IMVF Proceedings 1/2013 - A Parceria África-Europa em construção: que futuro?

A PARCERIA EUROPA-ÁFRICA EM CONSTRUÇÃO

1 IMVF PROCEEDINGS 1/2013

A PARCERIA ÁFRICA-EUROPA EM CONSTRUÇÃO: QUE FUTURO? Conferência realizada na Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian em 13 e 14 de Dezembro de 2012

Proceedings 1/2013



Abstract

This publication summarises some of the presentations and discussions at the international conference Building the Africa-Europe partnership: what next?, held in Lisbon on December 2012. Bearing in mind the 2014 EU-Africa Summit, the conference aimed at debating some of the major themes that will continue to impact on the building of the Africa-Europe partnership and on international development cooperation in forthcoming years. The definition of a post-2015 global development agenda, which necessarily links complex issues such as security, environment, governance and growth, underpinned the discussions on the sessions.

Esta publicação resume algumas das apresentações e debates da conferência internacional A Parceria África-Europa em construção: que futuro?, realizada em Lisboa em Dezembro de 2012. Tendo em conta a próxima Cimeira África-UE em 2014, a conferência teve por objetivo debater alguns dos principais temas que continuarão a ter impacto na construção da parceria euro-africana e na cooperação para o desenvolvimento nos próximos anos. A definição de uma agenda global para o desenvolvimento pós-2015, que necessariamente liga questões complexas como a segurança, o ambiente, a governação e o crescimento, marcou transversalmente os debates.

Keywords: Europe, Africa, Global Development, Development Financing, Security, Demography

Palavras-Chave: Europa, África, Desenvolvimento global, Financiamento do desenvolvimento, Segurança, Demografia

SOBRE A PUBLICAÇÃO

Esta publicação deve ser citada como: IMVF (2013); A Parceria Europa-África em Construção: Que Futuro? Relatório da Conferência realizada na Fundação Gulbenkian em 13-14 Dezembro 2012, IMVF Proceedings 1/2013, Lisboa.

Pode copiar, fazer download ou imprimir o conteúdo desta publicação [recomendamos a utilização de papel reciclado ou certificado] . Pode incluir trechos desta publicação nos seus documentos, apresentações, blogs e websites desde que a fonte seja mencionada.

As intervenções são apresentadas no idioma em que foram feitas. A edição dos conteúdos foi feita por Patrícia Magalhães Ferreira. O conteúdo desta publicação é da exclusiva responsabilidade do editor.

Esta publicação é resultado de uma colaboração entre o Instituto Marquês de Valle Flor, o Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e

Internacionais, o European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) e o Centro de Estudos Africanos do ISCTE-IUL,

com a participação da Europe-Africa Policy Research Network (EARN).

A Conferência foi financiada pelo Camões-Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua, contando igualmente com o apoio da Fundação

Portugal-África e da Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian.

Saiba mais sobre o IMVF em www.imvf.org

http://www.imvf.org/



ÍNDICE

1. ENQUADRAMENTO 4

2. RESUMO DOS PAINÉIS 5

3. INTERVENÇÕES DOS ORADORES 8

3.1. ABERTURA DA CONFERÊNCIA 8

3.2. A CRISE 13

3.3. OS DESAFIOS DEMOGRÁFICOS 26

3.4. SEGURANÇA 49

3.5. FLUXOS E ACTORES DO DESENVOLVIMENTO 62

3.6. O FUTURO 79

3.7. ENCERRAMENTO DA CONFERÊNCIA 93

4. ANEXOS 100

4.1. PROGRAMA 101

4.2. BIOGRAFIAS DOS ORADORES | ABOUT THE SPEAKERS 103

4.3. LISTA DE PARTICIPANTES 109

PARA SABER MAIS… || FURTHER READING 113



1. ENQUADRAMENTO A conferência internacional A Parceria África-Europa em construção: que futuro? foi organizada pelo Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr (IMVF), o Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais (IEEI) e o Centro de Estudos Africanos do ISCTE-IUL, em parceria com o European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), e decorreu nos dias 13 e 14 de Dezembro na Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian. Os organizadores fazem parte da rede Europe-Africa Policy Research Network (EARN), que agrupa 25 membros, entre think tanks, instituições académicas e da sociedade civil africana e europeia, e que produz contributos e análises independentes na promoção do diálogo político entre os dois continentes. Os próximos anos assistirão a decisões fundamentais sobre as prioridades e objetivos do Desenvolvimento, bem como sobre o quadro das relações entre a União Europeia e África, para as quais é importante o contributo da investigação prática e de debates multidisciplinares que reflitam a complexidade crescente das novas dinâmicas globais. Na verdade, embora os desafios da segurança e do desenvolvimento tenham implicações profundas para os países desenvolvidos e em desenvolvimento, para a sociedade civil e para os decisores políticos, na Europa e na África, não têm ainda sido suficientemente analisados em termos dos impactos sobre os dois continentes e sobre o seu relacionamento. Tendo em conta a Cimeira África-UE em 2014, a conferência teve por objetivo debater alguns dos principais temas que continuarão a ter impacto na construção da parceria euro-africana e na cooperação para o desenvolvimento nos próximos anos. A definição de uma agenda global para o desenvolvimento pós-2015, que necessariamente ligará questões complexas como a segurança, o ambiente, a governação e o crescimento, marcou transversalmente os debates. Os temas abordados por mais de 20 oradores europeus e africanos e cerca de 100 participantes focaram o impacto na parceria da crise internacional, das tendências demográficas, dos problemas de segurança no norte de África e no Sahel, do surgimento de novos parceiros e do financiamento do desenvolvimento. Este relatório pretende resumir algumas das questões debatidas, das apresentações feitas pelos oradores e dos aspectos mais salientados nos diversos painéis.



2. RESUMO DOS PAINÉIS

Os debates foram organizados em 4 sessões e 1 painel:

Os aspetos mais salientados e discutidos nos diversos painéis foram os seguintes:

Crise || África e Europa vivem momentos diversos, com a primeira a experimentar fortes taxas de

crescimento nos últimos dez anos e a segunda mergulhada numa dinâmica de estagnação e crise política

e institucional do modelo de integração. Estas realidades contrárias têm vindo a colocar em causa os

paradigmas de ajuda, com condicionalidades políticas a serem secundarizadas em favor de interesses

económicos mútuos. A entrada de novos parceiros emergentes, designadamente da China acelerou estas

dinâmicas, cujos efeitos deverão produzir uma alteração progressiva nas agendas fazendo deslocar o eixo

da parceria das questões da ajuda para as do negócios e desenvolvimento.

Sessão 1

Crise Internacional

Impacto na Europa, na África e nas suas relações

Sessão 2

Desafios demográficos

Na sustentabilidade dos modelos de crescimento e na ajuda ao

desenvolvimento

Sessão 3

Ameaças de Segurança

O Norte de África, o Sahel e os países vizinhos

Sessão 4

Fluxos e Atores do Desenvolvimento: Novos doadores e investidores

e ajuda versus negócios

Painel

A Cimeira UE-África de 2014 & A Agenda Global de Desenvolvimento pós-2015



Demografia || Os desafios demográficos dos parceiros apresentam prioridades diferenciadas. No caso

europeu, a realidade é de envelhecimento da população, com uma crise de sustentabilidade dos modelos

de segurança social, agravada pelas políticas anti-imigração vigentes. Confrontados com os problemas

políticos e económicos do curto prazo, com taxas de crescimento decrescentes e o aumento do

desemprego, os países europeus têm evitado enfrentar as políticas necessárias, de natalidade e de

migração, para contrapor o impacto do envelhecimento populacional. No caso africano, as taxas de

crescimento demográfico têm-se mantido acima do limite de renovação geracional (2,1% ao ano),

originando problemas nos ritmos de urbanização e superiores aos da oferta de emprego, principalmente

aos jovens, levando à multiplicação de fenómenos sociais de marginalização e pressão social, sendo, por

isso, contrariamente ao caso europeu, prioritário o controle e planificação do crescimento populacional.

Neste contexto, o investimento nos sistemas de saúde e o empoderamento das mulheres assumem um

papel fundamental, querem termos de políticas de planeamento familiar quer na saúde sexual e

reprodutiva em geral, que se reflecte também em indicadores como a mortalidade materna e infantil. Foi

ainda salientada a falta de relevância das questões demográficas nas políticas governamentais, apesar da

sua relevância no médio e longo-prazo, bem como a falta de conhecimentos para implementar programas

abrangentes e inovadores, nomeadamente no campo da juventude e emprego.

Segurança || As questões de segurança em vastas regiões do Sahel e limítrofes foram priorizadas nas

discussões do painel, tendo sido salientada a necessidade de investir mais no conhecimento dos

fenómenos em curso evitando os sound-bites dos órgãos de informação e das forças políticas interessadas

em fazer vingar a sua versão da realidade. Neste contexto foi salientada a necessidade de centrar as

eventuais decisões de intervenção militar nos organismos regionais africanos, evitando a intervenção

unilateral de forças internacionais e europeias. O caso Líbio foi lembrado, designadamente para salientar

a oposição da União Africana à intervenção da NATO naquele país que foi desconsiderada; foi igualmente

lembrada a fragilidade demonstrada pelo regime maliano, em oposição ao nigerino, para lidar com as

consequências do desaparecimento do regime líbio, apesar do Mali ser até recentemente apontado como

exemplo de estabilidade e democracia em África. Foi ainda referida a existência de “double standards” na

actuação da União Europeia face a estes países, o que prejudica a assunção deste bloco como actor

político efectivo no plano global.

Financiamento || O impacto em África do crescimento da procura internacional de matérias-primas

desde o início da década anterior, o aparecimento de “novos” parceiros, particularmente da China (mas

não só) e o regresso do investimento privado foram salientados no painel. O crescimento nas ofertas de

financiamento sem condicionalidades políticas para obras de infraestrutura abriu uma janela de

oportunidade à generalidade dos países africanos e melhorou o ambiente de negócio atraindo novamente

o investimento privado internacional e nacional. Reflectiu-se, assim, numa maior capacidade negocial

destes países, que agora têm um espaço de manobra mais alargado para implementação das suas

próprias estratégias de desenvolvimento. Foi também referido que, contrariamente ao caso europeu,

onde uma significativa parte dos países membros da UE apresentam dificuldades nos respetivos

indicadores macroeconómicos, particularmente no peso da dívida e dos défices orçamentais nos PIB, a

generalidade dos países africanos, fruto do ajustamento estrutural e dos perdões de dívida anteriormente

realizados, apresentam melhores indicadores. No entanto, sabemos hoje que não havendo redução da

pobreza sem crescimento económico, pode existir grande crescimento económico sem redução da



pobreza e até com acentuação das desigualdades internas, pelo que o desafio está exactamente em

construir um crescimento inclusivo e sustentável. Paralelamente a estas considerações, foram abordadas

as principais questões relativas à reavaliação dos critérios do que efectivamente constitui Ajuda Pública

ao Desenvolvimento, como esta se interliga com outros fluxos externos e com outras políticas (numa

lógica de coerência), levantando-se a questão geral de como avaliar o esforço global de cada país para o

desenvolvimento.

Futuro da parceria || Foi transversal aos debates a ideia de que as relações ainda são marcadas por um

pendor assistencialista e por pré-conceitos históricos que afectam a confiança mútua entre as partes,

para além faltar à parceria “tracção política”, ou seja, de ainda ser necessário percorrer um longo

caminho para que exista uma verdadeira parceria política ao nível continental entre as duas partes. Foi

salientada a necessidade de relançar a parceria em novos moldes, passando progressivamente o discurso

e a prática do domínio quase exclusivo da ajuda para o domínio do diálogo político efectivo e da criação

de ambientes que favoreçam o investimento e as relações comerciais, com responsabilização de ambas as

partes. É, portanto, altura para os dois continentes repensarem os seus interesses no quadro deste

relacionamento, as suas mais-valias como parceiros e as imagens/percepções mútuas que ainda marcam

essas relações, investindo num diálogo mais franco e aberto sobre os seus interesses reais.

“ There is a need for a political and mental shift in the way we perceive this partnership relation.”



3. INTERVENÇÕES DOS ORADORES

3.1. Abertura da Conferência

Paulo Telles de Freitas Presidente do Conselho de Administração, Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr Esta conferência vem numa altura crítica para o futuro da Europa e, digamos, de toda a organização e relacionamento entre os diferentes continentes. Esta conferência é organizada pelo Instituto Marquês de Valle Flor em parceria com o Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais, o Centro de Estudos Africanos do ISCTE e também com o European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECPDM); todas estas organizações são membros da rede Europe-Africa Policy Research Network (EARN), que agrupa membros da sociedade civil instituições académicas, produzindo análises independentes na promoção do diálogo politico entre os dois continentes, Europa e África. Cabe agradecer pelo patrocínio desta conferência ao Camões - Instituto da Cooperação da Língua, principal financiador, e à Fundação Portugal África e a Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, fundação companheira de muitos projectos do Instituo Marquês de Valle Flor e que nos acolhe aqui nesta casa com história. Esta conferência vai focar vários temas de interesse, nomeadamente o impacto da crise económica internacional no relacionamento entre os dois continentes. A Europa passa, como sabem, por um momento de crise, que não é só económica mas também uma crise de projecto. Todo o modelo de integração europeia está em crise, está outra vez em refundação, e o impacto que esta crise europeia vai ter no relacionamento com o continente africano é um dos temas do primeiro painel. O II painel vai focar a segurança internacional e o impacto que a evolução recentemente verificada, nomeadamente nos países no Norte de África, com a mudança de regimes e a instabilidade gerada, vai ter



impacto não só nos países vizinhos mas também na União Europeia. Em termos demográficos, o III painel vai centrar-se-á na geografia mundial da pobreza, os novos conceitos de pobreza, a degradação económica dos países não só da Europa mas de alguns países de África, contrastando com outros países de África que registam um aumento significativo dos seus rendimentos. Todo o panorama económico mudou nos últimos cinco anos e isto tem certamente impactos que importa analisar, já que a deterioração económica verifica-se na Europa, em contraste com alguns países de África que estão em grande aceleração da economia. Finalmente, a recente diversificação dos parceiros externos de África com as novas economias emergentes e o papel destes como novos doadores no continente africano, obrigam-nos a reflectir sobre quais são os objectivos dessas novas parcerias, nomeadamente a importância desta diversificação de fluxos financeiros para o desenvolvimento de África.

Nuno Guimarães Pró-Reitor para a Internacionalização, ISCTE-IUL O que eu gostava de trazer aqui era a perspectiva do ISCTE-IUL sobre as parcerias África-Europa, no âmbito do espaço da internacionalização que temos vindo a desenvolver e que vamos desenvolver no futuro. Qual é a nossa teoria, que é a teoria obviamente própria do ISCTE na área do conhecimento, da formação avançada e da internacionalização? Como é que essa teoria é construída? O ISCTE possui, desde há décadas, várias actividades relacionadas com os temas aqui abordados. Por um lado, os estudos sobre temas africanos, ou seja, o Centro de Estudos Africanos, apesar de ter sido criado institucionalmente nos anos noventa, tem raízes já na década de 1980, sendo uma estrutura que corporiza um património científico maduro. Do ponto de vista da formação, há cerca de 15 a 20 anos o ISCTE começou a desenvolver actividades fora de Portugal. Temos cerca de dois mil e duzentos diplomados pelo mundo fora, sendo que a maioria é em África e depois uma segunda parte entre o Brasil e o Oriente, nomeadamente Macau e China. Tentando colocar o pensamento antes da acção, esta experiência e este grupo de pessoas faz-nos construir uma teoria com dois princípios fundamentais. Em primeiro lugar, estes quadros de referência na parceria com África são crescentemente distribuídos e multipolares, ou seja, já não faz muito sentido estabelecer uma parceria que seja entre Lisboa e a capital de outro país. Podemos referenciar, a este propósito, o facto de existir actualmente uma preocupação e discussão sobre a pertinência de integrar os Estudos Africanos com outro tipo de Estudos, Estudos Asiáticos, com Estudos de dimensão de outras geografias, porque o próprio estudo de natureza científica destes temas deve ser mais multipolar e mais alargado a outras geografias. Não é possível também, no campo da formação (e particularmente na formação avançada, de mestrado e doutoramento) pensar em programas para leccionar em Luanda, Maputo ou Cabo Verde, sem ter em conta a cooperação que temos com instituições académicas brasileiras, ou mesmo instituições académicas chinesas. Existe, portanto, uma certa multipolaridade que emerge. Um terceiro exemplo que reforça esta ideia é que, quando patrocinamos o encontro de estudantes de Angola, Moçambique, Cabo Verde, China, Brasil ou outros países, estabelecem-se ligações entre alguns desses parceiros que não incluem necessariamente Portugal. Assim, nesta rede (que até é uma rede pessoal mas também é uma rede de colaborações académicas, cientificas, empresariais), o ISCTE não se pode pôr no papel de “nó principal” ou exclusivo, por onde tudo tem de passar. Somos um nó razoavelmente relevante, na medida em que somos motivadores e promotores, e



esperamos ser um nó que contribui para a sustentação da rede, mas muitas das cooperações vão ocorrer entre parceiros que participam na mesma rede, em que nós não somos exclusivos ou determinantes dessa rede. Assim, na nossa perspectiva, o olhar para a Cooperação com África deve ser feito crescentemente, no campo do ensino e da formação, numa perspectiva multipolar. Há ainda um outro aspecto que tem vindo a evoluir no caso do ISCTE. Até agora, a tradição da colaboração com África tem sido feita numa perspectiva não apenas marcadamente bilateral, mas também muito baseada na unidade - seja o projecto, o curso, a acção de formação -, que é muito segmentada no tempo. Há um curso, nós participamos no curso, podemos leccionar mais ou menos disciplinas, os professores vão, alguns alunos até vêm defender os seus trabalhos, mas há um fim da acção e as dinâmicas terminam (ou são retomadas noutra edição dessa mesma acção). Por outras palavras, não há uma criação de uma estrutura institucional, pelo que pensamos que o próximo salto tem que ser no sentido da criação de instituições ou de estruturas para-institucionais com esses países, como Moçambique, Angola, ou Cabo Verde. Há várias tendências que justificam isto. Por um lado, as necessidades nestas economias crescem de forma tão rápida que não é possível manter o sistema granular da Cooperação pontual e, portanto, até para ir de encontro às necessidades é necessário criar instituições. Por outro lado, relativamente aos nossos parceiros, trata-se da criação de capital local, de capital intelectual e capital científico próprio, pelo que, cada vez mais (e independentemente do modelo anterior continuar a funcionar) as novidades vão necessariamente acontecer na criação de instituições multinacionais e transnacionais. Não sabemos bem como é que estas se organizarão, ou como é que as pessoas vão navegar nesse espaço, mas neste âmbito da formação avançada de base científica e académica, o ISCTE antecipa que iremos progressivamente criar instituições com parcerias de capital, com investimento directo estrangeiro de instituições académicas portuguesas nesses países, e de investimento directo estrangeiro de instituições desses países em Portugal. Esta é a nossa perspectiva, ou seja, estamos a pensar de uma maneira muito balanceada e não no modelo bilateral, desequilibrado, em que há um pólo que orienta a parceria e um pólo que é receptor dessa parceira. Sintetizando, as duas ideias ou tendências que gostaria de salientar no campo do conhecimento são, por um lado, a multipolaridade e, por outro lado, uma transformação das formas de parceria em formas institucionais mais sustentadas.

Francisco Almeida Leite Vogal do Conselho Diretivo, Camões - Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua É com imensa satisfação que a Cooperação Portuguesa se associa a esta iniciativa, agora através do novo Camões - Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua, que é não só o organismo coordenador da Cooperação Portuguesa, mas que também passou a ser responsável pelas funções das duas instituições que no passado recente eram responsáveis, quer pela Cooperação para o Desenvolvimento, quer pela divulgação da Língua e da Cultura Portuguesa no estrangeiro. Trata-se de um novo organismo, mas que retoma na íntegra todas as funções e o empenho então a cargo do ex-IPAD, Instituto Português de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento, relativamente à Cooperação para o Desenvolvimento, incluindo no que diz respeito ao fortalecimento das relações entre a União Europeia e África. Há já alguns anos que o então IPAD, agora Camões, tem vindo a colaborar com as entidades envolvidas na organização desta conferência, com particular atenção para as relações UE-África, às quais Portugal atribui a maior importância. A realização desta conferência é aliás uma prova inegável da importância desta colaboração. O tema escolhido pelos organizadores desta Conferência Internacional não podia ser mais oportuno, pois o futuro das relações entre a Europa e a África é um desafio incontornável, que tem a maior actualidade



no relacionamento entre os dois continentes, encontrando-se numa fase crucial. Portugal, até pela sua ligação secular e histórica ao continente africano, tem procurado desempenhar um papel activo no estabelecimento do diálogo, com vista ao reforço de um relacionamento mais estreito entre União Europeia e África. Recordo que foi durante a presidência portuguesa da União Europeia, no ano 2000, e após ultrapassadas muitas vicissitudes, que se conseguiram reunir as condições para que a primeira Cimeira Europa-África, que reuniu os Chefes de Estado dos dois continentes, se realizasse no Cairo. Portugal voltou a ter um papel determinante para que a segunda Cimeira, a chamada Cimeira de Lisboa, fosse por nós organizada durante a Presidência Portuguesa de 2007. Como é sabido, foi nessa Cimeira de Lisboa que se lançou a Estratégia Conjunta África-UE, em cuja negociação Portugal se orgulha de ter participado na qualidade de Presidência da União. Esta estratégia veio efectivamente elevar a relação África-União Europeia a um novo patamar estratégico, com uma parceira politica reforçada e uma cooperação mais intensa a vários níveis. A Estratégia é baseada num consenso Euro-Africano assente em valores e interesses comuns e procura reforçar quer a cooperação económica, cada vez mais importante nos dias que correm, quer o desenvolvimento sustentável em ambos os continentes, para que possam viver lado a lado e em paz, segurança, prosperidade, solidariedade e sobretudo dignidade humana. Contudo, a concretização destes ambiciosos objectivos não é fácil tendo nomeadamente em conta os diversos acontecimentos e os desafios que a conjuntura internacional coloca actualmente. O ultrapassar destes obstáculos, no sentido da construção de uma parceria com futuro, pode beneficiar das respostas às questões que os organizadores desta conferência levantam, e de entre os quais eu destaco, desde logo, o impacto da crise financeira internacional nos dois continentes. Primeiro desafio: Como é que a Europa vai lidar com os constrangimentos financeiros que ameaçam o novo quadro financeiro plurianual 2014-2020, que poderão pôr em causa o tradicional papel de primeiro doador global e o cumprimento de compromissos assumidos internacionalmente em termos de Ajuda Pública ao Desenvolvimento? Segundo desafio: Que mecanismos alternativos se podem accionar para manter esse papel? Terceiro desafio: Como se vai posicionar face à crescente intervenção e relevância dos países emergentes? Quarto desafio: Como dinamizar e fortalecer mecanismos complementares de ajuda e financiamento, através do reforço necessário do papel de outros atores como as Organizações da Sociedade Civil e do Sector Privado, sem se pôr em causa o principal objectivo que rege a Ajuda Pública ao Desenvolvimento, que é a luta contra a pobreza? Em África, nos últimos dez ou quinze anos, pelo menos ao nível económico, tem-se verificado um crescimento assinalável e continuado. Como vai África reagir à estagnação que tem atravessado a economia europeia? Por último, como é que os países africanos concretizam a sua integração regional? Como ultrapassam situações cada vez mais complexas, de diálogo entre as diversas organizações económicas regionais? Por aquilo que expus aqui, os desafios são muitos e não deveram ser negligenciados. Porém, esta parceria encerra um potencial enorme, incluindo ao nível da execução de assuntos de interesse comum, que deverá ser devidamente aproveitado. Entre estes assuntos conta-se, por exemplo, o processo de definição do quadro para o Desenvolvimento pós-2015, data limite para a concretização dos actuais Objectivos do Milénio, onde uma concertação estratégica entre a União Europeia e a África se assume de cada vez maior importância. Enquanto principal doador internacional e importante actor político e global, a União Europeia poderá, e deverá, ser capaz de assumir uma posição activa e concertada neste processo, estando prevista para breve a apresentação de uma comunicação da Comissão Europeia sobre o quadro pós-2015. Esta comunicação servirá de base à definição da posição europeia para a discussão que terá lugar no quadro das Nações Unidas. Cabe-lhe também uma responsabilidade importante ao nível da promoção de consensos e de envolvimento dos seus parceiros estratégicos neste processo, assegurando que as suas preocupações e necessidades ficam reflectidas na futura agenda global do Desenvolvimento, que se pretende que seja tão inclusiva como consensual. O



diálogo União Europeia-África reveste-se, assim, de uma importância óbvia neste quadro, devendo este ser um tema central neste relacionamento ao longo dos próximos anos. Esta será uma das questões relativamente à qual a parceria estratégica estabelecida entre os dois continentes poderá ter um papel crucial. Aguardamos com expectativa os resultados da discussão sobre esta e outras questões, que serão certamente um contributo importante para a reflexão em torno do futuro das relações União Europeia-África na próxima Cimeira, prevista para 2014.



3.2. A Crise

Hélder Oliveira Fundação Portugal-África Moderador Pensamos muito mais na Europa do que na relação que a Europa pode ter com outras áreas que puderam e podem, em determinadas circunstâncias, contribuir significativamente para a solução da crise que estamos a enfrentar na Europa. A crise que vivemos é económica, mas é também uma crise de valores e uma crise de confiança. A relação com outros países, com outras áreas do mundo, designadamente com África, pode contribuir para que possamos ultrapassar esta crise. A transição de um pensamento um pouco eurocêntrico para uma perspectiva mais universal pode ser uma mais-valia para o desenvolvimento dos debates desta conferência.

Adebayo Olukoshi Director of UN African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP ) and Executive Director, Africa Governance Institute (AGI), Dakar When I read the outline on the subject of this panel, I was tempted to ask: Crisis? What crisis? In a certain sense there’s a very eurocentric reading of the crisis: an European crisis is not necessarily an African crisis, and Africa is actually in a moment in which the narrative of growth is actually the dominant narrative today. So, coming from Africa, you tell me about crisis and the impact on Africa, but what crisis are you talking about at the end of the day? I want to first of all situate the current crisis which began in 2007/8 in the broader flow of crisis which have characterised the contemporary experience of globalisation, which itself has been underpinned by the unidirectional strategy of liberalisation across the world (of trade liberalisation, of financial liberalisation, of capital accounts’ liberalisation, broadly speaking of market reforms). You can call it

O impacto da crise internacional na parceria Europa-África

Os efeitos combinados da crise financeira internacional e da crise do Euro, bem como o debate sobre modelos de austeridade versus modelos de crescimento, continuarão seguramente a influenciar a parceria e as perspetivas de cooperação UE-África. A Europa permanece indecisa sobre o seu futuro e papel como ator global, vivendo hoje uma fase aguda de crise do modelo de integração, o que exerce pressão sobre políticas e fundos destinados ao desenvolvimento internacional. Por seu lado, não obstante o seu crescimento continuado, as economias africanas não deixam de ser igualmente afetadas pela crise internacional e pelos efeitos da crise económica e política europeia.

Principais questões debatidas:

Quais são os principais impactos da crise em ambos os continentes?

De que forma se refletem nas relações UE-África?



