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The Barrington Moore Thesis and Its CriticsAuthor(s): Jonathan M. WienerSource: Theory and Society, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Autumn, 1975), pp. 301-330Published by: Springer

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301

THE BARRINGTON MOORETHESIS AND ITS CRITICS

JONATHAN M. WIENER

At a time when most studies of modernization assume that the existing

political order is the most desirableone, BarringtonMooreargues n Social

Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston, 1966) that violent social

revolution has been, and is, a prerequisite or increasing reedom and ratio-

nality in the world. Moore rejects the view that all modernizingsocieties

undergo essentiallythe same process.Wheremost recent studies have triedto

find characteristicswhichall modernizing ocieties share- whether econom-

ic take-off (Rostow), expanded political participation (Huntington), or

multiple dysfunction (ChalmersJohnson)- Moorearguesthat there have

been three different types of modernizationdistinguishedby the changesin

class structurethat acconmpany evelopment,and by the political costs and

achievements of each in their contribution to increasing freedom and

rationality.

The first type Moore calls bourgeoisrevolution, in which a violent revolu-

tion abolished he dominationof the traditional anded elite and brought capi-

talist democracy to England, France, and the United States. The second isrevolution from above, the process in Germanyand Japan by which the

traditional landed elite defeated popular revolution and preserved its

dominant position during industrialization, a process which culminated in

fascism. The third type is peasant revolution, which in Russia and China

saw the traditionalelite abolished,not by a revolutionarybourgeoisie,but by

a revolutionary peasantry which cleared the way for modernization. All

modernizingsocieties have undergonea version of one of these three types,

Moore argues, providing case studies of England,France, the United States,Japan, China,and India.

More than 35 discussionsof the Moorethesis have appeared n Englishsince

the book was published; they include many brief journal reviews and some

longer review essays. These discussionshave been of three kinds: criticismof

University of California, Irvine







302

Moore's method, consideration of the thesis itself, and examination of

particularcase studies. I will considerthe importantissues raised in each of

these areas, and conclude with a brief evaluationof the Moore thesis in light

of the criticaldiscussionof the pastnineyears.

1. Moore'sMethod

The most frequent criticism of Moore's method is that he is an economic

deterministwho neglects non-economic factors which play a causalrole in

modernization.The chargeof economic determinismwas made explicitly by

Gabriel Almond, Lee Benson, David Lowenthal, and Cyril Black, among

others.' Stanley Rothman's reviewarticlein the AmericanPolitical Science

Review was the longest and most polemical statement of this argument:

Moore, he wrote, sees actors moved inevitably towards a predetermined

end by their economic interests; Moore argues that ideology, politics,

society, and culture are all determined by economic forces,and function as

mechanismsusedby the rulingclassesto furthertheirown interests, Moore

considers past revolutions to have been inevitable results of economic

forces.2

Rothman providedevidencefor his critiqueby embarking n a massivesearch

through Moore's footnotes, conclusively provingthat Moore's own sources

did not support an economic determinist interpretationof history. They

argued the importance, at various points, of politics, social structure,

ideology, and so on. And every point at which Mooreexaminesthe relations

between these elements in a particularhistoricalsetting,Rothman statedthat

he had found a point at which Moore weakenedhis thesis of economic

determinism,exhibited a tendency to hedge, and whimsically ntroduced

other factors beyond the economic.3

Rothman failed to see that behind Moore'sapparentwhimsey lay a method.

He was correct in arguing hat the sourcesdid not put forwardan economic

deterministanalysis;but neither did Moore. Rothman'scritiqueof Moore's

method succeeded n demolishing he classic strawman.

Those who criticized Moore for economic determinismmissed one of the

most fundamentalpurposesof his project: to distinguishbetween economic

analysis and social class analysis.Moore'sbook standsas the most thorough

and systematic demolition of economic determinismfrom a social class

perspective.4The decisive element in historical development from Moore's







303

point of view is class conflict, an understandingof which presupposesa

specific historicalanalysisof the constituent classes. The confusion betweenMarxian class analysis and economic determinismarises from the Marxian

definition of classesin terms of property in the meansof production.Moore

follows Marx be definingclasses n termsof the variousmechanismsby which

elites have extracted an economic surplus from the underlyingpopulation.

