Relações Internacionais e Globalização · Aula 16 5ª-feira, 12 de abril. Horários ... 146-168 (inglês). PEREZ, Carlota ... of spreading the social benefits much more widely

Relações Internacionais e GlobalizaçãoDAESHR014- 13SB

(4-0-4)

Professor Dr. Demétrio G. C. de Toledo – BRI

[email protected]

UFABC – 2018.I

(Ano 3 do Golpe)

Aula 16

5ª-feira, 12 de abril

Horários de atendimento extra-classe:

• São Bernardo, sala D-322, Bloco Delta, 3as-feiras, das 14-16h, e 5as-feiras, das 13-14h (é só chegar)

• Atendimentos fora desses horários, combinar por emailcom o professor: [email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

A Crise de 2008

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Módulo II: Módulo II: Breve introdução ao nosso futuro

Aula 15 (5a-feira, 12 de abril): A Crise de 2008

Texto base:

VAROUFAKIS, Yanis (2016), “Colapso”, p. 183-203 (português), p.146-168 (inglês).

PEREZ, Carlota (2010) “The Advance of Technology and MajorBubble Collapses: Historical Regularities and Lessons for Today”, p.1-9.

Texto complementar:

TEMIN, P. (2010) “The Great Recession and the Great Depression”.National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 15645.

STIGLITZ, Joseph (2010) O mundo em queda livre.

DUMÉNIL, Gérard, LEVY, Dominique (2011) “A crise doneoliberalismo na história do capitalismo. 2008-2011, os doisprimeiros atos”, p. 1-22.

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A Crise Global

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• A Crise de 2008 é um ponto de inflexão da história docapitalismo moderno, comparável à Crise de 1929.

• Segundo Ben Bernanke (presidente do FED de 2006-2014),“September and October of 2008 was the worst financialcrisis in global history, including the GreatDepression”. Segundo Bernanke, as consequências maisbrandas da Crise de 2008 em relação à Crise de 1929resultaram da resposta mais rápida dos governos e bancoscentrais, que, entre outras vantagens, contavam com oconhecimento histórico sobre a Crise de 1929, e não damenor severidade da crise de 2008 em relação a 1929.

A Crise Global

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A Crise Global

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Capitalismo ou Crise Permanente?

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• Primeiro Choque do Petróleo (1973)

• Segundo Choque do Petróleo (1979)

• Recessão, choque dos juros, crise das dívidas da AL (começo anos1980; década perdida da AL)

• Black Monday (1987)

• Recessão e crise de poupança e liquidez (começo anos 1990)

• Crise Indiana (1991)

• Crises Finlandesa e Sueca (começo anos 1990)

• Colapso da Bolha Imobiliária no Japão (1992)

• Crise do México (1994)

• Crise da Ásia (1997)

• Crise da Rússia (1998)

• Crise do Brasil (1999)

• Crise da Argentina (1998-2002)


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• Bolha dot.com (2001)

• Crise do Petróleo (2003-2008)

• Crise do Subprime (2007-2009, colapso da bolha imobiliáriaestadunidense)

• Grande Recessão (2008-presente)

• Crise da Islândia (2008-2012)

• Crise da Irlanada (2008-2010)

• Crise da Grécia (2010-presente)

• Crise da Rússia (2014-20160

• Crise da China (2015)


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A Crise de 2008: um brevíssimo vocabulário

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• “Subprime: Subprime is a classification of borrowers witha tarnished or limited credit history. Lenders will usea credit scoring system to determine which loans aborrower may qualify for. Subprime loans carrymore credit risk, and as such, will carry higher interestrates as well. Approximately 25% ofmortgage originations are classified as subprime”.(Investopedia)


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• “Mortgage: A mortgage is a debt instrument, secured bythe collateral of specified real estate property, that theborrower is obliged to pay back with a predetermined setof payments. Mortgages are used by individuals andbusinesses to make large real estate purchases withoutpaying the entire value of the purchase up front. Over aperiod of many years, the borrower repays the loan, plusinterest, until he/she eventually owns the property freeand clear. Mortgages are also known as "liens againstproperty" or "claims on property." If the borrower stopspaying the mortgage, the bank can foreclose”.(Investopedia)


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• “Mortgage: In a residential mortgage, a home buyerpledges his or her house to the bank. The bank has aclaim on the house should the home buyer default onpaying the mortgage. In the case of a foreclosure, thebank may evict the home's tenants and sell the house,using the income from the sale to clear the mortgagedebt”. (Investopedia)


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• “Subprime Meltdown: The sharp increase in high-riskmortgages that went into default beginning in 2007,contributing to the most severe recession in decades.The housing boom of the mid-2000s – combined withlow interest rates at the time – prompted many lendersto offer home loans to individuals with poor credit. Whenthe real estate bubble burst, many borrowers wereunable to make payments on their subprime mortgages”.(Investopedia)


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• Crise, regulação financeira, bonança, desregulaçãofinanceira, crise, regulação financeira, bonança…

– Crise de 1929: Glass-Steagal Act (1933), separoubancos comerciais e de investimentos.