Washington consensus, you can call it new liberalism but that has been the dominant theme underpinning the current face of globalisation. And from that point of view, the disconnections and the disfunctionalities that have been associated with the process of unidirectional and rapid accelerated liberalisation across the world has, in fact, played out over the last 20 to 25 years in repeated episodes of crisis. So, the latest financial and economic crisis is, in fact, only one in a series. We can go back to Mexico in 1982, when the Government of Mexico declared its inability to continue to pay its debts and the impact that had on the global economy, especially in the American banking system, which was heavily exposed in terms of loans to the Mexican economy. Moving on to Brazil, and the repeated currency crisis which Brazil experienced and the various plans which were put in place to try to save the Real, the Cruzeiro and the rest until the arrival of the Cardoso in power, and his success in stabilising the economy and restoring the Brazilian currency. Move on to Argentina, where there was a boom, which was presided over by Carlos Menem and soon after it become a meltdown in which effectively the value of the money was completely wiped out and the establishment of the currency board, which was basically an instrument that imposed a very tight fiscal regime and foreign exchange money system on the economy of Mexico. We can move on to Asia, in the 1997/8 crisis, which in a more dramatic expression resulted in the overthrow of the Suharto regime but also affected Korea, Malaysia and the rest. All of these episodes of crisis have pointed to a major disconnect in the international economic system, in a context of massive accelerated liberalisation and in the disconnection between finance and production. When it finally hit home in the USA, with the subprime crisis in 2007 and 2008, what for me was significant about it, is that it marked the first time in the current phase of globalisation in which the crisis (that is inbuilt into the system of liberalisation) hit the very centre of international capitalism and it changed the narrative of crisis management completely. Going back again to the crisis of Mexico, and to what Africa itself experienced on the 1980´s (when Mexico went into crisis, many African countries were put in this situation of debt unsustainability and balance of payments’ problems), as well as when it happened in Asia, the main narrative was essentially that many of those countries were suffering crisis of crony capitalism. They were put on regimes of corruption and neo-patrimonialism, which came to boost and translate it into crisis. When it hit home in the Unites States, the narrative was not the same. And the actions which were taken to try to manage the crisis run in direct contradiction to the precise actions which were prescribed for Latin America, Africa and Asia facing with similar crisis of accumulation. In the context of Africa, Asia and Latin America, the dominant crisis management approach was one of deflation. Economies were in crisis, essentially Washington Consensus said: squeeze them all, in order to put them back into ship. Structural adjustments were essentially about deflation. When the crisis hit in the United Sates and spread rapidly to Europe, the basic theme was one of reflation, how to reflate economies. Notions like quantitative easing invented by the Bank of England, basically meant pumping money into the economy. Keynesianism, which was thought to be dead, suddenly came back to become the key instrument, for the management of crisis and the message was how to avoid the economic crisis from becoming a depression. American nationalising? Britain nationalising? Not just pumping money into the economy but nationalising private institutions “too big to fail”? Notions that kind resonated heavily in the African world and the African context, and it would be very interesting to compare the similarities and differences in experience of Africa and Europe with adjustment. Perhaps with the partial exception of Greece, which probably has undergone serial structural adjustments in African style, the rest of Europe has somehow manage to push a narrative in which the message has been that we need to reflate, we need to prevent depression, we cannot squeeze an economy that is already in crisis. These are the same arguments which Africans



scholars and policy officials made against structural adjustment, that were dismissed as simply pledging special interests and not wanting to take painful decisions. This current crisis, therefore, came in the context in which, after twenty five years of economic stagnation and decline, Africa began to growth more than before. In the period before, growth rounded three to four per cent, equated with the rate of population growth, which did not reflected in economic transformation, as would have been desired. In the worst cases economies actually suffered a regression and negative growth rates were experienced in several African countries. With the dawn of the new millennium, with the rise of China, with the growing appetite of India and other new players and a commodity boom that began to be experienced, African countries returned to the path of growth, to the point that today six of the ten fastest growth economies in the world are in Africa. That sifted the narrative about the continent from an Afro-pessimism that dominated the 80’s and 90’s, into what I call an Afro-enthusiasm, which could itself be as irresponsible as yesterdays’ Afro-pessimism, because the over enthusiasm about Africa’s growth prospects also masks several important challenges which the continent that need to address. It also produces one-sided narrative of progress and happiness, which actually does not exist on the ground as exemplified by the events which took place in Tunisia and other northern African countries; I n general, and in different parts of the continent, people are not feeling the impact of growth in their pockets. African countries entered into a period of growth at the same time as the current international financial and economic crisis broke out, and immediately raised concerns in the continent as to whether Africa would not be penalised for a crisis for which it did not have any responsibility. Having passed twenty five years of structural adjustment and finally beginning to resume growth, the biggest concern of officials was how Africa would sustain growth in the face of the crisis; from the African Development Bank to the African Union and to the Economic Commission for Africa, calls were made to Africa’s development partners to be prepared to set aside resources, to compensate Africa for losses it might suffer as a result of the crisis which was not originated on the African continent. It is true that the initial crisis of 2007/2008 did impact on several African countries, particularly those with the most intricate connections to the international economic system. The fastest impact of the crisis was in stock markets almost all across the world, from Lagos to Nairobi or to Johannesburg. As capital was withdrawn (remember that capital accounts had been liberalised across the world, and so portfolio investors from Europe and America in the face of the financial crisis were rapidly recalling their moneys and domestic investments, particularly the banks that were making a fortune from trading stocks themselves also began to withdraw rapidly from the stocks in which they have invested), we saw a massive collapse of stock markets across the continent between 2008 and 2010. Collapse of stock markets carried consequences in terms of the ruination of many middle class investors, as well as small investor, because in some countries and banks loans were given to people to buy stocks (e.g.Nigeria). People went to the banks and took loans in order to buy stocks, then perhaps in some weeks you could double the value of your stocks, pay back your loan, take more loans, and a cycle was produced in which people actually began to depend on stock markets’ speculation for making a living, more than actually investing in the real sectors of the economy. Again this was a manifestation of the “financialisation” which we have experienced across the world in the international system. We also saw the devaluation of currencies - there was a run on the South African Rand, for example. Currencies across the world, for example Nigeria, depleted his external reserves from sixty billion; put over twenty billion to try to defend the value of the Naira in the context of the pressures of devaluation in the wake of the crisis.



However, these problems were relatively short-lived. Africa was able to recover from the initial shocks of the crisis, thanks in part to the continuing robustness of demand from Asia, for its primary commodities and the historically high commodity prices, plus the advantages which many of the oil rich countries like Angola and Nigeria continued to enjoy. This meant that, on aggregate, Africa maintained growth rates and recovered very quickly from the initial shocks of the crisis. So, Africa did not experience the kind of contagion which Europe has experienced, and the narrative of growth and transformation quickly returned to become the key issue in the discussion of economic prospects of the continent. This is underpinned by several other factors, such as demographics: Africa’s populations is going to hit the billion and it has a significant middle class, even if we are in a moment in which inequality has never been greater in history. The top three most unequal countries in the world today are in Africa, on the basis of the Gini coefficient, but still there is a big middle class with a great purchasing power, and from an investor point of view, demographics does matter. It is also a youthful population, and this, plus all the dividends associated with it, will be a reality over the next thirty to fifty years before it will pick and begin to reverse itself. It is also a continent that is undergoing massive urbanisation; in another twenty years or so Africa will be an urban continent. Many countries have already more urban than rural population today, with implications for the agrarian question, amongst others. In terms of natural resources, I think we listen every day that something has been discovered somewhere in Africa, you just loose count of it. You think you knew where all the uranium or platinum or palladium were located we wake up to find out that It’s also available somewhere else. For instance, we didn’t know that Mozambique was a diamond producing country until the massive discoveries that were made also in that country. The natural resources and this wealth constitute also an important driver of the change Africa is undergoing. Geostrategically, the shift is towards the East, and Africa’s trade relations with the Asian countries - not just China and India, but also Korea, and Turkey, and Malaysia - are growing massively, to a point where over the medium term will likely overtake the economic relationships with Europe. All of this suggests that Africa has become something of a “bride”, as everybody wants to have relationships with Africa: Europe-Africa, Japan-Africa, India-Africa, China-Africa, etc. There is a new scramble for the continent and it is in this context that we need to rethink Europe-Africa relations very seriously. It is clear that, in terms of the management of the European crisis and the approach which has been taken, the attitude Europe previously had in terms of dictating lessons to Africa in how to manage economies, can no longer stand. Africa will be justified to say to Europe “physician, heal thyself”. All of the measures taken by Europe to manage its own crisis run almost contrarily to the recommendations and prescriptions which Europe backed in the management of African crisis. And so it is not surprising to hear at ADB, for example, “well Europe, you need to get your macroeconomic fundamentals right because we, in Africa, we have our macroeconomic fundamentals right, after twenty five years of painful adjustment. You need to get it right, you cannot live on debt, and you cannot borrow money perpetually and hope that other people will pay your bills, directly or indirectly”. I think that the tune of the dialog is changing; we are going to be confronted with a continent that is far more confident in itself. Africa today holds about half billion dollars in aggregate reserves of all African countries, and these are the third most important reserves held by any region of the world, after China and India. I think that the discourse about Aid has also to change, because the all idea that the relationship with Africa can only be conditioned and based on aid is one which I feel, even in Africa, is becoming past. In discussions and meetings where Africa ministers participate, there are concrete examples of this: for example, partners are now asked about their exit strategy, which was not a discussion ten years ago. In



other cases, international partners are asked to put the contribution in the table and not to make promises, because several promises in the past were not delivered. A country like Kenya generates ninety five percent of its revenue internally (long before the discovery of oil) and finances its projects and economy on the basis of these internally generated revenues, so an aid discourse is not feasible anymore. Like Kenya, countries like Nigeria, Angola, South Africa, Namibia, or Botswana, have the option to say “we will choose what we think is in our interests, not what you think that is in our interests”. Therefore, the discourse around development assistance, which has been the pillar on which relationships have been constructed over the years, will have to change radically. The death of the aid ideology may be accompanied by the recomposition of the development cooperation framework altogether. Here again, it is worth keeping in mind the discourse around China, which may not feature officially and in formal engagements, but in fact is an underlying aspect of overall relationship between Europe and Africa. For better or for worst, China, India, Brazil and others have become big players on the African continent, in the same way as Europe, historically, was a big player on the continent. It is of no use telling Africa “be careful of China”, because as the Minister of the Planning of Kenya said in a meeting in Addis Ababa, the Europeans can also be found in Beijing – so what are you looking for in Beijing if it is such a dangerous place to be? The equation is changing, and if Europe wants to be relevant to the transformation which is taking place in Africa, it will also have to change the tone and the tune of its own relationship. It is important to move into concrete areas of trade and investment that can feed into the programme of transformation that is taking place in Africa. There are a lot of areas where investments can be made: there is a huge infrastructure deficit on the continent (which is why I talk about the need to temper our current afro-enthusiasm expressed in many circles in the West); there is a need to invest in social policy (poverty is still a big issue in the African continent and social policy will be an important area for governments to pay attention, if growth is to be inclusive and sustainable); there are investments to be made in industry. Against the prediction of the World Bank that industrial development in Africa will not happen for the foreseeable because of cheap labour in China, the expectation is in fact that, over the next decade, China will lose over 10 million industrial jobs for which countries like Ethiopia are positioned themselves strategically. Ethiopia is one of the fastest growing economies in the world today, which is not based on commodity exports or in any commodity boom. The growth of Ethiopia is due to a strategic refocusing of the economy, in order to attract investments into the real sectors, and I think this is where I see the possibility of changes occurring in Africa-Europe relations. Finally, the tendency to try to gain advantage in a changing strategic environment through the use of pressure is also one which needs to be rethought, in a very serious way. Too much pressure was put by Europe and by the European Commission on Africa, around the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), to a point where many actually began to ask if there was more to the EPAs than just an economic partnership. It almost became a conditionality, for African countries should sign an interim or a full EPA before any other discussion could take place with Europe. I think the room for manoeuvre around those kind of issues is also narrowing very tightly, to the extent to which Africa countries do not feel themselves, either individually or collectively, ready to go alone with the EPAs as proposed by the European Commission; and so the use of pressure might not be as useful as it used to be. Fortunately, Europe has been very preoccupied with its own crisis over the last few years, and forgot about the EPAs a bit. I fear that when things begins to stabilize, the EPA agenda might be revived, and the same old approach - of divide and rule, fragment, blackmail, intimidation - might yet come back again.



There’s also the concern that, in the bid to manage the influence of China in the continent, the temptation to resort to unilateral military interventions on the part of Europe might become an issue. Certainly there is concern in the African continent in some quarters, and not just in the African Union Commission, that some of the actions taken around Libya, Cote D’Ivoire or other countries may presage a new approach to manage the relations with Africa that includes the use the use of military force. Whatever the case, I think that the age of Europe-Africa relationship that is premised one-sidedly on an aid narrative, is gradually coming to the end, and maybe it is about time that it ends.

Damien Helly Visiting professor, College of Europe, Bruges Gulbenkian is one of my favourite museums in Europe; it is a fantastic place to discuss international politics, economics, but also in the background culture and architecture. I mentioned in culture because I think, as Europeans, we need to get back to our own cultural communalities, and when the UK is about to have a referendum about leaving the EU in 2015, we need to look back at our common capacity to imagine the world, to rethink it together and, to quote a French curator: “if you don’t like the current world just invent a new one”, and I think that this is a perfect place to try to do it together with our African colleagues. There are two topics in this pane – the crises and the EU-Africa partnership - and we are asked to reflect on the interactions between the two, which is a very challenging task. I think the wording of the first Lisbon declaration in 2007 is still valid: it’s about a more equal relationship, trying to move away from our donor-recipient relationship. The rhetoric is really good and the strategic vision on paper is still relevant, and I think we should not throw this baby with the bath water. But there’s also a need to reach the gap between the discourse and the practise and actually this partnership was a very good compromise between EU member states on one hand, the European Commission on the other, and African partners. Everyone found some interest: the African were looking for some funding because it was still a mindset of aid donorship, the European Commission wanted to be independent enough to disburse its money and the members states wanted to have an impression of being in control of the whole process. The compromise was there, but the question is ‘is this compromise still holding today when renegotiating the partnership in two years’ time?’. It was also a very Euro-African vision which is very common in some European states, that is, the idea of a common space, and I think this vision is now outdated. The shift to the East was already mentioned, and perhaps we need to be a little bit self-critical about this Euro-African narrative. The relationship is still very marked by nation-states policies and we see that in the impact of the crisis; those countries in Europe which have been most seriously hit by the crisis, have seen a strong damage in their bilateral relations with their former colonies (look at Portugal and Mozambique for instance). We need to be aware that our national foreign policies are still very much at the core of the way our national



capitals and foreign ministers look at our relationship with Africa. At the same time, you have countries realising that they are not influential enough anymore to go on dealing with Africa, so they are using the European framework to multiply their influence. This is also a very strong trend in Europe from all the countries; Portugal is a very good example, but you have France, and even the UK is been doing it. I wouldn’t say there is reciprocity, because African states do not do that with the African Union and, therefore, there is a misbalance there that we need to think of. I think one of the main challenges of the partnership is being far too bureaucratic, managed by the two Commissions, and the eight partnerships have not worked well. Some people say that the Security Partnership has been the one working best, but if you really look at the deliverables and the difference made by the very framework of the partnership, it is really not convincing. It should probably have been more focused on results but it was such a patchwork of existing components, programs and cooperation relationship, that I think it didn’t really take off the ground. There are some exceptions, of course, and that is why one of the big messages in my presentation is “let us be careful with the overall encompassing analytical framework of Europe Africa relations”. It is misleading, because we need to look at the details, very technical aspects, sectorial policies to be pursued, etc., and I think we need to be much more precise in the way we look at facts, figures and trends,. This probably has been one of the shortcomings of the partnership. Looking at people, instead of just institutions, is absolutely crucial and if the institutions fail in moving the partnership forward, I have no doubt that societies will do it; there are already doing it: very hands-on, very concrete day to day corporation, substate levels, civil societies, diasporas, you name it. Regarding the crisis, I will just like to repeat and complement something on what Adebayo Olukoshi said about the return of the Keynesian school. Early 2009, many economists said: there is African resilience because Africa is disconnected from the world economy. They were mainly economists working in economic finance that said the African finance is not that globalised, so Africa will be fine. Others were looking at commodities prices and food crisis, saying that it’s all part of the same crisis. Jeffrey Sachs stated that the challenge is global sustainability and we need to look at global solutions. One of the solutions we were talking about, as earlier as 2009, was to really boost investment in all kinds of infrastructure in developing countries, to boost growth there, but also to boost growth in developed countries. A second message I take from that is that it’s a global crisis, which calls for global solutions. Perhaps Europeans and Africans, if they want to do something together, should think (and it is also a part of the rational partnership of 2007) to give a global dimension to the partnership by looking for joint approaches to global solutions. How to work more together within multilateral institutions, global fora, climate change, global financial architecture, etc., is certainly one avenue for the future of the partnership and usually it is a little bit underlooked but some work have been done in these fora between the two sides.



Literature also looked at the various channels of impact of the crisis on Africa. There are very good reports on that, so let me perhaps mention some of them. We need to acknowledge the degree of interdependence between our economies. Simulation models from the World Bank quoted by economists in Africa really show that a decrease in our growth rate in Europe will have some impacts in growth rates in Africa. This has actually has taken place, so we need to be aware of that, and we need to look at what to do. If look for instance at the CFA franc zone, there is a clear linkage and parity with the Euro. So the interdependency is there; it’s true that there is a power shift to the East but still we cannot forget that we are very much interdependent. One of the channels of the impact is aid. I agree we need to shift from the aid discourse, but at the same time we also need to recognise that, some countries and some governments in Africa are still very much aid dependent, even through budgets support (look at Mozambique, where the percentage of state budget which is coming from aid is still very significant). So, aid still matters; the question is that there is less aid because of the crisis. Trends from OECD show that there is a decrease globally from OECD donors, and despite the fact that overall assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa in the last few years is still growing a little bit (if you take the EU as a whole), the question is that some states have cut their budget dramatically: Portugal, Greece, Spain, France, even Denmark or Austria. The targets of the MDGs in 2015 to have 0,7 of our budget to aid is appearing further away, meaning that we’re less good at reaching the targets that we had promise to reach initially. I think the question now has to be on what impact of the crisis country by country. Aggregates are fine, but they are misleading perceptions; we speak about optimism or pessimism, but actually the reality it’s much more complex if we look at the details. Some authors have compared the crisis with a tidal and strong viral wave, on which surfers would continue to surf, and the best and most talented surfers would surf at a faster speed, while those who are not skilled enough or weakest would just fall down and sink. This is what has been happening from some countries in Africa. If you take data from the OneCampaign, they have clearly shown that there are several groups of countries in Africa suffering or being hit by the crisis in very different ways, so we need to look at that in particular. There other channels of impact which are not related to aid and I think they are growing in importance. First of all, direct investment: although data shows that there is a decrease in flows from Europe, there are still large amounts of FDI from Europe towards Africa and still we have ten countries in Europe representing around 35% of global FDI flows towards Africa. Despite the impact of the crisis, there are still private sector and public enterprises seeking FDI towards Africa. Policies have change as well in the EU, with the blending models, trying to mix investment, loans and grants; so the aid business models in Europe is being rethought. There is a debate about this and I think we need to look at how this will evolve in the next few years and how it is going to be reflected in the new partnership. Remittances are much higher than ODA itself, and although it decreases because of the crisis, it’s still there and it’s also a factor of resilience. Besides that, there is indigenous growth in Africa and an emerging Africa narrative. I think we need to insist on this, because this creates still huge opportunities for both African societies and Europe. Regarding long term trends and changes in the relation, parts of the optimistic narratives are related to progress in health sector (e.g. fight against malaria), new models for development and development aid, all the work done on innovative financing for development (this is new and includes air tax, financial transaction tax online, etc), the huge work being done on transparency in extractive industry, amongst



others. All these trends are bypassing the old way of doing, of the relationship between the two continents and I think this also has too inspire the new partnership. But, because there is a but, there are huge areas of enduring fragility in Africa and I think one long term challenge is how to find virtuous interactions between African growing areas and African fragile territories. The challenge is about dealing with inequalities in long term within countries, within societies, but also within regions and even within cities, and we are facing exactly the same challenge in Europe with the current crisis. How to manage future growing inequality? Amongst the remaining challenges for the partnership, beyond the crisis, is the quality of the political dialogue. I think one change in Europe, even during the crisis, is the creation of a European External Action Service and a stronger strategic approach to political issues. It is time for Europeans to go to African partners not only talking about aid and donor-recipient relationship but also talking about interests, about what do Europeans want out of Africa and what Africans want out of Europe. Let’s talk about interests and be a little bit more business-like, rather than emotional about our historical ties and so on. Trade negotiations have been very seriously irritant and I fully agree with Adebayo’s assessment about the EU use of arrogant and bullish behaviour during some negotiations. I think this was true for around 2007, when Peter Mandelson was Commissioner for Trade, but I think it’s not always case still everywhere. You need also to look to the other side of the coin, which is African leadership really bargaining development aid in compensation for liberalisation. You also need to look at the African internal challenge which is about regional integration, and the EPAs have forced African countries to think about the real terms of their regional integration. I don’t think that it is fair, but I’m just saying that all this confusion of regional organisations is a challenge that goes beyond the behaviour of the EU, which I agree has been unacceptable too many times. We’ve not mentioned migration policies yet; there are also strong biased perceptions in Europe about migration from Africa and think the debate needs to be reopened on that. About the predicament of treating Africa as one, we also need to go beyond the intercontinental scheme and think more precisely about what subsidiarity means in Africa between the states, the sub-states, regional economic communities and the African Union. African partners are not clear enough about who should be responsible for what, at what level, in our cooperation. Fundamentally, it is all about sound political leadership and human capital. We need to work more together on these two things, because, no matter the emerging narratives and African optimism, Africa will need human capital to be sustainable in its growth. I suspect that those who know Europe and know the experiences of European cooperation, recognise there is a value in keeping some relations with the Europeans about human capital and capacity building. In sum, I think the question is for Europeans not to miss the train of African growth and opportunities; for African governments not to miss their own economic opportunities for their own societies; for private sectors to work with the right partners and in the right legal environment; and for both continents to rethink their mutual interests and their own image. Ultimately, this is the question of what models each continent wants to give to the world and to its own citizens. Quoting Alyson Bailes in 2009, “the crisis is a reminder that Europe global credibility depends precisely on how well it handles its internal social and economic affairs”.



Fernando Jorge Cardoso IMVF, Lisboa A crise internacional de que falamos não é meramente uma crise financeira ou só uma crise económica, mas sim uma crise sistémica e estrutural. Esta crise acelera e demonstra também, (é uma consequência e uma causa) um movimento que se foi gizando desde a segunda metade dos anos 90 e acelerou a partir do início da década passada, particularmente após a entrada da China para a Organização Mundial do Comércio em 2001. É uma crise em que as chamadas economias capitalistas desenvolvidas - Estados Unidos da América, Canadá, parte dos países da Europa Ocidental - sofreram um processo de desindustrialização e de terciarização das suas actividades e, em simultâneo, alguns países emergentes (a China em primeiro lugar, mais do que todos os outros juntos) se foram progressivamente transformando em abastecedores do mercado mundial de um conjunto cada vez maior de produtos de natureza industrial. Isto significou uma modificação progressiva, e cada vez maior, dos investimentos directos internacionais para a Ásia e particularmente para a China, para além de ter significado também a entrada, em termos da economia internacional, de algumas economias emergentes que tinham uma base industrial muito forte, que vinha de políticas de substituição de importação dos anos 50, 60 e 70, com população muito ampla, ou seja, com mercados internos muito fortes como o Brasil e agora o México também. Assim, estamos num processo de aceleração de mudança das relações de força e de poder, de natureza económica, politica, e até de segurança. Portanto, esta crise não é meramente uma crise financeira. Em segundo lugar, a crise do Euro não é meramente uma crise orçamental. É, sem dúvida, uma crise económica e monetária, que tem muito a ver com a forma como a moeda única foi criada, pelos seus condicionantes. Tem a ver com o facto de a União Económica Monetária na Europa não ter todos os seus pilares construídos e em funcionamento. No entanto, o que se começou a verificar na Europa a partir do fim da Guerra Fria é que, na Alemanha, o capital privado alemão e o Estado alemão investiram fortemente na reunificação alemã, e ao fazê-lo, a própria Alemanha se atrasou do ponto de vista da modernização tecnológica de um conjunto de áreas importantes, a começar pela energia e pelas redes de transporte, que é uma das grandes preocupações de natureza estratégica que os Alemães têm actualmente. Enquanto nos anos 90 vivemos esse grande processo, da reunificação da Alemanha e de um euro-optimismo pronunciado, também as decisões sobre a construção europeia a partir da década seguinte foram tomadas nos anos 90, como a decisão da criação do Euro e do avanço para formas mais aprofundadas de integração. Mas ao passar-se isto, a Europa avança para um mundo que ele próprio está em profunda mudança, e ao chegarmos ao início desta década a capacidade de competitividade industrial europeia estava a diminuir consideravelmente em termos internacionais. Enquanto os bancos europeus e os investidores europeus, que na primeira metade da década passada (particularmente através de bancos alemães mas não só) investiram grandemente nos países do Sul da Europa, avançavam também para a Ásia e em particular para a China, acontecia à população europeia algo que não está a acontecer à população africana nem na América Latina e em partes da Ásia também não. Ou seja, passava por um processo de envelhecimento da população e de diminuição do crescimento demográfico, de tal maneira, que hoje só há um país da União Europeia em que as taxas de crescimento demográfico se aproximam dos 2,1% sem as atingir, que é a França. E muito devido a politicas de emigração antigas, que já não são mais as mesmas. Por outras palavras, isto significa custos muito acrescidos do ponto de vista do chamado Estado Social Europeu como nós aqui o chamamos, bem como uma incapacidade de o Estado funcionar como anteriormente, um pouco também como motor de financiamento e como motor de desenvolvimento.



Assim, esta crise do Euro é também uma crise politica. Vivemos, na Europa, um processo de europessimismo, em que há alguma descrença na construção europeia e um retorno à predominância de políticas nacionalistas ao nível europeu, que são absolutamente evidentes nas discussões e nos debates que estão em curso, a propósito dos países altamente endividados na Europa e a propósito daquilo que é necessário fazer para ultrapassar a crise. E toda esta crise sistémica dos países mais desenvolvidos do capitalismo das últimas décadas do último século acontece num cenário em que a economia mundial está a crescer, apesar da Europa e apesar dos Estados Unidos da América. A economia mundial está a crescer mais fortemente no lado dos países emergentes e, interessantemente, dos países menos desenvolvidos, em que África não é caso único. Vemos países saídos da antiga União Soviética e alguns países asiáticos que também experimentam, desde há dois ou três anos, taxas de crescimento acima dos 10% ou muito perto disso. Estamos num cenário em que o mundo cresce, mas a Europa e os Estados Unidos não, bem como o Japão, que continua a sofrer a deflação dos anos 90. No caso africano, a partir particularmente de 2002, vemos sistematicamente taxas de crescimento positivas, com pequenos recuos em 2009 e 2010 devido à crise financeira internacional, recuos esses que não serviram para que as taxas médias de crescimento baixassem para além das taxas médias de crescimento demográfico, ou seja, África cresceu em termos relativos e em termos absolutos. O que é interessante também neste crescimento é que os estudos demonstram que cresceram não só os países exportadores de petróleo, mas também os países importadores de petróleo em África. O crescimento de alguns países não exportadores de petróleo ultrapassou o crescimento dos países tradicionalmente exportadores de petróleo no continente. Isto significa que algo de novo está a acontecer no mundo e em África do ponto de vista sistemático. Nos anos após a descolonização em África, nós vivemos quatro décadas de saída e de não entrada do investimento directo estrangeiro privado em África (1960-1990). As políticas nacionalistas do pós-independência levaram à saída de investimento directo privado em África, levaram a uma situação em que o financiamento para o desenvolvimento no caso africano veio principalmente da ajuda ao desenvolvimento (através de financiamentos protagonizados pelo Banco Mundial, pelo Banco Africano de Desenvolvimento e pelos chamados países membros do Comité de Ajuda ao Desenvolvimento). Também por causa das relações históricas entre África e Europa, o relacionamento entre estes dois continentes após as independências foi um relacionamento muito centrado na formatação da ajuda ao desenvolvimento, através das convenções de Yaoundé, depois mais tarde da convenção de Lomé e dos acordos de Cotonou. O diálogo institucional e político entre Europa, União Europeia, países europeus e África, países africanos, Organização de Unidade Africana e depois, mais tarde, União Africana, foi um debate muito à volta da ajuda ao desenvolvimento e do financiamento para o desenvolvimento. Esta realidade está em profunda mudança neste momento, tal como referido anteriormente. Do ponto de vista estatístico, se olharmos para o financiamento dos Orçamentos de Estado dos 54 países africanos em 2010, e apesar das mudanças que se estão a operar em África, metade ou mais dos Orçamentos de Estado destes países ainda eram financiados pela ajuda ao desenvolvimento. Isto apesar de, de um ponto de vista geral, a tendência e um dos principais desafios que os países africanos têm pela frente em termos de modernidade e de governação dos respectivos Estados, seja suportarem os respectivos orçamentos, particularmente os Orçamentos que nós chamamos correntes através do sistema fiscal. Países como Angola ou Moçambique praticamente não têm receitas orçamentais provenientes dos impostos dos seus cidadãos, e isto é uma das fraquezas da democracia em África, porque a partir do momento em que houver uma lógica clara por parte da população e dos votantes de que as receitas do Estado provêm do seu próprio trabalho e dos seus próprios impostos, então a pressão sobre os seus respectivos dirigentes e governantes vai ser muito maior do que aquela que existe agora. Isso é bom do ponto de vista de consolidação dos Estados de Direito e dos Estados Democráticos. Esta questão da reforma fiscal talvez seja um dos principais desafios governativos que os africanos têm.