This method is economic only in the broadest sense. It permits com-

parative analysis by recognizing the existence of a recurringproblem (ex-

tracting the surplus) and limited historical solutions (feudalism, agrarianbureaucracy,commercialagriculture,etc.); but it also recognizesthe differ-

ence among particular lassesat particularplacesand times. Thesedifferences

result from unique configurations of economic interests, existing political

alternatives, emi-autonomouscultures,and particularworldviews,which are

seen in relation to economic interests,but not wholly subordinate o them.

The assumption that the economic factor determines the behavior of a

class in any particular situation rather than, for instance, the religious

factor or the political factor, is ahistorical, ignores the totality andinterrelationshipsof the various elements, and is therefore not Marxist.As

Marxhimself wrote, empirical observationsmust in each separate nstance

bringout empirically . . the connection of the social and politicalstructure

with production. 5

Moore himself repeatedly rejects economic determinist explanations. The

conception of bourgeoisrevolutionas the result of a steady increase in the

economic power of the bourgeoisieMooredescribesas a caricatureof whattook place; he rejects as obviously inadequate the idea that peasant

revolts are caused by the deterioration of the peasants'economic situation

under the impactof commerceandindustry.6

A case in point is Rothman'sdescription of Moore'schapter on the English

Civil War as an economic interpretation. Rothman'sown analysis is that

wide agreement had been reached in the Long Parliament on purely

economic issues; it was the political and religious question, as well as

Charles'personality, which ultimately produced the conflict. 7 Rothman

here confuses the explicitly economic issues debated in Parliamentwith the

changes in class structurewhich culminatedin war - Moore's own concern.

But Rothman'scategories of analysis are not exactly clear; n what sense did

the factor of personality ultimately produce the conflict?







304

The most frequentlyrecommendedalternative o economic determinismwas

the additionof non-economicfactors to the list of effective causesof social

change. Thus LawrenceStone insistedthat demographybe considered,Rein-

hard Bendix and Gabriel Almond agreed that internationalrelations should

not be ignored, and Lee Benson called for attention to religious and ethno-

cultural influences; Cyril Black's list of factors was among the longest:

ideology, social psychology, leadership,war, diplomacy, and indeed, chance,

must be taken into account. 8

What these critics shared was an unsystematic, almost haphazardnotion of

how to explain social change. In place of a theory of change,they depended

on the existing sub-fields of academic disciplines to form the basis of their

conception of society and history, uncriticallyassuming that, just as each

field makes a contribution, so each factor playsa role in explaining he

overall pattern of social change.The resulting ist of factors amounts to, not

an alternativemethod to social class analysis,but ratheran absenceof theory

and method.

The multi-factor approachtended in two directions - either toward an

emphasis on a particular factor, or else toward an effort to compare the

causal importanceof different factors. Some of those criticisingMoorefor

economic determinismargued that their own academicspecialty dealt with

the most importantcausalfactor - thus an intellectual historianarguedfor

the fundamentalcausalsignificanceof formal ideas in history. Other critics,

however, saw as their task not emphasizing he importanceof one particular

factor, but rather comparingthe causal role played by different factors.

Rothman, for instance, made statements such as the changing politicalcultureplayed some role, and religiousfactors played at least as importanta

role as economic. 9

In this attemptto list all potential causes,to measure he relative nfluenceof

different factors case by case, critics like Rothman left themselves in a

theoretical void - facing each new historical case without a tested way to

begin an analysis, with no conception of what is fundamentally mportant

and what is not, without a method for examiningthe structureof inter-relationshipsamong the various factors, or of systematicallycomparing he

cases thus studied.