– Bonança dos anos 1990 (bolha dot.com): Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999), substituiu partes centrais doGlass-Steagal Act, entre as quais a remoção daseparação entre bancos comerciais, de investimentose seguradoras, e reduziu o controle da SEC (StockExchanges Comission, equivalente à CVM brasileira)sobre grandes hondings financeiras.

Temin (2010) “The Great Recession and the GreatDepression”

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• “The housing boom flourished in recent years, nourishedby the availability of Chinese capital and the rulingeconomic theory of the Washington Consensus. Thisterm indicated a set of economic policies that rangedfrom stable exchange rates and responsible fiscal policiesto deregulation and privatization. It was an adaptation ofthe Gold Standard to current conditions, stipulatingstable instead of fixed exchange rates to avoid therigidities of the Gold Standard that were so harmful inthe 1930s.”. (Temin 2010: 5, grifos meus)


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• “The government should stay out of the way so thatprivate finance and industry could prosper in this theory;competition would ensure continued growth andprosperity. Like the Gold Standard, the WashingtonConsensus was based on the enlightenment ideas ofHume and Smith and promulgated as a way to organizethe postwar world.” (Temin 2010: 5, grifos meus)

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• “The Great Depression and the Great Recession thuswere both caused by policies deriving from nostalgia forthe world of the Enlightenment. Drawing on theoriesfrom the eighteenth century, hard-headed policy makerseither assumed or tried to recreate the idealizedconditions of Hume and Smith. These policy makersignored both the growth of economies of scale inmodern economies and the work of behavioraleconomists who have shown that people do not behaveas homo economicus”. (Temin 2010: 7, grifos meus)


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• “The results of their efforts in the 1920s and in recentdecades was to produce the new economy of the earlierperiod and the goldilocks economy of the later one thatturned into booms and busts. Was it inevitable thatthese economic expansions would end badly?” (Temin2010: 7, grifos meus)


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• “Nothing lasts forever, and prosperity generated a desirefor more independent financial dealings. Economicturmoil in the 1970s hastened the transition, and theWashington Consensus arose in the 1980s. The Glass-Steagall Act was repealed, and the SEC became morerelaxed. Americans urged the rest of the world to followsuit and deregulate both domestic and foreign capitalmovements. The distribution of income widened, thesize of the financial sector rose, and there began to be astring of small-scale (at least to the United States)financial crises”. (Temin 2010: 14, grifos meus)


Perez (2010): Crise global e mudança tecnológica

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• “The current crisis is not an accidental event in thefinancial system. It is a historically recurrentphenomenon endogenous to the market system. Itresults from the way technological revolutions areassimilated. Such major collapses signal the need for astructural shift in the forces guiding growth andinnovation from financial to production capital and to thereturn of an active state. If history is a guide, a globalgolden age may lie ahead”. (Perez 2010: 1, grifos meus)


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• “All bubbles are about greed and herd behaviourregulation tries to avoid their worst excesses, but somebubbles are also about the installation of technologicalrevolutions and making overall paradigm shifts. Thecrash of 1929 and the twin collapses of 2000 and 2007-8are of this type. Recovery from the consequences ofthose bubbles requires major institutional innovation toenable the real economy to flourish. The basis for makingthose statements is the evidence of regular historicalpatterns of diffusion and assimilation of technologicalrevolutions in the economy and society.” (Perez 2010: 1,grifos meus)


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• “There have been five technological revolutions in 240years: [1771, 1829, 1875, 1908] in 1971, Intel’smicroprocessor launched our current age of informationtechnology and telecommunications. This informationera is only half way through its diffusion path. If historyis a guide, it has twenty to thirty years of deploymentahead, while serving as a platform for innovation in allthe other sectors and for opening new radical paths inproduction and lifestyles.” (Perez 2010: 1, grifos meus)