Voltando à questão das relações Europa-África, o que nós verificamos neste momento é que, particularmente a partir de 2002 em diante, o financiamento para o desenvolvimento começa a vir de outras origens que não só as origens tradicionais dos países do Comité de Desenvolvimento e das instituições multilaterais, predominantemente da China. Neste momento, a China é claramente a principal fonte de financiamento do desenvolvimento em África, ultrapassando todos os outros. E a China, como todos nós sabemos também, não o faz meramente por princípios caritativos, mas fá-lo por interesse próprio. Fá-lo porque está num processo de crescimento acelerado, que já vem de há 30 anos, em que necessita de escoar as enormes reservas monetárias que tem em seu próprio beneficio, o que significa modernizando as infra-estruturas, aeroportos, portos, redes de comunicação, transportes e etc., de todos aqueles países que detêm matérias-primas, não só em termos minerais e em termos energéticos, mas também matérias-primas agrícolas (alimentos). O pensamento estratégico da China (também verificado noutros países como alguns países árabes), incide no investimento directo, ou seja, de compra não só de minas mas também de terrenos agrícolas e de terrenos de produção alimentar em vastas partes, neste não só de África mas também na Ásia e na América Latina. Estamos num mundo diferente, em que estas diferenças foram muito aceleradas nestes últimos tempos, e chegamos também do ponto de vista da parceria Europa-África em que há que mudar completamente de sintonia o tipo de diálogo político que existe até agora entre os dois continentes. Este diálogo já não pode ser mais assente na cooperação para o desenvolvimento, mas a cooperação para o desenvolvimento tem de passar a ser parte do diálogo (deixando de ser aquilo em que o diálogo assenta). Após quatro décadas de não entrada de investimento directo estrangeiro em África, nós temos dez anos do regresso deste investimento directo privado estrangeiro no continente, e mais, com o crescimento das classes médias em África temos também investimento privado africano a investir no continente. Deixem-me pegar em Portugal para ilustrar um pouco com aquilo que está a acontecer. Em Portugal, desde há quatro anos, a principal entrada de investimento e de financiamento privado em Portugal não vem dos seus parceiros e, como sabem, Portugal está num programa de ajustamento estrutural. Em África, os programas de ajustamento estrutural sempre tiveram duas pernas: de um lado os programas de deflação e de austeridade, suportados pelo Fundo Monetário Internacional e, do outro lado, houve os programas de crescimento suportados pelo Banco Mundial, o que significa que houve financiamento para o crescimento em simultâneo com medidas de reformas estruturais e de diminuição dos défices orçamentais e das dívidas. Para além disso, em terceiro lugar, houve o perdão da dívida externa em muitos países além dos reescalonamentos. Portugal não é África por uma razão muito simples: é muito pior que os programas de ajustamento estrutural em África. Nós só temos uma das três dimensões que os países africanos tiveram e essa dimensão é a seguinte: os portugueses que paguem o dinheiro que Portugal deve à Banca Internacional. Este dinheiro que está a entrar não é dinheiro para investimento nem para financiamento, mas sim dinheiro para pagar a dívida privada das famílias, que depois se transforma em dívida dos bancos e que depois se transforma em dívida externa (para além da dívida do Estado propriamente dita, que vem dos permanentes e constantes défices orçamentais dos últimos tempos). Quem é que está a meter dinheiro para financiamento do desenvolvimento em Portugal? São os chineses, através da compra, por exemplo, da EDP e da REN; são os angolanos do sistema bancário e não só; são agora os brasileiros através de um investidor que vai comprar a TAP. E aqui nós vemos também aquilo que está a acontecer de um ponto de vista internacional. Neste quadro, a parceria Europa-África tem de passar a ser uma parceria de natureza politica, económica, de segurança, em que a cooperação poderá ter um papel muito importante mas que aparece em quarto lugar. No fundo foi tudo isto que nos levou a constituir a rede Europe-Africa Policy Research Network, ou



seja, pensar de que maneira é que a parceira Europa-África deve evoluir num ponto de vista estratégico e político. É preciso salientar que 1% da população portuguesa, 100 mil pessoas pelo menos, emigraram nos últimos dois anos para Angola e Moçambique, mas foi população qualificada. São movimentos completamente contrários àqueles que existiram até há pouco tempo e, num ponto de vista de pontes para o futuro, quero crer que pode haver aqui um aspecto positivo, tal como existe um aspecto positivo da entrada de capitais angolanos (e eu espero que futuramente de capitais moçambicanos) em Portugal.



3.3. Os Desafios Demográficos

Alcinda Honwana Visiting Professor at the Open University, UK, and Columbia University, NY Abstract My presentation examines the lives of young people struggling with unemployment and sustainable livelihoods in the context of widespread social and economic crisis. Failed neo-liberal economic policies, bad governance and political instability have caused stable jobs to disappear - without jobs young people cannot support themselves and their families. Most young Africans are living in “waithood”; a period of suspension between childhood and adulthood. This state of limbo is becoming pervasive and is gradually replacing conventional adulthood. While focusing on African case studies, the paper argues that youth in Europe, North America and other parts of the world face the same crisis of joblessness and restricted futures. Thus, this youth crisis is global. The “waithood generation” possesses a tremendous transformative potential, as young people understand that the struggle to attain socio-economic freedoms requires radical political change. From riots and protests in the streets of Maputo, Dakar, Madrid, Lisbon, London, New York and Santiago, to revolutions that overthrow dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the “waithood generation” is claiming a space for themselves and remaking the world.

Os efeitos das tendências demográficas nas perspetivas de desenvolvimento e cooperação

As tendências demográficas encerram um conjunto de questões complexas e diversificadas, tais como a sustentabilidade dos modelos de crescimento e de segurança social em sociedades envelhecidas, a coesão social ou o impacto da crescente urbanização e desemprego, particularmente nas camadas jovens. A geografia internacional da pobreza está em rápida mutação, com a maior parte da população pobre concentrada em países de rendimento médio e com o crescimento da desigualdade, incluindo nos países mais desenvolvidos. Estas questões não têm sido suficientemente abordadas no debate sobre a cooperação para o desenvolvimento, apesar dos seus impactos nas relações UE-África, incluindo em temas sensíveis como as migrações e o emprego.

Principais questões debatidas:

Como é que os desafios demográficos se refletem nas perspetivas de desenvolvimento nos dois continentes e na respectiva parceria?

De que formas podem a Europa e a África responder melhor aos riscos subjacentes ao desemprego jovem, às migrações e a outras questões demográficas que desafiam a coesão

social e a sustentabilidade económica?



Presentation My presentation will focus on the issue of youth unemployment and the difficulties faced by young people to establish the transition to adulthood in Africa and beyond. Let me start with a few stories. Three Stories Maputo, September 2010. I was there when thousands of young Mozambicans staged riots against the government to protest the rise in prices of bread, water and fuel. They blocked the streets, burned tires, and confronted the police. The escalation of the protests forced the Mozambican government to concede and reverse the price hikes. Sidi Bouzid, in December 2010. A massive youth uprising was triggered by the death of Mohamed Bouazizi, a twenty-six-year-old unemployed street vendor who killed himself in protest to his condition. Bouazizi’s self-immolation and subsequent death created enormous outrage, and thousands of young men and women came out to the streets to protest against unemployment and lack of opportunities. Under the slogan “Ben Ali Dégage!” (Ben Ali Go!), the youth led demonstrations drove Ben Ali out of power, opening a new chapter in Tunisian and world history. The Arab spring was born! Dakar, June 2011. Rallying alongside the movement Y’en a Marre! (Enough is enough!), Senegalese youth came out to the streets and managed to stop the approval of the constitutional amendments to favour the sitting president. Galvanized by this victory the Y’en a Marre youth movement launched a national campaign to encourage young people to vote freely. Under the slogan “Ma Carte d’Electeur, Mon Arme” (my voting card, my weapon), in February 2012 they voted Abdoulaye Wade out of office. Change also took place in Egypt and Libya in 2011 and youth protests have been happening in many African and Middle Eastern countries. But this is not just an African story: In Europe, youth demonstrations denouncing unemployment economic inequalities took place in Greece and here in Portugal in March 2011. Since May 2011 the indignados movement in Spain has been protesting the lack of prospects for the youth. Youth riots in London highlighted disconnections within British society and lack of prospects for underprivileged youth. In South America, Chilean youth took to the streets of Santiago to demand better quality public education; and in the United States, the Occupy Wall Street Movement rallied many young Americans to protest against corporate greed and corporations’ undue influence over government. Despite their diverse situations, young people, in rich and poor countries alike, are affected by the same problems of unemployment and restricted futures. And they are beginning to assert their rights as citizens, and claiming a space for themselves in the world. Waithood But what is the situation of young men and women living in Africa today? We all know that young people constitute the vast majority of the African population with more than 50 percent under the age of twenty-



five. But most young Africans feel marginalized from major socio-economic and political processes. They lack stable jobs to become independent and fully partake in the responsibilities of adulthood. I use the term waithood (Singerman 2007; Navtej and Yousef 2009), a portmanteau of “wait” and “-hood”, meaning ‘waiting for adulthood. “Waithood” refers to this period of suspension that delays young people’s access to social adulthood. While chronological age defines them as adults, they have not been able to attain the social markers of adulthood, which are: earning a living, being independent, establishing families, providing for their offspring and other relatives, and becoming taxpayers. Liggey, which means work in Wolof, the national language of Senegal, is celebrated as an important marker of adulthood. The ability to work and provide, defines a person’s self-worth and position in the family and community. Yet, the majority of young people in Africa are unable to attain the sense of dignity embedded in the notion of liggey. Joel, a 28-year-old Mozambican man, explained that: “At the age of eighteen our fathers would go to South Africa as labour migrants to work in the mines . . . [and] come home with enough money to pay lobolo (bridewealth) for a girl, to build a house and start a family...” Indeed, becoming a labour migrant was a rite of passage into adulthood, as work in the South African mines enabled young Mozambicans to become workers, husbands, fathers and providers. And it allowed young women to become wives, mothers, and homemakers. Today, however, African societies do not offer robust pathways into adulthood - both traditional or new ones. Although more young women are being educated, they are unable to enter the labour market. Young people, both rural and urban, are increasingly forced to survive in an oversaturated informal economy. Coping with Waithood Coping with waithood is a major challenge for many young people.Young Mozambicans used the Portuguese term desenrascar a vida (eke out a living); young Senegalese and Tunisians employed the French term débrouillage (making do); and young South Africans spoke about “just getting by”. All these expressions vividly convey the extemporaneous and precarious nature of their lives. These are the experiences of young men and women who resort to street vending, petty trading, smuggling, illegal migration or to temporary odd jobs. Or those who get involved in relationships with sugar daddies and sugar mamas to make ends meet or access fashionable goods in exchange for sexual favours. And these types of relationships are redefining existing notions and patterns of intimate relationships and generating new understandings of masculinity and femininity. But these are also the experiences of young people become involved in fraudulent and criminal endeavours, as swindlers, traffickers and gangsters. Indeed, waithood constitutes this twilight zone, or interstitial space, where the boundaries between legal/illegal; proper/improper; right/wrong and often very blurred. And it is precisely at this juncture that young people are forced to make choices. The choices they make often define their relationships towards work, family, intimacy, and the type of citizens they will become. Regrettably, rather than being a short interruption in their transition to adulthood, waithood is pervasive and prolonged, and is gradually replacing conventional understandings of adulthood. For many, being young in Africa today becomes synonymous with living in waithood.



Waithood and Social Change Waithood stems from national and global policies that failed to reduce poverty, and to promote growth with equity. There is a failure of the social contract between the state and its citizenry. Corruption, incompetence, absence of fundamental freedoms further compounds the problem. Despite the challenges outlined above, it’s not all doom and gloom. Today young Africans are better educated than their parents. They are also better connected with the rest of the world through new technologies of information and communication. Young people are fully aware of the broader structural conditions that create their inescapable socio-economic vulnerability. There are stories to be told about young people’s engagement in youth associations in civil society, in popular culture, in debates through cyber social networks, and in open political demonstrations. If we listen carefully to the lyrics in their songs, the verses in their poems, the scripts of their plays and the discourses in their cyber debates we will find a strong social critique of the status quo. As discussed in the opening stories, young people are expressing their anger and are loudly questioning their waithood status. This waithood generation is global. And in this case, both European and African countries need to find ways to effectively address unemployment and create better opportunities for the youth. However, young people are not just waiting for governments to act. They are taking upon themselves to try and remake the world they live in. These current youth social movements are still unfolding and it is anyone’s guess where they might lead. But as Franz Fanon once said, “each generation must, out of relative obscurity, discover its own mission (and either) fulfill it, or betray it”.

Gregory de Paepe Policy Analyst, Development Centre, OECD, Paris Promoting Youth Employment Structure 1. Africa’s recent economic performance and outlook, focussing on why the recent high growth hasn’t

been conducive to job creation. 2. What is the situation of young people in African labour markets? (Some stylized facts) 3. What are the implications and risks of this situation and what can be done to promote youth

employment? Abstract Africa’s youth population is growing rapidly and getting better educated. This is a huge chance but also a potential threat. With almost 200 million people aged between 15 and 24, Africa has the youngest population in the world. By 2045 Africa’s youth population will double to 400 million. This means that every year 10-12 million young people are joining Africa’s labour market, in need of a job. Based on current trends, 59% of 20-24 year olds will have had secondary education in 2030, compared to 42% today. Although significant quality gaps remain, these trends offer an unrivalled opportunity for economic and social development. The Arab Spring has shown that unemployment and a lack of opportunity among young people contain the potential for upheaval.



Surprisingly, Africa’s poorest countries have less unemployed youth than the better-off countries. As countries grow richer and incomes rise, consumers start flocking to known brands, away from the simple local products that used to provide livelihoods for many locals. Many African youth are poor despite being employed. They deserve as much attention and support as youth that are not working. The global economic crisis had a strong negative impact on the employment profile of African youth. Between 2008 and 2010 good jobs declined, while jobs in family agriculture and informal activities, picked up. Youth expectations meet a difficult employment outlook. A global survey conducted by Gallup showed that, young North Africans would rather have a government job than one in the private sector. But the public sector cannot grow as fast as the population and is a much less important employer among youth than adults. The large majority of our country experts as well as young people themselves see the lack of demand for labour as the main barrier to young people in African labour markets. The next bottlenecks are skills mismatches and poor education. Thus any youth employment policy must place job creation at its centre. First, there is the attitude of governments towards small business. Second, governments can support social insurance adapted to the needs of small businesses. Third, many small entrepreneurs in Africa do not have access to the loans that could allow them to grow their business. Fourth, better services could do a great deal. For instance, a stable electricity supply would allow many, especially in rural areas, to start small-scale production outfits. Governments can also strive to make the education young people receive more relevant to what they need to know in the world of work. Many young people in Africa suffer from skills mismatches. Vocational and technical training systems are an important tool especially when done in cooperation with firms, but play a minimal role for the time being. Education in technical fields is expensive and requires scarce expertise. Presentation





II. The employment situation of young Africans



III. What can be done to promote youth employment?



Ana Pires de Carvalho Investigadora, Centro de Analise de Politicas, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo Resumo De que maneira as dinâmicas demográficas afectam as prioridades de desenvolvimento e ajuda no futuro? As dinâmicas de população constituem um instrumento crucial para a definição de estratégias do desenvolvimento das sociedades, seja a curto, médio ou longo prazo, e a sua não inclusão conduz necessariamente a quebras no desenvolvimento harmonioso das mesmas. As interligações entre população e desenvolvimento são diversas, numerosas e frequentemente complexas. Esta apresentação faz a abordagem dos efeitos de elevadas taxas de crescimento populacional no desenvolvimento em Africa, com particular atenção à urbanização excessiva e à juventude. Para além de uma rápida incursão na história do desenvolvimento da população humana, serão apresentados três temas, designadamente, crescimento populacional e seus efeitos no desenvolvimento e pobreza, urbanização e juventude. A apresentação terminará com algumas ideias para a contribuição de uma relação Europa-Africa. Durante mais de um milhão de anos existiu um balanço relativamente estável entre nascimentos e mortes, com um ligeiro aumento médio de nascimentos em relação aos falecimentos. A população humana atingiu os primeiros mil milhões de pessoas nos fins do século XVIII – princípios do século XIX. Neste momento a população humana ultrapassa os 7 mil milhões de pessoas, tendo a passagem de 6 para 7 mil milhões de pessoas ocorrido em menos de 10 anos. Em África ainda há uma taxa de crescimento natural muito elevada, na verdade, dos 10 países do mundo com taxas de fecundidade mais elevadas, 8 são de África. A taxa geral de fecundidade destes países situa-se entre 7,8 e 6,7 filhos por mulher. Apesar da epidemia de HIV-SIDA, estima-se que a África Subsaariana acrescentará mil milhões à população mundial em 2050. Se, por um lado, mais pessoas pode significar mais produção e mais riqueza, um crescimento populacional muito rápido não ajuda ao desenvolvimento dos países. A questão de fundo é a proporção entre as pessoas que não trabalham em relação às que trabalham, pois quanto maior for esta proporção, mais fraco será o desempenho económico do país. Na verdade, o crescimento acelerado da população conduz ao desemprego, crescimento desmesurado e muito rápido das cidades, pressão na oferta de alimentos, degradação do meio ambiente, aumento da dimensão da pobreza absoluta e estimula governos autoritários. De particular importância dos efeitos do rápido crescimento populacional são a educação e saúde. Na verdade, por exemplo, elevadas taxas de fecundidade contribuem para o aumento da malnutrição e mortalidade infantil, assim como para a mortalidade materna. As cidades criam riqueza e podem contribuir significativamente para a diminuição da pobreza de um país e as zonas rurais têm constituído o epicentro da pobreza e sofrimento humano. Contudo, esta situação está a modificar-se. Na verdade, embora a proporção da população urbana vivendo nos ‘slums’ na Africa Subsaariana tenha diminuído de 70% para 62% nos últimos vinte anos, o número total de pessoas vivendo nessas condições duplicou em igual período, passando de 102 milhões para 213 milhões. Em igual período de tempo, a população urbana passou de 146 milhões para 346 milhões. Note-se que o crescimento urbano na Africa subsaariana é maioritariamente motivado pelo crescimento natural, isto é, nascimentos superiores a mortes. Os jovens urbanos merecem uma atenção especial. São uma grande parte do futuro dos países e portanto deveriam ser educados, deviam ter acesso a serviços de saúde reprodutiva e saúde em geral, e deveriam



ter o direito ao emprego. Como mencionado atrás, o acesso à educação e saúde é fortemente restringido pelo rápido crescimento. Por exemplo, em Moçambique, a população de 5 a 14 anos de idade crescerá de 6.3 milhões em 2010 para 9.6 milhões em 2030. Isto representa um crescimento de 50%, que se reflectirá num crescimento igual de escolas, professores, carteiras, livros, etc., só para manter a actual taxa de escolaridade e a actual qualidade de ensino. Além disso, o número de jovens urbanos de 15 a 24 anos duplicará em igual período, passando de 1,5 milhões para 3,0 milhões. Como pano de fundo, a população urbana em idade de trabalhar terá um acréscimo de quase 5 milhões de pessoas entre 2010 e 2030. Geopoliticamente, Africa é de grande importância para a Europa e vice-versa. É indispensável a estabilidade e o desenvolvimento dos países africanos, para que haja frutuosas relações. As questões demográficas apresentadas apontam para um conjunto de acções específicas, a serem debatidas profundamente. Apresentação1

1 Os dados incluidos nesta apresentação foram retirados de documentos oficiais do FNUAP, UNICEF, UNDESA,



É interessante notar que: • Nos anos 60 e nos anos 70 a taxa de crescimento anual da população no Ruanda era cerca de 4%,

ou seja uma geração antes do genocídio; • No Níger, país sujeito a fomes com frequência, a taxa de crescimento populacional anual ronda os

3.5 nas ultimas décadas; • No Mali, a taxa de crescimento populacional natural nos últimos anos é quase 3% ao ano.

Alguns comentários:

A questão de fundo em relação aos elevados níveis de fecundidade é a proporção entre as pessoas que não trabalham em relação às que trabalham, pois quanto maior for esta proporção, mais fraco será o desempenho económico do País. Tipicamente, 50% da população na maior parte dos países da Africa Subsaariana tem menos de 15-20 anos de idade, devido aos altos níveis de fecundidade e mortalidade.

Nos ultimos 50 anos a vasta maioria do crescimento da população a nivel mundial realizou-se nos países menos desenvolvidos.

O crescimento da população em África nas últimas décadas é o mais elevado que há conhecimento na história da humanidade. As Nações Unidas estimam que, apesar da pandemia do HIV/AIDS, Africa provavelmente acrescentará mil milhões de pessoas à população mundial em 2050. Assim, prevê-se que a população em Africa atingirá aproximadamente 1,8 mil milhões em 2050.



1. Emprego O efeito dos elevados níveis de crescimento populacional na oferta de emprego é um dos efeitos mais negativos desse crescimento. Por exemplo, se um país tem 20 milhões de habitantes em 2000, alta fecundidade (TGF=5) e crescimento populacional de 2% ao ano, em 15 anos a população potencialmente activa terá crescido em cerca de 3 milhões. Para manter as taxas de emprego de 2000, sera necessário criar 3 milhões de novos postos de trabalho em 15 anos, ou seja, 200.000 por ano. 2. Crescimento urbano acelerado e massivo (mais à frente) 3. Aumento da pobreza e do número de extremamente pobres Uma consequência óbvia do crescimento populacional é a diminuição dos serviços de educação e saúde, para o mesmo valor orçamental. Para se garantir, por exemplo, que o mesmo número de crianças vá para a escola, todos os anos o orçamento da educação tem de ser aumentado, caso contrário é diminuída a sua qualidade e a sua cobertura. Vejamos alguns indicadores de saúde e educação nos países de elevadas taxas de crescimento atrás mencionadas (UNFPA, 2012).

Os elevados níveis de fecundidade associados ao rápido crescimento populacional , tem um conjunto de efeitos na area da saúde e bem-estar:

• Aumenta a mortalidade infantil (nascimentos de mulheres mais novas, mulheres mais velhas e pouco espaçados aumentam a probabilidade de morte das crianças)

• Aumenta a mortalidade materna, porque têm mais filhos e ficam mais expostas a mortalidade e também é mais provavel a mortalidade materna em nascimentos de mulheres mais novas, mulheres mais velhas e pouco espaçados

• Aumento de abortos clandestinos e consequentes riscos associados



Além disso, crescimento populacional acelerado reproduz a pobreza. Um modelo muito simplificado: Imaginemos:

• 20 casais, dos quais 10 são pobres (50%) e 10 são ricos (50%), ou seja 20 pessoas pobres e 20 pessoas ricas

• Os casais pobres têm 6 filhos cada, totalizando 60 • Os casais ricos têm 2 filhos cada, totalizando 20 • A probabilidade de passar de pobre a rico numa geração é de 20 % • A probabilidade de passar de rico a pobre é zero

Resultado: Na geração seguinte, haverá 48 pessoas pobres (60%) e 32 pessoas ricas (40%). O número total de pessoas aumentou, o número total de pobres aumentou e a percentagem de pobres também aumentou, apesar de 20% dos pobres passarem a ser ricos… Este modelo é muito simplificado. Na verdade, numa economia agrária de subsistência e sem limites de acesso à terra, altos níveis de fecundidade são economicamente atraentes. Na prática, neste caso a família funciona como uma pequena empresa com economias de escala. Além disso, quanto mais filhos os pais tiverem, mais apoio na velhice terão. À medida que a economia se moderniza e aparece um valor associado aos filhos (custos de educação, saúde e outros) a estratégia de ter muitos filhos deixa de ser eficiente. Note-se que esta modernização da economia vem acompanhada de uma diminuiçao das taxas de mortalidade, particularmente a mortalidade infantil, mas de que os pais não se dão conta imediatamente e continuam a pensar que precisam de ter muitos filhos. E, é claro, a premissa de haver terra sem limites já não existe. 4. Pressão na procura de alimentos e degradação do meio ambiente Se neste momento já há falta de alimentos em muitas regiões de África, a situação tende a exacerbar-se com o crescimento populacional. Na verdade é extremamente difícil num curto espaço de tempo garantir a oferta para uma procura crescente. Além disso, o aumento da produção agrícola provavelmente vai impor stress insustentável no solo e estará limitada em muitas regiões pela falta de acesso a água. 5. Estímulo para exacerbação da desigualdade de rendimentos e fortalecimento de governos autoritários O crescimento rápido aumenta em grande escala a oferta de mão-de-obra, provocando uma redução de salários reais. Isto provocará um piorar da desigualdade de riqueza. Este aumento da desigualdade fará com que as políticas de crescimento económico não tenham o efeito no crescimento da economia que se previa. Na verdade, uma sociedade em que a maioria seja pobre e pouco educada dificilmente criará riqueza. A criação de uma pequena elite em contradição com uma maioria muito pobre, tão pobre que a sua subsistência está em causa, leva os governos a tomar medidas de força e restringir as liberdades e direitos básicos para conter a revolta dessa maioria. Os distúrbios que nos últimos anos têm tido lugar em várias cidades africanas são um exemplo.



A população urbana no Séc. XX cresceu de 220 milhões para 2.8 milhões, mas nas próximas décadas a escala de crescimento urbano será sem precedentes, em 2030 a população urbana na África e na Ásia será o dobro que era em 2000. É particularmente preocupante o crescimento urbano nos países mais pobres. Prevê-se que a maior parte deste crescimento terá lugar nas cidades mais pequenas e secundárias, onde as taxas de pobreza são mais altas e a cobertura sanitária e educacional é mais fraca, assim como outros serviços públicos (água, saneamento, infra-estruturas, etc.).





• Embora o acréscimo populacional na Ásia e Pacífico nas próximas décadas seja superior ao acréscimo populacional em África, o ritmo do crescimento em África é muito superior.

• O crescimento populacional moderado pode conduzir a um aumento de riqueza, embora haja um limite para esse crescimento. No entanto é muito difícil gerir um crescimento acelerado.

IV – JUVENTUDE A pirâmide etária característica de países com elevados níveis de fecundidade e mortalidade tem a forma semelhante a um triângulo de base grande. A população é jovem e tipicamente metade da população tem menos de 15-18 anos.



Alguns indicadores de Educação: • Muitos jovens não terminam o ensino primário (p.ex., mais de metade dos jovens 15-19 anos no

Níger, Burkina e Mali) • Entre os jovens de 20-24 anos, uma grande parte não tem nenhuma educação (mais de 50% em

Burkina Faso e Mali, mais de 30% no Chade e Etiópia) • Em geral, a taxa de escolaridade das raparigas é mais baixa que dos rapazes, particularmente nas

zonas rurais (p.ex , em Moçambique, em 2003, a percentagem de rapazes de 16-20 anos que iam a escola nas zonas rurais era de 43.5%, enquanto das raparigas era de 16%)

Alguns indicadores relativos a actividade laboral dos jovens em África :

• Taxa de desemprego de jovens é de 19.5% (Esta taxa não é relativa apenas ao mercado de trabalho formal; neste caso a taxa seria muito mais elevada)

• Entre 1995 e 2005 a taxa de desemprego cresceu 34% • Os jovens têm três vezes mais probabilidade de serem desempregados do que os adultos a partir

dos 25 anos de idade • Cerca de 27% dos jovens não trabalha nem vai a escola • O desemprego é muito maior nas zonas urbanas do que nas zonas rurais • Existem diferenciais significativos por género: as raparigas têm maior taxa de desemprego que os

rapazes Alguns indicadores de Saúde:

• No período 1988-1999, entre 30% a 40% das crianças na Africa Subsaariana eram malnutridas, consequentemente os jovens de hoje terão problemas de rendimento escolar, sistemas imunológicos reduzidos e susceptíveis a uma longevidade reduzida

• As estatísticas de prevalência do HIV-AIDS nos jovens são limitadas, mas alguns inquéritos apontam para uma prevalência nas jovens raparigas com sendo pelo menos o dobro da prevalência nos rapazes. Por exemplo, na Swazilândia, a prevalência de HIV-AIDS é de 27.2% para jovens raparigas de 15-24 anos e 9.3% para rapazes do mesmo grupo etário.

• A severidade da pandemia HIV-AIDS verifica-se pelo enorme actual número de órfãos: no Quénia, Malawi, Namíbia, Uganda e Zâmbia, cerca de 10% das crianças menores de 15 anos são órfãs. no Ruanda , 26.5% das crianças menores de 15 anos são órfãs . Este valor reflecte a gravidade da doença e do genocídio.

