge lrsquoInde lrsquoAfrique le Moyen-Orient les reacutegions

pauvres Pepe Mujica procircne plutocirct une solidariteacute planeacutetaire une alliance entre riches et

pauvres laquo La concentration des richesses les ineacutegaliteacutes sont intoleacuterables raquo laquo Jrsquoai

terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope a-t-il affirmeacute Nous Latino-Ameacutericains nous avons besoin

des Europeacuteens pour eacutequilibrer le rapport de forces Cela fait quinze ans que nous

the Constitutional Court

Mr Santos who had been Mr Uribersquos defence minister got his predecessorrsquos reluctant

backing but the two quickly fell out Whereas Mr Santos is cool patrician and

managerial Mr Uribe is volatile a consummate politician who has a rapport with

ordinary Colombians Largely because of Mr Uribersquos opposition Mr Santos only

narrowly won a second term last year

This special report will celebrate Colombiarsquos transformation over the past 15 years But

the job is only half done To achieve lasting peace the country needs to bring security

the rule of law and public services to rural areas reform the justice system and restore

political consensus It must also open up the economy and internationalise a deeply

introverted country But first it must clinch the deal with the FARC Leia na iacutentegra httpwwweconomistcomnewsspecial-report21676955-colombia-close-historic-peace-agreement-will-transform-its-prospectsfsrc=rss|spr

Le Monde - A Paris Joseacute Mujica ex-preacutesident de lrsquoUruguay

appelle les eacutetudiants de Sciences Po agrave srsquoengager

Joseacute Mujica Crsquoeacutetait un cours magistral qui sort de lordinaire lrsquoancien preacutesident

uruguayen Joseacute laquo Pepe raquo Mujica a inaugureacute la troisiegraveme confeacuterence Europe-Ameacuterique

latine organiseacutee par Sciences Po mardi 27 octobre agrave Paris Connu pour son franc-

parler son air deacutebonnaire et informel Pepe Mujica srsquoest adresseacute aux eacutetudiants du haut

de ses 80 ans Face agrave une jeunesse tenteacutee par lrsquoapolitisme il a appeleacute agrave srsquoengager car

lrsquoavenir de lrsquohumaniteacute et de la planegravete est en jeu Le deacutefi ineacutedit est avant tout politique

avant drsquoecirctre eacutecologique ou eacuteconomique Joseacute Mujica a tenu agrave lrsquoeacutegard de lrsquoEurope un

langage inhabituel Drsquoune part il a revendiqueacute lrsquoheacuteritage europeacuteen de lrsquoAmeacuterique

latine laquo Descendants drsquoimmigreacutes nous devons agrave lrsquoEurope nos noms notre culture

notre langue LrsquoUruguay est un Etat laiumlc mais je dois reconnaicirctre notre dette envers le

christianisme Berceau de notre civilisation lrsquoEurope nrsquoest heacutelas pas agrave la hauteur des

deacutefis de la planegravete raquo laquo Notre eacutepoque dispose de ressources ineacutedites drsquoune productiviteacute

jamais vue Nous sommes proches du Ciel alors que nous semblons marcher vers

lrsquoEnfer Aucune nation ne peut faire face seule aux problegravemes de notre temps raquo Pepe

Mujica a eacutevoqueacute lrsquohistoire laquo Les preacuteceacutedentes globalisations Rome ou la Chine avaient

une direction politique alors que la nocirctre est livreacutee agrave la volatiliteacute des marcheacutes a-t-il

deacuteploreacute En Ameacuterique latine le recircve drsquointeacutegration reacutegionale est aussi vieux que les

indeacutependances Mais nous avons tregraves peu avanceacute Une part infime de nos eacutechanges se

fait entre nos pays alors que les exportations restent tourneacutees vers le reste du monde

Aujourdrsquohui la Chine a pris la place preacutepondeacuterante jadis occupeacutee par lrsquoEurope ou les

Etats-Unis raquo laquo Jrsquoai terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope raquo Lrsquoancien preacutesident a loueacute la vision des

pegraveres fondateurs de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne apregraves la seconde guerre mondiale laquo Lrsquoenjeu

eacutetait deacutejagrave politique avant drsquoecirctre commercial ou eacuteconomique Dans un monde bipolaire

face aux Etats-Unis et agrave lrsquoUnion sovieacutetique lrsquoEurope a deacutecideacute de srsquointeacutegrer pour

continuer agrave exister raquo Lrsquoancien gueacuterillero Tupamaro a regretteacute que lrsquoOrganisation

mondiale du commerce (OMC) gage de regravegles du jeu universelles soit mineacutee par la

prolifeacuteration drsquoaccords bilateacuteraux Il a aussi critiqueacute lrsquoaccord transpacifique et lrsquoaccord

transatlantique encore en gestation car ils preacutetendent eacuteriger des barriegraveres contre la

Chine Comment laisser en marge lrsquoInde lrsquoAfrique le Moyen-Orient les reacutegions

pauvres Pepe Mujica procircne plutocirct une solidariteacute planeacutetaire une alliance entre riches et

pauvres laquo La concentration des richesses les ineacutegaliteacutes sont intoleacuterables raquo laquo Jrsquoai

terriblement mal agrave lrsquoEurope a-t-il affirmeacute Nous Latino-Ameacutericains nous avons besoin

des Europeacuteens pour eacutequilibrer le rapport de forces Cela fait quinze ans que nous

neacutegocions un accord entre nos deux reacutegions LrsquoUnion europeacuteenne est trop centreacutee sur

ses propres problegravemes Lrsquoeacutegoiumlsme national des fins de mois doit ecirctre remplaceacute par

lrsquointelligence agrave long terme LrsquoUE doit reprendre lrsquoinitiative prendre en charge les

questions du monde raquo Ancien preacutesident drsquoun petit pays coinceacute entre le Breacutesil et

lrsquoArgentine lUruguayen srsquoest deacutebarrasseacute de tout reacuteflexe chauviniste laquo La bourgeoisie

de Sao Paulo ne peut pas continuer agrave ecirctre provinciale elle doit srsquoengager dans

lrsquointeacutegration reacutegionale par la creacuteation de multinationales latino-ameacutericaines raquo Un tel

plaidoyer pour lrsquointeacutegration latino-ameacutericaine et pour lrsquoalliance avec lrsquoUE reste rare Leia na iacutentegra httpamerica-latinabloglemondefr20151027a-paris-jose-mujica-ex-president-de-luruguay-appelle-les-etudiants-de-sciences-po-a-sengager

Stratfor - Paraguay South Americas Economic Bright Spot |

Summary The downturn in global commodity prices has hit Latin America hard

Although Brazil and Venezuela are the most notable cases several countries in the

region are experiencing major economic slowdowns or even contractions Paraguay

however has managed to buck this trend and become a hotspot for economic growth

The countrys small but robust low-end manufacturing sector lies at the heart of this

growth buoyed by business-friendly tax incentives and low wages Meanwhile the

Paraguayan economy is becoming increasingly diverse Though Paraguay will find it

challenging to sustain growth in the coming years it will continue to outpace its larger

neighbors and to boost the momentum it has already built up in its manufacturing

center Analysis The International Monetary Funds World Economic Outlook projects

that Paraguay will grow by 3 percent in 2015 compared to the previous year and again

by 38 percent in 2016 This outlook stands in stark contrast to expectations for

Paraguays neighbors and fellow Mercosur members Brazil and Argentina which are set

to either contract or see negligible growth over the same period With the exception of

Bolivia Paraguay is projected to have the highest rate of growth in Latin America over

the next two years just as it has been the regions leader in growth for much of the past

decade Unlike Paraguayrsquos diversified industrial growth Boliviarsquos economy has been

fueled by an increase in natural gas production and exports Paraguays strong

economic growth stems from several factors Like most in Latin America the countryrsquos

economy is largely driven by commodity exports Paraguay is the worlds fourth-largest

exporter of soybeans sixth-largest exporter of corn and 10th-largest exporter of

wheat These exports particularly soybeans have been hurt by the decline in global

commodity prices but the trend has still proved to be a net positive for Paraguay

Because the country is a net importer of oil and natural gas the drop in oil prices has

been a boon Furthermore the country meets most of its energy consumption

needs through the Itaipu dam which produces 75 percent of its energy as well as 17

percent of Brazils consumption needs Paraguayrsquos beef exports have also increased

recently up by 70 percent to value $13 billion over the past two years mainly on the

back of Russian consumption amid Moscowrsquos ban on European agricultural goods But

over the past decade Paraguays manufacturing boom has spurred the countrys

diversification away from a primarily commodity-based economy to one broadly based

in different sectors While Paraguay is still reliant on commodity exports the country

has seen substantial growth in industries such as textiles pharmaceuticals and auto

parts Collectively these sectors account for around 24 percent of the countrys total

exports Their growth has been aided by business- and investment-friendly policies

pursued by the government of Paraguayan President Horacio Cartes who came to

power in 2013 The country employs a flat 10 percent rate on income tax and a value-

added tax that is the lowest among Mercosur members and one of the lowest in Latin

America These policies have also made Paraguay an attractive destination for foreign

direct investment According to Brazils National Confederation of Industry 42

Brazilian companies have moved to Paraguay in the past few years in search of lower

labor costs and preferential tax rates The contrast to its neighbors is striking In Brazil

businesses must pay a 25 percent income tax in addition to other taxes and fees Many

of the new businesses are textile companies and Brazilian officials have said they hope

to use Paraguay to replace Chinese imports Currently textile products made in

Paraguay make up only 2 percent of Brazils total textile consumption but there are

plans to raise this figure Several auto parts factories based in Brazil are also starting to

move to Paraguay and many companies from Europe and Japan have also expressed

interest in setting up operations there At the same time Paraguay has the youngest

population in Latin America with around 33 percent of its people between the ages of

15 and 24 This benefit is enhanced by wages that are much lower and labor laws that

are more flexible than those in neighboring Brazil and Argentina The countrys two

primary production and population centers Asuncion and Ciudad del Este both have

relatively well-established infrastructure for the manufacturing sector and are the site of

most of the countrys textiles and auto parts production The Ciudad del Este region

which abuts the Argentinian and Brazilian borders and is close to Brazils main

industrial center in Sao Paulo is also home to a maquiladora program similar to that

along the US-Mexico border through which factories receive raw materials from and

sell value-added goods directly to third countries Low levels of government debt

moderate inflation and a relatively stable currency have also buoyed the Paraguayan

economy Despite these strong foundations challenges linger for Paraguay The country

is landlocked and therefore does not control the ports through which it exports

although Asuncion does have seasonal access to the Atlantic Ocean via the

Parana River Paraguay thus has to rely on Brazil Uruguay and Argentina to

facilitate trade These countries along with Venezuela and soon to be Bolivia

are all part of the Mercosur customs union to which Paraguay also belongs Paraguay

has an agreement allowing it to use Brazils port of Paranagua and Paraguays national

port administration controls one full terminal there However Brazil and

Argentina together account for nearly 40 percent of Paraguays export market and both

countries are facing either recession or negligible growth for at least the next two years

This will likely hurt Paraguays own economic outlook over the same period Paraguay

has supported external trade initiatives like the Mercosur-EU free trade agreement but

ratification will largely depend on Argentina since any free trade deal must have

unanimous support from within Mercosur Nevertheless the countrys position as a low-

end manufacturing center will likely improve in the coming years especially as China

transitions away from a low-wage high-growth exporting model and companies from

Brazil and elsewhere seek to exploit Paraguays favorable regulatory and tax structure

Paraguay is thus well positioned to maintain its place as one of the fastest growing

economies in South America far beyond 2015 Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwstratforcomanalysisparaguay-south-americas-economic-

bright-spot

UNIAtildeO EUROPEIA

Le Monde Diplomatique - Identifiez-vous

Pablo Iglesias

Lrsquoattitude de Berlin vis-agrave-vis drsquoAthegravenes lors des neacutegociations ne mrsquoa pas surpris Mecircme

si la Gregravece est un Etat faible le gouvernement Tsipras remet en question le mode de

fonctionnement de lrsquoUnion europeacuteenne sous heacutegeacutemonie allemande Lrsquoampleur de la

provocation est donc sans commune mesure avec la taille du pays Par ailleurs

Podemos apparaicirct deacutesormais comme un acteur politique important en tant que candidat

au pouvoir dans la quatriegraveme eacuteconomie de la zone euro Or nos camarades grecs nous

lrsquoont dit nos bons reacutesultats dans les sondages ne constituent pas neacutecessairement une

bonne nouvelle pour eux Nos adversaires craignent en effet que toute victoire

enregistreacutee par Syriza dope nos propres reacutesultats qursquoelle nous alimente en oxygegravene

Leur objectif ne se borne donc pas agrave tenir en eacutechec le gouvernement grec il srsquoagit

eacutegalement de barrer la route agrave drsquoautres menaces comme celle que nous repreacutesentons agrave

leurs yeux Mettre Syriza sous pression revient agrave faire de mecircme avec Podemos agrave

deacutemontrer qursquoil nrsquoy a pas drsquoalternative laquo Vous voulez voter Podemos Regardez ce qui

se passe en Gregravece raquo voilagrave en substance le refrain que lrsquoon sert aux Espagnols agrave lrsquoheure

actuelle

De notre point de vue Alexis Tsipras srsquoest montreacute tregraves habile Il est parvenu agrave donner

corps agrave lrsquoimage drsquoune Allemagne isoleacutee dont les inteacuterecircts ne coiumlncident pas

neacutecessairement avec ceux du reste de lrsquoEurope y compris en termes de politique

eacutetrangegravere Crsquoest ce qursquoil a tenteacute de faire valoir aupregraves de la France et de lrsquoItalie avec un

succegraves mitigeacute mais eacutegalement aupregraves des pays de lrsquoEst Il ne faut donc pas trop

srsquoeacutetonner que lrsquoAllemagne se montre aussi dure lors des neacutegociations