Rothmandescribedhis alternative o Moore'sposition as Weberian. t was

Max Weber,Rothman suggested,who provided- he most thorough critique







305

and alternative theory to Marx's, and Rothman has strong words about

Moore'sattack on Weber. '0But Moorehas emphasized he extent to which

Weber'swork is the basis of much of his own, arguing hat Weber'smethod

resembled Marx's in severalcrucial respects, which distinguishes heir work

from contemporarysocial science.11 Moore wrote that both WeberandMarx

possessed a critical spirit, a refusal to accept the status quo as given, that

had disappearedrom modernsociology (Moorewaswriting n the mid-fifties'

end of ideology interlude); both were steeped in historical study and

possessed a historical perspectiveon present society which has been lost by

contemporary social scientists; and both refused to sacrifice content to

technical virtuosity, as modern social science has done. Marx and Weber,

Moorewrote, in spite of their lack of sophisticatedstatisticaltechnique,had

more to say about significantsocialquestionsthantoday's sociologists.

While Moore recommended Weber's historical work as a model of com-

parativesociology, he was convincedthat Weber'saterwriting particularly

Economy and Society - was characterizedby a decline of historicalperspec-

tive which culminated in an arid desert of definitions - eventually

elaboratedby TalcottParsons.12

Between Weber and Marx, Moore suggested that Marx provided the more

valuable startingpoint. He considered our aspects of Marx'smethod to be of

crucial value to social science today: Marx'sconception of social class as

arising out of an historically speciflc set of economic relationships; his

conception of the class struggleas the basic stuff of politics; his awareness

of the sharp divergencebetween official valuesand aspirations,andthe way a

society actually works;and his sense of the absence of antagonismbetweenscience and morality. For Marx, the whole enterpriseof science makes sense

only in terms of moral convictions, Moore wrote.'3 To this list should be

added Moore's acceptance of Marx's conception of exploitation as an ob-

jective and measurable conomic phenomenon.

Rothman indicated that the Weberian method he was defending against

Moore was a culturalexplanation. 4 Moore, however, n criticizingcultural

explanations, attacks not Weber, but Parsons,15He rejects the Parsonianposition that the culturalfactor is the startingpoint in historical and social

analysis,and anindependentcausal actor in its own right.Mooresays that the

basic errorof those who rely on cultural explanationsis the assumptionof

social inertia, the assumption that continuity of value systems requiresno

explanation, that only change requiresexplanation. Social analysis based on







306

value systems begs the fundamentalquestion. Moorewrites: Whydid this

particularoutlook prevailwhen andwhere it did? The answer o this question

is historical: particularvalues are maintainedand transmittedby particular

groups under particularconditions, often with great pain and suffering. 6

But Rothman himself did not defend the Parsonianposition which Moore

attacks - that culturalvalues, rather han social classes, should be the starting

point for historical analysis. Rothman'sargumentwas much weaker; he says

only that the cultural inheritance of a society is a significantpart of any

explanation, and urges historians to give significant weight to cultural

factors. 7 Moore never denies that cultural values are significant; he does

attempt to explain where they come from and how they function in the

context of social classes.

Parsons himself has referred to Social Origins in his System of Modern

Societies, publishedjust before he retired.18 But, instead of responding o

Moore'scritiqueof his theory, he treatedMoore as a source of half a dozen

facts to be incorporated into a structural-functional nalysis of European

history. Thus Parsons cited Moore as the authority for the statement that

English peasantswere weakerthan the French, and that the French aristoc-

racy was more dependent on the crownthanthe English and fit these into

a value-orientedrather than a class-oriented nalysis.Parson'sdecision not to

defend his own work - the single most important Americanalternative o

Marxistsocial theory - appears o be an implicit admissionof the strengthof

Moore's critique,a recognitionof Moore'ssuccessat demonstrating he value

of classanalysisas a method.