• Nos países mais desenvolvidos, Norte de Africa e maior parte da Asia, só 1% ou menos dos jovens que atingem os 15 anos não atingem os 25 anos. A probabilidade de morte neste grupo etário na Africa Subsaariana é quatro vezes maior

Jovens e instabilidade política: • Conflitos armados • Revoluções • Manifestações



COMO LIDAR COM OS PROBLEMAS POPULACIONAIS NO MUNDO?

‘Se a população mundial tivesse a produtividade dos Suíços, os hábitos de consumo dos Chineses, os instintos igualitários dos Suecos, e a disciplina social dos Japoneses, então o planeta poderia

suportar muitas vezes a actual população sem deprivar ninguém. Por outro lado, se a população mundial tivesse a produtividade do Chade, os hábitos de consumo dos Americanos, os instintos igualitários da Índia e a disciplina social da Argentina, então o planeta não poderia suportar de

maneira alguma os seus numeros correntes’ in Thurow, 1986, p.22.

(note-se que esta citação foi escrita há mais de 25 anos)

“Bigger pie, fewer forks,

better manners”

(Joel Cohen, 1995)



Victor Ângelo Member of the Board, PeaceNexus Foundation, Switzerland and former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Europe-Africa: From Indifference to Interdependence Introduction Examining the future of the relations between Europe (EU) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), I can foresee a clear trend of mutual growing indifference, as if both regions were moving apart and becoming less interested in building a privileged partnership. The current generation of European leaders is no longer emotionally connected with Africa. It is a depart from the attitudes of past generations, who had kept a close interest in Africa, through colonial ties and related business interests. The historical links appear now lost in the vague memories of the past. Today, the empirical observation leads to the conclusion that there is lack of understanding on the importance of co-operating with SSA. This is especially evident at present with the leaders ‘attention focused on the EU’s internal crisis, including its own new poor, the developments in the immediate neighbourhood of North Africa and Middle East and the economic and political threats China’s expansion poses. In the current context of the international relations, Africa is perceived by many European opinion-makers at best as a distant and modest player, with little relevance to the future of Europe. For others, the stereotype is clear: Africa spells poverty, uncertainty and conflict, and undemocratic regimes. These views are not new, of course. What is new is the leverage they seem to have gained on decision making. If one observes the relationship from an African perspective, one notices that recent studies and well publicised schools of thought question the way the EU provides development assistance, as being donor driven, arrogant and too conditional. Besides, some African political and academic personalities have extensively criticised the role of aid, as creating dependency, being ineffective and favouring the elites in the recipient countries. In addition, several political leaders throughout the Continent have decided to look towards China, India and other non-traditional partners of Africa, such as Qatar and other Gulf States, and entice new economic investments and different forms of development aid from those countries. As a result, the following questions could be raised, from the European perspective:

Is it in the strategic interest of Europe to ignore the formidable challenges – high impact population dynamics, human insecurity and poor governance – that Africa will face in next decades? And, looking at the other side of the question, is it good strategy to disregard the huge potential Africa possesses?

What should be the priorities for a renewed partnership between Europe and Africa? More specifically, how relevant are the SSA’s demographic challenges in the shaping of a new development co-operation agenda? The subsidiary question would be: What efforts must be made to regain the political initiative in the EU in order to bring Africa back to the top of the development agenda?

Who sets the agenda? Who speaks on behalf of the African populations?



Key future African challenges Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is growing very fast. From less than a billion today, SSA will be home to close to 2 billion people by 2050. This rate of population growth is a major challenge with a tremendous, multidimensional impact in the Continent and globally. By mid-century, there will be in average two Africans out of nine human beings and almost three times more Africans than Europeans. The most immediate demographic challenge, that needs to be addressed today, is how to help Africa to stabilise its overall population at the level of two billion. If we do not act now, the population in SSA will continue to grow beyond 2050, well above the level that could be considered as sustainable. For that, the demographic transition, as technically defined by the demographers, needs to be accelerated through expanded free access to contraception and related health services, girls’ education and women’s political empowerment. Currently less than 20% of African women use modern contraceptive methods, whilst in Latin America and Asia the prevalence rate is well over 60% in average. But evidence as shown that access to family planning services and proactive population policies are incomplete and lack effectiveness if they are not accompanied by widespread campaigns to get girls to schools. Furthermore, for both issues – contraceptive access and girl’s education - to get high on the national priorities, more women need to occupy positions of political authority, as this type of development agenda is only genuinely implemented if driven by women leaders. I would hasten to add here that men’s adherence is critical for the demographic transition and the adoption of modern family life, but the change only takes place if women are truly empowered and in a position to fight for their rights. The rapid population growth outpaces Africa’s capacity to produce its own food. Food insecurity is widespread. SSA is the region of the world with the highest rate of undernourishment: it is estimated that at least 30% of Africa’s population suffers from chronic hunger and malnutrition. As we look into the coming decades, we can forecast more widespread food insecurity that could be further aggravated by Africa’s lack of financial resources to pay for imported food combined with greater scarcity of the international supply of grains, as the consumption of cereals augments in other parts of the world, including in China, India and the Arab world. The investment in agriculture – including some kind of green revolution adapted to the region’s conditions and consumption habits – is a priority. It has however to take into account that there is water insecurity in some parts of the Continent, as there is also an expansion of the arid lands and desertification. The agricultural revolution will have to take all these factors into account and be based on seeds and technologies that will have little water demands, short production cycles and be pest resistant. There will be in addition very serious competition for vital natural resources, such as land, rangeland, water, firewood and other forest related supplies, as well as minerals. In some cases, this competition will take violent forms, including disputes between countries, in-country armed rebellions, civil conflicts, and ethnic strife. In other cases, it will open the door for undemocratic, corrupt governments, which will try to remain in power by force and through favouring their ethnic base’s access to scarce resources against the interests of the rest of the population. Urbanization is the other side of the population growth coin. SSA’s cities will expand fast and chaotically. In the next decades many more urban centres like today’s Lagos and Kinshasa will spread all over Africa. These will be unmanageable, sprawling conurbations, with few job opportunities, short on social infrastructure and blind on humanity. Urban violence could easily become a trademark of the new megalopolis. Furthermore, for many young people, especially for the young men, the big city will be a temporary stop before joining the emigration flow, as they will be looking for opportunities to settle and find a better life outside the Continent. Indeed, one can foresee that the current youth unemployment rates – which can be estimated at 40% and in some cases can be as high as 2/3 of the total population



under the age of 35 years (the UNDP estimate of 28% is too conservative and is more inspired by a politically correct approach than by data) – will continue to prevail in the future. The above described conundrums are not inspired by either a pessimistic or a fatalist view of the future. They represent key issues, based on real facts. They come out of any serious projection of the present trends into the foreseeable future. For Europe, they represent two major challenges. One is related to our system of ethics: how can we contribute to mitigate and respond to the critical harsh demands that many in SSA will be facing? As fellow human beings and as a Continent that has benefitted for very long from African resources and an unequal relationship, we cannot ignore the plight of those living next door and to whom we have been linked by history. The second challenge is related to our own stability and security. It will be a serious mistake full of dramatic consequences to believe that Europe can raise enough barriers and frontiers that would isolate it from the problems experienced by people in desperation and who would look at our region as a possible destination for their exodus. There is however an optimistic side to the future of SSA. The region offers vast investment opportunities, in terms of resources, and labour, with high rates of return. It is also a growing market for many goods and services. Private sector expansion is an indispensable avenue to a better future. Public development assistance policies have to create space and conditions for the entrepreneurs. Private sector co-operation is a must. Investors should be guided by European institutions, as well as by their bilateral co-operation agencies, and encouraged to look south, and partner with potential counterparts in SSA. The priorities of a renewed development co-operation agenda Seen from the European side of the equation, the first priority should focus on changing the mind-set of the EU leaders. They have to look at Africa as a moral engagement and also as a Continent with huge risks and opportunities. The decisive objective is to bring Africa back to Europe’s priority list of external partners. The concept of neighbourhood has to include Africa, because of vicinity and impact, as well as our historical ties with that Continent. Firstly, it is a question of moral values. International relations and aid assistance have to be based in ethic principles, such as solidarity, promotion of people’s dignity and human rights, as well as protecting lives. Better off Europe has the duty to assist Africa’s disenfranchised populations. Secondly, it is a matter of Europe’s interest. Our security is linked to human security in SSA. Additionally, Africa’s development and democratic stability could make the region a major economic partner of ours. The challenge is to cooperate with Africa to turn this potential into reality. For the EU leaders to change their approach it is necessary to mobilise the public opinion. Members of national parliaments, as well as MEPs sitting in Brussels, are called to play a critical role in terms of changing the perceptions and the substance of the debate. Thereafter, the new policies would follow. The European Parliamentary Forum on Population and Development is a major step in the right direction. It



needs, however, to have a comprehensive view of the issues, linked to strategic goals and human security concerns. It also requires well-defined priorities and a close link with academic and media circles as well as with key NGOs. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) remain the indispensable frame of reference for development co-operation. The key challenges identified in the previous section of this paper are very much in line with the Goals. They should constitute the starting points when it comes to defining the aid agenda. In view of the specific context of SSA, particular attention needs to be given to maternal health, gender equality, and hunger. HIV is also a major issue: annually, over 70% of HIV-related deaths occur in SSA. Furthermore, the plight of urban youth deserves exceptional attention and resources. Recent experience has shown that youth employment programmes lack substance, appropriate expertise and measurable results. They are also very much oblivious of the political dimensions: lack of democratic access to power by young people in societies where the young are the majority but the political control is kept by older politicians. Empirical evidence has shown that these old men are by and large disconnected from the aspirations of the younger generations. International migrations are not the solution to the employment issue. It is true that we live in a more globalised world and that many will move to foreign lands in search of job opportunities. But there are limitations to these movements. Many of those who have migrated from Africa to Europe are the best educated. Africa’s future needs their talent, skills and know-how. It cannot continue to lose valuable human resources. Also, there is a limit to the number of foreign persons Europe can absorb without compromising its own social stability. This is a very sensitive issue but it cannot be minimized: it requires more research about impact and absorptive capacities of European societies and a better understanding of its long term consequences. In the meantime, aid programmes should aim at creating the conditions for young people to be able to settle in their own countries and lead meaningful lives where their roots belong. In addition to official aid programmes and strategic issues related to peace and security, the renewed partnership between Europe and SSA has to be built on shared economic interests. The facilitation of private sector investments should be encouraged, to expand mutual beneficial ventures, long term commercial and productive projects, and ensure capital protection, corporate social responsibility and resource sustainability. Who sets the agenda? The partnership between Europe and SSA has to result from a balanced dialogue between the two sides. Money cannot dictate the priorities. Europe should not set the agenda. The donor-recipient relationship should be something of the past. Only a balanced approach is acceptable in today’s circumstances. There is a tendency within the EU to think that a number of African political leaders do not represent the interests and aspirations of their own populations. This view is very much related to considering Africa as a land of poor governance and unrepresentative politicians. The same people also see many of the African intellectuals as distant from the masses, disconnected from their roots, and unable or unwilling to influence the political elites. They therefore conclude that the agenda should be decided in Brussels and other European capitals. They also tend to blindly consider the NGO community has more genuine interlocutors. The proliferation of NGOs is, in many ways, an unintended consequence of this approach. Whilst recognising the importance of voluntary and community based worked, one should also consider that many African NGOs have little or no impact on people’s lives and a number of them are simply as unconnected as many other players.



Europe has to engage the existing leaders and maintain with them a credible, robust and frank dialogue. This is the only way we can build an effective partnership and, if necessary, contribute to the democratization of political life in Africa and a new type of relationship. At the same time, Europe should avoid show off meetings, formal gatherings void of substantive exchanges, as it is often the case between the two Commissions: the European and the African. And, above all, Europe should abstain from double standard approaches towards African leaders and their governance systems. Values and principles are the same, for friends and foes alike.



3.4. Segurança

Alexandra Magnólia Dias Investigadora, Centro de Estudos Africanos, ISCTE-IUL, Lisboa Apresentação sobre Radicalismo Armado no Corno de África: que implicações para a segurança internacional e as relações Europa-África?

Radicalismo armado na África do Norte, no Sahel e nos países vizinhos: implicações para a segurança internacional e para as relações Europa-África A segurança e a paz são condições necessárias ao desenvolvimento na Europa e na África, como se confirma pela história recente em ambos os continentes. A proliferação de armas resultante do fim do regime de Khadafy tem alimentado grupos rebeldes e jihadistas numa vasta zona do Norte, do Sahel e da África subsaariana limítrofe, como o caso do Mali bem ilustra. O agravamento da situação de segurança e das suas implicações na segurança internacional contribuiu para (re)colocar África no mapa estratégico internacional e é igualmente um desafio para a política externa da União Europeia e para as prioridades africanas de segurança.

Principais questões debatidas: De que forma é que as alterações políticas no Norte de África (especialmente na Líbia), afetam os países da África Subsaariana? Quais os impactos da insegurança no Sahel e nas regiões limítrofes sobre as prioridades internacionais e a parceria UE-África?



UE/Corno de África

Desde 2006 Comunicação da Comissão ao Conselho e ao Parlamento de uma Estratégia para África: A Parceria regional da UE para paz, segurança e Desenvolvimento do Corno de África.

Desde Dezembro de 2009 Política da UE para o Corno de África- uma estratégia compreensiva (integrada) Estratégia com maior enfoque na segurança.

Desde Novembro de 2011 a UE adoptou o Enquadramento Estratégico para o Corno de África. (Stategic Framework for the HOA)

Objectivo e mudança significativa de abordagem: Coordenar acção dos Estados Membros e ter uma Voz mais coerente na região.

Representante Especial da UE para Corno de África (Jan. 2012): Alex Rondos No quadro do Enquadramento Estratégico de Nov. De 2011 (Strategic Framework influência do Documento para Sahel de Março de 2011)

EEAS-África: Nick Wescott

Representante Especial da UE para Corno de África (Jan. 2012): Alex Rondos

Representante Especial da UE para o Sudão e Sul do Sudão: Rosalind Marsden

Representante Especial da UE para UA: Gary Quince

Representante Especial da UE para os Direitos Humanos: Stavros Lambrinidis

Representante da UE para a Somália ( base em Nairobi-Quénia): George-Marc André Duplicação de papéis ou complementaridade? Quais os Estados membros com mais envolvimento bilateral na região: Itália, França, Reino Unido.

Fonte: Williams, 2011



Padrões de Conflitualidade e Tendências:

1) Frequência relativa de guerras inter-estatais em África muito baixa. Apenas duas se enquadram inteiramente neste tipo.

Duas Guerras inter-estatais ocorreram no Corno de África envolvendo a Etiópia:

1979 Tanzânia vs Uganda ( no entanto classifica-se enquanto intervenção humanitária)

1977-78 Etiópia vs Somália (45.000 fatalidades)

1998-2000 Eritreia vs Etiópia (80.000-100.000) Corno de África e os principais desafios às Fronteiras herdadas do colonialismo: dois novos Estados no pós-Guerra Fria (Eritreia e Sul do Sudão) Princípio do uti possidetis (respeito pelas fronteiras herdadas do colonialismo) na carta fundadora da Organização da Unidade Africana como forma de prevenir abertura da Caixa de Pandora e prevenir conflitos





Corno de África no pós-11 de Setembro de 2001 e o debate em torno da ameaça dos Estados falhados (Somália) A) Proponentes da tese dos Estados Falhados enquanto ameaça à paz e segurança e enquanto bastiões

(safe-havens) para terroristas, Teóricos: Robert Rotberg

EUA Estratégia de Segurança Nacional 2006

Administração Bush

Reino Unido Primeiro Ministro criou Unidade de Estratégia «Investir na Prevenção» 2005

Maioria dos Estados Falhados em África (22 entre 40 de acordo com Index Estados Falhados) B) Críticos K. Menkhaus : Estados Fracos maior ameaça do que Estados falhados. Crítica a esta tese por parte da literatura pós-colonial na medida em que se parte de assumpções etno-cêntricas que caracterizam os Estados africanos enquanto cópias imperfeitas dos Estados ocidentais Corno de África, a recurrência de conflitos e o processo de formação do Estado: Resultados:

1) A guerra Consolida o Estado ou conduz ao seu enfraquecimento e desintegração? 2) Guerra pode conduzir ao redesenhar do mapa africano? 3) Criação de Novos Estados?

Tese: Guerra e a Lei do Retorno Limitado ie A guerra pode contribuir para a formação e/ou consolidação do Estado (Eritreia e a insurreição contra o regime do Derg até à auto-determinação) no entanto o recurso ou o regresso à força armada compromete e pode conduzir à desintegração do Estado (Sudão vs Sul do Sudão). RESPOSTA INTERNACIONAL

Desde não interferência até às intervenções internacionais

Peacebuilding ou construção da Paz pós-bélica como construção do Estado

Peacebuilding como statebuilding. Grau de interferência externa ou processo externo de reconstrução de Estados liderado pelos Estados ocidentais através das OIs e sistema da ONU.

A questão do Sudão / Sul do Sudão: Arena Política Regional: O Sul do Sudão: novo Estado sem acesso directo ao mar ( Landlocked) Dependência do Norte e oportunidades para os Estados vizinhos Reconfiguração do Corno de África e da África Oriental: Projectos de Expansão de Infra-Estruturas Arena Política Interna: as políticas em torno da fronteira entre o Norte e o Sul

1) A Fronteira Propriamente Dita: O Enquadramento Institucional para o Acordo da linha fronteiriça entre o Norte e o Sul (Quadro do Acordo de Paz Global de 2005: Comité Técnico Fronteiriço e os pontos de disputa; Extra-APG: Abyei); Flashpoints & outras fontes de disputa relacionadas com a delimitação e demarcação da Fronteira

2) A Questão Monetária 3) Definição e direitos de Cidadania





Como intervem a UE ao nível da RSS na Somália - Apoio às Instituições de Transição e Pós-Transição, AMISOM, ECHO - PCSD:

• EU-NAVFOR ATALANTA (Contra-pirataria): desde 2008, mandato até Dezembro de 2014. Orçamento para 2012: 8.6 milhões EUR (estimativas de custos anuais combinados para EM 1.5 biliões).

• EUTM Missão de Treino para a Somália, Uganda, Campo de Bihanga: desde 2010, mandato expira Dez. 2012. Mandato será renovado. Orçamento : 4.8 milhões EUR (Agosto 2011-Out. 2012). Providenciou formação e treino a 3000 recrutas da Força Somali de Segurança Nacional.

• EUCAP NESTOR: Desde Julho de 2012. Orçamento inicial: 22 millhões EUR. Reforçar as capacidades marítimas inicialmente de 5 Estados da Região: Djibouti, Quénia, Seicheles , Somália e futuramente Tanzânia. (Inicialmente desenvolvimento de Força Policial Costeira nas regiões da Somália de Puntlandia, Galmudug, e Somalilândia). Formação terá lugar nos Estados referidos e no Treino de Formação Regional de Djibouti.

Ligações com MARSIC (Programa de Rotas Marítimas Críticas). Estratégia de saída para EUNAVFOR ATALANTA? Objectivo: apoiar os Estados regionais a assumirem dimensão marítima da segurança regional. O APOIO DA UE À FORMAÇÃO DE INSTITUIÇÕES DE SEGURANÇA A Missão de Treino da União Europeia (EUTM)

A Formação de recrutas no campo de treino de Bihanga no Uganda foi precedida por uma iniciativa bilateral francesa de formação de recrutas do GFT Somali em Djibouti (contingente: 500).

Única missão de formação militar da UE em território africano.

Actualmente 13 Estados membros contribuem para a EUTM, entre os quais Portugal.

1 Contigente regressou a Mogadiscio em Fevereiro de 2011 (907).

Total de recrutas treinados até ao presente: 3000



Constrangimentos: por um lado dificuldades de recrutamento e dada a trajectória da Somália e permanente mudança de lados como evitar potencial de ‘’deserção’’ para facções opostas ao Governo por partes dos recrutas formados?

Grande desafio: constituição de uma Força Nacional.





Empenhamento internacional na Somália

Dificuldades em apreender o padrão volátil de formação de alianças na Somália.

Tensão chave em modelos políticos anteriores: Presidente, Presid. Do Parlamento e Primeiro Ministro.

Tensão entre representates e círculos internos.

Dificuldades na Extensão de controlo e presença por parte do Governo Federal e mobilização de apoio para além da capital e nas áreas recentemente controladas no Sul e Centro da Somália pela AMISOM.

Empenhamento internacional na Somália ‘’A conta gotas’’. Intervenções Temporárias-limitadas e não coordenadas.

O Enquadramento Estratégio para o Corno de África de Novembro de 2011 visa contrariar esta tendência e conduzir a um empenhamento a médio-longo prazo



Morten Boas Head of Research, Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies, Oslo Abstract This presentation draws on my chapter ‘Castles in the sand: informal networks and power brokers in the Northern Mali periphery’, published in Mats Utas (ed.) African Conflicts and Informal Power, Zed Books, 2012, but it also move beyond this chapter seeking to locate Northern Mali in a changing regional context. This context is affected by post-Gaddafi repercussions, but also informal and illicit forces of globalisation. The area north of the river Niger in Mali is an area of remoteness and isolation, but also of increased geopolitical significance due to the ‘war on terror’ and the ‘unintended’ consequences of the Libyan revolution. It is a site of informalisation, but also increased criminalisation: illicit transportation of cigarettes, drugs, arms and people. There is also Global Jihad in the form of AQIM, MOJWA and Ansar ud-Dine, more secular Tuareg rebels (MNLA) and ordinary bandits. This is an area that formally belongs to a state, but that for most practical purposes exists somewhere in-between and betwixt the Malian state and several neighbouring states. The region and town of Kidal illustrates this point. Kidal is formally a part of Mali, but in reality it is something else as the state of Mali stops where the road ends outside of Gao. The 350 kilometre track through the sand from Gao therefore cuts across a borderless limbo between the Algerian and the Malian state. To some extent a place lost in time and space. It is marginal, but also of primary importance. Kidal has been at the forefront of all Tuareg rebellions, and it is increasingly a centre for trade and transportation (legal and illicit). Taking this context as its point of departure, the presentation goes on to discuss the current situation in Northern Mali and critically reviews:

1) the claim for Azawad: it is real as an image and a dream, but as a state in the making it is no more a state that the large wadi, the dry desert riverbed north of Timbuktu where the name originates from,

2) the claim that AQIM, MOJWA, Ansar ud-Dine, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab are uniting under the al-Qaeda banner: another axis (triangle) of evil in the making – this view is caused by the failure to understand the difference between ‘branding’ and ‘branching’, and

3) the planned Nigerian-led ECOWAS intervention force: it may managed to take Gao and Timbuktu, but without successful negotiations with the Malian group Ansar ud-Dine and a clear exit strategy, it will become yet another ‘castles of sand’ in the Northern Mali periphery.

Presentation on “The Crisis in Northern Mali: in-between resistance, criminality and Global Jihad?” Locating Northern Mali?

• Basically it’s the area north of the River Niger, but what does this actually tells us about its regional neighbourhood?

It is an area that formally belongs to a state, but that for most practical purposes it is somewhere in-between and betwixt the Malian state and several neighbouring states

That is Algeria, Libya, Mauritania and Niger Each of them with their own sort of trouble and each of them hosting Tuareg minority

groups And the long lasting competition for hegemony in this part of the Sahel is also in flux

partly due to repercussions from the Libyan revolution



• It sent people (Tuaregs, but not exclusively) back to their homes of origin with arms and ammunition, but little else, and the very same repercussions are also altering for good and for bad the quest for hegemony between Algeria, Morocco and Libya

The region and town of Kidal illustrates this point Kidal – formally a part of Mali, but in reality something else

o The state of Mali stops where the road ends in Gao o The 350 kilometre track through the sand from Gao cuts across a borderless limbo between the

Algerian and the Malian state o A place lost in time and space

Kidal is marginal, but also a place of prime importance, at the forefront of all Tuareg rebellions, and increasingly a centre for trade and transportation (legal and illicit)

Do the people of Northern Mali support an independent Azawad?

• To a certain extent the history of rebellion here is “separatism as an allias”, and we should acknowledge that

The politics of the state as a “city game” – one of the few things that the North and the South has in common

In the South probably fair to say that to the extent that the rural population care about the state it is as hoping that a government could improve their economic situation or at the least not worsen it

• In the North – in may be that for the majority of the Tuareg pastoralists – an independent Azawad simply means no more state interference in their lives.

• Azawad is real as an image and a dream, but as a state in the making no more a state than the large wadi, the dry desert riverbed north of Timbuktu where the name originates from.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bd/Morocco_Africa_Flickr_Rosino_December_2005_84514010.jpg



Global Jihad in Africa: another axis of evil?

• The great conspiracy: AQIM, MOJWA, Ansar ud-Dine, Boko Haram, al-Shabbab – all as one united under the al-Qaeda banner – this is the failure to understand the difference between “branding” and “branching”;

• Hausa being spoken in Gao is certainly not solid evidence, and neither is the fact that fighters are shouting as this has been the main battle cry in the Muslim world the past 1432 years;

• Rather we need to understand the chaos that MNLA created when the Malian army ran away and how Iyad Ag Ghali and Ansar ud-Dine with the support of AQIM and MOJWA stepped in to the security vacuum that this created.

The 2012 rebellion – purification, or what actually happend?

• Tuareg warriors and military leaders returned from Libya well-armed • Started MNLA and the Malian army just fragmented and ran away • MNLA plunder, looting and sexual violence inflicted on the Tuareg population • It is into this chaos that Iyad Ag Ghali and Ansar ud-Dine steps with the support of AQIM and

MOJWA, re-establishes some sort of order • The old Turaeg warrior turned Jihadist or just a pragmatic re-orientation to a changing context? • Impossible to say at this point, but most likely a little of both • MNLA destroyed the old song of Azawad and a new tune, a reinterpretation of the Azawad

texture was necessary and a stricter version of Islam was one possibility and not that many others really existed

• Thus, the imaginary had to be re-imagined, but as ECOWAS both negotiate and plan for a military intervention and the Tuaregs has probably lost once more.

The planned ECOWAS intervention

• Need a credible partner in Bamako to have any chance of success – that is not the case now; • Even with such a partner it will be difficult:

Can recapture Gao and Timbuktu, but much more difficult to fight an insurgency with local support

Need to find a negotiated settlement with Ansar ud-Dine – maybe then possible to deal militarily with AQIM and MOJWA (weaken them and force them far into the desert)

Need a military and a political plan, and a clear and credible exit strategy To conclude with a plea for caution

• We should be very careful to jump to conclusions • Simply too much that we do not know • Some pieces of information is given way too much credibility – particularly the case of that which

supports a ”war on terror”/criminalisation approach and thinking, whereas information that would lead to the questioning of this paradigm is if not ignored at least not investigated much further so far



3.5. Fluxos e Actores do Desenvolvimento

Any Freitas Gestora de Programas, Instituto de Estudos de Segurança da União Europeia (EU-ISS), Paris O nosso painel abordará questões centrais do relacionamento entre a África e a União Europeia: as políticas, instrumentos e principalmente os actores para o desenvolvimento. Gostaria de fazer algumas reflexões para lançar o debate: por exemplo, de que tipo de desenvolvimento estamos a falar hoje; o desenvolvimento humano, o well-being, ou outros conceitos que estão hoje ligados ao desenvolvimento? Outra reflexão tem a ver com a forma como nos são apresentados estes “novos” doadores, frequentemente em oposição aos “tradicionais”, como se houvesse uma dicotomia. Esta separação ou dicotomia na verdade é falsa; é criada por uma espécie de justaposição um pouco rígida em que parece que os países africanos estão perante uma escolha exclusiva dos seus parceiros, como se fosse “ou um, ou outro” quando a realidade é mais complexa. No painel sobre a crise internacional, vimos que é importante não subestimar o papel dos doadores tradicionais, particularmente da UE, quando se fala em questões do desenvolvimento e da ajuda ao desenvolvimento. Muitos especialistas indicam que a contribuição e papel da UE como actor de desenvolvimento, em particular na África, continua a ser bastante forte. Dito isto, a posição de separar entre novos e tradicionais não deixa perceber que há uma complementaridade entre diferentes actores e mecanismos. Talvez fosse nesta ideia de complementaridade que a UE se deveria posicionar nos próximos anos, incluindo através de mecanismos de cooperação trilateral e com maior engajamento do sector privado.