Nos camarades grecs ont deacuteveloppeacute une strateacutegie similaire agrave la nocirctre dans un contexte

tregraves diffeacuterent Drsquoabord ils entendent rebacirctir la leacutegitimiteacute institutionnelle du

gouvernement laquelle avait eacuteteacute meacutethodiquement mineacutee puis deacutetruite Cela passe par

une reacuteforme de lrsquoimpocirct qui dote lrsquoEtat drsquoune marge de manœuvre notamment en termes

de politiques publiques afin de reconstruire le tissu social et les liens deacutetruits par

lrsquoausteacuteriteacute Il srsquoagit ensuite au plan exteacuterieur de geacuteneacuterer des contradictions au sein du

bloc heacutegeacutemonique de lrsquoEurogroupe Cela srsquoest traduit surtout au deacutebut par de timides

critiques de la maniegravere dont lrsquoAllemagne geacuterait la crise europeacuteenne Il ne fait aucun

doute que lrsquoobjectif eacutetait de fissurer le consensus dominant

Notre strateacutegie serait diffeacuterente drsquoabord parce que lrsquoEspagne repreacutesente 106 du

produit inteacuterieur brut (PIB) de la zone euro en 2013 contre 19 pour la Gregravece (1)

Nous engagerions donc le bras de fer avec la certitude de disposer drsquoune marge de

manœuvre plus importante Bien eacutevidemment nous aborderions eacutegalement la question

drsquoune reacuteforme des traiteacutes budgeacutetaires pour accroicirctre les deacutepenses publiques en

investissements et deacutevelopper les politiques sociales notamment les retraites mais aussi

pour mettre un terme agrave la baisse des salaires qui eacuterode la consommation Une fois ces

reacuteformes acquises et seulement alors nous pourrions poser la question de la dette au

niveau europeacuteen dans le cadre drsquoune restructuration visant agrave lier les remboursements agrave

la croissance eacuteconomique par exemple Seule une strateacutegie agrave lrsquoeacutechelle europeacuteenne mdash

qui nrsquoexiste pas agrave lrsquoheure actuelle mdash permettrait drsquoimaginer un autre paradigme que

celui des politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute

Or cette deacutemarche ferait eacutemerger des contradictions chez nos adversaires notamment au

sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates Nous sommes conscients de lrsquoimmense reacutesistance

qursquoelle rencontrerait au sein de lrsquoappareil drsquoEtat espagnol comme dans lrsquoEurogroupe

mais si un pays aussi petit et faible que la Gregravece a reacuteussi agrave devenir un tel facteur

drsquoinstabiliteacute dans la zone euro notre capaciteacute agrave reacuteveacuteler des contradictions de ce type au

sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates serait drsquoautant plus grande Il deviendrait clair que

le projet europeacuteen nrsquoest pas compatible avec les politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute ce qui ouvrirait

un espace politique sur la question eacuteconomique

Un si long printemps

Les eacutelections municipales du 24 mai dernier [qui ont vu la victoire de Podemos et de ses

allieacutes agrave Madrid et agrave Barcelone] constituent un moment-cleacute du processus de changement

sans preacuteceacutedent depuis la transition deacutemocratique [engageacutee en 1975 avec la mort du

geacuteneacuteral Francisco Franco] Bien que cela ait eacuteteacute plus lent que nous lrsquoattendions mdash et

espeacuterions mdash nous sommes arriveacutes agrave une situation ougrave le bipartisme ne permet plus de

comprendre la vie politique en Espagne Les deux grands partis mdash Parti populaire (PP

droite) et Parti socialiste ouvrier espagnol (PSOE gauche) mdash ont obtenu leurs pires

reacutesultats depuis le retour de la deacutemocratie

Srsquoouvre ainsi une situation ineacutedite pour les eacutelections geacuteneacuterales (2) puisque la bataille se

jouera autour drsquoun front principal continuiteacute ou changement Il ne fait aucun doute que

le PSOE tentera lui aussi de se preacutesenter comme une force de changement mais ce ne

sera pas facile (3) Pour Podemos ces eacutelections repreacutesentent au contraire un rendez-

vous naturel puisqursquoelles viennent clore le cycle politique ouvert par les manifestations

du mouvement du 15-Mai (4) Nous sortons drsquoun hiver difficile au cours duquel notre

adversaire a penseacute pouvoir nous faire eacutechouer Nous avons pris des coups mais nous

avons tenu et nous avons abordeacute ces eacutelections municipales ainsi que les eacutelections

andalouses (5) dans de bonnes conditions Il nous faut neacuteanmoins tirer quelques leccedilons

de la campagne ainsi que du reacutesultat du scrutin

Pendant quelques semaines nous avons eacuteteacute sur la deacutefensive Mais nos efforts pour nous

reacuteapproprier notre discours originel mdash visant agrave repreacutesenter les classes populaires et agrave

deacutefendre les droits sociaux en mettant en valeur lrsquoaction des mouvements sociaux mdash se

sont reacuteveacuteleacutes le meilleur moyen drsquoincarner la nouveauteacute la reacutegeacuteneacuteration Sur ce terrain

Ciudadanos (Citoyens (6)) nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter

Autre leccedilon la deacutenonciation de la corruption comme modegravele eacuteconomique et politique

dont le PP serait la cleacute de voucircte permet drsquointroduire un clivage efficace Ici crsquoest le

PSOE qui nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter contre nous

Ces deux axes mdash deacutefense des classes populaires et refus de la corruption conccedilus

comme les deux faces drsquoune mecircme meacutedaille mdash nous ont permis drsquoecirctre la seule force

politique capable de deacutefier le bipartisme dans bon nombre de municipaliteacutes

Lrsquohiver srsquoachegraveve arrive un printemps qui nous conduira jusqursquoen novembre Le terrain

ne nous est pas favorable mais notre preacutesence institutionnelle srsquoadosse maintenant agrave

une expeacuterience du combat Il nous faut deacutesormais sortir des trancheacutees ougrave nous avions ducirc

nous replier il ne nous reste que quelques mois

Drsquoici lagrave la possibiliteacute drsquoaccords avec le PSOE est avant tout un problegraveme strateacutegique

car notre principal objectif mdashnous avons toujours eacuteteacute tregraves clairs agrave ce sujet mdash ce sont les

eacutelections geacuteneacuterales de cet automne De sorte que chaque deacutecision chaque situation doit

ecirctre analyseacutee agrave la lumiegravere de la position dans laquelle elle nous place pour ce scrutin En

mecircme temps on ne peut ignorer lrsquoampleur du deacutesir de changement dans la population

ce qui implique de se montrer agrave la hauteur

Il y a donc la question des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux bien sucircr mais au-delagrave il y a surtout celle

de notre capaciteacute agrave exercer une pression sur les autres forces politiques Quand on nous

demande laquo Passerez-vous des accords avec le Parti socialiste raquo nous reacutepondons

laquo Les socialistes devront drsquoabord effectuer un virage agrave 180 degreacutes raquo Nous savons qursquoil

existe deux tendances au sein du PSOE La premiegravere se caracteacuterise par une logique de

systegraveme ou de reacutegime qui soutient que la prioriteacute est de nous stopper drsquoarrecircter ce

mouvement Pour eux cela pourrait se traduire par une grande coalition avec le PP ou

Ciudadanos La seconde raisonne selon une logique de parti elle sait qursquoune telle

option conduirait agrave lrsquoimplosion du PSOE et donnerait davantage drsquoespace agrave Podemos

La question des accords se reacuteglera donc en fonction des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux mais

eacutegalement de notre analyse des diffeacuterentes situations en prenant en compte notre

capaciteacute agrave exploiter les dissensions de nos adversaires Notamment si comme les

sondages le suggegraverent lrsquoEspagne se dirige vers un systegraveme agrave quatre partis avec des

reacutesultats entre 15 et 25

En Andalousie la question qui se posait nrsquoeacutetait pas de former une coalition Nous

avions fixeacute trois conditions agrave notre soutien au PSOE pour qursquoil forme le gouvernement

reacutegional Nous demandions tout drsquoabord la deacutemission de deux anciens preacutesidents de

lrsquoAndalousie soupccedilonneacutes de corruption (lrsquoun siegravege agrave lrsquoAssembleacutee nationale lrsquoautre au

Seacutenat) Nous exigions par ailleurs que le gouvernement andalou ne signe aucun contrat

avec des eacutetablissements financiers qui expulsent des gens sans leur proposer de

relogement Et nous demandions enfin une reacuteduction du nombre drsquoassistants politiques

haut placeacutes de faccedilon agrave permettre la reacuteinteacutegration de tout le personnel des eacutecoles et des

hocircpitaux qui a eacuteteacute licencieacute pendant la crise Il ne srsquoagissait pas drsquoun programme de

gouvernement mais de trois conditions pour que nous ne bloquions pas la voie au

PSOE Nos reacutesultats ayant eacuteteacute moins bons que ceux du Parti socialiste notre marge de

manœuvre eacutetait limiteacutee Nous essayons de faire en sorte que tout soutien institutionnel

de la part de Podemos mdash y compris lorsqursquoil srsquoagit simplement de ne pas srsquoopposer agrave

une prise de fonctions mdash se traduise immeacutediatement par des mesures sociales qui

attestent qursquoun changement est possible (hellip) Ces demandes ne coucirctaient pas un

centime elles nrsquoaccroissaient pas la deacutepense publique Le PSOE a choisi le soutien de

Ciudadanos

La creacuteation de ce parti a eacuteteacute un coup tregraves malin non pas tant parce qursquoil drainerait

directement des eacutelecteurs qui se tournaient auparavant vers Podemos mais parce qursquoil

affaiblit notre discours visant agrave nous preacutesenter comme le choix du renouveau et qursquoil

nous subtilise une partie de lrsquoespace que les meacutedias nous accordaient agrave ce titre Il existe

deacutesormais un autre laquo parti du changement raquo qui preacutesente des traits fort diffeacuterents

puisque Ciudadanos eacutemerge largement au sein mecircme de lrsquoestablishment libeacuteral Cela

nous a conduits agrave reformuler lrsquohypothegravese Podemos

Notre objectif-cleacute a toujours eacuteteacute drsquooccuper la centraliteacute du champ politique en tirant

parti de la crise Cela nrsquoa rien agrave voir avec le laquo centre raquo politique du discours bourgeois

En termes gramsciens (7) notre but dans cette guerre de positions a eacuteteacute de creacuteer un

nouveau laquo sens commun raquo qui nous permette drsquooccuper une position transversale au

cœur du spectre politique reacutecemment reconfigureacute A lrsquoheure actuelle lrsquoespace

disponible a eacuteteacute reacuteduit par les contre-attaques de lrsquoeacutelite agrave commencer par la promotion

de Ciudadanos Notre tacircche srsquoavegravere donc deacutesormais plus deacutelicate elle requiert une

nouvelle intelligence strateacutegique

Ces initiatives de lrsquoadversaire ont par ailleurs creacuteeacute de nouvelles difficulteacutes au sein mecircme

de notre camp Drsquoabord lrsquoapparition de Ciudadanos nous replace dans une logique que

nous avons depuis le deacutebut consideacutereacutee comme perdante celle de lrsquoaxe gauche-droite

traditionnel Nous pensons que sur cette base il nrsquoy a pas de possibiliteacute de changement

en Espagne Le danger aujourdrsquohui serait drsquoecirctre renvoyeacutes agrave cet axe et drsquoeacutechouer agrave

deacutefinir une nouvelle centraliteacute Dans ce paysage le discours pleacutebeacuteien de Podemos

organiseacute autour de lrsquoopposition entre laquo ceux drsquoen bas raquo et laquo ceux drsquoen haut raquo

(lrsquooligarchie) pourrait ecirctre reacuteinterpreacuteteacute comme le discours habituel de lrsquoextrecircme gauche

ce qui lrsquoexposerait agrave perdre sa transversaliteacute et le priverait de la possibiliteacute drsquooccuper la

nouvelle centraliteacute Enfin nous faisons aussi face au risque mdash qui repreacutesente eacutegalement

un levier potentielmdash de la normalisation Nous nrsquoapparaissons plus comme des

outsiders lrsquoeffet de nouveauteacute srsquoestompe mais Podemos a deacutesormais aussi gagneacute en

force et en expeacuterience il dispose drsquoune capaciteacute de repreacutesentation accrue Nous devons

impeacuterativement redeacutefinir ou affiner notre discours afin de deacutejouer les contre-attaques et

de rouvrir lrsquoespace qui nous a eacuteteacute fermeacute Ce ne sera pas facile

Maintenir le jeu politique ouvert

Nous avons eacuteteacute confronteacutes agrave un cas drsquoeacutecole lors de la visite officielle du roi drsquoEspagne

au Parlement europeacuteen le 15 avril 2015 Un tel eacuteveacutenement nous place devant une

question difficile celle de la monarchie Pourquoi difficile Parce qursquoelle nous interdit

drsquoembleacutee la centraliteacute du terrain Il existe grosso modo deux options La premiegravere

geacuteneacuteralement adopteacutee par la gauche mdash dont Izquierda Unida (Gauche unie) mdash consiste

agrave dire laquo Nous sommes reacutepublicains Nous ne reconnaissons pas la monarchie nous

nrsquoirons donc pas agrave la reacuteception en lrsquohonneur du roi drsquoEspagne Nous ne reconnaissons

pas cet espace de leacutegitimiteacute pour le chef de lrsquoEtat raquo Mecircme si crsquoest une position

parfaitement tenable sur le plan eacutethique et moral elle nous place immeacutediatement dans

lrsquoespace de la gauche radicale dans un cadre tregraves traditionnel Cela nous aliegravene

instantaneacutement de larges couches de la population qui eacuteprouvent de la sympathie pour le

nouveau roi (8) et ce quoi qursquoelles puissent penser drsquoautres questions et

indeacutependamment du fait qursquoelles associent lrsquoancien roi agrave la corruption de lrsquoancien

reacutegime La monarchie figure toujours parmi les institutions les plus appreacutecieacutees en