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• “The next revolution is likely to bring the age of biotech,bioelectronics, nanotech and new materials, in somecombination, depending on unpredictable scientificbreakthroughs that may open low-cost and all-pervasiveinnovation trajectories. Each of these revolutions drives agreat surge of development and shapes growth for half acentury or more.” (Perez 2010: 1)


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• “Due to the natural resistance and difficulty inassimilating such changes, each great surge goesthrough two different periods. The first half sets up theinfrastructure and lets the markets pick the winners; thesecond half reaps the full economic and social potential.Each of these periods takes about 20 to 30 years. TheInstallation Period is a time of Schumpeterian ‘creativedestruction’, a battle of the new paradigm against theold, when investment is concentrated in the newtechnologies, both to install the new industries andinfrastructures and to modernise all the matureindustries”. (Perez 2010: 2)


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• “During Installation, investment is led by financialcapital, which funds the technological transformationand, in the excitement, also intensifies its casino-typeactivities until it decouples from the real economybuilding a major asset inflation boom that ends in acatastrophic collapse. That “gilded age” prosperity ischaracterised by income polarisation and by thechanging fortunes and rankings of companies,industries, regions and countries”. (Perez 2010: 2)


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• “The Deployment Period that follows is what historicallyhas been considered a “golden age” i.e. the great Britishleap (with the Industrial Revolution), the Victorian Boom,the Belle Époque and the post WWII boom. Suchprosperous epochs are unleashed by the policies thatovercome the post-collapse recessions. They are a timeof widespread application of the new paradigm forinnovation and growth across the whole economy andof spreading the social benefits much more widelywhile, at least partially, reversing the income polarisationof the Installation Period”. (Perez 2010: 2)


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• “Investment is led by production capital, usuallyfavoured by government policies and supported by amore regulated financial system. This period ends withthe maturity of the technological revolution and itsparadigm, the exhaustion of their potential for furtherinnovation or productivity increases and the saturation ofmarkets. All that sets the conditions for financial capitalto look for other outlets, among which are the loans tofaraway countries and the funding of new – potentiallyrevolutionary – technologies”. (Perez 2010: 2)


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• “This separation and the fact that technical changeoccurs by revolutions are at the root of the pendularpatterns of capitalism from Installation to Deploymentand back. When a technological revolution reachesmaturity production capital becomes conservative.Financial capital then breaks loose, backs the newentrepreneurs, dismantles as much as it can of theinstitutional framework, overinvests in the newinfrastructure and also uses the new technologies toinnovate in instruments for financial speculation.” (Perez2010: 3)


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• “When the resulting bubble collapses, the state needs tocome back actively to regulate finance and favour thenew and renewed production capital, which can thenlead the expansion using the installed potential forgrowth and innovation. That is the moment we areexperiencing now.” (Perez 2010: 3)


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• “The last time around, the policies applied included awide set of changes on the national and internationallevels. Among the latter were the Bretton Woodsinstitutions (the IMF, the World Bank and the role of theUS dollar as standard), followed by NATO, the MarshallPlan and the “Cold War”. These shaped the direction ofinnovation in military and much of capital goods”. (Perez2010: 5)


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• “Nationally, the Keynesian demand managementmechanisms were applied together with the WelfareState, which performed income redistribution throughtaxation and turned the majority of the workingpopulation into mass consumers. The automobile, theState funded road networks and universal electricitymade it possible to use cheap land outside the cities tomass produce suburban homes and accelerate thedemand for electrical appliances and refrigerated andfrozen foods”. (Perez 2010: 5)


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• “Mortgage support extended home-ownership furtherand further down the income scale, unemploymentinsurance guaranteed that instalment payments wouldbe continued in recessions and counting on pensionsencouraged people to spend their monthly incomewithout much saving.” (Perez 2010: 5)


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• “In my view, the current opportunity space for a globalpositive-sum game involves three interdependentelements: ICT, ‘green’ and full global development. (…)Those three forces defining the opportunity space areinterdependent. Information and communicationstechnologies (ICTs) serve as facilitators and externalitiesfor all. Full globalisation provides the market volumegrowth and “green” provides the direction ofinnovation.” (Perez 2010: 6)

Streeck (2012): As crises do capitalismo democrático

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• “Em vez de interpretar nossa atual atribulação como umdistúrbio isolado em uma condição essencialmenteestável, vou considerar a “Grande Recessão” e o (quase)colapso subsequente das finanças públicas como amanifestação de uma tensão elementar subjacente àconfiguração político-econômica das sociedadescapitalistas avançadas (...)”. (Streeck 2012: 35)