Investimento Direto Estrangeiro, ajuda externa e novos parceiros: Impactos nas estratégias africanas de desenvolvimento Os fluxos externos de financiamento do desenvolvimento provenientes da cooperação internacional têm estado pressionados pelas crises orçamentais dos principais doadores “tradicionais”. O surgimento de novos financiadores e investidores em África, com critérios próprios de ajuda ao desenvolvimento, abrem novas oportunidades e têm estado a alimentar os debates sobre as prioridades de afetação de fundos ou sobre a (in)coerência das políticas para o desenvolvimento. Para além do impacto das economias emergentes em África, é igualmente relevante analisar em que medida os negócios estão a substituir a ajuda como principal motor de crescimento e como isso se reflete nos programas de redução da pobreza.

Principais questões debatidas: Quais as implicações políticas do aumento da importância de novos doadores na arquitetura internacional da ajuda ao desenvolvimento? Como podem os países africanos aproveitar da melhor maneira a crescente complexidade e diversificação de parceiros para o seu desenvolvimento?



Erik Lundsgaarde Senior Researcher, German Development Institute (DIE), Bonn Development Flows and Actors One starting point for the presentation is that the Joint Africa-EU Strategy from 2007 was formed with the recognition that the geopolitical importance of the African continent was increasing already then. One reflection of the continent’s growing global geopolitical importance has been the increasing engagement of a variety of external players in African countries. In this presentation on new development aid providers in Africa, I will focus my remarks on three broad areas: 1) I will provide some descriptive information on key new actors; 2) I will briefly discuss how their engagement with the continent is perceived to differ from Europe’s; 3) I will discuss some challenges that their engagement presents for European development cooperation and African development strategies. 1.Who are the ‘new’ development aid providers in Africa? First, they are the so-called emerging economies, particularly China, India and Brazil. These countries can all be considered mid-sized donors in comparison with OECD-DAC aid providers; narrow estimates of their aid-like contributions fall in the range of $500 million to $1.5 billion per year. In terms of the scale of giving, China leads the way, with cautious estimates of global giving falling in the range of $1 to $3 billion annually, and India may provide as much as $1 billion in development aid annually. If these estimates are small and potentially controversial, there is widespread agreement that aid figures comparable to official development assistance provided by traditional donors are growing at a quick pace. In 2011, the Chinese government announced that China had provided some $38 billion in aid to Africa from the 1950s through 2009 (according to American scholar Deborah Brautigam); as a point of comparison, all donors that report to the DAC disbursed some $50 billion to Africa in 2009 alone. Brazil and South Africa are also increasing their presence in the region and estimated to provide under $500 million annually as donors. For Brazil, about half of its development assistance goes to Africa (comparable to the size of Portuguese aid to Sub-Saharan Africa). South Africa’s aid is essentially limited to the African continent. Turkey is another regional power considered in this category, and seems to be growing dramatically. The most recent figures from the DAC suggest that Turkey provided only around $38 million in aid to Africa in 2010, but $270 million dollars in 2011. Often forgotten as official providers of development assistance are the donors in Central and Eastern Europe. Africa is not really a strong focus of their aid programmes, and together only about $20 million in development assistance to Africa from CEEC donors was reported to the DAC in 2011. Though these states are small, they may nevertheless have an important impact on the future development financing landscape in Africa if their political influence interests within the EU lead to a reassessment of the priority given to the continent in development cooperation. Apart from state donors, we should look at private aid providers. In some sense a traditional provider of development assistance, considering large Western NGOs these are sometimes embedded in existing OECD donor structures; in the last decade there has also been a growth in aid from private aid providers, though the scale of this growth is difficult to quatify. One example of growth in private assistance is engagement from private foundations, led by rising investments from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which distributes about $3 billion in global development and global health funding annually on a global basis. This accounts for a large share of foundation funding on its own, as general estimates of



the scale of private foundation giving worldwide lie in the range of $7.5 to $9 billion, with Africa representing one of the more important destinations for this aid globally. Foundations are associated with innovation, but in many cases operate in traditional sectors of development cooperation: health, education, and agriculture, for example. While they are also associated with applying business-oriented approaches, often their manner of engagement also often takes a conventional form, giving grants to other actors to implement programs. Alongside with emerging donors and private aid providers, we can also point out the outgrowth of program proliferation in multilateral development cooperation and traditional aid programs. Perhaps discussed less in the context of ‘new’ aid providers, but it is also important to acknowledge the expansion of channels for disbursing and administering aid within existing bilateral and multilateral aid systems. This includes the growth in specialized agencies within the UN system and in bilateral programs (MCC) as well as the rise of global vertical programs such as the Global Fund to Combat AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria or the GAVI Alliance. These new channels may be considered a remedy for the failings of more traditional development cooperation approaches, but they are generally an addition to, rather than a replacement for, existing channels. This heightens potential for greater transaction costs in aid management. In this context, it is also important to note that major DAC donors like the United States, Japan, Canada, and Norway which are outside of the EU continue to play an important role in the African development financing landscape as well. European aid to Africa itself is still significant though-accounted for 56% of DAC aid to Africa in 2010, or $16.5 billion. But then, the question is: what is Europe? Here, too, we are talking about very different donors’ systems and a diverse set of actors that do not always pursue the same interests. 2. What do we know about the character of the work of new actors and development aid providers? There are perceived differences between “new” aid providers and European/OECD donors in terms of priorities and manner of operation, but the former are also a very diverse group. The nature of assistance can include large-scale loans for major infrastructure projects, debt relief, technical assistance, or support for small-scale projects in traditional sectors of development cooperation such as education or health, or agriculture. In terms of the thematic focus, Brazil emphasises agriculture and food security, and prefers technical cooperation programmes (capacity building), provision of expertise in particular areas rather than distributing financial assistance. Indian development cooperation includes both financial assistance in the form of loans made on concessional terms, and technical assistance (focusing on training programmes). In Indian development cooperation there is often a perception of clear linkages between aid and private investment, which is clear in programmes such as the so-called TEAM-9 credit facility for 8 African countries ($500 million), the aim of which was to promote socio-economic development via increasing access to Indian technology in poor countries.



It remains difficult to know exactly what China is providing as development assistance, due to lack of transparency in reporting, differing definitions of development aid, and the blending of public and private investment, which happens through support for foreign operations of state-owned enterprises. China has especially been associated with the provision of loans for large-scale infrastructure projects, but the priorities addressed and the form that aid assumes has in reality been more diverse than this. Assistance also falls outside of the area of economic cooperation; China has recently announced its intention to increase its support for the African peace and security architecture, for example. In general, new donors are characterised by their preference for bilateral engagement, even if they prefer coordinated multilateral engagement in their own development cooperation with OECD countries. This preference for bilateral cooperation is not that different from many European donors, though, and within the DAC bilateral aid has represented around 70% of aid flows in recent years.

The “new” donors also perceived to be generally characterised by the transparent linkage of development funding to foreign policy objectives, such as the maintenance of energy security, or the promotion of trade and investment. Development cooperation programmes and systems generally remain under the umbrella of foreign affairs ministries in these countries. Especially in the ‘developing countries’ which promote development under the label of South-South cooperation, the principles of non-interference in internal affairs, equality of partnerships, and the mutuality of benefit are a key part of their self-perception as development actors. At the level of principles, one can question whether these notions are really different from those guiding European cooperation with Africa, and also ask to what extend there is a gap between the rhetoric and the reality on the ground. 3.Implications for (European) aid architecture and African development strategies? One interesting aspect of studying the impact of emerging economies on the broader development policy landscape is that their growing presence by itself acts as a stimulus for deepened self-reflection on the performance of OECD donors as development assistance providers, and for the EU in particular. If EU donors are concerned that the arrival of new donors undermines efforts to improve aid and development effectiveness by increasing transaction costs for partner countries, they need to reflect on the factors that are limited EU donors from coordinating their aid to a greater degree. This includes barriers to achieving a more effective division of labor in development cooperation at the country level, which still appears to be driven largely by what European donors want rather than as a result of assessments of value-added from the side of partner governments. If EU donors are concerned that the arrival of new donors undermines key policy goals such as the promotion of good governance or democratisation, they similarly need to consider whether their own instruments for democracy promotion are effective in achieving these goals and whether these instruments are applied in a consistent manner. If EU donors are concerned that China or other new players are becoming more important or attractive interlocutors and partners for African governments, EU member states can consider whether it makes



sense to maintain a strongly bilateral orientation in development cooperation themselves, or whether this it is now time to strengthen the development mandate of EU institutions to gain greater leverage. Moreover, the rise of new actors is a stimulus for Europe to consider its attractiveness as a development partner. Is its aid predictable, productive, and effective? Finally, if the close linkages between aid, trade, and investment that are features of aid from new donors are unsettling, the EU should consider whether it is fully transparent about the goals that it pursues in external policy toward Africa and assess how its current institutional framework enables the EU to pursue a coherent foreign policy agenda that better links these different dimensions of economic relations, especially trade and development. In general, new aid providers can have a positive role to play in African development as a source of additional financing and alternative ideas on how to promote effective development cooperation. The Busan Partnership has acknowledged the value of diversity of approaches and suggests that in the future development cooperation is about managing a diversity of actors. Two key things are needed in order to make the management of these actors easier at the country level. One is transparency: if it is not clear what different donors (old and new) are doing within a country, it is probably difficult to determine how to use their financing in a complementary way. A second factor is related to this: to ensure that new financing can lead to development results it is necessary for partner governments to be in a position to adequately steer the development process. This will require investments in capacity development, one example being in the area of financial management of external flows and internal statistical capacities.

Ana Paula Fernandes Conselheira de Portugal junto da OCDE Vice-Presidente do Comité de Ajuda ao Desenvolvimento (CAD), Paris What are the political implications of the rising of new providers of development cooperation in the traditional aid architecture? Abstract The Monterrey Consensus of 2002 established the primacy of domestic resources and the enabling environment in fostering growth and development, while emphasising the role of ODA as a complement and catalytic for other sources of financing for development. Significant changes in the financing landscape have already taken place and it is clear that addressing the challenges of the post-2015 development agenda requires a comprehensive approach to development: the role of the private sector; market- based financial instruments; the need to engage with non-DAC donors (Arab donors, south-south cooperation providers). Still ODA will continue to be relevant for fragile and least developed countries, but we need to modernize the system for measuring and reporting development finance. Many developing countries insist that financing for global objectives, as climate change, should be additional to aid. In this sense, the ODA concept may be re-examined. I will focus on the current debate on development finance in the DAC and what are the challenges for the current and post-MDG framework.



Apresentação Há dois aspectos transversais à minha intervenção, que eu gostaria de destacar. Um é a desadequação da classificação de “tradicional”. Quando nos tentam classificar como doadores tradicionais, face àquilo que é a nova terminologia aceite em Busan relativa aos “novos parceiros da cooperação” que não se querem classificar a si próprios como doadores mas como fornecedores de cooperação e de desenvolvimento, vemos que os doadores denomidos de “tradicionais” de facto não têm sido tradicionais nas suas abordagens. Isto porque têm assumido as suas responsabilidades, reformulado as abordagens e reconhecido os erros do passado, tentando ao mesmo tempo inovar, e parte dessa inovação reside no acordado em Busan sobre os novos princípios de uma parceria global para o desenvolvimento. Para além disso, as economias emergentes também não gostam de ser apelidadas de “novos” doadores, já que a China por exemplo afirma fazer cooperação há muitos mais anos que os doadores do CAD. O segundo ponto tem a ver com a discussão se centrar muito numa perspectiva de competição. Parece que estamos todos a competir entre nós, a avaliar qual o melhor e qual o parceiro mais vantajoso. Essa não deve ser a ideia central da discussão, sobretudo se estamos a pensar num cenário pós-2015, mas sim a ideia da complementaridade e de quais as mais-valias de cada um, sempre na perspectiva de que cabe ao país parceiro tomar as suas decisões e optar pelas parcerias que considera serem mais vantajosas. É nessa perspectiva que devemos pensar o futuro do financiamento do desenvolvimento, que se interliga necessariamente com o debate sobre a revisão dos Objectivos de Desenvolvimento do Milénio e o quadro global após 2015. A minha intervenção centra-se no que têm sido os debates no âmbito do CAD relativamente aos que se perspectiva sobre a revisão do próprio conceito de Ajuda Pública ao Desenvolvimento (APD), os novos fluxos e a relação com os novos actores da cooperação para o desenvolvimento. Nos últimos anos, e apesar da crise financeira, os doadores do CAD têm conseguido manter o seu nível de compromissos em matéria de APD e até aumentar o volume dessa ajuda. O CAD perspectiva, contudo, que não existirá um aumento substancial até 2015 e que os compromissos assumidos quer em relação ao continente africano quer em relação aos ODM em matéria de APD não serão cumpridos por uma série de circunstâncias, incluindo a crise.



Face a este cenário, é preciso não esquecer que os doadores não contribuem só com a APD para o desenvolvimento dos seus países parceiros, ou seja, a sua lógica de cooperação nunca foi assente exclusivamente na ajuda ao desenvolvimento. Verifica-se uma tendência para ver a relação com os países parceiros sempre na óptica da APD, mas sempre existiram empréstimos, concessionais e não concessionais, embora essa vertente de cooperação não fosse no passado a mais privilegiada pelos doadores tradicionais. Esse dado também está a mudar, por duas ordens de razão. Por um lado, cada vez mais há um reconhecimento por parte dos doadores de que a ajuda por si só não é suficiente. Por outro lado, há também um reconhecimento dos ministros das finanças dos países doadores de que há mudanças nas realidades dos países em desenvolvimento que são importantes para as suas próprias economias e que há outros países emergentes no terreno a estabelecer diferentes tipos de relação com esses países (nomeadamente através de empréstimos). Nessa óptica, existe uma relação de concorrência evidente nos fluxos que não são ajuda ao desenvolvimento, em termos de quem está a conseguir maiores parcerias na área das infraestruturas para o desenvolvimento, do desenvolvimento financeiro desses países, do investimento directo estrangeiro, entre outros. Busan reflecte a ideia, presente nos debates do CAD há bastantes anos, de que temos de reconhecer finalmente que a APD não é suficiente e que existem outros fluxos tão ou mais importantes – fluxos oficiais que não são considerados APD e fluxos privados, reflectindo a importância das fundações e outros actores que são reconhecidos como parceiros na Declaração de Busan. O que tem de discutir agora é qual a divisão de trabalho entre entres fluxos, instrumentos e actores. O diálogo com vários parceiros e actores tem sido levado a cabo pelo CAD conjuntamente com outros comités da OCDE, nomeadamente na área do investimento e com o sector privado. Este diálogo começou não há muito tempo mas está a ser estruturado também em função do que foi criado com Busan, através do Building Block for Private Sector, em que várias companhias multinacionais e associações empresariais reúnem com os doadores, ditos tradicionais mas que estão a desenvolver parcerias e a discutir o desenvolvimento com o sector privado. O CAD tem também procurado desenvolver um diálogo com os chamados “novos” fornecedores de ajuda, nomeadamente com a China, mas também com doadores árabes. Estes últimos tendem a ser esquecidos neste debate, mas têm desempenhado um papel importante em alguns países em desenvolvimento, tendo uma preocupação em matéria de governação e direitos humanos (desenvolvendo um diálogo interessante com o CAD sobretudo nesta áreas). A Turquia é observadora do CAD e está no pipeline para aderir ao Comité, tendo justamente desenhado um quadro de contribuição para a APD já de cerca mil milhões de dólares (naturalmente concentrada nos parceiros da região). Um outro aspecto importante que tende a ser esquecido é todo o investimento que tem sido feito, não só pela EU mas também pelos países doadores do CAD em matéria de Ajuda ao Comércio (Aid for Trade). Esta agenda está a ser revista e as negociações de Doha têm sido muito complicadas, mas entra na negociação que os doadores também fazem em termos de coerência com as regras internacionais de comércio e a capacitação dos países em desenvolvimento para terem estruturas capazes de aproveitar o comércio internacional. Quais as grandes discussões do CAD sobre a APD e os cenários pós-2015? Claramente parece, pelos dados que temos, que a APD a partir de 2015, terá um papel complementar e deverá estar centrada nos países com maior dificuldade de financiamento externo ao seu desenvolvimento, nomeadamente os países em situação de fragilidade (que têm mais dificuldades em captar IDE). Relativamente ao papel da APD, realça-se o seu papel na área da Coerência das Políticas para o desenvolvimento (CPD): por um lado, como é que a ajuda pode contribuir para aumentar a capacitação dos países em desenvolvimento para serem



parceiros no comércio e no investimento e terem capacidade para assumirem cada vez mais o seu desenvolvimento, e por outro lado, o papel de potenciar discussões globais ao nível de fóruns como o G-20, da Parceria Global para o Desenvolvimento ou no contexto das Nações Unidas, sobre problemas globais que afectam estes países. Existe portanto uma agenda que se interligada com a da coerência das políticas, e que nos é sistematicamente colocada pelos PED, relacionada com a contabilização da ligação entre ajuda ao desenvolvimento como a conhecemos hoje e outros bens públicos globais (como p.ex. o ambiente). OU seja, o que é que vamos considerar que é APD e aquilo que é adicional à APD; como é que vamos medir o esforço financeiro dos novos ODM, quando dizemos que esses objectivos até podem ter várias camadas – nacional, regional e global -; como é que definimos targets financeiros? Ainda não é muito claro, para já, o que iremos definir como objectivos. Os ODM tiveram a grande mais-valia de definir objectivos globais ligados a targets financeiros e a indicadores, mas este debate está ainda a ser definido para 2015. Na questão da definição da APD, há também um debate de definição do que é concessional e não-concessional, do que é empréstimo e do que constitui APD. Há quem diga que faria sentido retomar o que foi discutido em Monterrey, de ter um objectivo de 1% do RNB afectado ao esforço de cada país para o desenvolvimento global. Pensando nesse valor, poderíamos medir o global do esforço, passando da eficácia da ajuda para a eficácia do desenvolvimento, mas por outro lado isto poderia ser penalizador para os compromissos de APD na medida em que pode reduzir o esforço só com ajuda ao desenvolvimento, favorecendo logicas mais comerciais e de empréstimos. Há um equilíbrio a definir entre aquilo que o mundo precisa em termos de APD (nomeadamente os países em situação de fragilidade) e aquilo que são os fluxos privados de relacionamento entre países que potenciam também o crescimento económico. Nesta equação entra ainda a questão climática, uma vez que se discute também para o pós-2015 a ligação entre APD e o debate realizado no Rio+20. Uma das mensagens da reunião de alto nível do CAD realizada no início de Dezembro foi a necessidade de ligar os Objectivos do desenvolvimento aos objectivos da sustentabilidade para ter uma única agenda global. Aqui coloca-se mais uma vez a questão de serem fluxos adicionais ou não, e o que significa isto em termos financeiros. O CAD tem no seu mandato o objectivo explícito de acabar consigo próprio. O esforço dos países que estão sentados á mesa do CAD é entendido como um esforço para terminar com a necessidade de ajuda. Toda a discussão política e esforço financeiro devem ser feitos no sentido de criar sustentabilidade nos países parceiros e de a APD não ser necessária no futuro. Esta também explícito no novo mandato que temos de entender o mundo como completamente diferente daquele que existia nos anos 70, quando foi elaborada a definição de APD. Há novos parceiros e novos doadores, pelo que o diálogo não pode ser exclusivamente bilateral, nem exclusivamente multilateral no sentido tradicional do termo, mas muito mais inclusivo sobre estas dimensões. A nova parceria global para o desenvolvimento que surgiu em Busan também passa esta mensagem, em que o CAD está presente mas assume que, ao contrário do que fez na primeira discussão sobre a agenda dos ODM, não pode ser o único contribuinte para essa discussão, sendo antes uma das partes desse diálogo. É também interessantes não esquecer que a coerência das políticas é uma parte fundamental. A agenda da fiscalidade e do desenvolvimento, da luta contra os fluxos ilícitos e a corrupção, p.ex., mostra-nos que por cada dólar investido no combate à corrupção, resultam 20 dólares de cativação de rendimento. Será tão importante no futuro contribuir para que os Estados em desenvolvimento tenham capacidade para aumentarem os seus recursos internos, como será importante que os Estados doadores invistam muito mais no combate a fluxos ilícitos e à corrupção, bem como em questões globais e políticas sectoriais que sejam muito mais potenciadoras do desenvolvimento global, já que o desenvolvimento dos países parceiros é também o nosso desenvolvimento.



Diogo Gomes de Araújo Presidente Executivo, Sociedade para o Financiamento do Desenvolvimento (SOFID), Lisboa Abstract There are enormous challenges in increasing inclusive growth, reducing poverty, and improving people’s lives in developing countries. The private sector has a key role to play in addressing these challenges by supporting inclusive growth, poverty reduction, job creation, and access to critical goods and basic services and by providing tax revenues. International Financial Institutions (IFIs) support the private sector gaps in finance, knowledge, and standards and endeavor to create high-impact, sustainable development projects and programs. The private sector in developing countries faces many constraints in such areas as finance, infrastructure, employee skills, and the investment climate. IFIs focusing on private sector development can help address these constraints. Over the past decade, IFIs have achieved substantial growth in private sector operations. IFI projects have had significant impacts on job creation, connecting people via infrastructure and communications, reaching small and medium enterprises (SMEs), generating government revenues, providing health care and education, and assisting farmers. Great change is occurring both in developing countries and in the approaches and institutions that promote development. Recent trends indicate a growing emphasis on private sector to improve lives and living conditions in developing countries. IFIs are attractive options for public expenditure, as they leverage the limited funds entrusted to them by catalyzing the resources and talent of private actors. IFIs will need to partner with each other and with other key stakeholders to enhance impact and to adapt. To maximize development impact, public and private sector policies in each country need to be coherent and complementary. There needs to be a virtuous circle between public and private undertakings to maximize development impact and IFIs play an increasingly more important role on it. Apresentação É um prazer estar aqui e falar-vos sobre um tema que nem sempre é abordado neste tipo de conferências mas que curiosamente já foi referido pelos membros do painel, que é o sector privado e o desenvolvimento. Há neste âmbito um conjunto de instituições financeiras que não são tão novas quanto isso, já que a nossa congénere alemã celebra já 50 anos de actividade. Vou falar sobre o impacto do sector privado em diferentes aspectos do desenvolvimento, sobre qual o papel que a instituições financeiras vocacionadas para o desenvolvimento – como bancos multilaterais de desenvolvimento que apenas financiam o sector privado, ou braços privados de bancos multilaterais de desenvolvimento – têm no desenvolvimento dos países em desenvolvimento, e ainda sobre o gaps que existem no apoio ao sector privado e no papel deste tipo de instituições financeiras em suprir estas falhas de mercado. 1. Impacto do sector privado no desenvolvimento

Relativamente ao impacto do sector privado no crescimento, é preciso referir que este que é fundamental para reduzir a pobreza e ajuda a criar riqueza para os mais pobres se for feito de forma inclusiva. Temos dados que mostram que um PIB per capita maior está ligado a uma maior redução da pobreza (gráfico 1). Quanto mais houver investimento privado, maior o crescimento, uma vez que as economias com maior peso deste investimento na sua economia, relativamente ao investimento público, crescem também mais depressa (gráfico 2). Ao nível da criação de emprego, temos o exemplo do México, onde o rácio de postos de trabalho criados pelo sector privado, relativamente ao sector público, é de 87%, por comparação ao



Gabão, onde esse rácio é quatro vezes menor, sendo a diferença de crescimento entre os dois países também notória (gráfico 3). O sector privado tem também impactos ao nível da inclusão. Os estudos indicam que as desigualdades no rendimento e nas oportunidades de acesso a vários serviços têm limitado a capacidade das pessoas beneficiarem do crescimento económico Nesse sentido, temos de ter em atenção onde as pessoas vivem e trabalham, em que sectores trabalham, para avaliar se há um impacto positivo nos mais pobres quando falamos de investimento. O investimento privado pode ter um papel absolutamente fundamental ao criar oportunidades, criando emprego, serviços, concorrência, que leve a que populações possam ter acesso a vários serviços que não tinham anteriormente. Quanto menos avançado é um país, menor acesso existe aos serviços financeiros – as pessoas não têm contas bancárias, não têm acesso a soluções financeiras – e a serviços de comunicações, energias e outras infraestruturas, sectores estes onde a actuação do sector privado é importante.



2. Papel das IFI no desenvolvimento do setor privado

Gostava de chamar a atenção para um inquérito quer foi feito pelo Banco mundial, onde se detecta que, de todos os factores que limitam a actividade das empresas em países em desenvolvimento e emergentes, a electricidade é indicada como a maior limitação pela maioria das empresas, mas o acesso ao financiamento é aquele que mais consistentemente é referido em todas as regiões do mundo.



Relativamente às falhas de mercado para o apoio ao sector privado, gostaria de destacar que são as pequenas empresas em países de baixo rendimento que mais identificam a falta de acesso ao financiamento como o seu maior obstáculo para terem sucesso. Se analisarmos os três pilares do desenvolvimento, verificamos que a ajuda pública ao desenvolvimento representa mais de 100 biliões de dólares (doações, assistência humanitária e outras intervenções de ajuda); o segundo pilar são os bancos de desenvolvimento do ponto de vista público (financiamentos públicos de Estados, a empresas públicas, etc, com instrumentos que vão desde as doações, aos empréstimos e garantias) representando entre 50 e 100 biliões de dólares; e o terceiro pilar que são as instituições financeiras de desenvolvimento e que providenciam soluções de financiamento para o sector privado, sendo já assinalável: cerca de 42 biliões de dólares, de financiamentos, investimentos, garantias e todo o tipo de apoios que funcionam como catalisadores nos países onde actuamos. De destacar que estas estratégias têm de ser coerentes e complementares, tem de ser desenvolvido um trabalho conjunto (p.ex. é assinalável o trabalho que o CAD-OCDE tem feito de aproximação às EDFI – European Development Finance Institutions, das quais a SOFID é membro).



Quanto ao papel destas instituições financeiras de apoio ao sector privado ao nível do preenchimento de lacunas que possam existir no financiamento de empresas nestes países, gostaria de explicar a relevância da nossa actuação. Existe muita dificuldade no acesso a financiamento, particularmente a pequenas e médias empresas, existe igualmente um grande risco do sector privado investir em determinados países, e ainda uma grande necessidade de aconselhamento. Já tivemos reuniões com cerca de mil empresas e algo muito apreciado é o aconselhamento e a experiência que lhes podemos transmitir.

A nossa actuação contribui para melhorar o ambiente de negócios e de investimento; aconselhamos o sector privado a ter preocupações de sustentabilidade nos seus projectos e de impacto no desenvolvimento (algo que os empresários ainda não têm muito em consideração), introduzindo esses conceitos nos projectos que nos são apresentados; promovemos a responsabilização por aspectos ambientais, sociais e de boa governação nos projectos onde participamos. Para além disso, como somos detidos maioritariamente pelos Estados, damos também algum conforto político que é apreciado pelos clientes, muitas vezes em ambientes difíceis. Temos ainda um efeito demonstrativo, uma vez que quando os bancos comerciais não acreditam num projecto, podemos apoiar esse projecto e demonstrar que se forem apoiadas essas ideias, poderão ter sucesso. É interessante ver em quanto se transforma cada euro investido por uma instituição como a SOFID. Normalmente os nossos accionistas investem um terço do empréstimo e nós mobilizamos dois terços através dos mercados internacionais, o que permite através do nosso financiamento alavancar esse valor em três vezes (mobilizados através e bancos comerciais ou de capitais próprios dos promotores dos projectos). Isto obviamente vai gerar receitas que depois continuarão a alimentar a nossa estrutura. Isto faz com que 1 euro investido numa IFI pode gerar 12 euros de um investimento, sendo que também contribui com 1 a 3 euros para impostos colectados pelos países onde esse investimento é feito. Portanto, um investimento numa instituição como esta pode alavancar em 12 vezes esse valor (A SOFID ainda só tem 5 anos de existência e esse valor é neste caso de 1 para 4). Isto gera receitas para os accionistas e para a própria instituição, existindo um cash-flow que alimenta a nossa actividade ao nível de receitas e que contribui para as receitas fiscais dos países onde actuamos. Há também uma importância no contraciclo, ou seja, quando a crise se revela é exactamente quando instituições como esta são chamadas a actuar. Quando os movimentos de investimento ou de capital começaram a reduzir em virtude das crises sucessivas que se foram sentindo nesta última década, foi quando a actividade das IFI aumentou. Este factor pode, por isso, ser determinante para apoiar e manter um certo dinamismo económico nos países que mais precisam desse capital.



Foi feito um estudo sobre quais as vantagens e desvantagens de envolver a banca comercial com um banco de desenvolvimento orientado para o sector privado. Só fomos classificados mais negativamente em dois aspectos: a velocidade de processamento e na falta de presença local, mas em todos os outros factores a nossa performance face aos bancos comerciais é muito satisfatória. Alguns exemplos de como actuamos de forma diferenciada e em prol dos mais pobres são fornecidos na apresentação.



