Alargamento NATO

7/29/2019 Alargamento NATO

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Edited byJ olyon HoworthandJ ohn T.S. K eeler

Defending EuropeThe EU, NATO and the Quest forEuropeanAutonomy


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CHAPTER 9

Dilemmas ofNATO Enlargement

J ulian Lindley- F rench

A t NATO's Madrid Summit in July 1997, the Czech Republic,Hungary and Poland were invited to join the Alliance. The Alliancealsocommitted itself to "extend further invitations in coming yearstonarions willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations ofmembership." 1 50 far, so good. However, enlargement is, in many ways, an

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182 e J ulian Lindley-Frenchcredible conventional capability. Enlargement tests that balance becauit redefines the political mssion, complicates decision making, crenta diffuse security role for the Alliance, reduces the qualitative levei (lImlitary-operational effectiveness and costs alot of money-money rh Ino one seems willing to spend.Consequently, the internal and external pressllres upon NATO Ian organization are profound and becomng steadi ly more so as Europand America dri ft into a dysfllnctional strategic relationship in whk 1 1rhere is little or no consensus over the risks and threats that rnust hconfronted or the solutions that must be found. Missile defens IEuropean defense, sanctions against Iraq are but rhree areas wher ,profound malaise in the relationship manifests itself. Moreover, NAT )enlargement cannot be neatly packaged or quarantined from tho ('tensions. Indeed, in many ways, the process will become alitmus test ((lithe state of transatlantic relations as the debate over extending the se 11rity umbrella meets head on the need for greater mlitary efficiency. No!surprisingly, the 2002 NATO Review Conference, which wi ll assess tilprogress made on enlargement and decide who next wi ll be offered fullmernbership, islikely to prove an exacting and delicate affair.In the fog of a peaceful but vaguely unstable European continent Iwhat cannot be denied is that the political heart of the Alliance ischang-ing radically and i r i s diffi cult to assess what t~e out:ome will. be,Unfortunately, such change seems poorly appreciated m the UlllttIStates, particularly in a Congress that has driven much of the enlargement processo Consequently, the United States will doubtless r~act tothis perceived drift in its now time-honored way by atternpung toreassert U.S. leadership when the rhetoric of partnership wouklprobably be more politically effective. This dichotomy in both tilpolicy positions and perceptions of Americans ando Euro~eans .covcral i the issues that cause contention in the rransatlantic relationship, notjust enlargement. In addition to the tensions over the strategic directionof rhe A lI iance, rhere are a host of more imrnediate problems,NATO-EU relations, a redefinition of burden sharing in a cornplcxsecurity environment that requires holistic, civil-mlitary approach ,(including civilian aid programs), the policy toward Russia and, 0 1course, U.S.-European disagreements over an extra-European role fOI 'NATO. Certainly, it is a challenge to see how further enlargement cantake place without some sort of settlernent between the United Stat ,and its allies over the future shape and role of the Alliance.jThere isalsoa degree of urgency because, as the EU is now finding to its ~ost, failcdpromses not only complicate relations with candidate countrres but also

Dilemmas of NATO Enlargement e 183create a c1imate of insecurity, which is precisely the outcome the processseeks to avoid.

Imp li cations of Enlargement for NATO:The L egitimacy/Effectiveness DilemmaNATO enlargement is paradoxical because while embracing states in asecurity regime is normally deemed to reinforce its strength this isby nomeans automatically the case, either in the wider context of Europeansecurity or in the case of NATO. Indeed, enlargement brings as manycomplications to the Alliance, borh political and functional, assecuritybenefits, As early asJanuary 1996, Gebhardt von Moltke, NATO's assis-tant secretary general for Pol itical Mfairs, wrote "Allies will want toknow how possible new members intend to contribute to NATO'stasks ... "2 In this respect, an enlarged NATO is a leap in the darkbecause no one really knows how successive enlargements will changethe political balance and/or the mlitary efficiency of the Alliance.At the mlitary levei there will certainly be no NATO standard ofmlitary capability. Indeed, there are already four levels of mlitary capa-bility in rhe Alliance-the United States, which is vanishing into themlitary-technical distance, the United Kingdom and France, which findthemselves floating in the mlitary rnid-Atlantic, the other continentalWestern Europeans and, finally, the new members. Moreover, if thepartner countries are added to rhis politico-mlirary soup rhen theproblem becomes even more complex. The most likely outcome, there-fore, is that NATO will come to resemble a mlitary "clearing house"-a kind of interoperability nexus in which asymmetrical capabilities arecobbled together in some form of (hopefully) working politico-rnilitarymechanism.At best, an enlarged NATO could help to reinforce interlocking insti-tutions, underpin NATO-EU relations and, in cooperation with theOSCE, establish a broad security guarantee in rhe European securityspace. At worst, an enlarged NATO could push Russia toward an aggres-sive posture, duplicate OSCE, reinforce the mltary role of the EU asjuxtaposition to that of NATO and undermne the basic pol iticalconsensus and mlitary mssion of the Alliance. NATO enlargement,therefore, is a risk-a cost-benefit exerci se in which the Alliance mustconfront exactly the same "deepening" and "widening" dilemma that rheEU faces. In the absence of a systemc threat American hegemony losesits ability to influence by cooptive means. Indeed, hegemony is not whatit used to be. Consequently, at a time of supreme American power, the