Espagne (hellip) Deux options donc soit nous nrsquoallons pas agrave la reacuteception et nous restons

coinceacutes dans la grille drsquoanalyse traditionnelle de lrsquoextrecircme gauche qui offre tregraves peu de

possibiliteacutes drsquoaction soit nous y allons et Podemos se mecircle agrave la classe politique ce qui

revient agrave valider le cadre institutionnel Bref agrave passer pour des traicirctres des monarchistes

ou que sais-jehellip

Comment avons-nous reacutesolu ce dilemme Nous y sommes alleacutes mais sans rien changer

agrave notre faccedilon de nous preacutesenter avec nos vecirctements de tous les jours en ignorant le

protocole Crsquoest une toute petite chose mais crsquoest symboliquement repreacutesentatif de

Podemos En outre jrsquoai offert au roi les DVD de la seacuterie Le Trocircne de fer (Game of

Thrones) en les lui preacutesentant comme un outil drsquointerpreacutetation de ce qui se passe en

Espagne () Bien sucircr crsquoest une posture deacutelicate agrave tenir mais crsquoest la seule qui nous

permette de maintenir le jeu politique ouvert de manœuvrer au cœur de ces

contradictions bref de remettre en cause le statu quo au lieu drsquoecirctre releacutegueacutes dans une

position pure mais impuissante Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwmonde-diplomatiquefr201507IGLESIAS53187

sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates Nous sommes conscients de lrsquoimmense reacutesistance

qursquoelle rencontrerait au sein de lrsquoappareil drsquoEtat espagnol comme dans lrsquoEurogroupe

mais si un pays aussi petit et faible que la Gregravece a reacuteussi agrave devenir un tel facteur

drsquoinstabiliteacute dans la zone euro notre capaciteacute agrave reacuteveacuteler des contradictions de ce type au

sein des forces sociales-deacutemocrates serait drsquoautant plus grande Il deviendrait clair que

le projet europeacuteen nrsquoest pas compatible avec les politiques drsquoausteacuteriteacute ce qui ouvrirait

un espace politique sur la question eacuteconomique

Un si long printemps

Les eacutelections municipales du 24 mai dernier [qui ont vu la victoire de Podemos et de ses

allieacutes agrave Madrid et agrave Barcelone] constituent un moment-cleacute du processus de changement

sans preacuteceacutedent depuis la transition deacutemocratique [engageacutee en 1975 avec la mort du

geacuteneacuteral Francisco Franco] Bien que cela ait eacuteteacute plus lent que nous lrsquoattendions mdash et

espeacuterions mdash nous sommes arriveacutes agrave une situation ougrave le bipartisme ne permet plus de

comprendre la vie politique en Espagne Les deux grands partis mdash Parti populaire (PP

droite) et Parti socialiste ouvrier espagnol (PSOE gauche) mdash ont obtenu leurs pires

reacutesultats depuis le retour de la deacutemocratie

Srsquoouvre ainsi une situation ineacutedite pour les eacutelections geacuteneacuterales (2) puisque la bataille se

jouera autour drsquoun front principal continuiteacute ou changement Il ne fait aucun doute que

le PSOE tentera lui aussi de se preacutesenter comme une force de changement mais ce ne

sera pas facile (3) Pour Podemos ces eacutelections repreacutesentent au contraire un rendez-

vous naturel puisqursquoelles viennent clore le cycle politique ouvert par les manifestations

du mouvement du 15-Mai (4) Nous sortons drsquoun hiver difficile au cours duquel notre

adversaire a penseacute pouvoir nous faire eacutechouer Nous avons pris des coups mais nous

avons tenu et nous avons abordeacute ces eacutelections municipales ainsi que les eacutelections

andalouses (5) dans de bonnes conditions Il nous faut neacuteanmoins tirer quelques leccedilons

de la campagne ainsi que du reacutesultat du scrutin

Pendant quelques semaines nous avons eacuteteacute sur la deacutefensive Mais nos efforts pour nous

reacuteapproprier notre discours originel mdash visant agrave repreacutesenter les classes populaires et agrave

deacutefendre les droits sociaux en mettant en valeur lrsquoaction des mouvements sociaux mdash se

sont reacuteveacuteleacutes le meilleur moyen drsquoincarner la nouveauteacute la reacutegeacuteneacuteration Sur ce terrain

Ciudadanos (Citoyens (6)) nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter

Autre leccedilon la deacutenonciation de la corruption comme modegravele eacuteconomique et politique

dont le PP serait la cleacute de voucircte permet drsquointroduire un clivage efficace Ici crsquoest le

PSOE qui nrsquoest pas en mesure de lutter contre nous

Ces deux axes mdash deacutefense des classes populaires et refus de la corruption conccedilus

comme les deux faces drsquoune mecircme meacutedaille mdash nous ont permis drsquoecirctre la seule force

politique capable de deacutefier le bipartisme dans bon nombre de municipaliteacutes

Lrsquohiver srsquoachegraveve arrive un printemps qui nous conduira jusqursquoen novembre Le terrain

ne nous est pas favorable mais notre preacutesence institutionnelle srsquoadosse maintenant agrave

une expeacuterience du combat Il nous faut deacutesormais sortir des trancheacutees ougrave nous avions ducirc

nous replier il ne nous reste que quelques mois

Drsquoici lagrave la possibiliteacute drsquoaccords avec le PSOE est avant tout un problegraveme strateacutegique

car notre principal objectif mdashnous avons toujours eacuteteacute tregraves clairs agrave ce sujet mdash ce sont les

eacutelections geacuteneacuterales de cet automne De sorte que chaque deacutecision chaque situation doit

ecirctre analyseacutee agrave la lumiegravere de la position dans laquelle elle nous place pour ce scrutin En

mecircme temps on ne peut ignorer lrsquoampleur du deacutesir de changement dans la population

ce qui implique de se montrer agrave la hauteur

Il y a donc la question des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux bien sucircr mais au-delagrave il y a surtout celle

de notre capaciteacute agrave exercer une pression sur les autres forces politiques Quand on nous

demande laquo Passerez-vous des accords avec le Parti socialiste raquo nous reacutepondons

laquo Les socialistes devront drsquoabord effectuer un virage agrave 180 degreacutes raquo Nous savons qursquoil

existe deux tendances au sein du PSOE La premiegravere se caracteacuterise par une logique de

systegraveme ou de reacutegime qui soutient que la prioriteacute est de nous stopper drsquoarrecircter ce

mouvement Pour eux cela pourrait se traduire par une grande coalition avec le PP ou

Ciudadanos La seconde raisonne selon une logique de parti elle sait qursquoune telle

option conduirait agrave lrsquoimplosion du PSOE et donnerait davantage drsquoespace agrave Podemos

La question des accords se reacuteglera donc en fonction des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux mais

eacutegalement de notre analyse des diffeacuterentes situations en prenant en compte notre

capaciteacute agrave exploiter les dissensions de nos adversaires Notamment si comme les

sondages le suggegraverent lrsquoEspagne se dirige vers un systegraveme agrave quatre partis avec des

reacutesultats entre 15 et 25

En Andalousie la question qui se posait nrsquoeacutetait pas de former une coalition Nous

avions fixeacute trois conditions agrave notre soutien au PSOE pour qursquoil forme le gouvernement

reacutegional Nous demandions tout drsquoabord la deacutemission de deux anciens preacutesidents de

lrsquoAndalousie soupccedilonneacutes de corruption (lrsquoun siegravege agrave lrsquoAssembleacutee nationale lrsquoautre au

Seacutenat) Nous exigions par ailleurs que le gouvernement andalou ne signe aucun contrat

avec des eacutetablissements financiers qui expulsent des gens sans leur proposer de

relogement Et nous demandions enfin une reacuteduction du nombre drsquoassistants politiques

haut placeacutes de faccedilon agrave permettre la reacuteinteacutegration de tout le personnel des eacutecoles et des

hocircpitaux qui a eacuteteacute licencieacute pendant la crise Il ne srsquoagissait pas drsquoun programme de

gouvernement mais de trois conditions pour que nous ne bloquions pas la voie au

PSOE Nos reacutesultats ayant eacuteteacute moins bons que ceux du Parti socialiste notre marge de

manœuvre eacutetait limiteacutee Nous essayons de faire en sorte que tout soutien institutionnel

de la part de Podemos mdash y compris lorsqursquoil srsquoagit simplement de ne pas srsquoopposer agrave

une prise de fonctions mdash se traduise immeacutediatement par des mesures sociales qui

attestent qursquoun changement est possible (hellip) Ces demandes ne coucirctaient pas un

centime elles nrsquoaccroissaient pas la deacutepense publique Le PSOE a choisi le soutien de

Ciudadanos

La creacuteation de ce parti a eacuteteacute un coup tregraves malin non pas tant parce qursquoil drainerait

directement des eacutelecteurs qui se tournaient auparavant vers Podemos mais parce qursquoil

affaiblit notre discours visant agrave nous preacutesenter comme le choix du renouveau et qursquoil

nous subtilise une partie de lrsquoespace que les meacutedias nous accordaient agrave ce titre Il existe

deacutesormais un autre laquo parti du changement raquo qui preacutesente des traits fort diffeacuterents

puisque Ciudadanos eacutemerge largement au sein mecircme de lrsquoestablishment libeacuteral Cela

nous a conduits agrave reformuler lrsquohypothegravese Podemos

Notre objectif-cleacute a toujours eacuteteacute drsquooccuper la centraliteacute du champ politique en tirant

parti de la crise Cela nrsquoa rien agrave voir avec le laquo centre raquo politique du discours bourgeois

En termes gramsciens (7) notre but dans cette guerre de positions a eacuteteacute de creacuteer un

nouveau laquo sens commun raquo qui nous permette drsquooccuper une position transversale au

cœur du spectre politique reacutecemment reconfigureacute A lrsquoheure actuelle lrsquoespace

disponible a eacuteteacute reacuteduit par les contre-attaques de lrsquoeacutelite agrave commencer par la promotion

de Ciudadanos Notre tacircche srsquoavegravere donc deacutesormais plus deacutelicate elle requiert une

nouvelle intelligence strateacutegique

Ces initiatives de lrsquoadversaire ont par ailleurs creacuteeacute de nouvelles difficulteacutes au sein mecircme

de notre camp Drsquoabord lrsquoapparition de Ciudadanos nous replace dans une logique que

nous avons depuis le deacutebut consideacutereacutee comme perdante celle de lrsquoaxe gauche-droite

traditionnel Nous pensons que sur cette base il nrsquoy a pas de possibiliteacute de changement

en Espagne Le danger aujourdrsquohui serait drsquoecirctre renvoyeacutes agrave cet axe et drsquoeacutechouer agrave

deacutefinir une nouvelle centraliteacute Dans ce paysage le discours pleacutebeacuteien de Podemos

organiseacute autour de lrsquoopposition entre laquo ceux drsquoen bas raquo et laquo ceux drsquoen haut raquo

(lrsquooligarchie) pourrait ecirctre reacuteinterpreacuteteacute comme le discours habituel de lrsquoextrecircme gauche

ce qui lrsquoexposerait agrave perdre sa transversaliteacute et le priverait de la possibiliteacute drsquooccuper la

nouvelle centraliteacute Enfin nous faisons aussi face au risque mdash qui repreacutesente eacutegalement

un levier potentielmdash de la normalisation Nous nrsquoapparaissons plus comme des

outsiders lrsquoeffet de nouveauteacute srsquoestompe mais Podemos a deacutesormais aussi gagneacute en

force et en expeacuterience il dispose drsquoune capaciteacute de repreacutesentation accrue Nous devons

impeacuterativement redeacutefinir ou affiner notre discours afin de deacutejouer les contre-attaques et

de rouvrir lrsquoespace qui nous a eacuteteacute fermeacute Ce ne sera pas facile

Maintenir le jeu politique ouvert

Nous avons eacuteteacute confronteacutes agrave un cas drsquoeacutecole lors de la visite officielle du roi drsquoEspagne

au Parlement europeacuteen le 15 avril 2015 Un tel eacuteveacutenement nous place devant une

question difficile celle de la monarchie Pourquoi difficile Parce qursquoelle nous interdit

drsquoembleacutee la centraliteacute du terrain Il existe grosso modo deux options La premiegravere

geacuteneacuteralement adopteacutee par la gauche mdash dont Izquierda Unida (Gauche unie) mdash consiste

agrave dire laquo Nous sommes reacutepublicains Nous ne reconnaissons pas la monarchie nous

nrsquoirons donc pas agrave la reacuteception en lrsquohonneur du roi drsquoEspagne Nous ne reconnaissons

pas cet espace de leacutegitimiteacute pour le chef de lrsquoEtat raquo Mecircme si crsquoest une position

parfaitement tenable sur le plan eacutethique et moral elle nous place immeacutediatement dans

lrsquoespace de la gauche radicale dans un cadre tregraves traditionnel Cela nous aliegravene

instantaneacutement de larges couches de la population qui eacuteprouvent de la sympathie pour le

nouveau roi (8) et ce quoi qursquoelles puissent penser drsquoautres questions et

indeacutependamment du fait qursquoelles associent lrsquoancien roi agrave la corruption de lrsquoancien

reacutegime La monarchie figure toujours parmi les institutions les plus appreacutecieacutees en

