Material de Apoio Aula 4 Parte 19

7/25/2019 Material de Apoio Aula 4 Parte 19

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Al Qaeda Is Losing the Battle for JihadiHearts and MindsAyman al-Zawahiri's latest audio tape shows that the group that organized 9/11 is a

bunch of cranky old men compared to the Islamic State.

AUGUST 19, 2015BY ,DA NIEL B YMA N JENNIFER R. WILLIA MS

Terrorists usually try to stay in the news, but Ayman al-Zawahiri has seemed an exception. Al Qaedas

leader has gone almost a year between public statements before breaking his silence last Thursday.

The archterrorists remarks, however, were as underwhelming as they were overdue. Zawahiri declared

his loyalty to Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, the new Taliban leader, but otherwise his

communiqu contained little of interest.

Much has occurred in the world of jihad since Zawahiris last public statementin September 2014: the

death of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi, who was widely considered to be

al Qaedas second in command and had close personal ties to Zawahiri and his predecessor Osama bin

Laden; the deaths of two otheral Qaeda heavyweights, likely in U.S. airstrikes; the continued rise of the

Islamic State as a direct threat to al Qaedas leadership of the global jihadi movement; the decision by

Saudi Arabia to intervene in the Yemeni civil war; and, of course, the revelation that Taliban leader

Mullah Omar has apparently been dead for the past two years.
http://jihadology.net/2015/08/13/as-sa%E1%B8%A5ab-media-presents-a-new-video-message-from-dr-ayman-al-%E1%BA%93awahiri-pledging-bayah-to-mulla-akhtar-mu%E1%B8%A5mmad-man%E1%B9%A3ur/mailto:?subject=Check%20out%20this%20story%20on%20Foreign%20Policy&body=Al%20Qaeda%20Is%20Losing%20the%20Battle%20for%20Jihadi%20Hearts%20and%20Minds%20-%20http%3A%2F%2Fforeignpolicy.com%2F2015%2F08%2F19%2Fal-qaeda-losing-battle-jihadi-hearts-minds-zawahiri-tape%2Fhttp://foreignpolicy.com/author/daniel-bymanhttp://foreignpolicy.com/author/jennifer-r-williamshttp://jihadology.net/2014/09/03/as-sa%E1%B8%A5ab-media-presents-a-new-video-message-from-al-qaidah-on-the-occasion-of-the-unity-of-the-ranks-of-the-mujahidin-and-creation-of-al-qaidah-in-the-indian-subcontinent/http://foreignpolicy.com/author/jennifer-r-williamshttp://jihadology.net/2015/08/13/as-sa%E1%B8%A5ab-media-presents-a-new-video-message-from-dr-ayman-al-%E1%BA%93awahiri-pledging-bayah-to-mulla-akhtar-mu%E1%B8%A5mmad-man%E1%B9%A3ur/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/22/senior-al-qaida-figure-muhsin-al-fadhli-killed-in-us-airstrike-in-syria-officials-saymailto:?subject=Check%20out%20this%20story%20on%20Foreign%20Policy&body=Al%20Qaeda%20Is%20Losing%20the%20Battle%20for%20Jihadi%20Hearts%20and%20Minds%20-%20http%3A%2F%2Fforeignpolicy.com%2F2015%2F08%2F19%2Fal-qaeda-losing-battle-jihadi-hearts-minds-zawahiri-tape%2Fhttp://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/25/world/asia/abu-khalil-al-sudani-al-qaeda-chief-of-bombing-attacks-died-in-us-strike-pentagon-says.html?_r=0http://foreignpolicy.com/author/daniel-bymanhttp://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/19/al-qaeda-losing-battle-jihadi-hearts-minds-zawahiri-tape/


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Yet Zawahiri addressed none of these issues in his message. Although he recited a long list of fallen

comrades whom he praised as martyrs, he strangely didnt include Wuhayshi or any of the others who

have died this past year. He did, however, make sure to explicitly include Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the

former leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, the group that is now known as the Islamic State, and Zarqawis

successor Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, on his list of glorious martyrs (right after bin Laden himself, in fact)

in what analyst Thomas Joscelyn correctly noteswas a pointed dig at the Islamic State, which has split

from al Qaeda and rejected Zawahiris authority. By including Zarqawi and his successor on the list of

vaunted al Qaeda martyrs right after bin Laden, Zawahiri is claiming the AQI leaders as his own,

making it clear that despite their differences, Zarqawi and Muhajir were members of al Qaeda who died

for al Qaedas and thus Zawahiris cause. The message to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his followers

in the Islamic State is clear: You have betrayed the cause for which your founders gave their lives.