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184 J ulian Lindley-FrenchUnited States will find leadership increasingly difficult to assert withinan AlIiance more fractious, more divided and more political than at anytime in its history.This will also lead progressively (irony of ironies) to a NATO. t~"1Imore resembles the political machinations of the EU. Thus, rhe posttl 1\of the European members will be furrher reinforced because they havfif ty years experience of playing the kind of g~mes that are p.art ~"dparcel of Brussels daily l ife across rown from NAfO. In such a situatronthe new members are likcly to be disappointed because the NATO theyjoin is unlikcly to be the NATO they want. Moreov~r, ~hey th~msdvare faced with achoice: spend limted resources on bringing rheir armcdforces up to NATO srandard or embark on the thoroughgoing economreform required to prepare for EU membership. . .The complexity of contemporary Alliance and European politicsalready constraining the Alliance. First, the reform of the armed forces tilboth new members and aspiram countries isproving extremely slow '" U 'complex. Indeed, the mechanisms for "self-improvem~nt," s~ch as ti"Individual Partnership Programs (IPPs), Membershtp Action Plnn(MAPs) and the Planning and Review Process (PARP) tend to underllnrhe extent of problems, rather than offer any meaningful solut~~11,Second, as indicated earlier, NATO was built around a core POIIlH "understanding and an asymmetric political and mlitary ~artnel" 111berween North America and Western Europe. led by the United S ,:alEnlargement rakes place at a time when tha~~alallce i.s.being disturh IInot only by Western Europe's legitimate political ambitions but also hthe demands of a new group of members who arenot so much parto I ' ,c1ients. Third, enlargement transfers security risks from beyond NA1'()'horders to within them, which further complicates the nature of 11 1Alliance and bifurcares its mssion. Fourth, by creating the expectation 111enlargement, NATO creates winners and losers Wit~ rhose "excludrd,"such as Ukraine, needing constant reassurance to avoid the overt re sI ,hlishrnent of the very dividing lines in Europe that NATO seeksto pr ''11 '111Fifth, rhe paraphernalia of enlargement have expanded over th 1 '"decade in inverse proportion to the political will necessary to makt Ihappen. Indeed, rhe architecture of ~uasi-enla~gement has beco~T1 "industry: the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAP.C), the PFr. ,liNATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council. the Commttee of Natlou ,IArmaments Directors with Partners (CNAD with Partners). They 1 '1 'Idisproportionate burden on a bureaucracy rhat is ill suited to t!le. t:'\, li.badly underfunded and that still needs urgently to attend to exisnng 111Ifunctions, such as ESDI and the DCI. NATO is in need of reforrn.

Dilemmas of NATO Enlargement e 185Not surprisingly, as a result of these many conflicting forces and

inconsistent positions, NATO is going about enlargement in an almostad hoc manner, with neither the political nor the practical implicationsbeing properIy addressed. Indeed, in spite of the many declarations tothe contrary, there is no polirical roadmap guiding the allies on the pathto enlargement-no agreed timetable, no agreed order of prospectivemembers, no plan of action. NATO is muddling through enlargementbecause the members lack sufficient political cohesion to will either itsmeans or its ends.

Implications for the EU:TheAsymmetric Membership DilemmaThe report of the French presidency of the EU to the Nice summt inDecember 2000 stated: "The Union will ensure the necessary dialogue,consultation and cooperation with NATO and its non-EU members,other countries who are candidates for accession to the EU as well asother prospective partners in EU-Ied crisis management, with fullrespect for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and the singleinstitutional framework of the Union."3 In EU-speak that means thegreat and rhe good have absolutely no idea how rhe relationship with thecandidate/accession countries is going to work in practice.

Certainly, NATO enlargement creates problems for the EU. First, irincreases the political pressure on the EU to enlarge itself Second, itreinforces asymmetric memberships that further complicate interinstitu-tional relations between the EU and NATO. There are fifteen candidatecountries seeking to "accede" to the EU, among them Turkey which,although a full member of the Alliance, finds its candidature for the EUperpetually 00the back burner, The "word on the street" is that 2006will be the earliest that the first wave of EU enlargement will take place,in spire of recent reassuring comments from British Prime MinisterTony Blair.4 The Alliance is not much better. In 2002 NATO is, at best,likely ooly to offer fulI membership to Romania, Slovenia and possibly .Lithuaoia. The complexity of their respective enlargements leavesNATO and rhe EU polirically paralyzed with rhe result that everybody,member and candidate alike, find themselves in a kind of political nomans land. The recent Intergovemmental Conference (IGC) on reformof EU institutions in preparation for EU enlargement underIined thesheer complexity of the process, and served only to demonstrate thatprogress is by no means certain.In practice it is very hard to separate the two enlargements in themnds of those who aspire to be members of the two organizations.


