Upload
tranngoc
View
216
Download
1
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
283
Index
Ação Declaratória de Constitucionalidade, ADC. See Supreme Court, Brazil, judicial review, abstract, Declaratory Action of Constitutionality
Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade por Omissão, ADIn por Omissão. See Supreme Court, Brazil, judicial review, abstract, Direct Action of Unconstitutionality by Omission
Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade, ADIn. See Supreme Court, Brazil, judicial review, abstract, Direct Action of Unconstitutionality
accommodation pattern of inter-branch interaction. See Brazil, inter-branch interactions in
Administración Nacional de Seguridad Social, ANSES. See Social Security Administration, Argentina
Alfonsín, Raúl, 39, 45, 73–4, 84, 131–3, 141–2
amparo, 42n19, 149Arantes, Rogério Bastos, 10n14, 53n59,
178n42, 182n57, 193n1Argentina
bank freezes, 2–3, 46, 47, 72cases concerning economic policy. See Court
cases, Argentinacivil service, 49civil society, 41Codes. See Codes, ArgentinaConstitution of 1853, 41, 42, 126constitutional reform. See Argentina, legal
transitionDecrees. See Decrees, Argentinaeconomic collapse 1989, 45, 143economic collapse 2001, 40, 46, 149economic transition, 44–50
civil service and labor reform, 49–50economic context, 45–6opening the economy and
privatization, 48social security reform, 48, 140
stabilization plans and monetary policy, 46–7
Austral Plan, 46, 132, 141Bonex Plan, 47n40, 144Convertibility Plan (peso), 47, 146
tax and fiscal reform, 49inter-branch interactions in, 5, 32, 121–2,
123–33, 139–52, 195–6Court character thesis, 133–9, 142–3,
145–6, 148–9, 151–2, 195–6elected branch compliance and retaliation,
130–1, 232–3; See also Court cases, Argentina
patterns ofconfrontation, 8, 131, 133, 140–3,
146–52Court submission, 8, 131, 137, 142,
143–52Supreme Court approaches to decision-
making, 128–30, 224–31deferential, 129, 131, 135, 145, 153pragmatic, 130principled, 129self-protective, 130
Supreme Court selective assertiveness, 121, 127–8, 222–3
judicial centralization in, 70–3appeals as tactic of, 70–1laws facilitating, 72need for, 70Supreme Court as participant, 72–3
judicialization of economic governance, 50labor reform, 49labor unions, 49Laws. See Laws, Argentinalegal transition, 39–44
constitutional reform, 39, 41–3, 74, 83–4social and economic rights, 42
inclusion on agenda of rule of law issues, 39–41
increasing concern with rights, 41judicial reform, 43judicialization, 43–4
www.cambridge.org© in this web service Cambridge University Press
Cambridge University Press978-1-107-00828-1 - High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and BrazilDiana KapiszewskiIndexMore information
Index284
military trials, 39, 40Ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo), 42piqueteros, 40political parties. See Peronist Party; Radical
Partypoliticization of the Supreme Court.
See Supreme Court, Argentina, politicization of
Social Security Administration. See Social Security Administration, Argentina
Argüição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental, ADPF. See Supreme Court, Brazil, judicial review, abstract, Argumentation of Failure to Comply with a Fundamental Precept
bank freeze, 1–3in Argentina, 2–3, 46, 47, 72in Brazil, 1–2, 59
Baum, Lawrence, 14n22, 20Bianchi, Alberto, 73, 73n15, 79, 91n60,
148n45, 151, 152Brazil
bank freeze, 1–2, 59cases concerning economic policy. See Court
cases, Brazilcivil society, 51Constitution of 1988, 52–4, 53n56, 59n71,
60, 63, 98, 98n12, 155, 170, 178, 178n41, 181
Constitutional Amendments. See Constitutional Amendments, Brazil
constitutional reform. See Brazil, legal transition
economic transition, 57–63civil service reform, 62economic context, 57–8opening the economy and
privatization, 60social security reform, 60–1stabilization plans, 58–60, 182–3
Collor, Plans I and II, 59Cruzado Plan, 59Real Plan, 57–8, 59
tax and fiscal reform, 61–2, 99n17, 177–81
inter-branch interactions in, 5, 32, 156–70, 176–88, 196
Court character thesis, 170–6, 181–2, 187–8, 190, 196
elected branch compliance and retaliation, 168, 260–1; See also Court cases, Brazil
patterns ofaccommodation, 8, 157, 159–61,
168–70, 177–88Supreme Court approaches to
decision-making, 166–7, 251–9deferential, 167pragmatic, 166, 189principled, 166, 176self-protective, 166support-building, 167
Supreme Court selective assertiveness, 164–5, 247–50
judicial centralization in, 95–100appeals as tactics of, 96–7concentrating authority in the
STF, 100need for, 95–6Supreme Court as participant, 100
judicialization of economic governance, 63, 155–6
Laws. See Laws, Brazillegal transition, 50–6
constitutional reform, 52–4, 98–9, 178reform to economic order articles,
53–4, 60inclusion on agenda of rule of law
issues, 51increasing concern with rights, 51–2judicial reform, 54–6, 99, 104n36judicialization, 56
lower courts, 98n14Office of the Federal Prosecutor, 54n64,
147n43party system fragmentation, 110–12, 175political parties. See Worker’s Party, Brazil;
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party
professionalization of the Supreme Court. See Supreme Court, Brazil (Supremo Tribunal Federal, STF), professionalization of
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, PMDB), 111
Brinks, Daniel, 34, 96n7, 193n1, 200, 208, 208n20
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 57–8, 60Carrió, Alejandro, 42, 144, 144n30, 145n36Cavallo, Domingo, 46, 47Chavez, Rebecca, 74n17, 88n47, 193n1,
197, 200Codes, Argentina
Argentina (cont.)