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• “(...) Uma tensão que faz do desequilíbrio e dainstabilidade regra, e não exceção, e que encontrouexpressão numa sucessão histórica de distúrbios nointerior da ordem socioeconômica. Maisespecificamente, vou argumentar que a crise atual sópode ser plenamente compreendida à luz dastransformações contínuas e inerentemente conflituosasda formação social que chamamos de ‘capitalismodemocrático’”. (Streeck 2012: 35)


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• “Na verdade, creio que não os trente glorieuses mas asvárias crises que se seguiram representam a condiçãonormal do capitalismo democrático — uma condiçãopautada por um conflito endêmico entre mercadoscapitalistas e políticas democráticas, que recrudesceucom o término do alto crescimento econômico dos anos1970”. (Streeck 2012: 36)


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• “Há vários modos de conceitualizar as causas subjacentesao atrito entre capitalismo e democracia. Para ospresentes fins, vou caracterizar o capitalismodemocrático como uma economia pautada por doisprincípios ou regimes conflitantes de alocação derecursos: o primeiro opera de acordo com aprodutividade marginal, ou com aquilo que é expostocomo uma vantagem por um “livre jogo das forças demercado”, e o outro se baseia em necessidades oudireitos sociais, tal como estabelecidos por escolhascoletivas em contextos democráticos.”. (Streeck 2012: 37)


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• “O conflito entre as demandas democráticas por justiçasocial e as demandas capitalistas por distribuiçãosegundo a produtividade marginal, ou ‘justiçaeconômica’”. (Streeck 2012: 52)


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• “Sob o capitalismo democrático, os governos sãoteoricamente instados a cumprir ambos os princípiossimultaneamente, ainda que eles quase nunca sealinhem de forma substantiva. Na prática, podemnegligenciar um princípio em favor do outro por algumtempo, até serem penalizados pelas consequências”.(Streeck 2012: 37)


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• Quatro etapas da crise do capitalismo democrático:

1. Era da inflação;

2. Era de deficits públicos;

3. Era de endividamento privado;

4. Era do endividamento soberano:

“Nos três anos após 2008, o conflito distributivo sob ocapitalismo democrático se converteu em um cabo deguerra intrincado entre investidores financeiros globais eEstados-nação soberanos”. (Streeck 2012: 50)


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• “Mais do que nunca, o poder econômico parece ter setornado poder político, enquanto os cidadãos parecemestar quase inteiramente despojados de suas defesasdemocráticas e de sua capacidade de imprimir àeconomia interesses e demandas que são incomparáveiscom os dos detentores de capital”. (Streeck 2012: 56)


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• “De fato, levando em conta a sucessão das crises docapitalismo democrático desde os anos 1970, parecehaver uma possibilidade real de um novo arranjo —mesmo que temporário — do conflito social nocapitalismo avançado, desta vez inteiramente a favor dasclasses proprietárias ora firmemente entrincheiradas emsua fortaleza politicamente indevassável: a indústriafinanceira internacional”. (Streeck 2012: 56)

Para ter bons sonhos...

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• “(…) Uma segunda crise quase tão significativa comoaquela de 1929 atacou em 1938. Não fosse a carnificinada Segunda Guerra Mundial, a Crise de 1929 teriavigorado até 1940. (…) O conflito liberou as finançasestatais de todas as restrições políticas. O governo gastoudinheiro como se não houvesse amanhã, a dívida federalduplicou, mas o ciclo do pessimismo foi interrompido.(…) Velhas fábricas foram reerguidas, novas fábricassurgiram em campos verdejantes, a inovação atingiu suaapoteose, a produção foi às alturas, os negóciosexplodiram. Pena que milhões tiveram que morrer antesque a política permitisse aos governos agir de maneiraadequada plenamente”. (Varoufakis 2016: 86).

Para ter bons sonhos...

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• Há fortes indícios de que uma guerra entre grandespotências se avizinha.

• Entre analistas de relações internacionais, começa a seformar um quase consenso sobre a inevitabilidade deuma guerra por hegemonia no sistema internacional.

• É possível que essa guerra esteja mais próxima do quegostaríamos. De qualquer modo, a geração de vocês quetêm 20 anos hoje dificilmente deixará de presenciar aolongo de suas vidas essa guerra em escala global.

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Relações Internacionais e Globalização · Aula 16 5ª-feira, 12 de abril. Horários ... 146-168 (inglês). PEREZ, Carlota ... of spreading the social benefits much more widely