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186 J ulian Lindley-FrenchPreviously, there was arrade-off between economc security and mlitarysecurity by which candidates sought a U.S. security guarantee alongsidean EU economc "guarantee." Indeed, that was the implicit "deal"between the United States and its allies. However, the United States hasbecome increasingly concerned that EU membership means a "back-door" secur ity guarantee from NATO for EU members, thus implyingan involuntary extension of U.S. commtments in Europe. To counterthis, the debate in the early 19905 centered upon rhe need for parallelenlargements, but that goal proved to be polirically and practicallyimpossible. The United States had a point. The debate that took pl~cein Finland in the run up to their accession to rhe EU was often heavilylaced with references to the security that the country would gain fromEU membership. Given the relative paucity of EU rnilitary capabilitiesand that Finland's main securiry concern has been and rernains Russia,they were not voting for a EU security guarantee. Through ESDP aEuropean guarantee may one day prove feasible, but not for the foresee-able future (and is hardly likely to enjoy U.S. support).

This interinstitutional imbroglio is further complicated by thepressure emanating from those in Washington who seeEU enlargementas a commtment to what they regard as asymmetric burdcn-sharing,whereby the U.S. mlitary commtment to Europe is offset by the EU'seconomc investment in Europe. Thus, there is a fine balance betweenthe forces pushing the EU to enlarge (including NATO enlargement)and the many pressures from within it to delay. It isalso adebate fraughtwith difficulty because there are undoubredly some in the United States(and United Kingdorn) who believe that a wider Europe will mean lessEurope and those in Europe who believe that awider Alliance will rneanless America.

One solution could be for the EU member states to opt for a kindof "virtual enlargement" in which non-El.I, NATO allies and, indeed,partners, are invited to formalize the decision-shaping formula throughakind of EU "Partnership for Peace." ln effect, this would be an exten-sion of Pillar Two of the Treaty on EU (i.e., the intergovernmentalCFSP). There is already pressure from some EU acccssion states to"join'' PiIlar Two before rhey are fully admtted to the rest of rhe Treatyon European Union.? Certainly, if NATO ernbarks upon a second waveof enlargement before the EU has even reached the starting post, theproblem of block-building within the Alliancc will become more acuteas Western European interests become increasingly distinct, by contrastto those of other members, irrespective of the final shape of NATOenlargement. This would aiso help case the problem of EU-caucusing

Dilemmas of NATO Enlargement 187within the Alliance that NATO enlargement tends to reinforce becauseit further dilutes a single European position. EU-caucusing is not Euro-caucusing and so long as there is an imbalance between the two enlarge-ments Western Europeans will tend to see their interests as beingdistinct from their Central and Eastern European neighbors. Moreover,in many ways EU-caucusing is as inevitable as it is desirable because ofthe need for a functioning mechanisrn that can adequately reflect thechanging political balance of power in the Alliance. Indeed, it is simplya reflection of political reality. Ultimately, there will only be truesymbiosis between the two enlargements if both sides to the transat-lantic security bargain recognize that membership of either will affordthe same security guarantee.

Implicat ions for the "Neutrals":TheAre We, Aren' t We D il emmaThe debate over NATO and EU enlargement is also having asignificantimpact upon how the so-called "neutrals" see themselves. Neutrality isno longer really an option for any EU member state, at least in the strictsense of the termo Even that doyen of neutrality, Switzerland, hascompromsed itself to an extent by joining NATO's pfP. This is a reflec-tion of geo-political change that is a1so encouraging a reevaluation inother "hard-line" neutrals, such as Sweden and .lreland. Having joinedthe EU they are now engaged in often-tortured debates about what isthe purpose and, indeed, the benefit to be derived from neutraliry in apostmodern world, including whether or not NATO membership is anoption in the medi um to long termo Moreover, a!though the EU'sautonomous capacity is still more autonomous than capable, rhe factthat ir exists exerts increased pressure upon rhem to come off the neutralfence. Ir is hard to imagine a scenario in which a NATO member isconfronted with a major challenge to its security without the non-NATO "EU Four" (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) making some.form of contribution. NATO enlargement will undoubtedly reinforcethis tendency, which will, in turn, create not only pan-European mutu-a11yassured vulnerabilities but a1so the need for mutually reassuringcommtments. Indeed, such cornmtments are already implicit in theEU's HG. Included in the planning framework for the EU's ERRF is aCommttee of Contributors made up of non-EU European states. Theywill have what is termed a "decision-shaping" capability, although whatthat means exactly has yet to be defined. Ir is ironic that it is the foggypeace of post-Cold War Europe that is forcing an abandonment of

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188 e )ulian Lindley-Frenchtraditional neutraliry, rather than the ideologically charged atmosphof the Cold War.