www.cambridge.org© in this web service Cambridge University Press
Cambridge University Press978-1-107-00828-1 - High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and BrazilDiana KapiszewskiIndexMore information
Index 285
Civil and Commercial Procedural Code, 71, 72
Codes, Brazil Civil Code, 99
Collor de Mello, Fernando, 2, 51, 59, 60compliance with judicial decisions, 19–21
measuring, 19theories of, 20
communications, 20external actors, 20legitimacy, 20normative, 20
CONADEP. See National Commission on Disappeared Persons
confrontation pattern of inter-branch interactions. See Argentina, inter-branch interactions in
Constitutional Amendments, Brazil No. 12, 62No. 19, civil service reform, 63No. 20, social security reform, 61No. 3, constitutionality and fiscal reform,
55, 99, 177, 178, 179No. 41, pension reform, 61No. 45, judical reform, 99No. 45, judicial reform, 55
constitutional reform. See Argentina, legal transition; Brazil, legal transition
constitutions. See Argentina, Constitution of 1853; Brazil, Constitution of 1988
Contribuição Provisória sobre Movimentação Financeira, CPMF. See Provisional Contribution on Financial Transactions; Court cases, Brazil
corralito. See Argentina, bank freezesCorte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación, CSJN.
See Supreme Court, ArgentinaCourt cases, Argentina, 123–7, 139–52,
216–33Guida, Liliana contra Poder Ejecutivo
Nacional, 146–52, 206–7, 220, 222, 226
Peralta, Luis Arcenio y otro contra Nación Argentina, 124, 143–6, 217, 222, 224
Porcelli, Luis A. contra Banco de la Nación Argentina, 132–3
Rolón Zappa, Victor contra Estado Nacional, 124, 140–3, 216, 223, 230, 232–3
Tobar, Leonidas contra Ministerio de Defensa – Contaduría General del Ejército, 125, 146–52, 206–7, 221, 223, 229, 232–3
Court cases, Brazil, 158–64, 176–88, 234–61CPMF, ADIns 1497 and 2031, 160, 169,
177–82, 242, 248, 249, 256, 260–1FGTS, RE 22855, 161, 169, 182–8, 207,
240, 249, 257, 260–1IPMF, ADIns 926 and 939, 159, 169,
177–82, 237, 259, 260–1Court character, 21, 66, 201
four features of, 27–8, 87in Argentina. See Supreme Court, Argentina,
political character ofin Brazil. See Supreme Court, Brazil,
statesman character ofinstitutional cohesion, 28perceived legitimacy, 27professional profile, 27stability, 27thesis, 3, 22–3, 30–3, 35, 122, 133–4,
137–9, 156, 170, 189, 193, 196–7Court crafting, 23–7, 69, 194–5, 201–3
in Argentina. See Supreme Court Argentina, politicization of
in Brazil. See Supreme Court, Brazil, professionalization of
strategic explanations, 25, 78theories of judicial appointment, 25–6theory of, 26–7, 69–70, 78–9, 94, 118,
199–200path dependency in, 26, 83, 108
Court submission pattern of interaction. See Argentina, inter-branch interaction in
CPMF tax case. See Court cases, Brazilcurrency plans. See Argentina, economic
transition; Brazil, economic transition
Dahl, Robert, 12, 19De la Rúa, Fernando, 2, 40, 45, 85, 148Declaratory Action of Constitutionality.