Ao nível dos resultados, gostaria de destacar a grande diferença nos volumes financeiros para o sector privado. A partir do seculo XXI parece haver um reconhecimento crescente por parte dos nossos accionistas (Estado) de instituições como a SOFID na eficácia de chegar aos mais pobres. Conseguimos, além disso, mobilizar recursos adicionais através da alavancagem já referida.





Em conclusão, acredito que a redução da pobreza necessita de um envolvimento muito forte do sector privado, que o sector privado beneficia se envolver um banco de desenvolvimento especializado (porque contribui para maior eficácia no desenvolvimento), e que este tipo de instituições tem competências específicas importantes preenchendo gaps nos financiamentos e aconselhamento. Por outro lado, temos de continuar a melhorar e a estreitar relações tanto com fornecedores de ajuda pública ao desenvolvimento como como com instituições multilaterais de desenvolvimento (public to public), sendo que os esforços de blending (conjugação e fundos públicos e privados) devem ser trabalhados. Nenhum de nós individualmente é mas esperto do que todos nós juntos.



3.6. O Futuro

Geert Laporte Deputy Director, European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Maastricht There have been quite a few meetings and brainstorms in the past years on Europe-Africa relations and I hope this session will also contribute in helping to set the agenda of a next milestone in the Europe-Africa partnership, the Summit that is foreseen in 2014. When we were here some five years ago for the II EU-Africa Summit preparatory work, I would say that there were a lot of positive feelings in most of the sessions we had at that time. In the past five years the world has changed a lot, Europe has changed a lot, Africa has changed a lot. If I carefully listened to all the various sessions, there are some changes for the better, but maybe also several changes for the worst. What are the positive elements that we could retain from the discussions that we had so far? Definitively the very important growth of Africa, although this growth is also creating a kind of paradox, because growth is not always equally distributed as it was mentioned. We have seen the emerging of new players, a lot of interest in Africa beyond the traditional Europe-Africa relationship; also a kind of shift that is gradually taking place in the mindset of the different actors about the role of aid and the traditional donor-recipient relations. I think everyone agrees that we should move beyond that approach and look on other ways to answer to the huge challenges for development and the huge challenges posed by some of the important global issues such as climate change. The whole discussion about finding enough resources to financing development beyond – and maybe also with – traditional aid, is a big issue.

Perspetivas para a Cimeira África-UE de 2014 e a Agenda de Desenvolvimento pós-2015 O debate em curso sobre a agenda de desenvolvimento global pós-2015, que substituirá os Objetivos de Desenvolvimento do Milénio definidos em 2000, inclui um conjunto de questões desde a eficácia do desenvolvimento, a coerência das políticas, o financiamento, as desigualdades e exclusão social (para além da pobreza), a inclusão de bens públicos globais, ou as ligações segurança-desenvolvimento-ambiente. Esta sessão procurará debater a relevância destes assuntos e a sua interligação com as prioridades para a cooperação África-UE, tendo em conta a Cimeira de 2014.

Principais questões debatidas: Quais são (ou devem ser) as principais questões debatidas na definição de uma agenda de desenvolvimento pós-2015? Quais os desafios e oportunidades desta nova agenda para a parceria Europa-África? Que contribuições podem os dois continentes dar a estes debates globais?



We’ve seen also a number of negative elements: in some of the sessions there was a lot of debate on the problems of inequality, of unemployment particularly amongst the younger generations, and the security problems were tackled. We also discussed the issue that some of the African institutions are quite ambitious but still very much dependent on donor funding – there are not enough resources mobilized within the African countries and continent to sustain the various institutions. On the European side there was also a lot of criticism leveled on what is happening in the continent – in spite of the fantastic Nobel prize for the EU that was delivered this week, Europe is confronted with a major credibility crisis. Credibility crisis in Africa, where we see for example that the whole EPAs negotiation as done a lot of harm in the mindset of many African leaders, but also in the populations, where Europe is not always seen as a coherent actor or a very reliable actor, with double standards in the application of some conditionalities that accompany European aid. Europe is in crisis and this will lead to a very different way of looking at development relations and international relations in general. We had a summit in 2010, in Tripoli and we probably deleted that summit out of our collective memory (and if you google EU-Africa Summit, the 2007 meeting is very mentioned but not the 2010), since it was not a very important event in terms of extending the dynamics that definitely existed 3 years before. Now we have to look forward and to how this joint Africa-Europe strategy is operating – regarding this matter there is a lot of criticism, because it is said that the JAES has not enough political traction, it has not the means to back up the huge ambitions, it is having also problems with the heavy structures to manage all the framework, and more importantly, in spite of that strategy, there is a kind of feeling that Europe and Africa over the past years are mutually ignoring each other. I’m maybe exaggerating a little bit, but there is certainly not the same type of dynamism that we witnessed in 2007. I’m coming now to a few questions that we put in this session. First basic questions: is there hope for a renewal and revitalized type of partnership between Europe and Africa towards 2014? What importance would the new leadership in the African Union attach to Europe-Africa relations? With major changes in Europe, such as the European External Action Service, what role does Lady Ashton want to play in the relation to Africa? To what extend if the EEAS really able to put a more coherent foreign policy framework in place, beyond the role that so far has been played by the Commission and the EC Development Directorate General that did not have that overall foreign policy ambition? How can the Summit in 2014 be a success and integrate many elements that we are currently discussing also for the post-2015 framework? These are some of the questions: I will also ask our speakers to highlight some of the issues that should be in the agenda.



Alex Vines Research Director & Head of the Africa Programme, Chatham House (RIIA), London I’m going to reflect on how the continent has changed since we had the Lisbon Treaty and the 2007 JAES and come up with some ideas on how we should move forward. What surprises have we already witnessed this year: I’m an analyst of Sub-Saharan politics and I wouldn’t necessarily expect those events. One big surprise is the impact of technology, for example shale gas technology and how it is transforming energy markets quite quickly. Exports of oil from Nigeria to the US are in decline and that trajectory will continue; Angola is producing gas that is not going to the US and from Tanzania to Mozambique they don’t what the future price of gas will be. Technology can be transformative quickly and the point is that we need to constantly review and test our assumptions. Another surprise is the security situation in Mali, since very few people would predict that so soon to an election Mali would crumble in the way it did. We were all anxious about Niger’s impact of Libia situation, but Mali less so. Again that is a big surprise that will predominate in Europa and Africa thinking in 2013. Discussions and events around Mali will certainly feed in the 2014 Summit. Another surprise was in Malawi, where the situation changed with the death of president Mutharika. We shouldn’t discount the role of individuals in all of this, because individuals play a key role. My last surprise is about the African Union, where I didn’t expect Ms. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, from one of big 5 countries in Africa, to become the chair of the Africa Union Commission. That, in itself, raises an issue when we are looking towards 2015: the mood inside the union amongst its members is mixed about Ms. Zuma and it was quite a surprise. She has a great track record and let’s see how she can progress. There’s no doubt that the African Union, as much as the EU, needs reform and rationalization. Looking back over 10 years of the AU, I reflected on how exciting many people where in the beginning and the vision that the first chair and commissioners had at that time. Then thinks began to lose steam and many of the problems were already defined and understood (see for instance the 2007 audit document): it’s about the enacting the politics, leadership, and the political will by the members themselves. I wonder if some parts of the AU architecture are premature, for instance I’m not sure about the pan-African parliament and whether it can be afforded, it is not democratically elected and it’s expensive. Maybe in this atmosphere of austerity, there needs to be some prioritization and strong political will about those priorities. I’m not sure that Ms. Zuma will be able to achieve this, but I’m hopeful that she has the technocratic skills and if she proves that she doesn’t pursues a national agenda, it could be quite an exciting time. There are other things that we can predict that will happen in the continent next year. Guinea-Bissau, the troubles with the collapse of the government in São Tomé & Principe, the situation in eastern Congo, the results of the Angolan elections, are all no surprises. Therefore there are some constants, but there are also things that we are not prepared for and we need to test our assumptions. The European crisis in not going to go away and that is also a key issue building towards the Summit in 2014 that we’ll need to be fully cognoscent on. This means that the big themes like the discussions on values versus interests are going to be very apparent – trying to get a coherent strategy when there are diverse economic interests and prosperity agendas… There are 120 thousand Portuguese in Angola at the moment and Angola is the largest export market for Portuguese wine, besides all the other things we hear about Isabel dos Santos and various investments that take place in Portugal. How are you going to get a coherent strategy when you have that? The same with France, with the UK and with other countries that need to export more and more efficiently to get out of the fiscal crisis they are in. That is not to say that the Europe-Africa relationship isn’t important, we have seen the figures: 1 billion euros spent by the EU between 2008 and 2013, 16.5 billion aid to Africa in 2011, a hundred million euros for the Africa Peace Facility since 2004 – this is not insignificant money and a significant part of that goes to the Africa Union project. Europe isn’t insignificant and it won’t be insignificant, but in an atmosphere of



continued austerity priorities and rationalization need to be made. There is a swing in the way of focusing in the continent architecture that has the flavor of the recent years; this is something officials in the African Union Commission are very vigilant about, but talking in the European capitals there in increasing interest in putting more resources, more thinking and more time into the Regional Economic Communities (REC) or regional mechanisms. The issue on how the RECs, the regional mechanisms and the Africa Union fit together and interrelate with Europe is critically important. The situation in Mali shows how all of these play a role – we need the AU level, the RECs level, the international level, and there is a great complexity where no one should be exclusive of the other. There are very positive moments where Europe has played a role. The process of encouraging coordination between the RECs and the AU, including funding the liaison offices in Addis is a good thing; the Zanzibar meeting as part of that process, held in November 2011, was positive and there are signs that some of this is improving. General Obasanjo integrated a joint AU-ECOWAS election monitoring team in Ghana elections and that has to be a good thing. There are examples of progress, and there are examples of incoherence. The Joint-Africa-EU Strategy has been significantly underperforming. It is meant to be the long term framework for the EU-Africa relations, with two actions plans (2008-2010 and 2011-2013). These action plans needs to be rationalized: they are overambitious, fluffy and underperforming. There is also meant to be provision for a civil society discourse, which is pretty silent and invisible. The question is how can the JAES be rationalized and made more practical and how can other voices, including by civil society actors, become involved? Part of the idea of EARN was a network to follow the JAES, but is also underperforming. These are the sort of questions we need to consider, because there needs to be better mechanisms to hold these processes to account. The EU has had some progress in terms of cohesion, in its responses. A very good example of whether there has been progress is the strategic framework on the Horn of Africa: there is better coherence in terms of the overarching themes and approaches than there was before that framework existed. That framework draws from the lessons and mistakes from the predecessor framework on the Sahel, which basically didn’t anticipate the subsequent events and is not well equipped to deal with these crises. With the input of the European External Action Service (EEAS), that didn’t existed in 2007, this is one area where there has been some progress and Europe itself is responding to some of these challenges. But to draw these strategic regional framework documents, the AU is not consulted, the AU ambassador in Brussels isn’t brought in for a discussion, and these are bilateral discussions between an African region and the EEAS and other parts of Brussels. Then again, how can you have an African strategy (“Africa should be treated as one”) when you have all these other efforts and initiatives? It is also striking that the EU can walk to AU Commission corridors very easily and have passes, when it is not the same for the AU mission in Brussels; it happens in Addis but it does not happen in Brussels. So how do you have common values and common trust when you have that sort of incoherence? Finally, the EEAS is going through thieving problems and it is still a project in development, but we can, as we’ve seen in the Horn of Africa strategic framework, see where there have been successes. I’m not sure how much Baroness Ashton worries about Africa (she certainly worries about pirates), but one of the things I would like to see in the run-up to the IV EU-Africa Summit is that she is more seized with the challenges of the continent and does not only have an off-shore view of the continent. I’ve talked about the regional frameworks, but we should also take into account the bilateral ones and how they interrelate with the “treating Africa as one” strategy. For example, there is a strategic partnership with South Africa and there was an attempt to have one with Angola, but the President dos Santos is not interested and has made clear who the Angolan strategic partners are: China, US, Portugal and Brazil, not the EU. So these are some of the issues we need to grapple with. The mechanisms are



there, there needs to be a rationalization and there needs to be a deepened seriousness on the commissions about how this process is managed.

John K. Shinkaiye Ambassador, former Chief of Staff of the President of the African Union Commission, Abuja INTRODUCTION I will like to begin my intervention by expressing my sincere thanks to the three Portuguese Institutions - IEEI, IMVF and ISCTE-IUL, as well as ECDPM, firstly for organising this conference, which I consider timely, and secondly for inviting me to participate in it. Having just left the African Union Commission at the end of October, this is one of my first post retirement engagements. The engagement of the four institutions I have just referred to, in the Africa-Europe partnership is well known and a demonstration of one of the major planks of the partnership – “ensuring a better participation of African and European citizens, as part of an overall strengthening of civil society in the two continents”. (1) It is therefore most appropriate that these institutions have jointly organised this conference to look at the next stages in this important partnership taking into account the critical decisions that will be taken outside the two continents regarding the post-2015 global development agenda. DISCLAIMER Before going any further, let me state quite clearly that I was invited here in my individual capacity as I no longer work in the African Union Commission. What I say therefore, is entirely my private and individual opinion and does not represent what the A U Commission thinks. I should, nevertheless say that it was because of the privileged positions I have occupied between 2000 and 2003 and 2006 and 2012 as Nigeria’s Ambassador to Ethiopia and the OAU/AU and the Chief of Staff of the Chairperson of the African



Union Commission, respectively, that I could be invited to such a conference as this and to make some contributions. LOOKING AT THE FUTURE Our session is to look at the future after the illuminating sessions preceding ours. Specifically, we were required to focus on the 2014 EU-Africa Summit and the post-2015 Development Agenda: What Next. The questions to address have also been identified and which are very helpful. I will try to address these questions, but not always directly. I will also like to make some general points about the partnership, how far it has gone since the first summit in 2000; issues of implementation of agreed instruments including the Africa-EU Joint Strategy and the envisaged 2014 Summit. With respect to the definition of a post-2015 agenda, my focus will be on how Africa sees it based on emerging consensus from the continent after a series of consultations that have taken place and are continuing. My hope would be to relate this to the contributions that the partnership between Africa and the EU could make, not just to the definition of the agenda, but also its implementation. FROM THE 1st Summit to the 4TH SUMMIT: BRIEF COMMENTS Africa’s relationship with Europe is deeply rooted in history and has gradually evolved into a partnership institutionalised through the Africa-EU Joint Strategy (JAES). The JAES has become the overarching political framework since it was adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2007, and guided the relations between the two continents, together with the Cairo, Lisbon and Tripoli Declarations and Plans of Action. Since the establishment of the Africa-Europe partnership, considerable changes have taken place on both continents. Democratisation and reform processes have been launched and deepened in Africa and efforts have been successfully made to address many conflict and crisis situations in the continent. The integration process has continued and the transformation of the OAU to the African Union has brought about such an important change on the continent, unimaginable in the last decade before that transformation. On the other hand, the EU has more or less doubled in size and far reaching reforms have been put in place, including the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), and the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Overall, new international and global challenges have also emerged and, with accelerated globalisation, the world has become increasingly interdependent. The importance of this last point is emphasized by the first theme relating to the impact of the international crisis on the Africa-EU relationship. As the concept note clearly and, in my view, correctly, indicated, the “combined effects of the global financial and the Euro crisis, as well as the debate over austerity versus growth policies will surely continue to frame the relationship”. (2) This point is extremely important because the EU collectively and with several of its individual members, constitute the largest provider of overseas development assistance to Africa, while the EU, as an Institution, is the largest provider of aid to the AU. It is therefore inevitable



that the current crisis will affect the agenda of the 4th Africa-EU Summit as it will affect how the EU could respond to the developmental needs of Africa. My conclusion on this section is that although the Africa-EU partnership has developed beyond the initial thoughts of some, who saw the Cairo Summit as a one-off process and photo opportunity session of African and EU leaders, and has recorded considerable achievements, the current crisis, particularly the Euro crisis, will definitely, regrettably, adversely affect the future relationships between Africa and the EU in terms of the implementation of the JAES and other agreed instruments. I should emphasize that, in my view, some of the processes are irreversible because, I could not, for example, envisage a situation where the EU will not be able to meaningfully engage with Africa in dealing with its peace agenda, governance issues, migration and the environment, all of which have direct impact on the EU – should they go wrong! THE POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: EMMERGING CONSENSUS FROM AFRICA. As the concept note indicates, the “on-going debate over the 2015 agenda will substitute the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) defined in 2000” and includes a “ range of discussions on development effectiveness, policy coherence, financing, the relevance of addressing exclusion and inequalities (more than poverty), the inclusion of global public goods or the security-development-links.” All of these are extremely important and relevant to Africa. However, as I indicated earlier on in the paper, I will focus on the consensus that is emerging in Africa on what should be the post-2015 development agenda. As would be seen, I think what is contained in the concept note is not incomparable with what Africa is thinking. Before proceeding further, let me just emphasize that Africa, led by its three continental institutions, namely, the African Union Commission (AUC), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), has been doing a lot of reflections on the post-2015 development agenda. A summary of the activities is contained in a paper titled the “Road Map for Post- 2015 Development Agenda.” (3) The paper shows that the process undertaken by the three institutions have been at the levels of the country, the region and the continent. It has also involved the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA) which functions as a technical arm of the AUC. They have also been working with the Africa Bureau of the United Nations Development Programme. The last (19th) ordinary summit of the African Heads of State and Government adopted the joint MDG report for 2012 in July 2012. The consultations are still on-going, but the outcome document of the process so far, is quite clear. It states that “Noting the relatively slow progress made by the African countries towards the MDGs and recognising the capacity deficits and disabling initial conditions prevailing in a number of countries, participants unanimously agreed that the post-2015 development agenda should: 1) Emphasize inclusive economic growth and structural transformation. 2) Re-orient the development paradigm away from externally-driven initiatives towards

domestically-inspired and funded initiatives that are grounded in national ownerships. 3) Prioritize equity and social inclusion and measure progress in terms of both the availability and

quality of services delivery. 4) Take into account initial conditions of nation states and recognise the effort countries have made

towards achieving the goals as opposed to exclusively measuring how far they fall short of global targets.

5) Be convergent with the Rio + 20 outcomes and related UN products such as ICPD + 20. 6) Focus on development enablers as well as development outcomes.” (4)



Three broad development outcomes have been identified as priorities for the post-2015 development agenda, namely: Structural economic transformation and inclusive growth; Innovation and technology transfer; Human development. (5) The consultations have also identified what they call “development enablers, which they emphasize, will provide the “enabling environment at the national, regional and global levels” and which are prerequisites for Africa’s post-2015 development agenda. These are:

i) Peace and Security; ii) Good Governance, transparency and fighting corruption; iii) Strengthened institutional capacity; iv) Promoting equality and access to justice, and information; v) Human rights for all; vi) Domestic resource mobilisation; vii) A credible participatory process with cultural sensitivity; viii) Enhanced statistical capacity to measure progress and ensure accountability; ix) Growth oriented macro-economic policy; x) Developmental state. (This refers to a developmental framework that is informed by market

principles but guided by the state); and xi) An enabling global governance architecture. (6)

I had earlier indicated, and I wish to reiterate here, that Africa’s emerging consensus is not incompatible with what is coming from outside the continent. I would however stress the imperative of listening very closely to what Africa is saying. Yes, the current Declaration was signed by over 180 countries. However, everyone knows that the Declaration has more relevance to Africa and it is that continent that has struggled the most with achieving the goals. It is a very good thing that Africa and its institutions are working with the UN and the EU to reflect on what happens post 2015. THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE NEW AGENDA FOR THE AFRICA-EU PARTNERSHIP AND AFRICA’S AND EU’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEBATE. If a comparison were to be made between the emerging African consensus on the post-2015 development agenda as briefly outlined above and the content of the JAES Action Plan 2011 – 2013, and other related Africa-EU programmes, a lot of similarities, would be found. When the details of the eight partnerships are broken down, there is a lot of communality between what Africa has identified as “development enablers” and what Africa and the EU are doing in their partnership. At the risk of being simplistic, I would say that the post-2015 development agenda constitutes opportunities for furthering the partnership between Africa and the EU. The challenges are of a general nature and will emerge with the evolution of how the 4th Africa-EU summit will be affected by the current world and EU crises. In one sentence, were the EU to be so incapacitated by the Euro crisis that it cannot maintain the level of its assistance to and collaboration with Africa, let alone increase it, then Africa’s capacity to meet its post-2015 development agenda can only be correspondingly weakened. For me, and I admit that I do not know how the debate on the post-2015 development agenda is going in Europe, the dialogue between Africa and EU could only but enhance early global consensus because what Africa is saying is very much in tune with what it is actually doing with the EU. The main challenge will be how the current crisis limits EU’s and Europe’s ability to make the contributions expected of them for the new agenda.



THE 4th AFRICA-EU SUMMIT: RELEVANCE OF POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA AND LINKS WITH THE PRIORITIES OF AFRICA-EU COOPERATION: From the information already circulating, it is as if a decision has been taken that the 4th Summit will be held in 2014. Let me just remind us that, were we to follow the Tripoli decision, in conformity with earlier decisions, the 4th Africa-EU Summit should be taking place in 2013. I am aware that some discussion has taken place between the two Commissions – AUC and EC – but I am not sure if both sides have already agreed that the summit should be delayed till 2014 rather than being held in 2013 as originally envisaged. I am sure the discussions will go on between the two Commissions. This was to have been part of the agenda of the AUC-EC Joint Task Force (JTF) meeting which should have taken place in November this year and which, I understand, may now hold in February 2013. From my personal point of view, with this development, it will probably be better if the 4th summit takes place in 2014. This has a number of advantages. It will allow the new AU Commission settle down properly; allow for a proper preparation for the summit including a review of the implementation of the JAES; offer the possibility of a clearer view of how far the current crisis will restrict EU’s intervention in Africa and provide a more realistic outcome of the 4th Summit. These issues will need to be the main focus of the next meetings of the JTF and the two Colleges in 2013. The fact though, is that neither Africa nor the EU seems to be focusing adequate attention on their next summit. There is need for both sides to change this, so as to ensure that the summit succeeds. Again, at the risk of being simplistic, I would say that the relevance of the post-2015 development agenda and its discussion, as well as links with the priorities of the Africa-EU cooperation or partnership, are quite obvious. The discussion between Africa and the EU, as pointed out above, are more or less on the same issues and the African identified priorities for the post-2015 development agenda are already priorities in the Africa- EU dialogue. What I would suggest here is that there is need to see how to deal with the impediments to the implementation of the JAES, as not doing so will just ensue that the dialogue does not lead to concrete implementation, which in turn, will adversely affect Africa’s ability to implement the new development agenda. One major area that I think both Africa and the EU agree on, is the need to have an instrument for the implementation of the JAES. In this respect, the African side had been happy with the news that the EU was thinking of establishing a “Pan-African Financing Instrument (7) which should have been contained in the Commission’s EU budget post-2013. The size of such an envelope, and even the possibility of getting it approved by all relevant EU institutions at a time of such financial turbulence, would always be a challenge. I have not seen much progress, since the JTF discussed this in April this year in Brussels, but I will be glad if I am wrong. If the African proposal for an “African Integration Facility” was also to make progress, then the financing issue would have been dealt with. Let me emphasize that the African side recognises that both Africa and the EU have responsibility to provide funding and efforts must be made to increase African participation in this. There might also be need to look at the institutional architecture for the Joint Strategy including the partnerships. I have heard hints of a reduction of the number of partnerships from the current eight to, by some accounts, as few as four. I am not myself certain what good this will do because it is hard to think of what should or could be left out. When you see the list of the “development enablers” identified



by Africa as essential for successful implementation, it will be tough to decide what should be dropped. Some trimming will be required as would be some tightening of some loose ends. There is also need to be faithful to the principles both sides have agreed to in Lisbon. One important one I will mention is the principle of treating Africa as one. This is something the EU agreed to but has found very difficult to implement. This has led to some complications in our relations, for example on how both sides reacted to and proposed solutions for the Libyan crisis. While the EU saw Libya through the eyes of its Southern Neighbourhood policies and did not want to deal with Africa, as in the other conflicts in Africa, Guinea, for example, Africa insisted that Libya is an entirely in Africa and constitutes the northern border with Europe! The repercussions of such divergences could be very serious for the relations between the two partners and needs to be taken care of in the next summit. CONCLUSION My conclusion is that there is an intricate link between the issues that will come before the forthcoming Africa-EU summit and Africa’s views and consensus on the post-2015 development agenda. The process through the Dialogue between Africa and the EU can only but reinforce the larger and wider discussion on the next global development agenda. The lessons learnt from this Conference will most certainly help the process for the discussions on the post-2015 development agenda. So also will the process in the latter help focus the right attention on the right issues as Africa and the EU prepare for their 4th Summit. In this respect, I want to close by reiterating my appreciation to the organisers of this Conference and all those who have supported it and participated in it. I have no doubt that the outcome of the Conference will be useful to the African continent, the EU and the UN as well. REFERENCES:

1) The Joint Strategy 2) Concept Note: BUILDING THE AFRICA-EUROPE PARTNERSHIP: WHAT NEXT. 3) Road Map for Post-2015 Development Agenda. 4) Post-2015 Development Agenda: Emerging Consensus from Africa 5) Ibid. 6) Ibid. 7) AFRICA-EU JOINT TASSK FORCE MEETING, 4 – 5 APRIL 2012: JOINT STATEMENT.

Pinkie Mekgwe Executive Director for Internationalisation, University of Johannesburg For me, the question about where the future lies, is with the future itself, and the future is with youth and their preparedness. I would like to see us focusing much more on Education, which is crucial for the preparedness of youth and allow us to deal with some of the exigencies of the XXI century – some of which have been occasioned by shifts in the landscape and that we might not have at the time we started our own construction of the EU-Africa partnership. A focus on Education is critical, that goes beyond Science and Technology, beyond simply primary education, and while these are certainly important there is also a need to look in a holistic manner to this subject. I would like to focus on higher education and internationalisation, which is linked to partnership and therefore to areas we can discuss on EU-Africa relations. I’d like to suggest that in the past few years, higher education has seen significant landscape shifts, with a challenging nature, but also accompanied by opportunities that led to the opening up of avenues for renewal. Some of the challenges that we see with respect to Africa are issues of low

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participation rates, issues of access, issues of quality, etc. There have been ways in which internationalization has been adopted in the South, in African countries, as a manner of addressing some of these exigencies and this has been possible because internationalization has come into vogue as a sight to renewal and creativity. In most developed areas of the world, including in Asia, institutions and countries have taken this to position themselves much more competitively, taking education as a development enabler and as a factor of openness. The focus is on producing graduates for the global markets, a recognition of universities as important global mobilizers for transformation, and also the importance of global themes of research and the increasing mobility of students (including within Africa, from the north to the south for instance). Why is internationalization a critical area of higher education and how does this strengthen the Europe-Africa partnership? A successfully internationalized institution would be research intensive, internationally mobile (with students going abroad and having international experiences), would have top faculty and diverse, would have multinational collaborations, and well managed. These are elements that provide us with and enhanced quality of education and with much more inclusiveness in terms of the work we do. There has been research and studies that conclude that students who have an international experience have attributes of adaptability, of creativity, of cross-cultural fluency and tolerance, in addition to the academic aspects. These additional skills are key for employability, which has become a real burden particularly for youth, with a big percentage of youth unemployment. This is something we have to take forward, if we want a kind of transformation in the employability and preparedness of youth as leaders. Industrial experience as well allows for entrepreneurial experiences for the students and prepares them to create jobs for themselves and for others. In short, these young leaders and imbued with global competencies and connectedness, which are key to leading and managing and shared and increasingly connected globe. The history of partnership in Education between Europe and Africa has been a long one, from the establishment of Universities in African to the support for African students coming to European countries, to continued partnerships between several instances in a loose level. The partnerships have been to a large extend very unequal and perhaps it is necessary, as African countries begin to formulate their own internationalisation policies, to pay much more attention on how do they work in consonance with those of Europe, so that this becomes an enabling partnership going both ways. We have had projects that have started as a way of Europeanising as Erasmus, that are going to other parts of the world (Erasmus mundus), but is still a very uneven partnership in this matter. There is therefore a need for reconfiguration of this partnership, where there should be much more reciprocity and joint research, where we co-creatively respond to global challenges and where there is a recognition that learning should happen in both directions (e.g. as African students learn languages of Europe, European students also learn languages of Africa). Youth is changing and is significantly different from the past; we have a significant group that is said to be “the third culture youth” that belong neither here nor anywhere else but belong everywhere else!

Also important is the recognition that the question as not been so much what is undertaken in the Europe-Africa partnership, but rather the nature of the partnership that needs to be transformed, and prepare leaders of tomorrow to be in a position to steer differently.