Implications for Russia: lhe Partnerl Adversary OilemmaRussia is an enigma for the Alliance. At a superficial leve~irnport 1111steps have been taken to reassure the Russians tha~NATO ~sno 10uI\! Ian anti-Russian coalition. The 1997 NATO-RuSSla Foundmg Act 011I1rhe creation of the NATO-Russian Joint Permanent Council, soughl 111frame a new relationship between the two former adversaries 111111commtted the new partners to joint efforts to construct peace 1\11I1stability in rhe Euro-Atlantic area. To that end, the Act stated: "NA'J'(and Russia do not consider each orher asadversaries. They share rhe ali Iof overcomng the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competitioll 011I1of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation."6 However, rnuch 01Russia's relationship with the West hinges on NATO enlargement am,not surprisingly, there is a very distinct Russian point of view. "To ! lu !'1out rhe prospect of NATO expanding to indude rhe ECE [Easi 111and Central European countries] would require sirnultaneous artemptto address Russis real and alleged concerns about the futur 01European securiry, Otherwise the stated assumptions of ali West 111security policies-that Russia is in some meaningtul sense a partncr \1111the substantial decisions affecting its security should therefore not I tmade without full cOllsideratiol l of Russian interests. including der 1 \ IcOllsultations with Moscow-could be considered in Russia as meanhless."" This Russian view of NATO enlargement not only sums up tiRussian attitude-it encapsulates the West's dilcmma. Ali Weslt 111governments would like partnership with Moscow but not atothe 1 ', " Iof giving the Russians an enduring veto over the flltur~ expansron 01 11 1Alliance. Equally, NATO cannot pretend that R~ssJa doe~ n~ 'I( IUnfortunately, the very name "NATO" is replete with neganve impllitions for a Russian people who labored under forty years of st~e pr(lpIganda. NATO was the enemy and now ir wants to n:'0~e rts e.IIM111border ever doser to Mother Russia. Ir is powerful and rt IS emotrv "NATO has made great efforts to convince the Russians that enlnl~ment is not aimed at ir and although ir has been repeatedly stressed t li IMoscow has no veto it is clear that much still depends on the Rus, 111attitude. Unfortunately, Russia continues to suffer from a form ,I"Versailles Syndrome," with NATO enlargement ~eing. only the 11\ , Ivisible sign of Russian "defeat." This is a tragedy, not Just for RII, 'but for the whole of Europe, because Russia still sees the end o f 111

Dilemmas of NATO Enlargement e 18911 1

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Cold War in terms of a defeat and any developments that come there-after as the imposing of terms by an arrogant victor. Thus, while theimplications for Russia of NATO enlargement are not in themselvesgreat, much depends on how Russia deals with it. Russian oppositionwill certainly have implications for the Alliance. As indicated earlier, thefurther east that NATO expands the more dilute Article V wiU become.Would the West go to war for the Baltics ifRussia reinvaded? No. WouldNATO go to war for Poland? Most certainly, yes. Therefore, it isa sadbut inescapable conclusion that Russis hostility to NATO enlargementcontinues to divide Europe and it is Russia who sets this particularagenda by choosing to see NATO enlargement in those terms.Consequently, it is aiso difficult to escape the conclusion that countriessuch as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will only join a meaningful NATOwhen they are no longer in need of it.Ir would appear, therefore, that the best that can be hoped for fromRussia is a reluctant and grudging acceptance. It is as yet unclear howPresident Putin will react to further NATO enlargements, but early signssuggest a "lucrative" pragmatism if the NMD debate is anything to goby. He will certainly exact a price, both political and financia\, for eachwave of enlargement that takes place. Moreover, given the somewhatanachronistic (hard-line realist) bent to current Russian thinking, itseems reasonable to assume that "linkage" could well raise irsugly headagain as the Russians demand further alterations to NMD, theConventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty or even European defense inreturn for grudging support for limted NATO enlargement. At thesame time, it is certainly difficult to see how progressive NATO enlarge-ment can take place if Russian opposition is implacable, at -Ieast if itinvolves any of the Balde states. Indeed, if NATO enlargement simplymakes Russia ever more hostile how can it be said to serve Europeansecurity. That is, after ali, the object of the exercise.

There is also something ironic and illogical about Russian negativity.A stabilized border to the West, which is implicit in NATO enlarge-ment, would enable it to focus more effectively on dealing with themany zones of insecurity and instability to its south and east. However,that is rhe "charrn" of Russia, a country whose painful history leads itperennially to confuse legitimate security concerns with those that are,frankly, illegitimate. One area of linkage that NATO must be careful toavoid is one in which enlargement is linked to domestic behavior. TheWest must not turn a blind eye to the manner by which Russia dealswith its internal security concerns. Chechnya must not become anaccepted norm. That said, it is impossible to overstate the psychological

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190 e J ulian Lindley-Frenchimpact of NATO enlargement on the Russian mnd and it isb~hol~enupon the West to use every means at its disposal to put these historicalconcerns to rest. NATO must, therefore, be sensitive to Russia withoutever allowing ir any right of veto. By ali means trade the tradable, buinot the inalienable.