See Supreme Court, Brazil, judicial review, abstract; See also Constitutional Amendments, Brazil, No. 3
Decrees, Argentina Decree of Necessity and Urgency 1819, 150Decree of Necessity and Urgency 2196,
141–2Decree of Necessity and Urgency 290, 146–8Decree of Necessity and Urgency 36, 144Decree of Necessity and Urgency 430,
147, 149Decree of Necessity and Urgency 896,
149–50
www.cambridge.org© in this web service Cambridge University Press
Cambridge University Press978-1-107-00828-1 - High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and BrazilDiana KapiszewskiIndexMore information
Index286
Decrees of Necessity and Urgency (Decretos de Necesidad y Urgencia, DNUs), 47n41, 145n36
Direct Action of Unconstitutionality. See Supreme Court, Brazil, judicial review, abstract
Direct Action of Unconstitutionality by Omission. See Supreme Court, Brazil, judicial review, abstract
Domingo, Pilar, 25, 37n4, 37n2, 40, 44n29, 67, 78
Duhalde, Eduardo, 1, 2–3, 40, 46, 74, 85, 149
economic reform, 38elected branch compliance. See compliance
with judicial decisionselected branch retaliation. See retaliation
against judicial decisionsEpstein, Lee, 16, 17, 24, 24n45, 29, 29n58,
137, 138, 174, 175n37, 197
Faro de Castro, Marcus, 10n14, 56n68, 99, 163n15
FGTS, RE 22855. See Court cases, BrazilFinkel, Jodi, 19n36, 20, 25, 37, 42, 42n18,
42n17, 42n16, 42n15, 43n25, 43n24, 43n22, 68, 74n17, 81, 85n42, 193n1
Gargarella, Roberto, 10n14, 18, 20, 37n4, 79, 144, 145, 146, 209
Gelli, María Angélica, 132n19Gibson, James L., 20Gillman, Howard, 16, 17n31, 197, 199Ginsburg, Tom, 5, 17, 17n31, 29, 67, 68,
68n4, 137, 138, 174, 193n1, 197, 204, 204n16
Guida, Liliana contra Poder Ejecutivo Nacional. See Court cases, Argentina
Helmke, Gretchen, 6, 10, 18, 24n44, 34, 42n19, 42n15, 74n17, 81, 83, 85, 129, 132, 193n1, 197, 200
high court decision-making. See judicial decision-making
Hilbink, Elisabeth, 5, 6, 16n30, 24, 34, 68, 193n1, 197n3, 200, 200n10, 201, 202
Hirschl, Ran, 37n4, 68, 193n1
Imposto Provisório sobre Movimentação Financeira, IPMF. See Provisional Tax on Financial Transactions; Court cases, Brazil
informal institutions, 33–4, 200–1inter-branch interactions, 1–3, 7, 23, 197–9
Court character account of. See Court character, thesis
in Argentina. See Argentina, inter-branch interactions in
in Brazil. See Brazil, inter-branch interactions in
patterns of, 4, 11, 30, 32, 121accommodation, 8confrontation, 8Court domination, 8, 9Court submission, 8, 148
strategic explanation of, 28–30, 33, 174–6based on Court-society relations, 29–30,
138–9, 175based on political divisions, 29, 137–8
inter-branch relations. See inter-branch interactions
IPMF tax case. See Court cases, Brazil
judicial activism, 11n17judicial appointments, 202–3
in Argentina. See Supreme Court, Argentina, politicization of
in Brazil. See Supreme Court, Brazil, professionalization of
in Chile, 202in Colombia, 202in Costa Rica, 203in Mexico, 202theories of, 24–5theory of court crafting. See Court crafting,
theory ofjudicial assertiveness, 6, 192, 197–9
definition of, 11measuring, 11–12selective assertiveness, 4, 164
judicial behavior. See judicial decision-making
judicial centralization, 23n42, 67, 194in Argentina. See Argentina, judicial
centralizationin Brazil. See Brazil, judicial centralization
judicial decision-making, 13, 197–9approaches to, 12–18, 128–9, 197
deferential, 17, 129pragmatic, 18, 129preference-driven, 16, 128principled, 15, 128self-protective, 16, 129support-building, 17, 129
theoretical models of, 14attitudinal, 16
Decrees, Argentina (cont.)