Thomas Lawo Executive Director, European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), Bonn BEYOND THE MDGS – THE POST 2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: A Review of the debate and potential elements of a joint EU strategy Studies conducted have revealed that the global distribution of poverty has shifted from low income to middle income countries. This ‘new bottom billion’ identified by Sumner (2012) is not the same as the ‘bottom billion’ earlier explained by Collier (2007) and is composed of five large MICs namely Pakistan, India, Nigeria, China and Indonesia. In these countries as well as the MICs with high poverty incidence, the average income increased whereas the absolute number of poor people fell negligibly. The majority of the world’s poor by income and multi-dimensional poverty measures live in countries categorized by the World Bank as middle-income countries. However it is important that the discussion of poverty in MICs does not distract the reality that LICs typically have higher rates of poverty incidence. A closer analysis indicates a ‘double bottom billion’ of poor people in MICs which implies a ‘bottom billion’ living on under $1.25 per day and a further billion poor people living on between $1.25 and $2 per day per capita. This compares with about 300 million living on under $1.25 and a further 200 million living on between $1.25 and $2 per day in LICs. Given that some present day LICs will move into the MICs bracket by 2020 or 2030, this suggests that the structure of world poverty will remain split between LICs and MICs for the years to come. Another established trend closely related to the poor in LICs is that 18.4 percent of the world’s poor live in ‘fragile states’ in comparison to 60.4 percent in MICs while only 7 percent of world poverty remains concentrated in ‘traditional’ developing countries such as Tanzania. Fundamentally, the new geography of poverty amid high levels of average per capita income raises questions about the types of economic growth that leads some countries to reduce the number of people in extreme poverty and other countries not to. The good news in general is that as countries get richer, the cost of poverty as a proportion of GDP should fall particularly for MICs. For countries which are currently LMICs, the average cost of ending $1.25 poverty is estimated to be in range of 0.2-0.6 percent of GDP in 2020 and at a similar level to end $2 poverty by 2030. However, the approximated cost of ending $1.25 poverty in the present day LICs may remain high even in 2020 and 2030 which implies that for about 20 countries on the moderate growth, external support for poverty reduction will remain absolutely essential. When data for the 20 countries with 90 percent world poverty is considered, LICs such as Bangladesh, the DRC, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique and Malawi have the particularly high costs of ending $1.25 and $2 poverty. MICs like Nigeria, Angola and Nepal also have high costs of ending poverty.

The discussion on the Post-2015 development agenda in the context of a new development paradigm, has also engaged various stakeholders such as governments, international institutions and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to provide views on this topic. The United Nations (UN) under the stewardship of the Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has set up a UN System Task Team which is supported by the High-level Panel appointed by Ban Ki-Moon himself. The proposals from a recent UN publication ‘Realizing the Future We Want for All’, inform the position of the UN that the future MDG framework should rest on human rights, equality and sustainability i.e. a holistic approach which also draws lessons from Rio+20. African priorities on post-2015 following the MDG Report 2012, indicate that the equity narrative or MDG-plus is the preferred option. The opinions of the G20 on development advocate for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth as articulated in the six principles in the Seoul Development Consensus



for Shared Growth. Where governmental perspectives are concerned, Japan proposes a set of new goals for new challenges guided by the principle of ‘Achieving well-being for all’. Whereas the Dutch government insists on measuring progress every five to ten years instead of setting new targets and also limiting the current eight goals to a maximum of four or five clusters and under each goal lay out the roles and responsibilities of the various actors. The Dutch government therefore is more inclined to the zero narrative. The 2013 European Report on Development to be released in 2013, will provide comprehensive proposals from the European Union. However the proposals thus far are for inclusive and sustainable development. Proposals from the Civil Society vary in content but most stress the need for an expansion of the goals i.e. a human-rights base to development, crisis management and political rights and most importantly, want an inclusive, participatory partnership process between the North and South in framing post-2015. A review of academic views on the post-2015 agenda reveals that three key positions have emerged from the ongoing debate; zero narrative, equity narrative and the sustainability narrative. These perspectives take into account the dynamics of international politics as well as the new geography of poverty and ongoing research on the effect of MDGs. The zero narrative proposes an elongation of the MDG deadline to 2030 in order to ‘finish the job’ but with minor adjustments to the indicators measuring the goals and targets. Under this approach, there would be no new structures or institutional arrangements but the aspiration to end extreme poverty would remain even if the agreement lacks ‘teeth’. The equity narrative or MDG-plus on the other hand, advocates for the revitalization of MDGs in order to address emerging issues from the previous set of objectives such as inequality or the quality of outcomes. This view emphasizes incorporating new goals such as human rights or rooting development onto a human security approach and exploring the possibility of MDGs relaying a policy to achieving these goals as well. This implies greater interventionist policies and thus far greater levels of national ownership in any structures or institutional arrangements. The sustainability position looks at the relationship between man and the environment and accentuates the notion of holistic development in which goals (social, economic and environmental) address poverty without contributing to further environmental degradation. This outlook would be bolder and more ambitious and involve the creation of new structures which stress global public goods and can build on MDG 8 on global partnerships to drive a new multilateralism to address global development and ignore the North-South dichotomy. Against the backdrop of the changing context in which post-2015 framework is being deliberated, the strengths and limitations of the narratives also vary. In terms of addressing the deficiencies of the MDGs and changing context of poverty ‘problem’, the ‘zero’ narrative may argue that the deficiencies of the MDGs are not so bad given the political trade-offs of agreeing a new framework. The ‘equity’ narrative on the contrary, is likely to address the weaknesses because it re-examines the indicators, adds local ownership which might better address the missing poor or poorest. The sustainability goes beyond and looks at global mechanism in order to mobilise resources and policy. Where addressing the changing context and pattern of global poverty is concerned, the ‘zero’ approach is unlikely to attend to the emerging challenges. The ‘equity’ approach would expand ownership and accountability to the national level and thus make ending world poverty more of a shared effort between donors and governments of MICs. The sustainability tackles the changing context. With the shifting global politics and emerging powers and donors, some say the ‘zero’ approach is possibly the easiest way to political consensus and it also pressures rich countries to honour commitments and stand by their pledges. However, it also misses the opportunity to improve targets and indicators. The ‘equity’ narrative in contrast, complicates the



simplicity of MDGs due to the introduction of new targets especially if they are not in tune politically at the national level. They risk being labelled again as donor led and reductionist. Through the ‘sustainability’ approach, a political agreement would be harder to reach despite the strength of being futuristic in outlook, addressing wider and intergenerational causes of poverty and vulnerability and incentivising behaviour change through mutual self-interest and solidarity. The shifting global poverty from the poorest countries to MICs portends that new approaches are needed in tackling extreme poverty. MICs for example will need and want “traditional aid” less and less as domestic resources expand. However concessional loans will still be useful even if grants are less appropriate given that resources are growing. In view of these dynamics, aligning a joint EU strategy with the changing distribution of global poverty a post-2015 agreement is necessary and could include the following components: i) Developing a new focus on the chronic, long-term poor, wherever they live and a new priority of

ensuring the benefits of growth and public spending are equitably distributed; ii) Focusing new resources to support the building of domestic taxation systems and the regulation

of tax havens and untaxed capital flight from MICs; iii) Supporting and expanding inclusive policy processes with the poor by donor-government joint

working with civil society; iv) Co-financing global public goods including knowledge sharing on public policy between MICs and

LICs; and v) Ensuring coherence across donors’ development policies such as trade and migration.



3.7. Encerramento da Conferência

Cheikh Tidiane Niang Representative of the Permanent Mission of the African Union in Brussels The European Union remains a key partner for Africa. Our two continents share a common destiny. As previously emphasized, the relations between Africa and Europe have crossed many centuries. They were woven and fashioned by history and geography and have led to various forms of cooperation in the political, economic, military, social, cultural and linguistic realms. A political will has emerged from the Cairo Summit in April 2000, to merge all these forms of cooperation into a comprehensive strategic framework based on a mutually beneficial continent to continent dialogue, which is a notable progress. The adoption of the Joint Strategy in December 2007 in Lisbon marked the beginning of a new era in the relationship between the two continents. You would agree with me that this new cooperation framework opens many windows of opportunities while raising many challenges in the same vein. The opportunities Globalization has made the world more and more interdependent as demonstrated by the current economic and financial crisis. The partnership between Europe and Africa is a real opportunity for our two continents. The EU – Africa block represents 81 countries which is an important element in global geopolitics, international institutions and multilateral negotiations.



Since the emergence of the AU in 2000, with its Pan African instruments such as NEPAD, the Peace and Security Council, the African Peer Review Mechanism, the Pan African Parliament, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, to mention but a few, Africa has been positioning itself more and more as a credible actor on the international scene. At the end of the day, Africa’s main objective is to seize this opportunity to engage in a sustainable development process which will usher its integration into the world economy. Africa is the continent of the future because of the following:

- Its increasing economic growth, its new strategic framework for economic diversification and job creation;

- the huge potential market that its population represents, the implementation of the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) in order to address infrastructure bottlenecks, the Accelerated Industrial Development of Africa (AIDA), the Accelerated Agri-business and Agro-Industries Development (ADI), and the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP)

- Its huge raw materials’ reserve and energy potential etc. The challenges The challenges we face are commensurate with the hopes associated with the Joint Strategy. The strong common vision of the Joint Strategy is to be translated into concrete actions to improve the impact and visibility of the Africa-EU Partnership. Many difficulties are faced in the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy because, particularly, of the inadequate institutional architecture; lack of balance between the political and development dimensions of the partnership; the co-existence of the Joint Strategy with other cooperation instruments with the EU, the weak involvement of the various actors in the Joint Strategy implementation process, lack of financial resources dedicated to Plans of Action of the Joint Strategy. The Joint Strategy was the only partnership of the EU which is not provided with any specific financial instrument. The proposed establishment of the Pan African Programme was provided for to remedy this situation. The establishment of an adequately funded Pan African financial instrument constituted added value to the Africa-EU Partnership and is an essential element to enhance its visibility. The Peace and Security Facility was an example of added value to the Africa-EU Partnership. The Pan African Programme would be a catalyst for cooperation between the two Continents. There is a need to translate into concrete action the expectations raised by the adoption of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy in 2007 and the need to find the right balance between political and development dimensions within the framework of the joint partnership with particular emphasis on the capacity building, skilling and mainstreaming of the youth and women to harness Africa’s full potential. EPAs issues I seized this opportunity to express the concerns of African countries and regions on the current status of the Economic Partnership Agreements negotiations, and on the European Commission proposal that amendment of EC Regulation 1528/2007 on access to European market be effective as from 1 January 2014. There is a need for initiation of a high-level political dialogue between the concerned parties in order to advance the negotiations and reach mutually beneficial agreements, likely to achieve



development and accelerate the continental ongoing integration process in Africa towards achieving the Continental Free Trade Area. We want to appeal to our EU partner to:

- support Africa in these efforts towards its true integration into the world economy; - continue to honor its commitments towards Africa despite the difficult as experienced by the

European Union due to the economic and financial crisis. The Partnership should deliver some concretes activities before the 4th Africa-EU Summit. This Summit would be fundamental as it would identify the existence or not of the necessary political will. “Building the Africa-Europe Partnership: What next”? The success of the Strategy is the common responsibility of the EU and Africa. We need to safeguard the gains of the Joint Strategy and the principles on which it is based. A lot has been achieved but a lot still remains to be done. We should pull together our efforts to meet all these challenges. I am sure that with an enhanced political will to promote cooperation in the spirit of a win-win partnership, the future of Africa-EU relations will be better than it is currently.

Françoise Moreau Head of Pan-African Unit DEVCO, European Commission I would like to congratulate the organizers and congratulate them for the quality of this conference and the usefulness of this research-policy dialogue. We definitely need much more of this, in order to improve policy making processes in the EU and elsewhere and more evidence-based policy making. I’m new in the EU-Africa Partnership “business” but I’m not new in development since I was heading the Policy and Coherence Unit in Europeaid previously, having dealt with a number of issues I think are very relevant and



the discussions in this events have confirmed me that importance: issues of the post-2015 framework and the post-MDGs, issues of Policy Coherence for Development – a big and challenging agenda -, amongst others. I’m also dealing with the European Report on Development, where there is also the attempt to better link science/ research and policy. All these issues have, in a way or another, some relevance in what I’m learning in regard to the Africa-EU Partnership. The discussions here have confirmed my strong feeling that there is, at least, a kind of informal consensus on the need to revitalize this partnership and review the policy priorities and modalities of our cooperation. By modalities I mean not only how do we approach financing issues (the discussions this morning very cleared pointed to the need to have more comprehensive approach to international cooperation financing, in line with what we have discussed in Busan, about private flows and about the “newcomers” in international cooperation), but also from the institutional working arrangements perspective. More broadly speaking there is also this kind of feeling that we need to change the mind-set with regard to Africa-EU relations – although that will, of course, take and will need some time. On the policy priorities, I very much think that this is not only true for EU and Africa; those of you that follow the discussions on EU development cooperation policy priorities know that we have adapted earlier in 2012 the Agenda For Change which puts the emphasis exactly on some of the issues identified in this conference’s discussions as being key for development today and in the future. Just to mention a few, the increased focus on what we call the “drivers” for inclusive and sustainable growth, meaning in particular an increased focus on certain sectors as agriculture and energy, and also focus on the inclusiveness of growth, including the strengthening or setting up of social protection systems and all the issues related to employability and job creation. There are also growing discussions on the involvement of the private sector and how to review our policies and modalities for public-private partnerships, namely the search for having a leveraging impact of development assistance by using it in blending operations or for attracting private investors. These are definitely part of our new development policy agenda, towards Africa but also elsewhere in general. The same type of approach is also guiding us in our current preliminary reflexion on the post-2015 agenda. I appreciated the presentation this morning on the potential and emerging consensus in Africa in a number of very important topics in this matter. In Europe we are maybe less advanced than Africa on this, which can be seen perhaps as a good thing since we absolutely believe the post-2015 should not be ODA based or donor-driven (in order to not reproduce all the weaknesses of the past MDG framework). We tentatively have identified some key pillars for the post-2015 agenda such as, first of all, keeping the focus on poverty eradication. All the analytical materials show that this is definitively unfinished business and it is important to keep the focus on providing minimum standards of living for everyone in terms of income poverty but also in terms of access to health, education and social services, while at the same time addressing the weaknesses of the current MDGs. This includes the (maybe too exclusive) focus on quantitative indicators; let’s use qualitative data as well and the discussion this morning on Education was very important on that regard. Let’s address the issue of how to articulate targets and goals which are set at the global level and what happens at the implementation level (at the national and local levels) taking into account initial conditions and the national context, and also addressing the issue of accountability, e.g. how to improve the governance accountability vis a vis their citizens with regard to progress or lack of progress to whatever goals can be agreed. Beyond this kind of minimum standards’ pillar, we definitely think that more attention will have to be paid to the drivers for inclusive and sustainable growth, to the issues of productive capacities and structural transformations, as it was mentioned in this conference and are important for Africa as well. The issue of sustainability needs to be addressed much more strongly, including the sustainable or good stewardship of natural resources at country and global level; as well as the issues access to justice and equity, with the link to governance human rights and democracy; and last but not least, all the issues in relation with



peace and security. My unit being also in charge of the Africa Peace Facility, I’d pay particular attention on these issues, that have to remain very high on the agenda, and the discussions in this conference were very interesting in this regard. I see a lot of communalities between those concerns and what we should address in the Africa-EU partnership. It is important not to reinvent the wheel, as previously mentioned: the two successive action plans and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted in Lisbon are certainly all still relevant, contain many important issues and identify lots of actions. Off course there is also an informal consensus that progress has been made in certain areas – we have pages of examples of concrete things that have happened and where progress has been made – but in general we all agree the partnership in underperforming, at least with regard to the initial expectations and ambitions in 2007 in Lisbon. In principle, we’ll have the Comission-to-Commision meeting in April 2013 and the EU-Africa Summit in 2014, and these are two important occasions to building this new impetus, which in my view depend on some important interlinked points. First, the political will is key - this morning it was mentioned the need for political traction in this partnership –in the EU and AU institutions but also regarding member states on both sides getting more actively involved and investing more politically in this partnership. Secondly, I have personally the feeling that we definitively need more in-depths, namely political economy type of analysis on African and EU interests in this partnership. The fact that this partnership very explicitly was about development but also beyond development, about cooperation but also about political dialogue and economic mutual interests, is really an opportunity not only to be more transparent , but more aware and knowledgeable about what are really the European interests vis a vis Africa, what are really Africa interests vis a vis Europe. For that we need more analytical material and forward looking analysis, and this is an area where this network of research institutes (EARN) could be very helpful. Thirdly, we need to frame this partnership in the global context. I think, on a personal basis, that today multilateral is not in a very good health – we know about the Doha development agenda, RIO+20 brought some positive outcomes but was well below expectations – and there is a big question mark on what are the chances of getting an ambitious consensus on the post-2015 development agenda, since there is no evidence that this negotiation process will be easy. This has to be taken into account in our partnership, because Africa and the EU could be very important allies and actors to build something meaningful and leading to concrete progress with regard to the post-2015 discussions and global governance issues. Fourthly, we need very concrete cooperation tools and mechanisms, and this means not only regarding the working arrangements (how the joint task forces are working, how the joint experts groups are working, etc.). On the financial side, it was mentioned this morning the Commission proposal to create a new programme that would be operational from 2014 in the new EU budget, the Pan-African programme, that would not be a miraculous solution (the proposal is for a 1 billion programme for a 7 year period) but nevertheless could be an important leverage and tool to facilitate the delivering of concrete outcomes and results from this partnership. To summarise, the ambitious of 2007 and 2010, in Lisbon and Tripoli, are still fully relevant and the political and policy dialogue has to be as broad as possible between Africa and Europe. With regard to concrete actions that we need to identify, I think we need to prioritise and rationalise, taking account of the capacities on both sides. I very much believe the principle of subsidiarity is an important one, which as you know is part of the European Union Treaty, and I definitely think it is something we need to apply in the definition of the concrete goals and targets we set ourselves in the framework of the partnership for



the coming years. The principle of complementary is also important, because what we do at continent-to-continent levels in a way complements what is on-going at national and regional levels. If we are a little bit clearer about what we can do and what we cannot do in this partnership, we will increase our chances of meeting our goals and targets.

Luís Brites Pereira Secretário de Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros e da Cooperação Queria começar por congratular a organização deste evento, que com muito mérito escolheu debater alguns dos principais temas que continuarão a ter impacto na construção da parceria euro-africana nos próximos anos. É justo dar também aqui o meu reconhecimento, ao trabalho que as entidades promotoras têm desenvolvido não só na excelente organização deste evento, mas também na reflexão, uma vez que o trabalho de produção e divulgação do conhecimento é muitas vezes invisível, mas tem uma enorme relevância no policy-making. É reconhecido que Portugal tem uma relação muito especial com o continente africano, muito especialmente com os cinco países de língua oficial portuguesa, com os quais possui uma comunhão linguística e identificação cultural. No seio da União Europeia, o nosso país tem sempre defendido uma relação mais forte e robusta com África, tentando traduzir para a política europeia esta nossa prioridade nacional. Diria mesmo que temos sido um dos actores principais na construção de pontes entre a Europa e África. Vemos África como um verdadeiro parceiro estratégico para a Europa. Na verdade, o diálogo com África foi uma das prioridades de Portugal no decorrer das suas presidências da UE. Na Cimeira África-UE de 2007, lançámos a Estratégia Conjunta, que representa o compromisso de dois continentes em trabalhar numa nova parceria estratégica, elevando a tradicional relação doador-receptor para um novo patamar de relacionamento através do aprofundamento do diálogo político e da cooperação em áreas de interesse comum assentando sobre valores e objectivos comuns, na construção da estabilidade,



democracia e Estado de Direito, do progresso e do desenvolvimento. À medida que nos aproximamos da próxima Cimeira em 2014, teremos de reflectir sobre uma visão comum para o que queremos desta relação entre os dois continentes. I strongly believe this common vision entails a shared and mutual beneficial commitment to grow and develop together. This vision implies strategic partnerships and a long-term perspective of our relationship; a vision that goes beyond that of development cooperation. I also believe that Portugal can build more and better bridges between Europe and Africa. Indeed, I often get to hear that Portugal is the most African-friendly European country when I travel in Africa. As you know, Portugal and other euro-zone countries have been in the international spotlight recently, due to the financial crisis. Portugal sees this crisis, however, as an opportunity to turn our economic prospects around and to reengage with the world, including Africa. Portugal is reducing its public deficit and debt levels, bolstering its banking sector and harmonising its economic governance with European partners, to ensure better growth prospects. Undoubtedly, this adjustment process will be slow and painful, but it is unavoidable, and as saying goes “no pain, no gain”. At the same time, the crisis has driven us to make our economy more competitive and open it up even more to the world, especially to those regions and countries beyond Europe’s borders. In 2010, the 27 EU countries accounted for almost 75% of Portuguese exports and around 85% of incoming foreign direct investment. We must clearly diversify our trade and investment to include non-European partners. And we are doing so: Angola is our 4th largest export market (has recently replaced the UK) and is our top non-European market. Although very important, economics and business are not the only reason why Portugal should diversify and strengthen its international relations. We feel obligated to contribute towards development of our Lusophone partner countries, especially in Africa. Today, Portugal is proud to have honest, balanced and fruitful relations with Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé & Principe. The bond we have with these five African countries goes beyond business; it implies a deeper engagement and understanding, which is built upon a shared language and common heritage. It is called “lusofonia”, reflected in the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) and its 250 million citizens. This community also comprises the diaspora of member countries, their companies spread out across the globe, but also neighbouring countries and regions; for example, Namibia recently announced its intention to apply for CPLP observer status. It also introduced the Portuguese language in the secondary school system, and this is because it sees these actions as being critical for its political and economic influence in the SADC region, which includes two Portuguese-speaking countries. Portugal’s engagement with these African partners is thus being developed, slowly but surely. We believe the potential of the Africa-European relationship can and must be further developed; and this must be done to the good of all, both Portuguese and non-Portuguese speaking countries. We firmly believe that this can only be achieved if we work together: our governments, our businesses, our civil societies. De resto, e num contexto de crise europeia, mas também de emergência política, económica e cultural de África, as nossas empresas, investidores, universidades e centros de investigação e organizações da sociedade civil têm tanto a receber e a aprender como o inverso. Tais dinâmicas devem ser potenciadas numa lógica de criação de riqueza e de desenvolvimento sustentável; com efeito, estes dois objectivos são o futuro da relação Europa-África, não só no plano bilateral mas também na parceria estratégica entre os dois continentes. Julgo, no entanto, que todos concordamos que a parceria Europa-África só faz sentido se esta for efectivada ao nível dos seus cidadãos – todos nós -, proporcionando um impacto positivo no dia-a-dia dos cidadãos. Só assim esta parceria será autêntica, respeitadora, e “future-proof”, a bem de todos, africanos e europeus.



4. ANEXOS



4.1. Programa Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, Lisboa 13-14 dezembro 2012 Quinta-feira, 13 dezembro

09h30 – 10h30 Abertura Paulo Telles de Freitas, Presidente do Conselho de Administração, Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr Nuno Guimarães, Pró-Reitor para a Internacionalização, ISCTE-IUL Francisco Almeida Leite, Vogal do Conselho Diretivo do Camões - Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua 11h00 – 13h00 Sessão 1: A CRISE O impacto da crise internacional na Europa e na África: quais os desafios para a parceria? Moderador: Hélder Oliveira, Fundação Portugal-África, Porto Adebayo Olukoshi, Diretor do UN African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP) e Diretor Executivo, Africa Governance Institute (AGI), Dacar Damien Helly, Professor Visitante, Colégio da Europa, Bruges Fernando Jorge Cardoso, Coordenador de Investigação, IEEI & IMVF, Lisboa 14h30 – 16h00 Sessão 2 : DESAFIOS DEMOGRÁFICOS Que efeitos das tendências demográficas nas perspetivas de desenvolvimento e cooperação? Moderadora: Mónica Ferro, Grupo Parlamentar Português sobre População e Desenvolvimento, Deputada à Assembleia da República Alcinda Honwana, Professora visitante na Open University, Reino Unido, e na Columbia University, Nova Iorque Ana Pires de Carvalho, Investigadora, Centro de Analise de Politicas, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo Gregory de Paepe, Analista de Políticas, Centro de Desenvolvimento da OCDE, Paris Victor Ângelo, Vogal do Conselho de Administração da Fundação PeaceNexus, Suíça, e Antigo Secretário-Geral Adjunto e Representante Especial das NU



16h30 – 18h00 Sessão 3: A SEGURANÇA Radicalismo armado no Norte de África, no Sahel e nos países vizinhos: que implicações para a segurança internacional e as relações Europa-África? Moderador: Santiago Martinez-Caro, Diretor, Casa África, Las Palmas Alexandra Magnólia Dias, Investigadora, Centro de Estudos Africanos, ISCTE-IUL, Lisboa João Bernardo Honwana, Diretor da Divisão África II, Nações Unidas, Nova Iorque Maurice Engueleguele, Coordenador, Africa Governance Institute (AGI), Dacar Morten Boas, Diretor de Estudos, Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies, Oslo Sexta-feira, 14 dezembro

09h00 – 10h30 Sessão 4: FLUXOS E ATORES DO DESENVOLVIMENTO O regresso do IDE e novos parceiros da ajuda em África: Qual o impacto nas estratégias africanas de desenvolvimento? Moderador: Any Freitas, Gestora de Programas, Instituto de Estudos de Segurança da União Europeia (EU-ISS), Paris Ana Paula Fernandes, Conselheira de Portugal junto da OCDE e Vice-Presidente do Comité de Ajuda ao Desenvolvimento (CAD), Paris Diogo Gomes de Araújo, Presidente Executivo, Sociedade para o Financiamento do Desenvolvimento (SOFID), Lisboa Erik Lundsgaarde, Investigador, German Development Institute (DIE), Bona Tetteh Hormeku-Ajei, Coordenador de Políticas & Programas, TWN Africa, Acra 11h00 – 13h00 Painel: O FUTURO A Cimeira África-UE de 2014 e a Agenda de Desenvolvimento pós-2015: que perspetivas? Moderador: Geert Laporte, Vice-Diretor, European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Maastricht Alex Vines, Diretor de Estudos e do Programa África, Chatham House (RIIA), Londres J. K. Shinkaiye, Embaixador, antigo chefe de Gabinete do Presidente da Comissão da União Africana, Abuja Pinkie Mekgwe, Diretora Executiva para a Internacionalização, Universidade de Joanesburgo Thomas Lawo, Diretor Executivo, European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), Bona 13h00 Encerramento Francoise Moreau, Diretora da Unidade Pan-Africana DEVCO, Comissão Europeia Cheikh Niang, Missão Permanente da União Africana junto da União Europeia Luís Brites Pereira, Secretário de Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros e da Cooperação



4.2. Biografias dos Oradores | About the Speakers Painel 1 THE CRISIS :: A CRISE Hélder Oliveira é Presidente do CA da SPE-Sociedade Portuguesa de Empreendimentos, Administrador Executivo da Fundação Portugal-África e não executivo da AMSCO – African Management Services (Amsterdão) e membro da Mesa da AG da Ordem dos Economistas depois de ter sido membro da Direcção da mesma Ordem. Tem participado regularmente em diversos grupos de trabalho e feito intervenções públicas sobre políticas de internacionalização das empresas portuguesas. Exerceu vários cargos no sector financeiro: Presidente da Comissão Executiva da SOFID Sociedade para o Financiamento do Desenvolvimento – IFC, SA (EDFI -European Development Finance Institution); Director Central do Banco BPI (Gabinete para Angola); Director Coordenador do Banco de Fomento e Exterior – (Área Internacional) e Administrador da EURO-FINANCEIRA – Sociedade de Investimentos, SA. Foi ainda Presidente do Conselho de Administração da Companhia Carris de Ferro de Lisboa e administrador de várias empresas, designadamente, nos sectores do comércio externo e da comunicação social. Hélder Oliveira é Licenciado em Economia pelo Instituto Superior de Ciências Económicas e Financeiras da Universidade Técnica de Lisboa. Adebayo Olukoshi, from Nigeria, is the Director of the UN African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP)and Executive Director of the Africa Governance Institute (AGI),in Dakar. Before, he was the Executive Secretary of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Director of research at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and Senior Research Fellow at the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala, Sweden. He served for one year as Professional Staff responsible for the development of the Africa programme at The South Centre, in Geneva, Switzerland, and holds a PhD on Politics from the University of Leeds. Damien Helly has joined the College of Europe to teach Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), as a visiting professor in Bruges. Between 2008 and 2012, he was senior research fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), an EU intergovernmental agency acting in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), where he dealt with Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe-Africa relations, and CSDP. In 2013-2014, he will also be an independent expert of a consortium led by the Goethe Institute to research on the external dimensions of EU’s cultural policies. Damien was senior analyst and head of the International Crisis Group office in Port-au-Prince, Haiti (2006-2007). He also opened and managed Crisis Group’s first regional South Caucasus office in 2003-2004 as project director before working as a consultant on Moldova/Transdniestria for the same organisation. In 2005-2006, Damien opened and ran Saferworld’s EU and advocacy office in Brussels. He holds a PhD in political science from Sciences po, Paris. He is currently writing a book entitled Why Africa matters and how Europeans should act strategically. Fernando Jorge Cardoso is the research coordinator of the Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr Think Tank, IMVF, in Lisbon. He is also member of the Institute for International and Strategic Studies, IEEI, and a senior researcher at the Centre of African Studies at the Lisbon University Institute, ISCTE. Currently, on behalf of IEEI, he chairs the Steering Committee of the Europe-Africa Policy Research Network, EARN. His main fields of interest are development, regional integration and international relations with a major focus in Sub-Saharan Africa. He holds a PhD in Economics by the Technical University of Lisbon.