Espagne (hellip) Deux options donc soit nous nrsquoallons pas agrave la reacuteception et nous restons

coinceacutes dans la grille drsquoanalyse traditionnelle de lrsquoextrecircme gauche qui offre tregraves peu de

possibiliteacutes drsquoaction soit nous y allons et Podemos se mecircle agrave la classe politique ce qui

revient agrave valider le cadre institutionnel Bref agrave passer pour des traicirctres des monarchistes

ou que sais-jehellip

Comment avons-nous reacutesolu ce dilemme Nous y sommes alleacutes mais sans rien changer

agrave notre faccedilon de nous preacutesenter avec nos vecirctements de tous les jours en ignorant le

protocole Crsquoest une toute petite chose mais crsquoest symboliquement repreacutesentatif de

Podemos En outre jrsquoai offert au roi les DVD de la seacuterie Le Trocircne de fer (Game of

Thrones) en les lui preacutesentant comme un outil drsquointerpreacutetation de ce qui se passe en

Espagne () Bien sucircr crsquoest une posture deacutelicate agrave tenir mais crsquoest la seule qui nous

permette de maintenir le jeu politique ouvert de manœuvrer au cœur de ces

contradictions bref de remettre en cause le statu quo au lieu drsquoecirctre releacutegueacutes dans une

position pure mais impuissante Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwmonde-diplomatiquefr201507IGLESIAS53187

laquo Les socialistes devront drsquoabord effectuer un virage agrave 180 degreacutes raquo Nous savons qursquoil

existe deux tendances au sein du PSOE La premiegravere se caracteacuterise par une logique de

systegraveme ou de reacutegime qui soutient que la prioriteacute est de nous stopper drsquoarrecircter ce

mouvement Pour eux cela pourrait se traduire par une grande coalition avec le PP ou

Ciudadanos La seconde raisonne selon une logique de parti elle sait qursquoune telle

option conduirait agrave lrsquoimplosion du PSOE et donnerait davantage drsquoespace agrave Podemos

La question des accords se reacuteglera donc en fonction des reacutesultats eacutelectoraux mais

eacutegalement de notre analyse des diffeacuterentes situations en prenant en compte notre

capaciteacute agrave exploiter les dissensions de nos adversaires Notamment si comme les

sondages le suggegraverent lrsquoEspagne se dirige vers un systegraveme agrave quatre partis avec des

reacutesultats entre 15 et 25

En Andalousie la question qui se posait nrsquoeacutetait pas de former une coalition Nous

avions fixeacute trois conditions agrave notre soutien au PSOE pour qursquoil forme le gouvernement

reacutegional Nous demandions tout drsquoabord la deacutemission de deux anciens preacutesidents de

lrsquoAndalousie soupccedilonneacutes de corruption (lrsquoun siegravege agrave lrsquoAssembleacutee nationale lrsquoautre au

Seacutenat) Nous exigions par ailleurs que le gouvernement andalou ne signe aucun contrat

avec des eacutetablissements financiers qui expulsent des gens sans leur proposer de

relogement Et nous demandions enfin une reacuteduction du nombre drsquoassistants politiques

haut placeacutes de faccedilon agrave permettre la reacuteinteacutegration de tout le personnel des eacutecoles et des

hocircpitaux qui a eacuteteacute licencieacute pendant la crise Il ne srsquoagissait pas drsquoun programme de

gouvernement mais de trois conditions pour que nous ne bloquions pas la voie au

PSOE Nos reacutesultats ayant eacuteteacute moins bons que ceux du Parti socialiste notre marge de

manœuvre eacutetait limiteacutee Nous essayons de faire en sorte que tout soutien institutionnel

de la part de Podemos mdash y compris lorsqursquoil srsquoagit simplement de ne pas srsquoopposer agrave

une prise de fonctions mdash se traduise immeacutediatement par des mesures sociales qui

attestent qursquoun changement est possible (hellip) Ces demandes ne coucirctaient pas un

centime elles nrsquoaccroissaient pas la deacutepense publique Le PSOE a choisi le soutien de

Ciudadanos

La creacuteation de ce parti a eacuteteacute un coup tregraves malin non pas tant parce qursquoil drainerait

directement des eacutelecteurs qui se tournaient auparavant vers Podemos mais parce qursquoil

affaiblit notre discours visant agrave nous preacutesenter comme le choix du renouveau et qursquoil

nous subtilise une partie de lrsquoespace que les meacutedias nous accordaient agrave ce titre Il existe

deacutesormais un autre laquo parti du changement raquo qui preacutesente des traits fort diffeacuterents

puisque Ciudadanos eacutemerge largement au sein mecircme de lrsquoestablishment libeacuteral Cela

nous a conduits agrave reformuler lrsquohypothegravese Podemos

Notre objectif-cleacute a toujours eacuteteacute drsquooccuper la centraliteacute du champ politique en tirant

parti de la crise Cela nrsquoa rien agrave voir avec le laquo centre raquo politique du discours bourgeois

En termes gramsciens (7) notre but dans cette guerre de positions a eacuteteacute de creacuteer un

nouveau laquo sens commun raquo qui nous permette drsquooccuper une position transversale au

cœur du spectre politique reacutecemment reconfigureacute A lrsquoheure actuelle lrsquoespace

disponible a eacuteteacute reacuteduit par les contre-attaques de lrsquoeacutelite agrave commencer par la promotion

de Ciudadanos Notre tacircche srsquoavegravere donc deacutesormais plus deacutelicate elle requiert une

nouvelle intelligence strateacutegique

Ces initiatives de lrsquoadversaire ont par ailleurs creacuteeacute de nouvelles difficulteacutes au sein mecircme

de notre camp Drsquoabord lrsquoapparition de Ciudadanos nous replace dans une logique que

nous avons depuis le deacutebut consideacutereacutee comme perdante celle de lrsquoaxe gauche-droite

traditionnel Nous pensons que sur cette base il nrsquoy a pas de possibiliteacute de changement

en Espagne Le danger aujourdrsquohui serait drsquoecirctre renvoyeacutes agrave cet axe et drsquoeacutechouer agrave

deacutefinir une nouvelle centraliteacute Dans ce paysage le discours pleacutebeacuteien de Podemos

organiseacute autour de lrsquoopposition entre laquo ceux drsquoen bas raquo et laquo ceux drsquoen haut raquo

(lrsquooligarchie) pourrait ecirctre reacuteinterpreacuteteacute comme le discours habituel de lrsquoextrecircme gauche

ce qui lrsquoexposerait agrave perdre sa transversaliteacute et le priverait de la possibiliteacute drsquooccuper la

nouvelle centraliteacute Enfin nous faisons aussi face au risque mdash qui repreacutesente eacutegalement

un levier potentielmdash de la normalisation Nous nrsquoapparaissons plus comme des

outsiders lrsquoeffet de nouveauteacute srsquoestompe mais Podemos a deacutesormais aussi gagneacute en

force et en expeacuterience il dispose drsquoune capaciteacute de repreacutesentation accrue Nous devons

impeacuterativement redeacutefinir ou affiner notre discours afin de deacutejouer les contre-attaques et

de rouvrir lrsquoespace qui nous a eacuteteacute fermeacute Ce ne sera pas facile

Maintenir le jeu politique ouvert

Nous avons eacuteteacute confronteacutes agrave un cas drsquoeacutecole lors de la visite officielle du roi drsquoEspagne

au Parlement europeacuteen le 15 avril 2015 Un tel eacuteveacutenement nous place devant une

question difficile celle de la monarchie Pourquoi difficile Parce qursquoelle nous interdit

drsquoembleacutee la centraliteacute du terrain Il existe grosso modo deux options La premiegravere

geacuteneacuteralement adopteacutee par la gauche mdash dont Izquierda Unida (Gauche unie) mdash consiste

agrave dire laquo Nous sommes reacutepublicains Nous ne reconnaissons pas la monarchie nous

nrsquoirons donc pas agrave la reacuteception en lrsquohonneur du roi drsquoEspagne Nous ne reconnaissons

pas cet espace de leacutegitimiteacute pour le chef de lrsquoEtat raquo Mecircme si crsquoest une position

parfaitement tenable sur le plan eacutethique et moral elle nous place immeacutediatement dans

lrsquoespace de la gauche radicale dans un cadre tregraves traditionnel Cela nous aliegravene

instantaneacutement de larges couches de la population qui eacuteprouvent de la sympathie pour le

nouveau roi (8) et ce quoi qursquoelles puissent penser drsquoautres questions et

indeacutependamment du fait qursquoelles associent lrsquoancien roi agrave la corruption de lrsquoancien

reacutegime La monarchie figure toujours parmi les institutions les plus appreacutecieacutees en

Espagne (hellip) Deux options donc soit nous nrsquoallons pas agrave la reacuteception et nous restons

coinceacutes dans la grille drsquoanalyse traditionnelle de lrsquoextrecircme gauche qui offre tregraves peu de

possibiliteacutes drsquoaction soit nous y allons et Podemos se mecircle agrave la classe politique ce qui

revient agrave valider le cadre institutionnel Bref agrave passer pour des traicirctres des monarchistes

ou que sais-jehellip

Comment avons-nous reacutesolu ce dilemme Nous y sommes alleacutes mais sans rien changer

agrave notre faccedilon de nous preacutesenter avec nos vecirctements de tous les jours en ignorant le

protocole Crsquoest une toute petite chose mais crsquoest symboliquement repreacutesentatif de

Podemos En outre jrsquoai offert au roi les DVD de la seacuterie Le Trocircne de fer (Game of

Thrones) en les lui preacutesentant comme un outil drsquointerpreacutetation de ce qui se passe en

Espagne () Bien sucircr crsquoest une posture deacutelicate agrave tenir mais crsquoest la seule qui nous

permette de maintenir le jeu politique ouvert de manœuvrer au cœur de ces

contradictions bref de remettre en cause le statu quo au lieu drsquoecirctre releacutegueacutes dans une

position pure mais impuissante Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwmonde-diplomatiquefr201507IGLESIAS53187

(lrsquooligarchie) pourrait ecirctre reacuteinterpreacuteteacute comme le discours habituel de lrsquoextrecircme gauche

ce qui lrsquoexposerait agrave perdre sa transversaliteacute et le priverait de la possibiliteacute drsquooccuper la

nouvelle centraliteacute Enfin nous faisons aussi face au risque mdash qui repreacutesente eacutegalement

un levier potentielmdash de la normalisation Nous nrsquoapparaissons plus comme des

outsiders lrsquoeffet de nouveauteacute srsquoestompe mais Podemos a deacutesormais aussi gagneacute en

force et en expeacuterience il dispose drsquoune capaciteacute de repreacutesentation accrue Nous devons

impeacuterativement redeacutefinir ou affiner notre discours afin de deacutejouer les contre-attaques et

de rouvrir lrsquoespace qui nous a eacuteteacute fermeacute Ce ne sera pas facile

Maintenir le jeu politique ouvert

Nous avons eacuteteacute confronteacutes agrave un cas drsquoeacutecole lors de la visite officielle du roi drsquoEspagne

au Parlement europeacuteen le 15 avril 2015 Un tel eacuteveacutenement nous place devant une

question difficile celle de la monarchie Pourquoi difficile Parce qursquoelle nous interdit

drsquoembleacutee la centraliteacute du terrain Il existe grosso modo deux options La premiegravere

geacuteneacuteralement adopteacutee par la gauche mdash dont Izquierda Unida (Gauche unie) mdash consiste

agrave dire laquo Nous sommes reacutepublicains Nous ne reconnaissons pas la monarchie nous

nrsquoirons donc pas agrave la reacuteception en lrsquohonneur du roi drsquoEspagne Nous ne reconnaissons

pas cet espace de leacutegitimiteacute pour le chef de lrsquoEtat raquo Mecircme si crsquoest une position

parfaitement tenable sur le plan eacutethique et moral elle nous place immeacutediatement dans

lrsquoespace de la gauche radicale dans un cadre tregraves traditionnel Cela nous aliegravene

instantaneacutement de larges couches de la population qui eacuteprouvent de la sympathie pour le

nouveau roi (8) et ce quoi qursquoelles puissent penser drsquoautres questions et

indeacutependamment du fait qursquoelles associent lrsquoancien roi agrave la corruption de lrsquoancien

reacutegime La monarchie figure toujours parmi les institutions les plus appreacutecieacutees en

Espagne (hellip) Deux options donc soit nous nrsquoallons pas agrave la reacuteception et nous restons

coinceacutes dans la grille drsquoanalyse traditionnelle de lrsquoextrecircme gauche qui offre tregraves peu de

possibiliteacutes drsquoaction soit nous y allons et Podemos se mecircle agrave la classe politique ce qui

revient agrave valider le cadre institutionnel Bref agrave passer pour des traicirctres des monarchistes

ou que sais-jehellip

Comment avons-nous reacutesolu ce dilemme Nous y sommes alleacutes mais sans rien changer

agrave notre faccedilon de nous preacutesenter avec nos vecirctements de tous les jours en ignorant le

protocole Crsquoest une toute petite chose mais crsquoest symboliquement repreacutesentatif de

Podemos En outre jrsquoai offert au roi les DVD de la seacuterie Le Trocircne de fer (Game of

Thrones) en les lui preacutesentant comme un outil drsquointerpreacutetation de ce qui se passe en

Espagne () Bien sucircr crsquoest une posture deacutelicate agrave tenir mais crsquoest la seule qui nous

permette de maintenir le jeu politique ouvert de manœuvrer au cœur de ces

contradictions bref de remettre en cause le statu quo au lieu drsquoecirctre releacutegueacutes dans une

position pure mais impuissante Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwmonde-diplomatiquefr201507IGLESIAS53187