www.cambridge.org© in this web service Cambridge University Press
Cambridge University Press978-1-107-00828-1 - High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and BrazilDiana KapiszewskiIndexMore information
Index 287
legal, 15strategic, 17, 137–9
judicial empowerment theories of, 67–8
credible commitment, 67governance, 67hegemonic preservation, 68insurance, 67power consolidation, 67–8
judicial independence, 22, 181–2judicial power, 19–20judicial reform
in Argentina. See Argentina, legal transitionin Brazil. See Brazil, legal transition
judicial strategy, 67Court crafting. See Court craftingjudicial centralization. See judicial
centralizationjudicialization of economic governance, 4,
38–9, 120–1, 194, 203–8in Argentina. See Argentina, judicialization
of economic governancein Brazil. See Brazil, judicialization of
economic governancejudicialization of politics, 2, 18, 26, 66, 192
in Argentina. See Argentina, legal transitionin Brazil. See Brazil, legal transition
Kagan, Robert A., 17n31Kingstone, Peter, 36, 57, 59Kirchner, Néstor, 40, 76, 78, 86
law and economics, 203–8law and development movement, 203–4
Laws, Argentina Educators’ Statute (Law 14.473), 140Integrated Pension System Law (Law
24.241), 48Law of Economic Emergency (Law 23.697),
47Law of Fiscal Responsibility (Law 25.152),
49Law of Pension Solidarity (Law 24.463), 48,
72, 218Law of Public Emergency (Law 25.561), 47Law of State Reform (Law 23.696), 48, 217Law of Zero Deficit (Law 25.453), 49,
149–50New System of Retirements and Pensions
(Law 18.037), 140, 218Laws, Brazil
Law of Fiscal Responsibility (Complementary Law 101), 62, 246
Law of the ADIn and ADC (Law 9.868), 55, 98, 100
Law of the ADPF (Law 9.882), 55, 98Rita Camata Law (Complementary Law
77), 177, 178, 236legal transition, 37–8, 205Levitsky, Steven, 24n44, 34, 49n44, 200,
200n11lower courts, 70n5, 95n5Lula da Silva, Luiz Inácio, 51, 58, 102
Menem, Carlos, 40, 45, 47, 48, 74, 85“automatic majority”, 88, 125,
128, 145Miller, Jonathan, 123n4, 140n26, 145n36,
145n33Ministério Público, MP. See Brazil, Office of
the Federal Prosecutor
National Commission on Disappeared Persons (CONADEP), 39, 41
National Judicial Council, Brazil (Conselho Nacional de Justiça, CNJ), 99
Neves, Tancredo, 51, 52Nino, Carlos Santiago, 10n14, 18, 39, 39n6,
77, 146
O’Donnell, Guillermo, 34, 36, 41, 42, 126n5, 205, 206n18
Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, PMDB. See Brazilian Democratic Movement Party
Pellet Lastra, Arturo, 50, 74, 81–2, 88n47, 141, 142, 146
Peralta, Luis Arcenio y otro contra Nación Argentina. See Court cases, Argentina
Pérez-Liñán, Aníbal, 25Peronist Party, Argentina, 42, 49n44, 50n46piqueteros, 40politicization of high courts. See Supreme
Court, ArgentinaPorcelli, Luis A. contra Banco de la Nación
Argentina. See Court cases, Argentinaprofessionalization of high courts.