Implications for the Candidate Countries:lhe Article V Dilemma"The door to NATO membership remains open to other Europeancountries that are ready and willing to undertake the commtments andobligations stemmng from NATO members~~ and contribute to se '~rity in the Euro-Atlalltic area. The adnllsSlOn of new de~ocra\l(members into NATO is itself part of a wider pracess of greater tnteg tion in Europe involving other European institutions.,,8 The NAT(enlargement debate all too often has an unfortu~ate rendency to IIIdiscussed within the AlIiance as though the candidate cnurttrres ar Itheoretical device. There is always much talk about rhe interests an i lburdens of existing members and often lirtle about rhe legitimate aspirations and security needs of candidate countries. Unfortunately, th.ere li,no quick solutions to this problem because, contrary to Jo~chka FIscl~{.now famous view, widening does affect deepening and it makes I l l l l esense to pretend otherwise. lndeed, a NATO of twenty-three, twcnleight, or in the longer run, even thirry plus, ",:ould ~robably nllllunanimty of purpose in an ever more complex securrty envlronment. onlar the expense of democratic representatioll. Unfortunately: as th t i . \ fknows only too well, to be effective unanimty is not an option, wher u~to bedemocratic, neither iseffectiveness. NATO must gct used to awodtlthat iseven more suboptimal rhan the one it currently occupies. . INATO must avoid becomng simply a more muscular OS(.1Consequently, NATO enlargement is adilemma for the candidat~ 0\11 1tries. They want to join the Alliance because of wha.t I t. 1111/1Unfortunately, rheir very membership changes NATO making 11 1 1attractive as a mlitary security "product." Radu Bogdan captur ' 1 1 1problem succinctly by posing a couple of question~ "NAT l i.cornrnitted itself to reviewing the enlargement process in 2002. 111111meantime there wiU of course be much debate. Could the A 1I 111I1remain functional ir it were much further enlarged? How many I"members should be invited to join, in what arder and how fast?"Q'I hproblem is centered upon Article V of the Treary o: Washinl111 1NATO's founding act. lndeed, it is Article V that candidate COII I II I

Dilemmas of NATO Enlargement e 191really want because it implies an autornatic security guar~ntee. However,it is noto Compared, say, with Article V of the modified Brussels Treatyof the WEU, it is merely an agreement to consult in the event of anattack on a NATO member. ln any case, what constitutes an attack inthe modern age? Cyberwarfare?

Implications for NAlO's Nuclear Policy.TheCredible Deterrent DilemmaDuring the Cold War the assumption (and it was thankfully only anuntested assumption) was that Article V linked the U.S. nuclear arsenalto the territorial defense of Western Europe. Enlargement definitivelybreaks that link and denuclearizes the Alliance. There is no conceivablescenario in which NATO would use nuclear weapons in defense ofCentral and Eastern European members. Consequently, NATO enlarge-ment further decouples the United States fram its allies (it would beironic if Lithuania achieved by default what Russia had been working sohard for over the past fifty years). Therefore, the NATO nuclear securityguarantee is, by and large, a bluff. Actually, ir was always thus, at leastsince the md-1960s when the Soviets gained effective nuclear paritywith the United States. What the candidate countries have to consider iswhether a contemporary conventional "bluff" is worth having. Clearly,~or the m.ajority of thern it is. Indeed, its very uncertainty and arnbigu-rry lends rt some deterrent value. However, any deterrent needs crediblemlitary capability and. overt political will to reinforce its credibility.This is the central paradox of NATO enlargement because ir addsresponsibilities without adding capabilities, It is the sense of security andstability that Alliance membership affords candidate countries thatseems to matter, rather than the reality.

Implications for Public Opinion: TheWho PaysWhat DilemmaThe past decade has witnessed a new phenomenon in the shaping ofsec.u~ty and defense policy: the direct and potent influence of publicopllllOn. AlI Western governments are increasingly sensitive to publicconcerns about the cost of security, be ir in human or financial terms.Unfortunately, the celebrations were just a little too long and too loudat rhe end of the Cold War, and convinced their respective publics thatthe days of extensive security commtments were over. As a resulr,Europe has one almghty security hangover and it is questionablewhether Western Europeans and Americans are prepared to spend large


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192 _ )ulian Lindley-Frenchamounts of money on extending either mlitary or economc securit t lCentral and Eastern European countries. Certainly, what pass s 1 1 1 Idebate is hardly matched by enthusiasm. Indeed, much of the d 111111on this issue has been a quintessential exercise in transatlantic "hru Ipassing," primarily because public opinion in the West is oth rwengaged. Therefore, public opinion will have to be managed by gOVl'll1ments more effectively than has hitherto been the case and that 011111have significant implications for NATO enlargement.NATO enlargement will certainly have to be dane on the cheap, 1 1 Iis dane at all. There are too many other competing interests in sear h "Istate funding for significant amounts to be invested on enlarging tl l IAlliance. This is aproblem that is exacerbated for many of the Europ '11\allies by the strict budget constraints required by membership ar 1111Eurozone. Unfortunately, today's politics are those of the immediate , " tisophisticated arguments about investing in the future of Europe rhl l trarely get heard above the clamor for new hospitais and schools, 01' Ifurther cut in income taxoThis leaves two options. First, NATO enlargrwithin the framework of the existing bureaucracy. Second, the n wmembers have to fund, more or less, the requisite reforms thernselves.