CHINA

The diplomat - What Chinas Militarization of the South China

Sea Would Actually Look Like

Bonnie Glaser and John Chen

Much has been said about the legal and geopolitical aspects of Chinese land reclamation

in the South China Sea but US PACOM Commander Admiral Harry Harrisrsquos

Congressional testimony last month gave a closer look at specific US military

concerns posed by Chinarsquos artificial islands Harris detailed the military utility of deep

water port facilities and 3000 meter runways on three newly built Chinese islands

while Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear

noted the threat that ldquohigher end military upgrades such as permanent basing of combat

aviation regiments or placement of surface-to-air anti-ship and ballistic missile

systems on reclaimed featuresrdquo might pose

What exactly is the nature of the potential Chinese military threat and what

implications does it have for the region

What Might A Chinese Military Threat Look Like

Each of the above military concerns merit further examination in spite of Chinarsquos

vehement declarations that its new islands are for civilian purposes China has a range

of militarization options for its new South China Sea facilities ranging from deploying

intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to missile batteries to

augmenting power projection capabilities each with its own particular costs benefits

and escalatory severity

Deploying ISR assets to reclaimed land formations would significantly enhance Chinese

situational awareness in the contested region A long-range surveillance radar could

detect ships and aircraft up to 320 km away from Chinese-occupied features in the

South China Sea Chinese Y-8X maritime patrol aircraft launching from a 3000 meter

runway on Fiery Cross Reef would be able to locate and track ships and aircraft

operating up to 1600 km away putting most of Vietnam Malaysia and the Philippines

within range of Chinese surveillance aircraft While neither of these steps would overtly

threaten other military forces intelligence gathered by these systems could easily be

used for targeting purposes

Chinese missile systems deployed to reclaimed land formations would tangibly increase

the risk and cost of military operations by other states posing a much more concrete

military threat to both regional claimants and the United States in the South China Sea

The Chinese military has expended considerable effort over the last 20 years to

strengthen its missile capabilities and is now deploying formidable surface-to-air

missiles (SAMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) in large numbers in its army

navy and air force SAMs such as the HQ-9 and S-300 PMU-1 can destroy aircraft at

ranges of 150-200km and ground-launched YJ-62 and YJ-83 ASCMs could render

large swaths of the South China Sea vulnerable to accurate destructive fire up to 120-

400km away from Chinese-occupied land formations These missile threats would force

regional powers to think twice about operating ships or aircraft in the region against

Beijingrsquos wishes

At the most costly end of the spectrum China could use its newly reclaimed islands to

augment its power projection capabilities throughout the region Airstrips and deep

water ports on Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs could serve as diversion and resupply

points for Chinese military ships and aircraft that otherwise wouldnrsquot have the range to

operate safely in the South China Sea Basing aerial refueling tankers on these land

features could materially extend the range of Chinese military aircraft patrolling in the

region while basing H-6K strategic bombers would put countries as far as Australia

within striking distance of the Chinese air force Regularly basing military assets upon

Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs would be expensive and logistically challenging but

would confer tangible benefits to a Chinese military still honing its power projection

capability

The Impact of Chinese Militarization

The nature and type of Chinese militarization would visibly illustrate China relative

military superiority over other South China Sea claimants Rival claimant states possess

neither the advanced standoff strike capability nor the robust ISR assets required to

challenge a hypothetical Chinese missile buildup on its new islands The Vietnamese

Navyrsquos most capable anti-ship cruise missile has a maximum range of 300km ndash still

within the 280-400km range of a land-based Chinese YJ-62 Air-launched air-to-surface

missiles such as the US-supplied AGM-84 Harpoon would be similarly outranged by

Chinese anti-aircraft systems forcing non-stealthy aircraft to fire their missiles well

inside the kill radius of Chinese S-300 series SAMs

More importantly even if regional military planners had standoff range missiles at their

disposal their utility would be hindered by a lack of survivable and persistent ISR

assets to provide targeting information Malaysiarsquos handful of Beech 200 maritime

patrol aircraft and RF-5E Tigereye reconnaissance fighters are the most capable ISR

platforms in the area but these would prove easy targets for even rudimentary Chinese

air defenses to say nothing of advanced HQ-9 and S-300 series SAMs Vietnamrsquos

improved Kilo-class submarines could safely strike Chinese positions with 300km-

range 3M14E Klub land attack cruise missiles but counterforce accuracy would be

suspect without sufficient ISR for targeting In short no claimant state has the

operational maritime awareness and the standoff munitions needed to attack

hypothetical Chinese defenses without putting the launching aircraft surface ships and

personnel at risk from Chinese SAMs and ASCMs

Two of the three hypothetical Chinese militarization paths appear to be comparatively

cost-effective Building islands from coral reefs and paving runways may have been the

most expensive part of the project ndash deploying surveillance radars and aircraft or anti-air

and anti-ship missiles may not incur nearly as much financial expenditure In contrast

any military effort to neutralize Chinese defenses may incur significantly higher

financial and human costs Chinese cruise missiles out=range all but the most expensive

standoff munitions and recent simulations have indicated that concentrated integrated

Chinese SAM systems could hold off all but the most capable air forces Though

American air forces and standoff weapons could likely make short work of nascent

Chinese island outposts in a conflict the tyranny of distance the US faces deploying

from home or forward bases helps bring a potential Chinese military challenge from the

South China Sea into greater focus

Chinarsquos land reclamation represents a significant but limited potential increase in

Chinese regional military capability regardless of the specific militarization path

adopted by Beijing China has new airstrips where it had none before along with

defensive structures on islands that simply did not exist two years prior Chinese denial

of militarization rings hollow ndash these airstrips strengthen Chinese presence in peacetime

and provide redundant military bases that could increase resiliency in wartime A

cursory examination of militarization options helps justify the concern of American

officials over further Chinese military actions that have yet to occur Any Chinese

militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States but

militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors

and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States ndash an

outcome the United States would like to avoid

Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at

the Center for Strategic and International Studies John Chen is a research intern with

the China Power Project at CSIS and a Masterrsquos student at Georgetown University Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511what-chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-would-actually-look-like

points for Chinese military ships and aircraft that otherwise wouldnrsquot have the range to

operate safely in the South China Sea Basing aerial refueling tankers on these land

features could materially extend the range of Chinese military aircraft patrolling in the

region while basing H-6K strategic bombers would put countries as far as Australia

within striking distance of the Chinese air force Regularly basing military assets upon

Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs would be expensive and logistically challenging but

would confer tangible benefits to a Chinese military still honing its power projection

capability

The Impact of Chinese Militarization

The nature and type of Chinese militarization would visibly illustrate China relative

military superiority over other South China Sea claimants Rival claimant states possess

neither the advanced standoff strike capability nor the robust ISR assets required to

challenge a hypothetical Chinese missile buildup on its new islands The Vietnamese

Navyrsquos most capable anti-ship cruise missile has a maximum range of 300km ndash still

within the 280-400km range of a land-based Chinese YJ-62 Air-launched air-to-surface

missiles such as the US-supplied AGM-84 Harpoon would be similarly outranged by

Chinese anti-aircraft systems forcing non-stealthy aircraft to fire their missiles well

inside the kill radius of Chinese S-300 series SAMs

More importantly even if regional military planners had standoff range missiles at their

disposal their utility would be hindered by a lack of survivable and persistent ISR

assets to provide targeting information Malaysiarsquos handful of Beech 200 maritime

patrol aircraft and RF-5E Tigereye reconnaissance fighters are the most capable ISR

platforms in the area but these would prove easy targets for even rudimentary Chinese

air defenses to say nothing of advanced HQ-9 and S-300 series SAMs Vietnamrsquos

improved Kilo-class submarines could safely strike Chinese positions with 300km-

range 3M14E Klub land attack cruise missiles but counterforce accuracy would be

suspect without sufficient ISR for targeting In short no claimant state has the

operational maritime awareness and the standoff munitions needed to attack

hypothetical Chinese defenses without putting the launching aircraft surface ships and

personnel at risk from Chinese SAMs and ASCMs

Two of the three hypothetical Chinese militarization paths appear to be comparatively

cost-effective Building islands from coral reefs and paving runways may have been the

most expensive part of the project ndash deploying surveillance radars and aircraft or anti-air

and anti-ship missiles may not incur nearly as much financial expenditure In contrast

any military effort to neutralize Chinese defenses may incur significantly higher

financial and human costs Chinese cruise missiles out=range all but the most expensive

standoff munitions and recent simulations have indicated that concentrated integrated

Chinese SAM systems could hold off all but the most capable air forces Though

American air forces and standoff weapons could likely make short work of nascent

Chinese island outposts in a conflict the tyranny of distance the US faces deploying

from home or forward bases helps bring a potential Chinese military challenge from the

South China Sea into greater focus

Chinarsquos land reclamation represents a significant but limited potential increase in

Chinese regional military capability regardless of the specific militarization path

adopted by Beijing China has new airstrips where it had none before along with

defensive structures on islands that simply did not exist two years prior Chinese denial

of militarization rings hollow ndash these airstrips strengthen Chinese presence in peacetime

and provide redundant military bases that could increase resiliency in wartime A

cursory examination of militarization options helps justify the concern of American

officials over further Chinese military actions that have yet to occur Any Chinese

militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States but

militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors

and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States ndash an

outcome the United States would like to avoid

Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at

the Center for Strategic and International Studies John Chen is a research intern with

the China Power Project at CSIS and a Masterrsquos student at Georgetown University Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511what-chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-would-actually-look-like

militarization would have limited military utility vis-a-vis the United States but

militarization would manifestly establish Chinese military superiority over its neighbors

and heighten the potential for conflict that would draw in the United States ndash an

outcome the United States would like to avoid

Bonnie Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at

the Center for Strategic and International Studies John Chen is a research intern with

the China Power Project at CSIS and a Masterrsquos student at Georgetown University Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511what-chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-would-actually-look-like

RUacuteSSIA

Council on Foreign Relations - Council on Foreign Relations

Interviewee Dimitri Simes President and CEO Center for the National Interest and publisher of the National Interest magazineInterviewer Jeanne Park Deputy Director October 21 2015

Russias military intervention in the Syrian civil war has added a new dimension to

fraught NATO-Russia relations which are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold

War For Dimitri Simes president of the Center for the National Interest simmering

conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have the potential to escalate unless

Western powers recalibrate their strategy vis-Atilde -vis Russia Many people

underestimate how serious the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be

in our power to address the situation without sacrificing any real US interests in the

process he says

Are the United States and Russia entering into a new Cold War

Well history never entirely repeats itself And obviously you can see significant

differences between whats happening now and the Cold War of the past Russia is not a

full-scale superpower there is no Warsaw Pact alliance and the country does not have

any real allies in Europe certainly not in the Eastern European or Central European area

(even Belarus is not quite a reliable Russian ally)

Another difference is that during the Cold War of the past it was widely assumed that

the Soviet bloc enjoyed superior conventional forces including in Central Europe and

it was NATO that was relying on nuclear deterrence Today the situation is reversed

NATO is widely assumed to have a significant conventional superiority and

Russiaacirceuro trades particular claim to superpower status rests on the nuclear deterrent

Having said all that itacirceuro trades also clear that a level of mutual mistrust [between the West

and Russia] is as high or higher than during the worst days of the Cold War It is also

clear that there is a level of personal animosity between Russian and US leaders and

indeed between Russian and some European leaders that we did not have during the

Cold War In the 1980s there were all kind of war games in Washingtonacirceuro rdquo I took part

in some of them At the time there were strong suspicions of Soviet intentions but most

participants in these games had a strong interest in managing the situation in localizing

it in not allowing it to go out of control

This time around there are much higher stakes involved for Russia because NATO is

literally at its gates Theyacirceuro tradere not just dealing with European NATO members like in

the past who wanted to defend themselves but otherwise did not have particular claims

on Russia Now you see new NATO members some bordering Russia that feel very

strongly about Russia and they behave very differently than Russian neighbors did

previously like Finland in the past You see new members actively mobilizing NATO

against Russia And all this creates a very explosive chemistry particularly on the

Russian side

The Baltics remain on high alert after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 Are

their fears about a Russian incursion warranted in light of the current cease-fire in

eastern Ukraine

First of all there is a cease-fire in Ukraine but the political part of the Minsk agreement

is being widely ignored by both sides The Ukrainians have not shown much

willingness to uphold their end of the bargain and [US President Barack] Obamaacirceuro trades

administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians The Russians are making it

very clear that theyacirceuro tradere not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing

major changes in Ukrainian governance

Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas while these areas become more integrated

into Russia both economically and politically So this is not a conflict which seems to

be on the path to any kind of political resolution I think that you would see things

getting worse before they would become fundamentally better

The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat But one

reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO

opposition to Russia And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russiaacirceuro trades

neighbors

By being so up front about their hostility to Russia theyacirceuro tradere inevitably exposing

themselves to Russian retaliation And because they think they are protected by Article

5 [of the NATO charter] they often act vis-Atilde -vis Russia if they had a sense of real

impunity That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to

challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow

by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment

Now this is clearly not an official Russian policy today The Russian government is

denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states But if you talk to

Russian officials some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened

with domestic destabilization And they say that the only way they can protect

themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way

possible Furthermore while many in the Russian political establishment think that

President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns

they donacirceuro tradet believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or

Tallinn

Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President

Vladimir Putins support on the domestic front Or does Putin have real strategic

objectives in mind

I donacirceuro tradet know what Putinacirceuro trades strategic objectives are or whether the Putin

government has a well-thought-through strategy My concern is that you have two great

powers the United States and Russia which are being reactive tactical and responding

to domestic influences

Having said that there is an interesting element in Putins gamble namely his

diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a

possible transition government in Syria And they kind of are disappointed indeed

taken aback that after they demonstrated their strength and determination theyacirceuro tradere

still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies

Their hope was that after this kind of daring bold move they would be invited to a

diplomatic dialogue And now that itacirceuro trades not happening theyacirceuro tradere somewhat at a

loss I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this

situation

Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East And does his

involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russiaacirceuro trades Muslim

population

I dont know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population which

seems to be mostly content And Putin of course is making a major effort to cultivate

it But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries which are

otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia And if this perception that Moscow has

allied with Tehran takes hold there would be serious costs not only in relations with the