Zawahiri also did not address the rather prickly issue of whether he has known all along that Mullah

Omar died two years ago. Either way, its bad for Zawahiri. If he knew, it means he has been deceiving

his followers for years and publicly pledging his and his organizations loyalty to a corpse. If he didnt

know, that raises the equally problematic issue of why no one in the Taliban thought to tell Zawahiri,

the leader of al Qaeda, that the man to whom hed pledged his loyalty was dead and that he should

probably not pledge his loyalty to him anymore, because thats just creepy (not to mention illegitimate,

as a dead guy isnt exactly qualified to be the Commander of the Faithful anymore). Its perhaps

understandable that Zawahiri opted not to address the issue of who knew what when about Mullah

Omars death at all and instead merely acknowledged it and pledged his allegiance to the new

Taliban leader, Mullah Mansour. Even so, Zawahiris silence on the matter is deafening.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/08/ayman-al-zawahiri-pledges-allegiance-to-the-talibans-new-emir.phphttps://www.lawfareblog.com/ayman-al-zawahiris-terrible-horrible-no-good-very-bad-day


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Nor did Zawahiri emerge from his long period of silence with a rip-roaring call to arms to challenge the

Islamic State and reassert his and al Qaedas leadership of the global jihadi movement. Instead, he put

out a mind-numbingly dull video that featured an old clip of bin Laden that everyone has seen about a

thousand times at this point, followed by almost 10 minutes of Zawahiris voice droning on and on over

a static image of his weirdly beatific face. No fiery explosions, no rousing footage of brave jihadis

charging into the fight against the infidel. Just a tedious old man lecturing about how al Qaeda will

continue to fight alongside the Taliban to establish the caliphate that achieves security, removes

injustice, restores rights, and raises the banner of jihad. Neither thrilling nor original.

Compare this to Baghdadis speechfrom November 2014. This, too, was just an audio message without

any dramatic visuals no flames, no AK-47s, and no exploding Humvees. And yet the difference in

tone is striking:

O soldiers of the Islamic State, continue to harvest the soldiers. Erupt volcanoes of

jihad everywhere. Light the earth with fire upon all those who rebel against God, their

soldiers, and supporters. Carry on in your path, as you are the strong by Allahs

permission. Carry on, as you are the honorable. Carry on, as you are the superior.

Carry on, as you are the victorious God willing.

Baghdadi exhorts angsty young men to erupt volcanoes of jihad everywhere. Zawahiri offers lessons

on political theory.

Zawahiris video is not how you beat the Islamic State.
https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/11/14/audio-message-by-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-even-if-the-disbelievers-despise-such/


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None of this is terribly surprising. When bin Laden died, numerous experts notedthat Zawahiri lacked

his predecessors charismaand leadership skills and was prone to infighting and pedantry. What he

had instead was deep expertise in survival: Zawahiri formed his first terrorism cell as a teenager, and in

the decades since has survived the hammer of Egypts counterterrorism, infighting within the jihadi

movement, and an aggressive U.S. drone campaign. Running an effective organization today is hard,

as he and his senior lieutenants cant communicate or meet in large numbers without being on the

receiving end of a Hellfire missile. (Which makes the fact that Zawahiri recorded his most recent

statement pledging support for the new Taliban emir on the exact same day the Taliban issued their

statementformally announcing Mullah Mansours coronation particularly interesting, as it suggests

the lines of communication between the Taliban leadership and Zawahiri are not being disrupted at

all. Perhaps its not all that hard to communicate with someone when you live in the cave next door.)

So Zawahiri survives and al Qaeda survives. But surviving is not the same as prospering.

Al Qaeda still exists, and its operatives still plot against the West. But during Zawahiris tenure the

results have been pathetic. Since he took over the group in 2011, the core al Qaeda has conducted not

one successful attack in the United States or Europe. Those few terrorist attacks that did succeed were

conducted by al Qaeda affiliates acting independently, or Islamic State adherents, not Zawahiri and his

chief lieutenants.

Yet Zawahiri remains vital to al Qaeda. He is the last senior figure of the al Qaeda old guard that came

of age fighting in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan alongside bin Laden. Most of the groups original

leaders are dead, and a few, like the Egyptian theologian Dr. Fadl, have rejected violence and

condemned al Qaeda. A new generation might take up the torch upon Zawahiris death, but none have

his name recognition or credibility.