All the criticisms of Moore's method discussed thus far have come from

non-Marxistswho regardMooreas a Marxistof some sort. Marxistcriticismof

Moore's method was radically different. Eric Hobsbawmgenerally praised

Moore's method, but observedthat his focus on relations between landlord

and peasant neglectssome of the more subtleaspectsof ruralsocial structure.

Hobsbawm isted them: ruralsociety's marginal ndmobile strata, ts nuclei

of permamentdissidence and withdrawal,its permanentflux of inter-com-

munal and inter-gentryconflict and alliance,andits occasionalor permanentrecognition of wider social units. Hobsbawmsaid that Moore'schapteron

China in particulardemonstrates hat he is awareof some of these dimen-

sions; Moore'sproblemis that the necessaryprimaryresearchhas not been

done, and the comparativist an only be as good as the materialavailable or

comparison. '9







307

Eugene Genovese has written that he considers Moore's chapter on the

American Civil War the most successful attempt at a Marxiananalysis.

Genovese confined his discussionof Moore to the Americanchapter,without

consideringhis thesis as a whole - a procedurewhich, Genoveserecognized,

risks some distortions. He agreed that Marxian analysis requires the

broader context of comparative concerns such as the one Moore

offers. 20

Within this context of agreement on the general requirementsof Marxian

class analysis, Genovese put forward some ratherstrong criticismof Moore's

American chapter. Genovese shared Moore's concern that class analysisbe

distinguishedsharply from economic determinism,and most of Genovese's

essay on Marxiannterpretationsof the slave south is an attack on various

forms of vulgarMarxiandeterministwriting. But, Genovesewrote, Moore is

so anxious to repel (a) crude economic interpretation hat he concedes far

more ground than is necessary or safe. In arguing hat the Southern class

structure was a separate civilization, Moore minimized the economic

aspect of planter domination, and obscures the class issue, while at the

same time paying little attention to ideology; in consequence, despite a

framework that places social class at the center, he never analyzes the

slaveholders as a class; he merely describes certain of their features and

interests n a tangentialway. 1

Genovesesaid that Moore'sversionof the separatecivilizationargumentdoes

not include an analysisof the planterclass in terms of its economic interests,

ideology, and social relations with the rest of the plantation community.

Such an analysis, Genovesewrote, would consider the hegemonicmecha-nisms of the planters' domination as a special case of class rule - would

considerthe role of planter deology in defendinga particular et of economic

interests.22

Initially it may appearthat in calling for greatattention to the economic

aspect and to ideology, Genovese was makingthe same kind of argumentas

the anti-Marxistswho criticiseMoore for emphasizing he wrong factors n

his thesis, who want to add different variables o the list of effective causesin history. In fact Genovese'sargumentdoes not take this form. Hisargument