United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well

as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt

Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals

and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would

have to make some hard choices

Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the

short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the

European Union

I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the

migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative

But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very

carefully

Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be

watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia

tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria

operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from

sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people

in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to

the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the

conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to

make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take

over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe

There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem

aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation

Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a

recession

If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong

desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not

being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the

practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And

they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very

serious and dangerous consequences

So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a

very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And

itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart

from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin

himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian

interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional

predisposition

Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions

Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of

having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind

of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our

first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or

should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of

relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China

and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate

problem namely terrorism

Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be

based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us

not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This

is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy

So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions

Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult

to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with

Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low

oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the

Russian economy

So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian

geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some

extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable

direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are

witnessing so far is quite counterproductive

We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria

and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And

my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear

arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this

confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious

the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the

situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when

possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132

The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue

Khyber Sarban

Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have

worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence

of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into

Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into

Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream

is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a

willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are

understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long

engagement in Afghanistan

Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge

contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible

all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide

socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union

Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the

first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing

Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical

training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions

Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive

cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces

The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-

advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the

Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan

(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a

administration is not prepared to pressure the Ukrainians The Russians are making it

very clear that theyacirceuro tradere not going to make fundamental concessions without seeing

major changes in Ukrainian governance

Ukraine is blockading the separatist areas while these areas become more integrated

into Russia both economically and politically So this is not a conflict which seems to

be on the path to any kind of political resolution I think that you would see things

getting worse before they would become fundamentally better

The Baltic states are absolutely right to feel worried about the Russian threat But one

reason they have to feel worried is because they are the most vocal in leading NATO

opposition to Russia And this is a remarkable role for the smallest of Russiaacirceuro trades

neighbors

By being so up front about their hostility to Russia theyacirceuro tradere inevitably exposing

themselves to Russian retaliation And because they think they are protected by Article

5 [of the NATO charter] they often act vis-Atilde -vis Russia if they had a sense of real

impunity That creates a temptation on the part of some in the Russian government to

challenge Article 5 and to demonstrate that this whole NATO security system is hollow

by selecting one or two Baltic states for punishment

Now this is clearly not an official Russian policy today The Russian government is

denying that they have any interest in any aggression in Baltic states But if you talk to

Russian officials some of them do believe that Russia is being encircled and threatened

with domestic destabilization And they say that the only way they can protect

themselves is to demonstrate their strength and determination in the most dramatic way

possible Furthermore while many in the Russian political establishment think that

President Obama has been quite aggressive and insensitive to their legitimate concerns

they donacirceuro tradet believe he would dare use nuclear force against Russia to protect Riga or

Tallinn

Is the Russian involvement in the Syria conflict meant to shore up Russian President

Vladimir Putins support on the domestic front Or does Putin have real strategic

objectives in mind

I donacirceuro tradet know what Putinacirceuro trades strategic objectives are or whether the Putin

government has a well-thought-through strategy My concern is that you have two great

powers the United States and Russia which are being reactive tactical and responding

to domestic influences

Having said that there is an interesting element in Putins gamble namely his

diplomatic approaches to the United States to coordinate targets and to talk about a

possible transition government in Syria And they kind of are disappointed indeed

taken aback that after they demonstrated their strength and determination theyacirceuro tradere

still not invited to sit at the same table with the United States and its allies

Their hope was that after this kind of daring bold move they would be invited to a

diplomatic dialogue And now that itacirceuro trades not happening theyacirceuro tradere somewhat at a

loss I hear an element of frustration and confusion in Moscow on how to deal with this

situation

Has Putin taken sides in the Sunni-Shia proxy wars in the Middle East And does his

involvement in Syria make him vulnerable to blowback from Russiaacirceuro trades Muslim

population

I dont know whether he risks a blowback from his own Muslim population which

seems to be mostly content And Putin of course is making a major effort to cultivate

it But he also does not have the luxury of alienating any more countries which are

otherwise prepared to cooperate with Russia And if this perception that Moscow has

allied with Tehran takes hold there would be serious costs not only in relations with the

United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well

as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt

Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals

and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would

have to make some hard choices

Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the

short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the

European Union

I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the

migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative

But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very

carefully

Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be

watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia

tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria

operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from

sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people

in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to

the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the

conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to

make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take

over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe

There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem

aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation

Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a

recession

If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong

desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not

being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the

practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And

they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very

serious and dangerous consequences

So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a

very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And

itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart

from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin

himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian

interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional

predisposition

Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions

Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of

having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind

of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our

first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or

should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of

relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China

and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate

problem namely terrorism

Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be

based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us

not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This

is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy

So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions

Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult

to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with

Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low

oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the

Russian economy

So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian

geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some

extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable

direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are

witnessing so far is quite counterproductive

We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria

and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And

my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear

arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this

confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious

the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the

situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when

possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132

The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue

Khyber Sarban

Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have

worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence

of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into

Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into

Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream

is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a

willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are

understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long

engagement in Afghanistan

Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge

contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible

all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide

socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union

Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the

first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing

Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical

training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions

Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive

cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces

The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-

advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the

Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan

(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a

United States but with Syriaacirceuro trades immediate neighbors like Turkey and Jordan as well

as a country that otherwise wants to be quite friendly to Russiaacirceuro rdquo namely Egypt

Egypt is a major consumer of Russian arms Losing Turkeyacirceuro trades lucrative gas deals

and Egyptacirceuro trades military purchases would be very costly to Russia So Putin would

have to make some hard choices

Do you think his intervention in Syria is in any way motivated by the fact that in the

short term itacirceuro trades driving more migration to Europe which is destabilizing the

European Union

I donacirceuro tradet see any evidence of that particularly if you look at the timing Most of the

migration was happening anyway So at this point I canacirceuro tradet answer in the affirmative

But the question is quite legitimate and this is something we have to watch very

carefully

Now let me say this [with regards to Europeacirceuro trades migration crisis] we should also be

watching Ukraine because if we are talking about an escalation of NATO-Russia

tensions we have to think about a variety of scenarios Letacirceuro trades imagine that this Syria

operation doesnacirceuro tradet work out particularly well for Putin If there is no relief from

sanctions he might feel the need to do something on the Ukraine front There are people

in the Russian government who are saying that if the United States supplies weapons to

the Ukrainian government and if the Ukrainian government attempts to resolve the

conflict over Donbass [in eastern Ukraine] by force then Russia then would have to

make a historic decisionacirceuro rdquo that is that it has no choice but to go all the way and take

over the whole Ukraine which would send three to five million refugees to Europe

There is no plan to enact something like this in Moscowacirceuro rdquo at least not that Iacirceuro tradem

aware of But there is a conversation and a temptation

Whats the thinking behind Putins push to increase defense spending during a

recession

If you talk to Russiansacirceuro rdquo and not just on the leadership levelacirceuro rdquo there is a strong

desire to be taken seriously Right now there is a sense in Moscow that theyacirceuro tradere not

being taken seriously Itacirceuro trades not just a question of their [wounded] pride but also the

practical implications because they feel like they arenacirceuro tradet being fairly dealt with And

they think that if they do not stand tall if they do not stand strong there may be very

serious and dangerous consequences

So there is a temptation on their part to give priority to military spending to building a

very powerful force and to demonstrate that Russia cannot be pushed around And

itacirceuro trades very clear that Russia does not have any real claims to superpower status apart

from its nuclear force For people around Putinacirceuro rdquo and I think Putin

himselfacirceuro rdquo showing Russian determination to do whatever it takes to protect Russian

interests is not just a part of [a prevailing] philosophy but if you wish an emotional

predisposition

Would a new arms control treaty help to deescalate tensions

Itacirceuro trades not about arms control treaties at this point because itacirceuro trades not a question of

having too many arms or not knowing who has what Rather we have to ask what kind

of strategy we want to have vis-Atilde -vis Russia Do we need to have policy where our

first priority would be not to allow Russia to prevail in places like Ukraine or Syria Or

should we have a broader strategic view where we ask ourselves what kind of

relationship with Russia we need in light of our many other priorities namely China

and probably a less apocalyptic challenge in the long run but a far more immediate

problem namely terrorism

Do we want to explore a possibility of a relationship with Russia which would not be

based on any kind of an alliance but which would create conditions that would allow us

not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This

is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy

So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions

Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult

to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with

Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low

oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the

Russian economy

So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian

geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some

extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable

direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are

witnessing so far is quite counterproductive

We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria

and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And

my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear

arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this

confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious

the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the

situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when

possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132

The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue

Khyber Sarban

Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have

worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence

of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into

Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into

Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream

is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a

willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are

understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long

engagement in Afghanistan

Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge

contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible

all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide

socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union

Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the

first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing

Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical

training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions

Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive

cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces

The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-

advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the

Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan

(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a

not to focus on Russian assertiveness excessively at the expense of other priorities This

is one of the most fundamental questions for US foreign policy

So how do we ratchet down tensions Is it additional pressure in the form of sanctions

Sanctions clearly do work in terms of damaging the Russian economy Itacirceuro trades difficult

to say how much because there are a lot of other factors involved starting with

Russiaacirceuro trades own economic mismanagement pervasive corruption and of course low

oil prices But there is no question that sanctions have some negative impact on the

Russian economy

So we are doing damage to the Russian economy and some damage to the Russian

geopolitical standing If it is our ambition to punish Russia we are succeeding to some

extent If our objective on the other hand is to shift the Russian behavior in a desirable

direction to make Russia more moderate more cooperative then what we are

witnessing so far is quite counterproductive

We see that Putin is making very assertiveacirceuro rdquo some say aggressiveacirceuro rdquo moves in Syria

and that heacirceuro trades making it clear that heacirceuro trades prepared to act as a global spoiler And

my concern is when you have a situation involving great powers tremendous nuclear

arsenals and groups with agendas of their own that would not mind exploiting this

confrontation you have a very dangerous mix Many people underestimate how serious

the threat is but also underestimate to what extent it may be in our power to address the

situation by a combination of firmness when necessary and meaningful diplomacy when

possible without sacrificing any real US Acirc interests in the process Leia na iacutentegra httpfeedscfrorg~rpublicationinterview~38u9QLK8yCdQp37132

The diplomat - Russia in Afghanistan Past as Prologue

Khyber Sarban

Recent developments in Afghanistan particularly the temporary fall of Kunduz have

worried many in the region Russia among them More than ever the growing presence

of regional terror outfits pushed from their decades-long sanctuaries in Pakistan into

Northern Afghanistan has been a wakeup call The danger of extremists filtering into

Central Asia and upsetting Russian President Vladmir Putinrsquos lingering Eurasian dream

is real A nervous Russia mainly reliant on its military capabilities has expressed a

willingness to take the fight to the terrorists While Russiarsquos concerns are

understandable they do need to be placed within the context of its decades-long

engagement in Afghanistan

Afghans remember Russia (and the former Soviet Union) for two things First its huge

contribution to the socioeconomic reforms and major infrastructure projects still visible

all over Afghanistan During the 1960s Afghanistan undertook nationwide

socioeconomic reforms seeking technical and economic aid from the Soviet Union

Some of the major projects included the construction of the famous Salang Pass the

first collective housing in Afghanistan the Kabul Polytechnic the Housing

Construction Unit and many more The developmental aid also included technical

training and educational programs for personnel of public and educational institutions

Some of these projects ran until the late 1980s Russia also provided massive

cooperation in training and equipping Afghan security forces

The second most vibrant memory of Russiarsquos engagement in Afghanistan is its ill-

advised occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 The occupation took place shortly after the

Saur revolution (1978) launched by the Peoplersquos Democratic Party of Afghanistan

(PDPA) with a coup drsquoeacutetat This changed the nature of the relationship and added a

heavy political dimension to the previous cordial people-to-people and state-to-state

relations The occupation instantly acknowledged as a strategic error was the result of

regular ldquobear trapsrdquo laid by Pakistan with the blessing of its allies to draw the Soviet

Union into Afghanistan This strategic blunder engineered by former KGB chief Yuri

Andropov proved life-giving to all but Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union and its

communist ideology One of the main benefactors of the move Pakistan had by then

succeeded in selling its anti-Afghan agenda to the West and Arab states as an

anticommunist agenda

Soviet troops and the allied Afghan regime used a heavy hand to quell the rebels but in

vain By the mid 1980s the level of violence had increased viciously With no end in

sight Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to reverse course and instead support an

intra-Afghan reconciliation much to the dismay of the installed president Babrak

Karmal Subsequently the Soviet Union set a plan for a more inclusive political

discourse in Afghanistan one that could eventually lead to an independent country At

the Reykjavik Summit of 1986 Gorbachev assured US President Ronald Reagan that

the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan

The Moscow-endorsed shift started with changes in the PDPA hierarchy followed by

further changes in the Afghan political arena However despite the Reykjavik assurance

and the changes the US remained suspicious The ldquopetrodollarrdquo alliance of the United

States Pakistan and Saudi Arabia continued to provide financial military and

logistical covert support to the mujahedeen which ended catastrophically for the

Afghan nation

The worsening situation led to the Geneva accords signed by the United States Soviet

Union Afghanistan and Pakistan in April 1988 The subsequent withdrawal of the

Soviet Union in February 1989 was celebrated as the defeat of Communism the Soviet

Union breakup had become unavoidable and unification of East and West Germany was

imminent That was enough for Americans to lose interest and let loose Pakistan and

their proxy groups

The changed geopolitics in the region forced Russia to secure its front yard Central