See Supreme Court, BrazilProvisional Contribution on Financial
Transactions (Contribuição Provisória sobre Movimentação Financeira, CPMF), 62
Provisional Tax on Financial Transactions (Imposto Provisório sobre Movimentação Financeira, IPMF), 61, 177
www.cambridge.org© in this web service Cambridge University Press
Cambridge University Press978-1-107-00828-1 - High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and BrazilDiana KapiszewskiIndexMore information
Index288
Radical Party, Argentina, 42retaliation against judicial decisions, 21–2
institutional, 21policy, 21
Rolón Zappa, Victor contra Estado Nacional. See Court cases, Argentina
Rosenn, Keith S., 14n21, 37, 41, 51, 51n47, 53, 53n58, 57, 59, 102, 105n40
Santiago, Alfonso, 44, 48, 90, 127, 141, 142, 144, 145n36, 146
Sarney, José, 52Shapiro, Martin M., 14n22, 37n4, 67,
193n1Smulovitz, Catalina, 17, 18, 41, 44n29, 47Social Security Administration, Argentina
(ANSES), 72stare decisis, 66, 70Staton, Jeffrey, 17, 20, 30, 138–9, 175, 192,
193n1, 202Superior Tribunal de Justiça. See Superior
Tribunal of Justice, BrazilSuperior Tribunal of Justice, Brazil (Superior
Tribunal de Justiça, STJ), 55, 99Supreme Court, Argentina (Corte Suprema de
Justicia de la Nación, CSJN), 2–3, 8, 31, 70–4
approaches to decision-making in economic policy cases. See Argentina, inter-branch interactions in, Supreme Court approaches to decision-making
arbitrary ruling doctrine (sentencia arbitraria), 73
assertiveness in economic policy cases. See Argentina, inter-branch interactions in, Supreme Court selective assertiveness
case load, 44impeachment, 74, 75, 84–6, 149, 151–2institutional importance doctrine (gravedad
institucional), 72inter-branch interactions. See Argentina,
inter-branch interactionsper saltum, 73political character of, 31, 87–91, 133–9,
142–3, 145–6, 148–9, 151–2, 207institutional instability, 87, 145, 151lower perceived legitimacy, 87–9, 142,
146, 148, 152weaker institutional cohesion, 89–91,
142, 149collegiality, 90consensus on role, 89leadership, 90procedural continuity, 90
weaker professional profile, 87, 145politicization of, 26, 31, 69, 70, 73–8, 81–3,
87–91, 134, 194–5Court crafting theory of, 78–87
formal institutional influences on, 83–4historical institutional influence on, 81–3partisan politics influences on, 84–6
manipulation of size and membership, 73–6
need for, 79–80weakening professional profile, 76–8
requirements to become justice, 83selective assertiveness. See Argentina, inter-
branch interactions insize, 75, 81–2
Supreme Court, Brazil (Supremo Tribunal Federal, STF), 1–2, 8, 31, 55, 93–119
approaches to decision-making in economic policy cases. See Brazil, inter-branch interactions in, Supreme Court approaches to decision-making
assertiveness in economic policy cases. See Brazil, interbranch interactions in, Supreme Court selective assertiveness
case load, 55, 56, 96–7, 162impeachment, 110inter-branch interactions. See Brazil, inter-
branch interactionsjudicial review, 55–6, 95judicial review, abstract
Argumentation of Failure to Comply with a Fundamental Precept (Argüição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental, ADPF), 55, 98
Declaratory Action of Constitutionality (Ação Declaratória de Constitucionalidade, ADC), 99
Direct Action of Unconstitutionality (Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade, ADIn), 55, 56, 98
Direct Action of Unconstitutionality by Omission (Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade por Omissão, ADIn por Omissão), 98
legalist and consequentialist justices, 113, 114, 171–2, 187, 190
professionalization of, 26, 33, 94, 100–3, 171, 195
Court crafting, theory of, 94, 104, 106–12
formal rules, 109–10historical institutional influences, 106–9
www.cambridge.org© in this web service Cambridge University Press
Cambridge University Press978-1-107-00828-1 - High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and BrazilDiana KapiszewskiIndexMore information
Index 289
party system fragmentation, 110–12, 175
maintaining size and composition, 101need for, 104–6strengthening professional profile,
101–3, 107requirements to become justice, 109selective assertiveness. See Brazil,
inter-branch interactions, Supreme Court selective assertiveness
size, 106, 109statesman character of, 5, 31–3, 112–17,
170–6, 181–2, 187–8, 207institutional stability, 112–13justices’ professional qualifications,
112–13perceived legitimacy, 113–14, 176strong institutional cohesion, 114–17
collegiality, 115consensus on role, 114leadership, 115procedural continuity, 116
súmula vinculante, 55, 99
Supremo Tribunal Federal. See Supreme Court, Brazil
Taylor, Matthew, 10n14, 19n33, 34, 37n4, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 61n76, 62, 63, 63n84, 95, 96n7, 97, 98n16, 106, 112, 116, 162, 164, 174n35, 193n1, 198n4, 199
Tobar, Leonidas contra Ministerio de Defensa – Contaduría General del Ejército. See Court cases, Argentina
Trochev, Alexei, 5, 20, 21, 24, 25, 68, 78, 193n1
Vanberg, Georg, 20, 29, 138, 175, 193n1, 197Vilhena Vieira, Oscar, 52, 53, 95n5, 98n14,
98n12, 99n18, 177, 178n42, 179, 182n57
Whittington, Keith, 16, 67, 68, 199Workers’ Party, Brazil, Partido dos
Trabalhadores (PT), 51, 103
Zakaria, Fareed, 37n2, 126n5, 205
www.cambridge.org© in this web service Cambridge University Press
Cambridge University Press978-1-107-00828-1 - High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and BrazilDiana KapiszewskiIndexMore information