The Islamic State leadership, in contrast, is more dynamic. Baghdadi electrified the jihadi world when

he proclaimed a caliphate last year. His groups campaign against Shiite apostates and military

victories on the ground are a demonstration of the groups prowess and emotionally appealing to jihadi

sympathizers and would-be radicals. Zawahiri talks the talk; Baghdadi walks the walk.
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/06/02/the-rebellion-withinhttp://nationalinterest.org/feature/isis-vs-al-qaeda-jihadism%E2%80%99s-global-civil-war-12304http://jihadology.net/2015/08/01/al-imarah-studio-presents-a-new-audio-message-from-the-islamic-emirate-of-afghanistan-taking-an-oath-as-a-group-to-mulla-akhtar-mu%E1%B8%A5mmad-man%E1%B9%A3ur-as-the-leader/http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/zawahiri-at-the-helm


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The Islamic State is also wooing groups in the Muslim world and creating fissures in existing ones. In

Nigeria, Boko Haram has pledged loyaltyto the Islamic State, though what it means to be a province

of the group remains unclear. Islamic State fighters are also active in Libya. In Sinai, local jihadis are

pledging loyalty and beheading foreigners in imitation. In Afghanistan, Yemen, and elsewhere, cells

claiming to act in the name of the Islamic State are active, posing a challenge to the al Qaeda-linked old

guard leadership.

Al Qaeda is strongest when we factor in its affiliate organizations: al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al

Shabab in Somalia, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al-Nusra Front in Syria. AQAP in particular

has done the most to carry on al Qaedas anti-Western agenda, training one of the Charlie Hebdo

attackers and attempting to bomb U.S. airliners. Others have expanded their targeting of Western and

international targets within their own local theaters of war but have not endeavored to launch attacks

inside the United States or Europe.

Yet even here al Qaeda seems on the decline, particularly when we consider the terrorism threat to the

West. All the affiliates are focused first and foremost on the bloody civil wars in their regions. They

hope to gain territory and expand their local control, but the wars are all-consuming, and terrorism

overseas is at best a sideshow. The leader of al-Nusra Front even claimedthe group does not want to

attack Western targets and is exclusively focused on the civil war in Syria.

The lone-wolf wannabe types offer a rough barometer of who is up and who is down in the terrorism

universe. In Europe, Australia, and the United States, dozens of individuals have plotted or attempted

attacks(and a few have succeeded) in the past year. Many of these have a long record of support for

jihadi causes. However, the vast majority today claim to be acting in the name of the Islamic State, not

Zawahiris al Qaeda.

But while the rise in the number of Islamic State-inspired lone-wolf attacks might suggest that the

Islamic State is a serious threat to everyday Americans, the fact remains that the Islamic State is

engaged in a state-building project in a part of the world far away from the U.S. homeland. Its

resources are focused on conquering new territory and establishing a functioning state in the territory

it currently controls.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-disrupts-plot-to-kill-scores-at-military-base-on-behalf-of-islamic-state/2015/03/26/36364f6a-d3d9-11e4-ab77-9646eea6a4c7_story.htmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/nusra-front-golani-assad-syria-hezbollah-isil-150528044857528.htmlhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11746709/Islamic-State-told-foiled-terror-attack-suspect-to-hit-France-says-prosecutor.htmlhttp://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-32361721http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/world/africa/boko-haram-is-said-to-pledge-allegiance-to-islamic-state.htmlhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/09/us-usa-security-fourth-idUSKCN0PJ2AU20150709https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/05/05/report-islamic-state-claims-credit-for-texas-attack/


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The main thrust of its propaganda efforts is to entice young men (and women) to travel to its territory.

It calls on supporters to launch lone-wolf attacks in the West, but only if they cant make their way to

Syria and Iraq to join the ranks of the Islamic State. Not surprisingly, many attacks inspired by the

Islamic State are amateurish. This is not to say that a more catastrophic attack is impossible and of

course the loss of even one innocent life is one too many but from the larger strategic perspective,

the Islamic State threat to the U.S. homeland is limited.

Al Qaeda, on the other hand, was that rare group that cared as much (if not more) about international

terrorism as it did about winning locally. Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and the rest of the al Qaeda core

leadership long emphasized attacks on the far enemy the West and especially the United States

over attacks on the near enemy the apostate regimes in places like Egypt that they wanted to

overthrow. The attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, were the pinnacle of this effort, but they have been unable to

pull off another attack on the United States anywhere close to that scale since.

So the Islamic State is growing stronger but focused on the Middle East. The al Qaeda core remains

focused on the United States but is a mere shadow of the group it once was. The threat to the U.S.

homeland, and the threat to U.S. interests abroad, must reflect todays terrorism dynamics not those

of 9/11.

Photo credit:AFP/Getty Images

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http://www.taboola.com/en/popup?template=colorbox&taboola_utm_source=foreignpolicy&taboola_utm_medium=bytaboola&taboola_utm_content=organic-thumbnails-c:Below%20Article%20Thumbnails%203rd:http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/13/islamic-state-iraq-al-asad-airbase-united-states-marine-corps/http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/26/why-are-the-islamic-states-commanders-so-much-better-than-the-iraqi-army/http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/12/21/the-real-shame-in-pakistan/

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Material de Apoio Aula 4 Parte 19