is that the method of classanalysisrequiresa more thoroughconsiderationof

the relationshipsand the reciprocalinfluences among different aspects of a

social class; his purpose is not to demonstratethat the economic factor is

causally more important n history that the politicalfactor or the cultural









309

Moore's relation to Marxismwas that of J. H. Plumb,who wrote, for too

long Americanhistorianshavebeen concernedwith narrative,with biography,

or with cultural and institutional history that evades economic and social

roots. Moore's work shows that Marx demonstrated he type of historical

question that needs to be asked,andthe way answersrequire o be framed, f

one is to understand the process of social change. Plumbconcluded that,

with Moore, a new analytic materialisms putting down strongroots. 30

Eric Hobsbawm criticized Moore's thesis from a Marxistperspective. In a

brief review, he agreedwith Moore that modernization n all forms implies

the destructionof the traditionalpeasantry;howeverhe found exaggerated

Moore's argument hat peasantswere moreimportant han industrialworkers

in radicalanti-capitalistmovements.31

In objecting to Moore'sargument hat industrialworkerswerehistorically ess

important than peasants in radical movements, Hobsbawm was of course

upholding the traditional Marxist view. Moore makes it clear that his

sociology of revolution is sharply at odds with Marx's. Moore sees no

revolutionarypotentialwhatsoever n the industrialproletariatat any stageof

the developmentof capitalism.Successfulrevolutionarymovementsfind their

mass base of supportamong the decliningartisansand peasants,rather than

amongthe growing factory proletariat; or Moore,modern social revolutions

are the dying wail of a class over which the wave of progress s about to

roll; they are reactionary rather than progressive n terms of the political

perspectiveof their mass of supporters.Here Moorejoins the ranksof those

who use Marxistcategoriesin an effort to refute Marx AdamUlam and

S. M. Lipset being prominentamongthem.

Hobsbawmalso objected, although with great tact, to the centralterms of

Moore'sanalysis: dictatorship and democracy Hobsbawmputs them in

quotation marks) - which require .. rathermore preliminaryanalysis

than Mooreprovided.

Hobsbawm suggested that Moore'sconception of freedom was the con-

ventional liberalone, limited to a constitutional framework, and was not aMarxistconception. Moore does not dwell on his definition of 'democracy,'

remarking hat concern for such definitions hasa way of leading away from

real issues to trivialquibbling. He defines the developmentof democracy

as a long and certainly incomplete struggle to accomplish three related

goals: first, to check arbitraryrulers; second, to replacearbitraryrules







310

with just and rational ones; third, to obtain a share for the underlying

population in the making of rules. He cites the beheading of kings as

important steps in checking arbitraryrule, and indicates that he considers

efforts to establish the rule of law, the powerof the legislature,and laterto

use the state as an engine for socialwelfare as steps toward establishingust

and rational rulesand increasingpopularparticipation.32Hobsbawmsuggests

that we ask whetherthere is anythinghere that challenges he assumptionsof

cold-war iberalhistoriography.

I think there is. First, Moore does not equate fascism and communism,but

distinguishes hem sharplyand evaluatesthem differently. Second, he argues

that liberalhistorianshave tended to accept the rulingclass'sown definition

of what is just and rational, when in fact it can be shown that they are

simply providingan ideological ustification for rulingclassinterests.33

Third, Moore challenges cold-warliberal conceptions of democracy by his

attention to the repressiverole played by Westerndemocracies n the Third

World.Moorepoints to imperialism nd to America's armedstruggleagainst

revolutionary movements in backward areas as evidence that liberal

democracyhas startedto turn into [an] ideology that justifiesand conceals

numerous formsof repression. 34While t canbe shown that this relationship

is not one which has started recently,Moore'sposition is to the left of the

cold-war iberalone.

AlthoughMooreexpressesthis criticismof the activitiesof the United States

the ThirdWorld,he does not indicate muchabout the state of democracyand

freedom within contemporary America. He would probably agree with

Joseph Featherstone'sargument hat it would be a mistaketo conclude that

because this freedom was taintedor incomplete,it was not worthhaving. At

the same time, Featherstone saw Moore arguing that revolution is no

guaranteeof freedom, citing Moore's statement that the claims of existing

socialist states to representa higher form of freedom than Westerndemo-

craticcapitalismrest on promises,not performance. 35

Lawrence Stone had a critique of Moore's political categorieswhich wassimilarto Hobsbawm's.Stone wrote that Moore'sconceptionsof dictatorship

and democracywere based on formalist, institutional,andlegalstandards.

Mooreacceptsthe notion that the institutionsof Anglo-Saxonsocieties(are)

the last word in political equity and wisdom, Stone wrote,36 He stated

explicitly what Hobsbawm only implied, that Moore's conception of the







311

problem of the development of twentieth-century dictatorship and demo-

cracy has its origins in the cold-war scholarshipof the late forties and early

fifties.

Stone's own critiqueof these views has an ad hoc qualityand lacksany firm

theoreticalbasis that could rivalHobsbawm's mplicit Marxism.Hewrote that

Moore was wrong to have a formal constitutional conception of democracy

because we now realizethat what matters s the state of mind which governs

the rulers. This appearsto be a suggestion that psychological analysis of

rulers replace formal analysis of the rules. Stone concluded that Moore's

political conceptions should be less legalisticand more anthropological. 37

Surely the basis on which formal analysisof political institutions should be

rejected is that it does not lead to a satisfactory understanding f power -

which groups use it to achieve what, and by what means, formal and

informal. Neither anthropology nor psychohistory have been particularly

concernedwith these questions;thus Stone's position does not seem to be a

satisfactoryone.