Asia and prevent the battle shifting from Afghanistan to the former Soviet Muslim

republics Moscow started looking for friendly allies in the communist regime mainly

leftist dissidents among the fragmented mujahedeen factions and other non-state actors

who could serve them well on their southern borders and in Afghanistan Unfortunately

the aim from then onward was no longer helping an Afghan state but finding reliable

allies who could give the Russians enough leverage to secure their interests To this end

Russia has remained a visible player in Afghans politics until this day

Taking the above into consideration the current Russian temptation raises the question

What does Russia expect from Afghanistan More importantly how can Russia

contribute to stability in Afghanistan Does Russia see its engagement in Afghanistan

through the prism of intensified support to quasi-state actors to secure its periphery Or

does Russia see stability in Afghanistan as a key to stability in Central Asia Moscow

should clarify these questions with Kabul prior to any course of action

Certainly Russia has the capacity and leverage to bypass the Afghan government with

cosmetic support and rely upon its former allies quasi-state actors But this approach

will not provide a lasting counter to the growing threat of extremism rather it will lead

to further chronic insecurity in the north of Afghanistan and beyond

However if Russia sees stability in Afghanistan as the key to stability in Central Asia

then there are some opportunities for a successful short and long-term engagement in

Afghanistan It would need a comprehensive strategy to support the Afghan government

on several fronts The good news here is that Russia has capacity and experience to

materialize this strategy

First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former

Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in

Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the

civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge

On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by

providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense

and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the

Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by

Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the

Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For

instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air

support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more

than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct

counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan

In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale

infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent

news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be

extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could

help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods

Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is

being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents

economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia

in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major

contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability

in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and

mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and

prevention is best done in Afghanistan

The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and

not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as

showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods

and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular

ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role

potentially more palatable

Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local

Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue

materialize this strategy

First and foremost compared with the growing divergence between US and former

Soviet Union in the 1980s both Washington and Moscow have converging interests in

Afghanistan This is a game changer Besides the previous Soviet involvement in the

civilian military and industrial aspects of Afghanistan gives Russia a significant edge

On the military front Russia can enhance security and stability in Afghanistan by

providing military training equipment and assistance to the Afghan National Defense

and Security Forces (ANDSF) which is the need of the hour and the top priority of the

Afghan president The Afghan officerrsquos corps and fighter pilots can be trained in or by

Russia In fact the Afghan security forces were mainly trained and equipped by the

Soviet Union hence they are more familiar with the Russian military hardware For

instance the Afghan Army still uses the Russian Mi-17 and Mi-35 for much-needed air

support In short any Russian military training and equipment for the ANDSF is more

than welcome to help overcome growing security challenges and conduct

counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan

In addition to the military assistance Russia can help Afghanistan with large-scale

infrastructure and industrial projects crucial for durable economic progress Recent

news about cooperation on housing construction is one such example This can be

extended to the production of raw and advanced construction materials which could

help Afghanistan to become self-reliant on basic construction goods

Of course there is also the question of what might be in this for Russia While Russia is

being squeezed on its European front South Asia through Central Asia still represents

economic opportunity There is also an opening for an assertive political role for Russia

in the region In comparison to Syria stability in Afghanistan would be a major

contributor to stability in Central Asian republics and in Russia In contrast instability

in Afghanistan could send shock waves of insecurity through to Central Asia and

mainland Russia with grave consequences Prevention is better than the cure and

prevention is best done in Afghanistan

The Russian approach to the Afghan imbroglio should be careful and thoughtful and

not one limited to a quick fix reliant on unrealistic deadlines or expectations as

showcased by the US There is a need for a durable strategy Russia has both the goods

and the experience that it can bring to the table And since it has no particular

ideological ambition the question of exporting it is less critical and thus a Russian role

potentially more palatable

Khyber Sarban served as an adviser in Afghanistanrsquos Independent Directorate of Local

Governance Leia na iacutentegra httpthediplomatcom201511russia-in-afghanistan-past-as-prologue

IRAtilde E QUESTAtildeO NUCLEAR

Foreign Affairs - How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb | Foreign

Affairs

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached by Iran six other countries

and the European Union in Vienna in July has sparked a heated political debate in the

United States Under the terms of the agreement Iran has agreed to accept some

temporary limits on its nuclear program in return for the lifting of the economic

sanctions the international community imposed in response to that program The Obama

administration a chief negotiator of the accord argues that the deal will freeze and in

some ways set back Iranrsquos march toward nuclear weapons while opening up the

possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic

which have been bitterly hostile ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution The

administration further contends that the agreement includes robust provisions for the

international inspection of Iranrsquos nuclear facilities that will discourage and if necessary

detect any Iranian cheating triggering stiff penalties in response Critics of the deal by

contrast argue that it permits Iran to remain very close to obtaining a bomb that its

provisions for verifying Iranian compliance are weak and that the lifting of the

sanctions will give Iranian leaders a massive windfall that they will use to support

threatening behavior by Tehran such as sponsoring global terrorism propping up the

Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and backing Hezbollah in its conflict with Israel (a

country that the Iranian regime has repeatedly promised to destroy)To keep nuclear

weapons out of Tehranrsquos hands will require a credible threat by the United States to

respond to significant cheating by using forceThe American political conflict will come

to a head in September when Congress gets the chance to register its disapproval of the

accordmdashalthough the president has promised to veto a disapproval resolution if it

passes and has enough support among Democrats to uphold the veto and perhaps even

to prevent a vote on such a resolution in the first place Still however the domestic

politics play out both the dealrsquos supporters and its critics agree that the United States

should prevent Iran from getting a bomb This raises the question of how to do somdash

whether without the deal after the deal expires or if the Iranians decide to cheat

Stopping Iranian nuclear proliferation in all three situations will require Washington to

update and adapt its Cold War policy of deterrence making Tehran understand clearly

in advance that the United States is determined to prevent by force if necessary Iranian

nuclearizationA CREDIBLE THREATThe English political philosopher Thomas

Hobbes noted in Leviathan that ldquocovenants without the sword are but wordsrdquo Any

agreement requires a mechanism for enforcing it and the Iranian agreement does

include such a mechanism in theory if Iran violates the agreementrsquos terms the

economic sanctions that the accord removes will ldquosnap backrdquo into place By itself

however this provision is unlikely to prevent Iranian cheating The procedures for

reimposing the sanctions are complicated and unreliable even if imposed the renewed

sanctions would not cancel contracts already signed and even as the sanctions have

been in place Iranrsquos progress toward a bomb has continued To keep nuclear weapons

out of Tehranrsquos hands will thus require something strongermdashnamely a credible threat

by the United States to respond to significant cheating by using force to destroy Iranrsquos

nuclear infrastructure US State Department Handout via Reuters US Secretary of

State John Kerry speaks with Hossein Fereydoun the brother of Iranian President

Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Vienna July 2015 The

term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response

is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on

the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War

Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some

similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was

aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while

in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those

weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has

not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other

countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and

North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify

threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would

be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were

continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had

the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with

minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before

them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not

threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy

and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The

United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest

danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the

hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth

Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was

ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an

agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime

would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts

however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of

George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its

bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to

threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced

national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to

achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One

of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton

administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the

North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North

Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired

nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military

presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this

reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent

need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the

case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions

that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet

Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and

relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country

would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its

nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a

nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of

people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the

flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even

worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US

military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the

Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital

Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the

South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States

has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by

contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a

US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it

clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the

way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear

weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified

feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of

deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what

acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will

follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in

deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of

communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced

a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including

costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering

response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade

later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos

ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat

to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific

and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of

deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian

ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic

Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to

trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such

violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on

Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for

nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of

doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that

keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for

credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a

violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It

was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on

North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands

of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a

Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French

President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to

war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths

to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and

Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and

stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any

European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran

now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts

of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but

the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause

enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even

without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia

or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack

American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such

responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe

administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the

deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with

deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and

psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an

Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit

of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt

that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating

US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position

that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale

then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would

suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument

in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military

action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover

neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past

decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of

US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly

during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in

order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an

explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly

articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare

such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such

a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration

should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US

naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency

of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold

War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the

United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has

become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial

since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian

bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the

shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And

since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries

about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold

War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer

poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or

fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the

United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb

term for an effort to prevent something by threatening forceful punishment in response

is ldquodeterrencerdquo It is hardly a novel policy for Washington deterring a Soviet attack on

the United States and its allies was central to the American conduct of the Cold War

Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons now and in the future will have some

similarities to that earlier task but one difference is obvious Cold War deterrence was

aimed at preventing the use of the adversaryrsquos arsenal including nuclear weapons while

in the case of Iran deterrence would be designed to prevent the acquisition of those

weapons With the arguable exception of Saddam Husseinrsquos Iraq the United States has

not previously threatened war for this purpose and has in fact allowed a number of other

countries to go nuclear including the Soviet Union China Israel India Pakistan and

North Korea Does the Iranian case differ from previous ones in ways that justify

threatening force to keep Iran out of the nuclear club It does An Iranian bomb would

be more dangerous and stopping it is more feasible The Soviet Union and China were

continent-sized countries that crossed the nuclear threshold before the US military had

the capacity for precision air strikes that could destroy nuclear infrastructure with

minimal collateral damage Israel and India like the United Kingdom and France before

them were friendly democracies whose possession of nuclear armaments did not

threaten American interests Pakistan is occasionally friendly is a putative democracy

and crossed the nuclear threshold in direct response to Indiarsquos having done so The

United States is hardly comfortable with the Pakistani nuclear arsenal but the greatest

danger it poses is the possibility that after a domestic upheaval it could fall into the

hands of religious extremistsmdashprecisely the kind of people who control Iran nowNorth

Korea presents the closest parallel In the early 1990s the Clinton administration was

ready to go to war to stop Pyongyangrsquos nuclear weapons program before signing an

agreement that the administration said would guarantee that the communist regime

would dismantle its nuclear program North Korea continued its nuclear efforts

however and eventually succeeded in testing a nuclear weapon during the presidency of

George W Bush Since then North Korea has continued to work on miniaturizing its

bombs and improving its missiles presumably with the ultimate aim of being able to

threaten attacks on North America It is worth noting that in 2006 two experienced

national security officials wrote in The Washington Post that if Pyongyang were ever to

achieve such a capability Washington should launch a military strike to destroy it One

of the authors was William Perry who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton

administration the other was Ashton Carter who holds that position todayBad as the

North Korean bomb is an Iranian one would be even worse For in the case of North

Korea a long-standing policy of deterrence was already in place before it acquired

nuclear weapons with the United States maintaining a strong peacetime military

presence on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the Korean War in 1953 For this

reason in the years since Pyongyang got the bomb its neighbors have not felt an urgent

need to acquire nuclear armaments of their ownmdashsomething that would be likely in the

case of Iranian proliferation Nor would the Iranian case benefit from the conditions

that helped stabilize the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet

Union A Middle East with multiple nuclear-armed states all having small and

relatively insecure arsenals would be dangerously unstable In a crisis each country

would have a powerful incentive to launch a nuclear attack in order to avoid losing its

nuclear arsenal to a first strike by one of its neighbors Accordingly the chances of a

nuclear war in the region would skyrocket Such a war would likely kill millions of

people and could deal a devastating blow to the global economy by interrupting the

flow of crucial supplies of oil from the regionBut if an Iranian bomb would be even

worse than a North Korean bomb preventing its emergence would be easier A US

military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the

Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital

Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the

South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States

has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by

contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a

US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it

clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the

way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear

weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified

feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of

deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what

acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will

follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in

deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of

communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced

a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including

costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering

response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade

later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos

ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat

to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific

and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of

deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian

ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic

Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to

trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such

violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on

Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for

nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of

doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that

keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for

credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a

violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It

was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on

North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands

of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a

Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French

President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to

war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths

to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and

Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and

stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any

European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran

now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts

of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but

the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause

enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even

without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia

or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack

American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such

responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe

administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the

deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with

deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and

psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an

Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit

of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt

that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating

US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position

that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale

then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would

suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument

in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military

action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover

neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past

decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of

US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly

during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in

order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an

explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly

articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare

such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such

a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration

should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US

naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency

of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold

War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the

United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has

become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial

since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian

bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the

shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And

since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries

about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold

War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer

poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or

fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the

United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb

military strike against North Korea would probably trigger a devastating war on the

Korean Peninsula one in which the South would suffer greatly (South Korearsquos capital

Seoul is located within reach of North Korean artillery) This is one of the reasons the

South Korean government has strongly opposed any such strike and the United States

has felt compelled so far to honor South Korearsquos wishes In the Middle East by

contrast the countries that would most likely bear the brunt of Iranian retaliation for a

US counterproliferation strikemdashSaudi Arabia and Israel in particularmdashhave made it

clear that although they are hardly eager for war with Iran they would not stand in the

way of such a strike A LIMITED AIM Deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear

weapons by promising to prevent it with military action if necessary is justified

feasible and indeed crucial to protect vital US interests To be effective a policy of

deterrence will require clarity and credibility with the Iranian regime knowing just what

acts will trigger retaliation and having good reason to believe that Washington will

follow through on its threatsDuring the Cold War the United States was successful in

deterring a Soviet attack on its European allies but not in preventing a broader range of

communist initiatives In 1954 for example the Eisenhower administration announced

a policy of massive retaliation designed to deter communist provocations including

costly conventional wars like the recent one in Korea by promising an overpowering

response But the doctrine lacked the credibility needed to be effective and a decade

later the United States found itself embroiled in another similar war in VietnamIranrsquos

ruling clerics may well doubt that Washington would actually follow through on a threat

to punish Iranian cheatingIn the case of Iran the aim of deterrence would be specific

and limited preventing Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons Still a policy of

deterrence would have to cope with two difficulties One is the likelihood of Iranian

ldquosalami tacticsrdquomdashsmall violations of the JCPOA that gradually bring the Islamic