There isanother constituency that Americans and Western Europr 11ali too readily forget: public opinion in the candidate countries. rOImany rhe promse of enlargement, be it that of NATO or the EU seernlittle like an Eastern Promse-always just over the horizon. The impllcations of dashed hopes and broken promses are replete with risks I()stability. When does a delayed prornise become a broken one? When i.a broken promse an act of betrayal? These are very real issues for coun-tries whose own histories have been consistently brutalized by a tragircornbination of Great Power aggression and/or indifference. In such anenvironment security policy could be increasingly renationalized and ina region of weak and failing states this would be dangerous not just forthe candidates thernselves, but for alI the NATO alJies. Failure to exporlsecurity to the East wilJ only result in the East exporting problems to rhcWest. Indeed, this is the reality thar the West must confronto Crime, ille-gal mgration and the destabilizing effects of poverty are ever moreapparent on the streets of Western Europe.

Functionallmplications of NATO Enlargement:The Who Does What DilemmaThere is a dangerous gulf opening between the United States and itsallies about the purpose of the Alliance. This gulf is primarily the resulc

Dilemmas of NATO Enlargement _ 193of contending mlitary-technical choices that the United States and itsallies are making. Indeed, there is a mlitary-technical dichotomy inthe Alliance today. The United States, for all its mlitary mght, seemsable only to escalate fram the top end of the Petersberg Tasks/small-scalecontingency threshold. The Europeans, on the other hand, seem ableonly to escalate fram the bottom end of the Petersberg Tasks (humani-tarian and rescue mssions) to some point up that limted scale (peace-keeping and some forms of peacemaking). Thus, the fundamentalpremse upon which the Alliance is founded, the sharing of both risksand burdens, is being undermned.Many Americans reading this will no doubt jump at this statementand assert (once again) that the problems result from low Europeandefense spending and a lack of willingness to follow the American lead.They are wrong. Indeed, the problem is primarily American in itsmaking and, sadly, will only be made worse by NATO enlargement.For a whole range of domestic reasons (such as the power of defense-industriallobby groups) the United States is preparing for a war that isnot going to happen. Ir is being seduced into a mlitary-technical"paradise" that is largely irrelevant for today's security needs.Consequently, the unwillingness of Americans to cornrnit their forces tothe kind of "muddy boots" peacekeeping that represents 90 percent ofthe security "market" effectively negates American leadership within theAlliance. Ir also forces the allies into a corner. They will never dose themlitary-technical gap with the United States. Frankly, they do not needto because they face threats/risks different from those facing the UnitedStates. At the same time, peacekeeping is not merely a subset of warfighting. It is a very complex set of skills at which several Eurapeanstates excel and at which the United States is poor. In effect, the U.S.drive toward the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) forces Europeansto make a choice between war fighting and peacekeeping-a choicemost do not want to make. Therefore, in order to demonstrate that theyare able to perform at least some relevant mssions, European states willincreasingly opt to spend their limted funds on peacekeeping capabili-ties at the expense of war fighting. For the new members and candidatecountries this problem is magnified. Indeed, such is the parlous state oftheir finances that they have no alternative but to follow the lead of theirWestern Eurapean counterparts in opting for cheaper, less capable, butmore relevant peacekeeping. Consequently, it is difficult to envisagehow in five years time Force XXI could possibly "interoperate" with, say,a Hungarian infantry battalion unless technology is diverted from itscurrent course as a force separator and turned into a force bridge.


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194 e lullan Lindley-FrenchThis mlitary-technical schism, more than any other developmcnt,carries with it the potential to tear NATO apart. Moreover, in an ar010

phere where it is British, French, Italian and German troops doin 111dirty work and who are taking the casualties (East Timor, Kosovo, i II I'Leone) European public opinion will simply not countenance Amerir \11whining about burden sharing. lndeed, in such an environn 1'111European public opinion mght decide that rhe EU is a better 01'11011for its security and defense than NATO. The burden-sharing debarnot a one-way street and the United States had better start getting Ipeacekeeping act together.

Implications for the United States:The Leadership/Partnership DilemmaFinally, what are the implications for the United States? To mauEuropeans such is American power today that the United States /111longer really constructs foreign policy in the classical sense; it simplexports domestic policy. Nowhere is this more apparent than over ,liprotracted issue of NATO enlargement.J'' And yet it is not that simphIn aspeech at NATO's Atlantic Fleet headquarters in Norfolk, Vil'gil1on February 13, 2001 President Bush focused on both the enduring nu l !changing qualities of the Alliance: "The security and welfare of I "member of this [transatlantic] community depend upon the security A I " Jwelfare of all, None of us alone can achieve economc prosperity or mlltary security, None of us alone can assure the continuance of freedomThis is still true today. Our challenges have changed, and NKfchanging and growing to meet them. But the purpose of NATO remalupermanent ... together, united, we can deter the designs of aggressioll,and spare the continent from rhe effects of ethnic hatreds." In th Isentences the president summed up America's dilemma: how to lead Iprocess in an environment where leadership is not possible. ln spit 01its awesome power the United States no longer leads NATO. lndeed, IIatime of unrivalled power ir confronts allies who, thernselves, haveredicovered their political aurhority, Hirherto, Americans were used to drivilllJ,the agenda inside the Alliance in away that would today be unrhinkablc,ln the run-llp to the presidential elections the U.S. debate OV l'1NATO enlargement subsided, although this is likely to prove only 11temporary respire and wi\l undoubtedly increase in the run-up to th,NATO Review Conference in 2002 lndeed, with such a delicate poli"cal balance existing berween the Bush adrninistrarion and Congres 111the run-up to the 2002 md-term elections, ir is one of the forei '11