Painel 2 DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES :: DESAFIOS DEMOGRÁFICOS Mónica Ferro é Deputada à Assembleia da República e Membro efetivo da Comissão de Negócios Estrangeiros (coordenadora do Grupo Parlamentar do PSD) e Comissão de Defesa Nacional. É Membro suplente da Comissão de Assuntos Constitucionais, Direitos, Liberdades e Garantias, Membro da Subcomissão da Igualdade, e Coordenadora do Grupo Parlamentar Português sobre População e Desenvolvimento. É Membro do Comité Executivo do Fórum Europeu de Parlamentares para a População e Desenvolvimento. É também Docente do Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas, Universidade Técnica de Lisboa e Docente Convidada do Instituto da Defesa Nacional, da Academia da Força Aérea, da Academia Militar. É Licenciada e Mestre em Relações Internacionais, pelo ISCSP, e Doutoranda em Relações Internacionais pelo ISCSP. Alcinda Honwana is a visiting professor at the Open University (OU) in the UK and at Columbia University in New York. She has been chair and director of the International Development Centre (IDC) at the OU; director of programs at the Social Science Research Council in New York; and research coordinator in the United Nations Office of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict. She lectured Anthropology at the Universities Eduardo Mondlane, University of Cape Town and the New School University in New York. Honwana has written extensively on the links between political conflict and culture, the impact of conflict on young people, and the role of young people and social change in Africa. Her publications include: Youth and Revolution in Tunisia (forthcoming July 2013) Zed Books, London; The Time of Youth: Work, Social Change and Politics in Africa, (2012) Kumarian Press USA, Child Soldiers in Africa, (2006), University of Pennsylvania Press, USA; Makers & Breakers: Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa, (2005, co-edited), James Currey Publishers, UK; and Living Spirits, Modern Traditions: Spirit Possession and Post-War Healing in Southern Mozambique, (2003) Ela Por Ela, Lisbon; and (2002) Promedia, Maputo. Ana Pires de Carvalho é Demógrafa e tem trabalhado como consultora em Moçambique, Angola e Sudão, para a UNFPA, UNOCHA, UNICEF e Banco Mundial. Previamente leccionou e dirigiu Faculdades na Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM), Moçambique. Licenciou-se em Matemática Aplicada e Informática pela UEM e concluiu o Mestrado de Investigação Operacional em Southampton, UK. Posteriormente especializou-se em demografia, tendo feito uma pós-graduação de um ano em Princeton, USA, e o doutoramento em Southampton, UK. Actualmente é investigadora sénior do Centro de Analise de Politicas (CAP) da Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, em Maputo. Gregory De Paepe, a Belgian national, joined the Development Centre of OECD, in Paris, as a policy analyst in the Europe, Middle East and Africa desk in November 2008. He has contributed to the several thematic chapters of the Development Centre’s annual flagship publication, the African Economic Outlook (AEO) and has been the AEO project coordinator since 2010. His main areas of work are development economics, macro-economics and public finances, with a regional specialisation on Africa. Prior to joining the Development Centre he has been working at the Spanish Delegation to the WTO and UNCTAD in Geneva, where he covered the DOHA round negotiations and the preparatory committee for UNCTAD’s XII Ministerial Conference. Gregory holds a Master degree in International Trade at the Centro de Estudios Comerciales y Economicos in Madrid and a Master degree in Business Economics with a major in Finance at the University of Ghent, Belgium. Victor Ângelo, a Portuguese national, is a Former Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General (Peacekeeping Operations, 2004-10), at the level of Under Secretary-General. He retired from the UN in April 2010, as SRSG for MINURCAT (CAR and Chad), after 32 years of work with different departments of the organization. As part of his career, he represented the UN in many countries, as resident coordinator



for development, as well as humanitarian coordinator and envoy for post-conflict situations. Prior to his UN work, he was a senior civil servant in the Portuguese government and a commissioner of National Electoral Commission which organised the Constitutional elections of 1975. He is currently a senior international advisor on governance, crisis management and security. He is also a recognised columnist on world affairs of Visão, the largest Portuguese weekly magazine, a board member of the PeaceNexus Foundation (Switzerland) as well as a member of the North-South Centre’s Think Tank in the Council of Europe and other research centres. He has written several academic papers and many weekly opinion columns. Painel 3 SECURITY :: SEGURANÇA Santiago Martínez-Caro de la Concha-Castañeda. Nació el 28 de enero de 1957 en Nueva York. Segunda Jefatura en la Embajada en Yaundé desde 18 de abril de 1984 y Cónsul de España en Lima desde 4 de julio de 1986. Secretario en la Representación Permanente de España en el Consejo de Europa, Estrasburgo, desde 9 de mayo de 1989. Consejero de Embajada en comisión el 8 de abril de 1992. Consejero Técnico Relaciones Exteriores Países no Preferentes desde 1 de agosto de 1992. Vocal Asesor de la Subdirección General de Coordinación Comunitaria para Asuntos Jurídicos desde 2 de agosto de 1993.-Subdirector General Adjunto de Coordinación Comunitaria para Asuntos Técnicos desde 1 de enero de 1994. Consejero Económico y Comercial, Jefe de la Oficina Comercial de la Embajada de España en Rabat, desde 1 de septiembre de 1994. Cónsul General de España en Caracas desde 14 de abril de 1998. Vocal Asesor en la Dirección General de Política Exterior para el Mediterráneo desde 31 de julio de 2001. Subdirector General de África Subsahariana desde 10 de enero de 2003. Embajador de España en la República de Zimbabwe desde 1 de octubre de 2004. Embajador de España en la República de Malawi, con residencia en Harare desde 26 de septiembre de 2005. Embajador de España en la República de Zambia, con residencia en Harare, desde 26 de septiembre de 2005. Segunda Jefatura en la Representación Permanente de España ante la ONU, Viena, desde 20 de abril de 2009. Alexandra Magnólia Dias é licenciada em Relações Internacionais-Ramo Culturais e Políticas pela Universidade do Minho. É mestre em Desenvolvimento Económico e Social em África : Análise e Gestão pelo Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa- ISCTE com uma tese intitulada «Ensaio sobre os Alinhamentos Partidários no Botswana». É Doutorada em Relações Internacionais pela London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) com uma tese intitulada "Uma Guerra Inter-Estatal no Pós-Guerra Fria: Eritreia-Etiópia 1998-2000", a qual recebeu menção honrosa do júri da 2.ª edição do Prémio da Associação Portuguesa de Ciência Política (APCP). É actualmente Investigadora auxiliar do Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL) no Centro de Estudos Africanos onde coordena o projecto «Monitorização de Conflitos no Corno de África». É Professora Auxiliar Convidada no Departamento de História na mesma instituição. João Bernardo Honwana (colonel, retired, Mozambique) is the director of the Africa II Division in the UN Department of Political Affairs since May 2012. He has served the UN as director of the Africa I Division, chief of staff of the UN Mission in Sudan, representative of the secretary-general and head of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNGBIS), and chief of the Conventional Arms Branch in the Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). Prior to joining the UN, Honwana was a senior researcher and project coordinator at the Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, South Africa, from June 1993 to January 2000. He participated in Mozambique’s national liberation struggle and, after independence, served in various capacities in the armed forces, including as commander of the Mozambican Air Force and Air Defence from 1986 to 1993. Honwana trained as a fighter pilot and military aviation tactical commander in the former Soviet Union (1977–80, 1982–83), graduated from the UK



Royal College of Defence Studies (1990), and holds an MA in war studies (1992) from Kings College London. Maurice Engueleguele is Professor of Political Science (PhD) and has taught for twenty years in French universities (Amiens, Bordeaux) and Cameroon (International Relations Institute). He also served as Head of Project in Governance Mission of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Maurice Engueleguele is the Programme Coordinator of the Africa Governance Institute, in Dakar, since May 2008. He has published several works on political behavior, political development and political participation issues. Morten Bøås, PhD is a senior researcher at Fafo’s Institute for Applied International Studies. He has written extensively on African politics and development. His work has appeared in a number of leading international journals, including among others Journal of Modern African Studies, Politique Africaine, Third World Quarterly, Global Governance, European Journal of Development Research, Globalizations and Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding. He has also published a number of books, including the much-cited African Guerrillas: Raging against the Machine (Lynne Rienner, 2007), co-edited with Kevin Dunn, International Development Vol. I.IV (Sage, 2010), co-edited with Benedicte Bull and The Politics of Origin in Africa (Zed Books, forthcoming 2013), co-authored with Kevin Dunn. Painel 4 DEVELOPMENT FLOWS AND ACTORS :: FLUXOS E ATORES DO DESENVOLVIMENTO Any Freitas holds a M.A. in International Relations (PUC -Rio de Janeiro Catholic University) and a PhD in Social and Political Sciences (European University Institute, Florence). She was visiting researcher at Instituto Juan March (2006), and the Centre March Bloch (2007), and worked in different organizations such as UNESCO (2008-2009), the Council of the European Union (2009), the Free University of Brussels (2009-2010). Since 2011, Any works at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS), in Paris, currently as Senior Programme Manager of the “Observatoire de l’Afrique”. Ana Paula Fernandes é Licenciada em Relações Internacionais pela Universidade do Minho, Mestre em Cooperação Internacional pelo ISCTE – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, e Doutoranda em Assuntos Africanos no mesmo Instituto. Foi voluntária dos Leigos para o Desenvolvimento em Moçambique (1994-1995) ; Assessora do Conselho Administração QBO Trading (1996-1997); Investigadora do Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais (1997-1999); Responsável de Projectos de Cooperação para o Desenvolvimento no Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr (1999-2005); Professora Universitária convidada (até 2009); e Assessora do Secretário de Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros e da Cooperação (2005-2009). Atualmente é Conselheira Técnica na Delegação Permanente de Portugal junto da Organização de Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Económico, desde 2009, tendo assumido a vice-presidência do Comité de Ajuda ao Desenvolvimento (CAD) desde Janeiro de 2010. É também co-presidente do Grupo de Trabalho sobre Investimento e Desenvolvimento da OCDE – AGID, desde 2012. Diogo Gomes de Araújo is the CEO of SOFID, the Portuguese Development Financial Institution since May 2010. Before that, Diogo was an Adviser to the Supervisory Board of EDP, the Portuguese electricity utility, Head of the Portuguese Business Development Agency responsible for promoting investment and trade in Tunisia and Libya, Portuguese Representative at the African Development Bank and Adviser to the Board of Directors the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Diogo has degrees in Economics and International Affairs by the University of Minho, Portugal, a Master in International Banking and Finance by the London Metropolitan University and has also studied International Trade in Vigo, Spain.



Erik Lundsgaarde is a Senior Researcher at the German Development Institute (DIE), Bonn, where his work focuses on the diversification of the actor landscape in development cooperation. He is the editor of the book Africa toward 2030: Challenges for Development Policy (Palgrave Macmillan) and the author of The Domestic Politics of Foreign Aid (Routledge). He received M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in Political Science from the University of Washington, USA. Tetteh Hormeku-Ajei is Head of Programmes at Third World Network-Africa based in Ghana.Tetteh has a Master of Laws degree in International Economic Law and for two decades has been involved in research and advocacy on key policy issues relating to international trade, finance, investment and the challenges facing African economies. Painel 5 THE FUTURE :: O FUTURO Geert Laporte, a Belgian national, is Deputy Director at The European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), in Maastricht/Brussels. He has worked for ECDPM since 1990 in different roles and functions. Currently he is responsible for ECDPM’s relations with the EU institutions, EU Presidencies, EU member states, and with the African Union, the ACP institutions and with a large network of partners of the Centre in different parts of the world. His thematic areas of specialisation include: EU external action and development policy, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy with a particular focus on governance, political cooperation and regional integration. Alex Vines is the Research Director at Chatham House (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London) since September 2008 and has run its Africa programme since 2002. He was Chair of the UN Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire from 2005 to 2007 and was a member of the UN Group of Experts on Liberia from 2001 to 2003. For nine years he was a senior researcher at the Arms and Africa Divisions of Human Rights Watch working on Angola until 2002. He sits on several academic editorial boards including the South Africa Journal of International Affairs and was awarded an OBE in the 2008 Queens Birthday Honours for his work on Africa. John Kayode Shinkaiye, a retired Nigerian career diplomat, who served his country for more than 35 years, has just left the service of the Commission of the African Union, where he was, for six years and nine months (February 2006 to October 2012), the Chief of Staff of the AU Commission Chairperson. Throughout that period he was the AUC Co-Chair of the AUC-EC Joint Task Force and played a key role in developing the partnership between Africa and the EU. Married to Mrs. Agnes Shinkaiye, and father of five children and two grandsons, Amb. Shinkaiye served his country in many capacities. He served in the Nigerian Missions in Lome, Togo, London (twice), Dakar, Senegal and was Nigerian Ambassador to Equitorial Guinea (1989 to 1993), Ethiopia and Djibouti and was the Nigerian Permanent Representative to the OAU/AU and UNECA (2000 to 2003). Amb. Shinkaiye has authored several articles and was honoured by Britain (LVO) in 1989; Equatorial Guinea (GCOI) in 1993 and his country (OFR) in 2001. He is a Member of the Nigerian National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies for which he was awarded the certificate, mni, in 1994. He is in the process of setting up a consulting firm to be based in Abuja, Nigeria. Thomas Lawo is the Executive Secretary of EADI (European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes) and Director of the international secretariat in Bonn/ Germany, since January 2000. From 1986 until November 1990 he was resident representative of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation in Malaysia and Visiting Research Fellow at the Asian and Pacific Development Centre (APDC) in Kuala Lumpur and Associate Fellow at the Institute for Development Studies, (IDS) Sabah in Kota Kinabalu/ Malaysia. He has worked in development co-operation since 1978 as Project Officer for South Asia (1978-86), Head of Asia Department (1990-94) and Managing Director of MISEREOR, Central Agency for



Development Assistance, Aachen/Germany (1995-99). He has concluded Studies of Law at Bochum University (1972-74), Agriculture and Nutrition Sciences at Bonn University 1974-78; additional studies of Philosophy and Education Sciences (1976-78); and post-graduate studies in Agricultural Sociology and Nutrition Sciences and doctoral Dissertation (PhD) in 1983 on Agriculture and Food Policy Issues in Banglad0.esh. He has participated in various publications on nutrition and food policy issues, poverty alleviation programmes, work of NGOs and Civil Society organizations, especially on participatory approaches and management issues in development cooperation programmes and planning; policies of European Development Co-operation.



4.3. Lista de Participantes

Adebayo Olukoshi Diretor do UN African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP) e Diretor Executivo, Africa Governance Institute (AGI), Dacar

Adolfo Rututo Estudante

Adriano Rafael Moreira Deputado à Assembleia da República, Presidente da Delegação Permanente da AR à Assembleia Parlamentar da CPLP

Ahmed Zaki Director de Projetos, IMVF

Aida Pegado Doutoranda em Estudos Africanos, ISCTE

Alcinda Honwana Professora visitante na Open University, Reino Unido, e na Columbia University, Nova Iorque

Alex Vines Diretor de Estudos e do Programa África, Chatham House (RIIA), Londres

Alexandra Magnólia Dias Investigadora, Centro de Estudos Africanos, ISCTE-IUL

Alina Santos APDES

Ana Mafalda Dourado Santos GPPQ/Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia

Ana Margarida Portugal Melo Diretora de Serviços de Cooperação, Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical

Ana Oliveira Mestranda, Estudos Africanos, e Freelancer, Estudos de Mercado

Ana Oliveira Jornalista, Sapo Internacional

Ana Paula Fernandes Conselheira de Portugal junto da OCDE e Vice-Presidente do Comité de Ajuda ao Desenvolvimento (CAD), Paris

Ana Pires de Carvalho Investigadora, Centro de Analise de Politicas, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo

Ana Roque Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical

Ana Sofia Afonso Cortes Camões – Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua

Anabela Carvalho Assessora de Imprensa, União das Cidades Capitais de Língua Portuguesa (UCCLA)

André Magrinho Associação Industrial Portuguesa

Antonieta Rosa Gomes Doutoranda, ISCTE-IUL

Any Freitas Gestora de Programas, Instituto de Estudos de Segurança da União Europeia (EU-ISS), Paris

Augusto Trindade Presidência do Conselho de Ministros

Bheki Dube Embaixada da África do Sul

Carlos Reino Antunes Diplomata

Carlos Sangreman Professor, Universidade de Aveiro

Cármen Maciel Directora de Projetos Nacionais, ADRA Portugal

Carmo Fernandes Leigos para o Desenvolvimento

Catarina Tavares Secretária Internacional, UGT

Cheikh Niang Missão permanente da União Africana junto da União Europeia, Bruxelas

Clara Carvalho Diretora, Centro de Estudos Africanos, ISCTE-IUL

Clara Justino Secretariado Executivo da CPLP

Cláudia Ramos DGPJ, Ministério da Justiça

Cristina da Cruz Vaz Tomé Vice-Presidente, Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical



Damien Helly Professor Visitante, Colégio da Europa, Bruges

Diana Jarro Campos Sameiro Estudante ISEG

Didier Gonzalez Embaixada da França em Lisboa

Diogo Gomes de Araújo Presidente Executivo, Sociedade para o Financiamento do Desenvolvimento (SOFID), Lisboa

Dynka Amorim Bué Fixe – Associação de Jovens

Erik Lundsgaarde Investigador, German Development Institute (DIE), Bona

Eugénio Costa Almeida Investigador, Centro de Estudos Africanos, ISCTE-IUL

Fernando Jorge Cardoso Coordenador de Investigação, IEEI & IMVF

Fernando Medeiros Direção-Geral da Qualificação dos Trab. em Funções Públicas (INA)

Fernando Sousa Júnior Ministério do Trabalho e da Solidariedade Social

Filipa Barreira Agência LUSA

Filomena André

Francisco Almeida Leite Vogal do Conselho Diretivo, Camões: Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua

Francisco Rego Presidência do Conselho de Ministros

Françoise Moreau Diretora da Unidade Pan-Africana DEVCO, Comissão Europeia

Gabriel Baguet Junior RDP África

Geert Laporte Vice-Diretor, European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Maastricht

Gerhard Seibert Pesquisador, Centro de Estudos Africanos, ISCTE-IUL

Gonçalo Marques Assessor, Gabinete do Secretário dos Negócios Estrangeiros e da Cooperação

Gregory de Paepe Analista de Políticas, Centro de Desenvolvimento da OCDE, Paris

Guilherme Collares Pereira Fundação EDP – Inovação Social

Hélder Oliveira Fundação Portugal-África

Helena Amaral Laboratório Nacional de Energia e Geologia (LNEG)

Hugo Tavares Augusto Project Development and Liaison Officer, OIM - Organização Internacional para as Migrações

Inês Ferro Ribeiro Officer-in-charge, UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)

Inês Rosa DG Assuntos Europeus, MNE

Isabel Amado IICT-AHU

Isidora Frasquilho Camões – Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua

J. K. Shinkaiye Embaixador, antigo chefe de Gabinete do Presidente da Comissão da União Africana, Abuja

Jessica Santos Gestão de Projetos, CEsA - ISEG

Joana Gonçalves Sá Investigadora, Instituto Gulbenkian de Ciência

Joana Pedro Aurecon

João Bernardo Honwana Diretor da Divisão África II, Nações Unidas, Nova Iorque

João Carvalho Presidência do Conselho de Ministros

João Martins Diretor Executivo, ADRA Portugal

João Nunes da Silva Gabinete de Planeamento e Políticas

Joaquim Fonseca Jornalista

Joaquim Gonçalves DGPJ, Ministério da Justiça



Joaquim Neves Camões – Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua

José Alberto Mafo Estudante, ISEG

José Almeida Bastos União das Cidades Capitais de Língua Portuguesa (UCCLA)

José Augusto Duarte Diretor do Departamento Geral da Administração, MNE

José Correia

José Gonçalves de Melo

José Manuel Rolo Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa

Keitumetse Matthews Embaixadora, Embaixada da África do Sul em Lisboa

Liliana Azevedo ACEP – Associação para a Cooperação entre os Povos

Luís Brites Pereira Secretário de Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros e da Cooperação

Luís Castelo Branco Camões – Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua

Luís Mah CEsA-ISEG

Luís Manuel Brás Bernardino Militar

Malan Gomes

Manuel Dutra

Manuela Afonso Camões – Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua

Margarida Cruz Acreditar

Maria Arnaldo Copeto Estudante, ISCSP

Maria da Conceição Peleteiro Faculdade de Medicina Veterinária, Univ. Técnica de Lisboa

Maria da Conceição Veiga Chefe do Serviço de Relações Externa e Cooperação, Instituto Nacional de Estatística

Maria da Costa Ferreira Doutoranda, ISCTE-IUL

Maria Hermínia Cabral Programa Gulbenkian de Ajuda ao Desenvolvimento, Fundação Gulbenkian

Maria Inês Silva

Maria Leonor Moreira Sales Fundação Gonçalo da Silveira

Maria Madalena Teixeira Franco Direção de Serviços Justiça e Assuntos Internos, DGAE - MNE

Maria Soto Barros

Maria Sousa Galito Aluna Curso Defesa Nacional, IDN

Mário Ribeiro Camões – Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua

Marta Bronzin Chefe de Missão, Organização Internacional para as Migrações (OIM)

Maurice Engueleguele Coordenador, Africa Governance Institute (AGI), Dacar

Maymouna Diop Sy Embaixadora, Embaixada do Senegal em Lisboa

Mirieme Ferreira Diretora de Departamento, Câmara Municipal do Seixal

Mónica Ferro Grupo Parlamentar Português sobre População e Desenvolvimento, Deputada à Assembleia da República

Morten Boas Diretor de Estudos, Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies, Oslo

Nazim Ahmad Comendador, Representante da Rede Aga Khan para o Desenvolvimento em Portugal

Nélia Ribeiro Plataforma Portuguesa das ONGD

Noémia da Conceição Certo Simões Engenho e Obra e ISEL

Nuno Degroote

Nuno Guimarães Pró-Reitor para a Internacionalização, ISCTE-IUL

Nuno Rodrigues Carvalho Estudante, ICTE



Oleksandr Nykonenko Embaixador, Embaixada da Ucrânia em Lisboa

Otília Leitão Jornalista, A Semana, Cabo Verde

Paolo Casilli Project Specialist, UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)

Papa Magueye Diop Primeiro Conselheiro, Embaixada do Senegal em Lisboa

Patrícia Magalhães Ferreira Consultora e Investigadora, IMVF

Patrícia Oliveira de Almeida e Silva DGPJ, Ministério da Justiça

Paula Borges RDP África

Paulo H. Alves Laboratório Nacional de Energia e Geologia (LNEG)

Paulo Telles de Freitas Presidente do Conselho de Administração, IMVF

Pedro Ferreira Commercial Specialist, US Embassy in Lisbon

Pedro José Mazissa Gomes Docente, Universidade Agostinho Neto, Luanda

Pedro Pereira Leite CES, Universidade de Coimbra

Pinkie Mekgwe Diretora Executiva para a Internacionalização, Universidade de Joanesburgo

Rafael Calandou Consultor

Raquel Freitas CIES, ISCTE-IUL

Regina Maria Quelhas Lima Diretora de Serviços Justiça e Assuntos Internos, DGAE - MNE

Ricardo Jorge Goulão Santos Doutorando, IDS, Universidade de Sussex

Rita Nascimento Camões – Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua

Rodrigo Ferreira Brum Administrador, INCM

Rui Paulo Almas ISLA Campus de Lisboa

Sandra Fernandes Fundação Gonçalo da Silveira

Santiago Martínez-Caro Diretor, Casa África, Las Palmas

Sean Olmstead Political and Economic Officer, , US Embassy in Lisbon

Sílvia Lopes Pereira Câmara Municipal do Seixal

Simone Arzeni Consultor Independente

Sofia Amaral de Oliveira Organização Internacional do Trabalho

Sofia da Graça Cordeiro Fernandes Investigadora, ISCTE-IUL

Souhir Mbarek China Conselheira, Embaixada da Tunísia

Susana Maria Mântua Assessora, Vice-Reitora para a Cooperação, Universidade Aberta

Tânia Couto

Tetteh Hormeku-Ajei Coordenador de Políticas & Programas, TWN Africa, Acra

Victor Ângelo Vogal do Conselho de Administração da Fundação PeaceNexus, Suíça, e Antigo Secretário-Geral Adjunto e Representante Especial das NU

Wanda Guimarães União Geral de Trabalhadores (UGT)



Para Saber mais… || Further Reading

Africa and Europe in Partnership http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/ THE AFRICA-EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 2007 http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/eas2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf Joint Africa-EU Strategy: Action Plan 2011-2013 http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/doc_jaes_action_plan_2011_13_en.pdf High-Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda http://www.post2015hlp.org/ Blogue do Secretário-Geral da UNECA sobre África http://www.uneca.org/es-blog European Report on Development http://www.erd-report.eu/erd/index.html The road to the 2014 Summit: Challenges for Africa-EU relations in 2013 ECDPM, Janeiro de 2013 http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/969F02B0260E072BC1257B0C0055790C/$FILE/challenges_2013_ENG.pdf African Security in 2013: a year of disequilibrium? NOREF, Abril de 2012 http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/dfd3e89925de94c748e775fe6a806cc7.pdf A Estratégia Conjunta África-UE: Análise e Desafios da implementação após a Cimeira UE-África Plataforma Portuguesa das ONGD, 2010 http://backoffice.plataformaongd.pt/documentacao/site/Repositorio/Documentos/Publica%C3%A7%C3%B5es/Estudo%20UEAfrica%20-%202010.pdf

http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/

http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/eas2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf

http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/doc_jaes_action_plan_2011_13_en.pdf

http://www.post2015hlp.org/

http://www.uneca.org/es-blog

http://www.erd-report.eu/erd/index.html

http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/969F02B0260E072BC1257B0C0055790C/$FILE/challenges_2013_ENG.pdf

http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/969F02B0260E072BC1257B0C0055790C/$FILE/challenges_2013_ENG.pdf

http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/dfd3e89925de94c748e775fe6a806cc7.pdf

http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/dfd3e89925de94c748e775fe6a806cc7.pdf

http://backoffice.plataformaongd.pt/documentacao/site/Repositorio/Documentos/Publica%C3%A7%C3%B5es/Estudo%20UEAfrica%20-%202010.pdf

http://backoffice.plataformaongd.pt/documentacao/site/Repositorio/Documentos/Publica%C3%A7%C3%B5es/Estudo%20UEAfrica%20-%202010.pdf

Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr Rua de São Nicolau, 105 1100-548 Lisboa Portugal Tel.: + 351 213 256 300 Fax: + 351 213 471 904 E-mail: [email protected] www.imvf.org

SOBRE O IMVF O Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr (IMVF) é uma fundação de direito privado e uma Organização Não Governamental para o Desenvolvimento (ONGD) que realiza ações de ajuda humanitária, de cooperação e educação para o desenvolvimento económico, cultural e social, realiza estudos e trabalhos científicos nos vários domínios do conhecimento, bem como fomenta e divulga a cultura dos países de expressão oficial portuguesa.

ABOUT IMVF Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr (IMVF) is a private foundation and a Non-Governmental Development Organization (NGDO) that carries out humanitarian aid and economic, cultural and social development cooperation and education. It also conducts studies and produces scientific papers on several fields of knowledge, and promotes and disseminates the culture of countries whose official language is Portuguese.

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Documents

IMVF Proceedings 1/2013 - A Parceria África-Europa em construção: que futuro?