Republic closer to a bomb without any single infraction seeming dangerous enough to

trigger a severe response The other is the potential difficulty of detecting such

violations The Soviet Union could hardly have concealed a cross-border attack on

Western Europe but Iran is all too likely to try to develop the technology needed for

nuclear weapons clandestinely (the United States believes it has an extensive history of

doing so) and the loopholes in the agreementrsquos inspection provisions suggest that

keeping track of all of Iranrsquos bomb-related activities will be difficultAs for

credibilitymdashthat is persuading the target that force really will be used in the event of a

violationmdashthis posed a major challenge to the United States during the Cold War It

was certainly credible that Washington would retaliate for a direct Soviet attack on

North America but the United States also sought to deter an attack on allies thousands

of miles away even though in that case retaliation would have risked provoking a

Soviet strike on the American homeland Even some American allies such as French

President Charles de Gaulle expressed skepticism that the United States would go to

war to defend Europe The American government therefore went to considerable lengths

to ensure that North America and Western Europe were ldquocoupledrdquo in both Soviet and

Western European eyes repeatedly expressing its commitment to defend Europe and

stationing both troops and nuclear weapons there to trigger US involvement in any

European conflictIn some ways credibly threatening to carry out a strike against Iran

now would be easier Iran may have duplicated dispersed and hidden the various parts

of its nuclear program and Russia may sell Tehran advanced air defense systems but

the US military has or can develop the tactics and munitions necessary to cause

enough damage to lengthen the time Iran would need to build a bomb by years even

without the use of any ground troops The Iranians might retaliate against Saudi Arabia

or Israel (whether directly or through their Lebanese proxy Hezbollah) or attack

American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such

responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe

administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the

deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with

deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and

psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an

Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit

of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt

that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating

US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position

that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale

then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would

suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument

in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military

action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover

neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past

decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of

US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly

during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in

order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an

explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly

articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare

such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such

a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration

should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US

naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency

of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold

War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the

United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has

become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial

since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian

bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the

shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And

since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries

about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold

War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer

poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or

fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the

United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb

American military forces or sponsor acts of anti-American terrorism But such

responses could do only limited damage and would risk further punishmentThe

administration should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the

deployment of US naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region The problems with

deterring Iranrsquos acquisition of nuclear weapons are not practical but rather political and

psychological Having watched American leaders tolerate steady progress toward an

Iranian bomb over the years and then observed the Obama administrationrsquos avid pursuit

of a negotiated agreement on their nuclear program Iranrsquos ruling clerics may well doubt

that Washington would actually follow through on a threat to punish Iranian cheating

US President Barack Obama initially embraced the long-standing American position

that Iran should not be permitted to have the capacity to enrich uranium on a large scale

then abandoned it He backed away from his promise that the Syrian regime would

suffer serious consequences if it used chemical weapons He made it the core argument

in favor of the JCPOA that the alternative to it is war implying that American military

action against Iran is a dreadful prospect that must be avoided at all costs Moreover

neither he nor his predecessor responded to Iranrsquos meddling in Iraq over the past

decade even though Tehranrsquos support for Shiite militias there helped kill hundreds of

US troops The mullahs in Tehran may well consider the United States particularly

during this presidency to be a serial bluffer DOUBT NOT All of this suggests that in

order to keep Iran from going nuclear the JCPOA needs to be supplemented by an

explicit credible threat of military action To be credible such a threat must be publicly

articulated and resolutely communicated The Obama administration should declare

such a policy itself as should future administrations and Congress should enshrine such

a policy in formal resolutions passed with robust bipartisan support The administration

should reinforce the credibility of its promise by increasing the deployment of US

naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf region and stepping up the scope and frequency

of military exercises there in conjunction with its allies As in Europe during the Cold

War the goal of US policy should be to eliminate all doubts on all sides that the

United States will uphold its commitmentsThe debate about the Iran nuclear deal has

become politically polarized but a policy of deterrence should not be controversial

since all participants in the debate have endorsed the goal of preventing an Iranian

bomb In addition a robust policy of deterrence would help address some of the

shortcomings of the JCPOA without sacrificing or undermining its useful elements And

since the deterrence policy could and should be open ended it would help ease worries

about the provisions of the accord that expire after ten or 15 years As during the Cold

War the policy should end only when it becomes obsoletemdashthat is when Iran no longer

poses a threat to the international community Should the Islamic Republic evolve or

fall eliminating the need for vigilant concern about its capabilities and intentions the

United States could revisit the policy Until then deterrence is the policy to adopt Leia na iacutentegra httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesiranhow-prevent-iranian-bomb

DIREITOS HUMANOS

European Journal of International Law - Embedding Human

Rights in Internet Governance

Catherine Kent Lorna McGregor Daragh Murray and Ahmed Shaheed

In Resolution 56183 (2001) the UN General Assembly welcomed the creation of an

inter-governmental World Summit on the Information Society (lsquoWSISrsquo) to address the

digital revolution and the increasing digital divide between the global North and South

During the Summitrsquos two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) a common desire and

commitment to build a people-centred inclusive and development-orientated

Information Societyemerged A key objective was therefore to harness the power of

information and communications technology (ICT) to secure the realisation of the

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

A decade on and against the backdrop of the recent transition from the MDGs to the

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a review of the implementation of the WSIS

outcomes is underway Delegations met last week for the Second Preparatory Meeting

of the UN General Assemblyrsquos Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes

of the WSIS (lsquoWSIS+10 Reviewrsquo) The aim of this meeting was to engage member

States and other stakeholders to reach a consensus on critical issues such as the goals of

Internet governance the relationship between WSIS and development and how to

address human rights related to ICT Oral statements and written submissions served as

the basis for developing the current Zero Draft into a Second Draft The WSIS+10

Review will culminate in a High-Level Meeting on 15-16 December at which an

Outcome Document will be adopted

Treatment of human rights in the Zero Draft is inadequate A sub-section on human

rights is included within Internet governance and there are other brief references

scattered throughout the Draft However human rights are not presented as a

foundational principle of Internet governance but are rather narrowly confined to issues

of freedom of expression and the right to privacy In this post and in our response to the

Zero Draft as part of an ESRC Funded Large Grant on Human Rights and Information

Technology in an Era of Big Data we argue ]for a more systematic approach to human

rights in this process in order to reflect the full scope of the human rights issues raised

by the use of ICT and big data

Opportunities and Challenges Presented by the Use of ICT and Big Data

Technology has the potential to produce an impact on all aspects of society The use of

ICT is becoming essential to the conduct of government operations to business and to

individualsrsquo day-to-day lives ICT and human rights have become inextricably

intertwined and this is set to continue in line with progress towards the Information

Society This interconnectivity means that ICT has concrete human rights implications

which can be both positive and negative Significantly however the full extent of ICTrsquos

human rights implications are not yet known

The transformative potential of ICT and big data for the protection and promotion of

human rights is becoming increasingly apparent For example digital platforms have

facilitated local and global dialogue between human rights defenders minorities and

other democratic voices giving rise to the phrase lsquoliberation technologyrsquo Analytics and

the use of big data can assist in the identification of otherwise invisible forms of

vulnerability and discrimination This information can be utilised to target interventions

and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate

the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo

(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered

electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care

Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health

records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and

facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance

in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced

inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo

However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with

the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising

human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big

data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist

First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage

sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-

purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was

initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues

of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the

individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement

of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft

surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone

location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data

analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive

analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals

affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while

decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to

employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also

be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of

an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral

algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic

background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged

These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of

human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights

implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights

include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest

attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination

Foundational Principles of Internet Governance

ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious

threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and

challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access

to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this

purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos

transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the

individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the

enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet

governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual

participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet

governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the

collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition

set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our

view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a

human rights based approach

At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred

inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights

However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated

by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human

rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of

human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable

Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to

lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the

SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more

generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and

development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human

rights

While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it

should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to

international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based

approach should ensure

Equality and non-discrimination

True participation and inclusion

Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and

The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights

In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the

participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational

principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between

development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and

utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human

rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative

human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance

should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular

transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should

incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the

Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and

integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance

and to facilitate efficient resource allocation and can therefore be employed to facilitate

the achievement of the SDGs For example in relation to lsquogood health and well-beingrsquo

(Goal 3) the adoption of e-health and m-health (where health services are delivered

electronically or via mobile devices) can lead to cost-effective access to health care

Equally the analysis of data drawn from a significant number of electronic health

records (big data-based analytics) can be used to identify appropriate treatments and

facilitate early intervention reducing future health care costs Technological assistance

in the identification of vulnerability and discrimination also facilitates lsquoreduced

inequalitiesrsquo (Goal 10) and can assist in tackling the lsquodigital dividersquo

However the inappropriate use of ICT and big data has the potential to interfere with

the enjoyment of human rights and thereby undermine the opportunities for realising

human rights and attaining the SDGs There are three main areas in which ICT and big

data can enable violations of human rights if adequate safeguards do not exist

First as already acknowledged in the Zero Draft (para 43) the collection storage

sharing and re-purposing of personal data may infringe the right to privacy re-

purposing of data involves the use of data for a purpose different to that for which it was

initially collected potentially without the userrsquos consent or knowledge Second issues

of consent and re-purposing arise when data is used for a purpose for which the

individual that disclosed it did not originally consent These two forms of infringement

of rights can arise in the context of state surveillance or near ubiquitous non-state lsquosoft

surveillancersquo whereby monitoring of social media consumer activity and smartphone

location occurs on a routine daily basis Third decisions made on the basis of data

analysis can have significant human rights implications For example predictive

analytics may be utilised to identify lsquohigh riskrsquo and therefore high cost individuals

affecting their access to health care or the affordability of health insurance while

decisions made on the basis of data analysis may equally affect individualsrsquo access to

employment or credit This may result in direct discrimination Discrimination may also

be indirect For instance predictive analytics may be used to determine the suitability of

an individual for a particular health care intervention However an ostensibly neutral

algorithm may disproportionately affect individuals from a particular socio-economic

background thereby further disadvantaging the disadvantaged

These examples illustrate how the use of ICT and big data may result in a wide range of

human rights violations beyond privacy which is often how negative human rights

implications of ICT and big data are narrowly framed Potentially affected human rights

include the rights to freedom of expression to liberty to health to work to the highest

attainable standard of living and to equality and non-discrimination

Foundational Principles of Internet Governance

ICT and big data can therefore be seen as both potentially transformative and a serious

threat to the enjoyment of human rights This tension requires that the opportunities and

challenges are not considered in isolation For example an individual could gain access

to the Internet to seek medical advice with consent to their data being used for this

purpose This contributes to reducing the digital divide and highlights the Internetrsquos

transformative potential However this data may then be re-purposed without the

individualrsquos knowledge invalidating their original consent and posing a real risk to the

enjoyment of a range of rights This is why we argue that a holistic approach to Internet

governance that overcomes the digital divide through greater informed and consensual

participation while simultaneously protecting against risk is required By Internet

governance we refer to both the regulation of the evolution of technology and the

collection storage sharing use and re-purposing of data as per the working definition

set out in the Tunis Agenda (para 34) and reaffirmed in the Zero Draft (para 32) In our

view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a

human rights based approach

At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred

inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights

However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated

by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human

rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of

human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable

Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to

lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the

SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more

generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and

development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human

rights

While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it

should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to

international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based

approach should ensure

Equality and non-discrimination

True participation and inclusion

Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and

The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights

In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the

participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational

principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between

development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and

utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human

rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative

human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance

should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular

transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should

incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the

Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and

integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance

view Internet governance has to integrate international human rights law and take a

human rights based approach

At the time of Tunis the three pillars of the Information Society ndash lsquopeople-centred

inclusive and development-orientatedrsquo ndash did not obviously encompass human rights

However the concept of inclusive and people-centred development is today articulated

by the UN to include a clear human rights commitment often expressed as a human

rights based approach to development For example the importance and relevance of

human rights for development is recognised in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable

Development grounding itself in inter alia the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

and international human rights treaties and emphasising the responsibilities of States to

lsquorespect protect and promote human rightsrsquo (paras 10 19) The connection with the

SDGs is seen as central to the WSIS+10 process and to Internet governance more

generally It is therefore critical that the language of a people-centred inclusive and

development-orientated approach explicitly recognises the connection with human

rights

While the precise meaning of lsquohuman rights based approachrsquo is debated in our view it

should mean applying human rights norms and principles with specific reference to

international human rights standards to policy and programmes A human rights based

approach should ensure

Equality and non-discrimination

True participation and inclusion

Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights and

The tripartite obligation to respect protect and fulfil human rights

In our submission to the WSIS+10 Review we therefore recommended that the

participating states consider explicitly including human rights as a foundational

principle and key goal of Internet governance in order to highlight the links between

development ICT big data and human rights In our view the development and

utilisation of ICT and big data should be guided and regulated by international human

rights law in order to facilitate the realisation of human rights while avoiding negative

human rights consequences whether intentional or unintentional Internet governance

should be framed around fundamental human rights principles in particular

transparency openness inclusivity non-discrimination and equality and should

incorporate the right to an effective remedy We therefore consider it critical that the

Zero Draft move beyond narrow and fragmented approaches to human rights and

integrate them holistically within the governance of the Internet Leia na iacutentegra httpwwwejiltalkorgembedding-human-rights-in-internet-governance