Dilemmas of NATO Enlargement e 195policy issues that could well get mred in what is likely to prove an acer-bic battle. The Clinton admnistration took the view that, havingreached a binding agreement with the Europeans at the Madrid summtin 1997, the process of enlargement was a done deal and it was nowsimply a question of who and when, not if. That is no longer the case.Moreover, it was a bipartisan position held by both Democrats andRepublicans, not least because of the vocal constituencies in the UnitedStates that trace their roots back to the candidate countries. Ir isCongress, therefore, that is again likely to take the political lead if asseems possible, the adrninistration fails to push the Europeans withsufficient vigor toward an acceptance of both aD.S. timetable and meet-ing much of the cost.Of course, underpinning these tensions are two sharply contrastingviews of burden sharing. Indeed, enlargement has become a metaphorfor burden sharing in the American political mnd mainly because of therefusal of Congress to fund the processo This sense of injustice is fuelledby the prevailng sense in Congress that the United States was doingEurope a favor through its presence during the Cold War. This is notonly plain wrong, but it islikely to do irreparable damage if rhe UnitedStates does not back away from it. Moreover, Europeans will increas-ingly demand a redeflnition of burden sharing to take into account theirextensive aid programs (alongside which the U.S. effort pales) and theirwillingness to put troops in harms way during dangerous Peace SupportOperations (PSOs) in a way that the United States seems unwilling tocountenance. Europeans are also suspicious that for some in the UnitedStates (both Republicans and Democrats) NATO enlargement is simplyaway for America to further disengage from European security.For many Europeans NATO enlargement is indicative of the lack ofclear thinking in a United States that encourages Europe to pay moreand do more without wishing to concede any real concomtant increasein its polirical influence. Two things are clear. First, the United States isin Europe in pursuit of its own interests. Ir was always thus. Second, theUnited States is not going to leave Europe. The sooner the debate movesbeyond the implied threat of disengagement that informs a lot ofAmerican rhetoric the sooner the political problems that afflict thealliance can be tackled.

Eastern Promse? The Implications of NATO EnlargementSo, what is to be done? Throughout this piece the complexities andparadoxes of NATO enlargement have domnated. Indeed, NATO


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196 e julian Lindley-French Dilemmas of NATO Enlargement e 197enlargement was a metaphor for the wider transatlan~~ [elatons~pand, as such, has been trapped in a vicious circle of political postunngand maneuvering that is undermning the Alliance. This is a shambecause a modero NATO remains a cornerstone of security relations,not just in the Eura-Atlantic area, but beyond. These are not just polir-ical niceties but observable fact. However, NATO must aiso be poli ti-cally relevant and this means that the allies need to ~oc~s'. Ir .wasMadeleine Albright who gave the Alliance the 3Ds (no dlscnmmatlOl1,no decoupling and no duplicarion). What NATO needs today arthe 5Cs: credibility, cohesion, convergence, commtment and candor.A credible security policy that does away with a vestigial Cold Wardoctrine that is progressively undermning the deterrent value of theAlliance. Policy cohesion with the EU to ensure that the negative, butunavoidable, implications of asymmetric enlargements are kept to amnimum. Planned convergence of the enlargement policies of the twoorganizations so that candidate/accession co~ntries trying to fulfi!1whatare essentially competing membership requuements from NA10 andrhe EU do not lose valuable and limted resources. Political commtmentfrom existing NATO mernbers to ease the legitimate security concernsof Partner and Canddate countries through the use not only of theenlargement "tool," but other confidence and security-buildingmeasures. A candid statement on both rhe likely timetable for enlarge-ment and the reality of the security "product" that new members canexpect from the Allance.To assist in this process, several measures should be adopted:

(ir is not going to change) by creating a new doctrine entitled"Flexible Interoperability." This would enable NATO to reach atrue interoperability nexus and assist new members by permttingthem to aim at interoperabiliry targets that include peacekeepingas a goal in itself Full spectrum war fighting is not aserious optionfor candidate countries.

e Breaking the nuclear link: NATO enlargement breaks the linkbetween the territorial defense of a member and the Americannuclear arsenal. This should be recognized in a protocol to theTreaty of Washington. lt is inconceivable that the United Stateswould go to nuclear war over, say, Lithuania and yet, in spite of alithe doctrinal adjustments of the past decade, this remains implicitin the core mssion of the Alliance. It is frankly ridiculous andundermnes the wider credibility of the Alliance as a security anddefense mechanism.

Denuclearizing theNATO-Russian relationship: NATO's claim rhat irno longer considers Russia as an adversary is undermned by the pres-ence of nuclear doctrine at me heart of the Alliance. Breaking thenuclear link would not only serve to reinforce me NATO-RussianFounding Act with little or no cost to the "realiry" of Alliancecapabiliry, but help Russia accept progressive enlargement of NATO.

New Euro-Atlantic nuclear command: a new autonomous nuclearcommand should be created by the United States, the UnitedKingdom and France that preserves aWestern nuclear identity andthe role of nuclear weapons as a deterrent of last resort. NATO-EU membership coordination: European security is asmucha function of economc security as mlitary security. NATO and

EU enlargements must be coordinated where possible by includingthe force improvements necessary for NATO membership as partof the overall economc package required to prepare Europeancountries for accession to the EU. At present, NATO and EUenlargements effectively compete for scare resources.

e [oint membership criteria: in addition, membership performancecri teria should be created that link improvements in economccapability required by the EU with the achievement of NATOstandards. This would assist in the "sequencing" of economc andmlitary development. [oint membership funding: funding for NATO candidate and EUaccession states should be linked to their performance under thejoint membership criteria.

e A Euro-Atlantic securityguarantee: NATO should commt itself to anew Euro-Atlantic Security Guarantee to recognize and resolve themlitary dimension of asymmetric memberships and back-doorsecurity gllarantees. The guarantee would commt rhe ,U.S., Canadaand the fifteen EU mernber states and partner countnes to supporteach other in times of crisis.e The reworking of Article V: in light of the Euro-At!antic secur!tyguarantee, the vrording of Article V should be rew?rked to rem-force its poli ti cal credibility. Ironically, this would involve .re~o~nizing the conditional nature of the security guarantee, that IS, tt ISonly an agreement only to consult in the event of achallenge to thesecurity of a partner.e Flexible nteroperability: NATO needs to recognize and formalizethe four basic levels of mlitary capability within the Alliance


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198 e Iulian Lindley-French Dilemmas of NATO Enlargement e 199e New Euro-Atlantic security contract: The United States and its n llhave certain rights and obligations implicit in the conrernpor 11relationship that need to be made explicit. These include r c 1\"

tion that: (1) burden sharing cannot be defined only by expendlt 11 I 1on high spectrum war-fighting capability; peacekeeping efforts 1111 11"security investrnents," such as aid, must also be factored lntothe equation (this will require a mnd-set change in WashinglOlI I(2) recognition by the Europeans that the United Stares has lI!right to expect from its allies construcrive support in extr IEuropean security management without carte blanche agreernr-ntto underpin this commtment the Europeans should create a regi I'Iof forces (like the mechanism rhat governs forces answerable to \1 1ARRC and ERRC) that are constantly in a high statc of readineand able to support V.S. forces in extra-European, out-of-area opcations; and (3) in what is an extraordinarilyIluid security environment in which any number of coalitions could confront :lIlynumber of challenges, the West needs a new force and operarionnlplanning nexus that can work up possible coalition formats (boihthrough virtual and real-time exercising) for operarions worldwide,

Ultimately, true European securiry (and that is the end state of NATenlargernent) will only be achieved through asecurity settlernent towhi hali agree and from which ali benefit, including Russia. For the time beiru ,however, the need for NATO to rernain a European mlitary securiryagency is compelling. This reinforces the need for a balanced approach toenlargement rhat marches expansion of members with improvements incapahilities, which mlitates against the "big-bang" approach to enlarge-ment favored by some in the Vnited States. NATO, rherefore, is in rhinsurancebusiness, offering different policies to different members. Anel,of course, like ali insurance cornpanies, hoping that disaster does norsrrike each and every mernber at one and the same time.

4. Speech by U.K . Prime Minister Tony Blair to the Polish Stock Exchange,October 6, 2000, at www.number-l0.gov.uk.5. This is effectively what happened to Norway, Spain and Portugal in rhe year

prior to their accession. They were treated as full members for ali aspects offoreign policy coordination under the EPC formula. Norway then withdrewfollowing a referendum that rejected EU membership.

6. "The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Securitybetween the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the RussianFed~ration" (Brussels: NATO Office of Press and Information, 1997), p. 2.

7. Yuny Davydov, "Russian Security and East-Central Europe," inV . Baranovsky, ed., Russia and Europe-The Emerging Security Agenda(Stockholm: SIPRI, 1997), pp. 382-383.8. "NATO's Open Door," in Tbe Reader'sGuide to the NATO Summt inWashington(Brussels: NATO Office ofInformation and Press, 1999), p. 82.9. Radu Bogdan, "Rornanian Reflections," in NATO Review(Spring/Summer2000), p. 25.

"Rernarks by the Presidem to the Troops and Personnel," February 13,2001, at www.whitehouse.gov.10.

Notes1. NATO, TheNATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Informaton and

Press, 1999), p. 83.2. Gebhardt Von Moltke, "NATO Moves Towards Enlargement," NATOReview(January 19%), p. 6.3. "Arrangernenrs Concerning Non-EU European NATO Members and OrherCountries which are Candidates for Accession to the EU," from "The

Presidency Repore on the European Security and Defense Policy," December 4,2000, p. 22.

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