Stone's argumenton the cold-warform of Moore'sstatementof the problemis more substantial, though equally problematic. To pose the problem of

dictatorshipversus democracy is an historical anachronism oday, Stone

argued; t is to exaggerate he historical mportanceof the thirties andforties.

In 1945 or 1950 it seemed that the rise of Stalin andHitlerwas the greatest

development of modern times, the culmination of centuries of historical

development; Stone believes this view to have been wrong. Fascism and

Stalinism, he wrote, both now look like short-term ransitionphasesrather

than permanentand deep-seated tructuralphenomena. 38Cyril Black agreedwith Stone's view of what can be called the culminationproblem. in what

sense did the conservativeroute taken by Germanyand Japan culminate' n

fascism? Blackasked, observing hat in neithercountry did fascismsurvive

for more than a dozen years. 39 The criteriaby which Black in particular

separates genuine 'culminations'from brief 'interludes'seems to be simply

temporalduration dependingupon the brevityof the phase,rather hanthe

extent of socialor politicaltransformationwhich areinvolved.

As evidence for his view, Stone cited the apparentsuccess of democratic

institutions in post-war Germany,Italy, and Japan, and the apparentevolu-

tion of the Soviet Union toward increasedpolitical participationand personal

freedom. He concluded that in studying the social origins of dictatorship

and democracy, Moore is not asking a significant question; a better







312

question would be: under what conditions a given society is likely to pass

through a relatively brief authoritarianphase as it enters the modern world.

However, he regardedeven this question as not a terribly important one,

since the phase is not likely to be prolonged much beyond the period of

industrial akeoff. 40

Stone's reasoning overlooks elementary facts. In the thirties, Germanyand

the Soviet Union were at radicallydifferent stages of development; t hardly

seems necessary to point out that German ndustry in 1933 was far beyond

take-off. Even if we accept all the assumptionsbehind Stone's argument,

the conclusion based on the German case would be that an authoritarian

phase s likely to occurin some of the most developed ndustrialcountriesat

times of capitalist crises, rather than, as Stone sees it, that such a phase will

come in the less developedcountriesat the time of take-off. ,4'

Stone arguedthat because there are short-term luctuations n the degree of

liberty and democracy in different societies, Moore may not be asking a

significant question in seeking the social origins of democracy. Stone cited

the Greek colonel's coup of 1968 as an example of such a short-term

fluctuation; Greece was a constitutional democracy from 1948 to 1968, and

now is in a period of right-wingdictatorship;Stone asked, how then is it

possibleto discusssocial originsfor such relativelybriefpolitical phases?

Moore's thesis in this regard s that industrialdevelopmenttends to culminate

in fascism unless there is social revolution which destroys the power of the

traditionalelite. MichaelWalzerhas appliedthis thesisto the case Stone cites

against Moore - the Greek colonel's coup. Walzerarguedthat American

foreign aid in the 1948-68 period promotedGreek economic development

while it repressedradical social change, with the consequence of simulta-

neously reinforcing oligarchicrule and threateningit - threateningit by

enhancingthe resentmentand capacities of the underlyingpopulation, at

the same time providing the elite with the material forces to meet the

threat. 42The result was the rise of fascism. Walzerconcluded that the

Moore thesis providesan excellent analysis of the social basis of post-war

Greekpolitical developments.

Stone also cited the developmentof democraticpolitics in post-warGermany

and Japanas evidencethat fascismwas a short-term ransitionphase rather

than the culmination of deep-seated structural phenomena. N. Gordon

Levin had a more consistent and more satisfactory analysisof this develop-







313

ment. He arguedthat the defeats and occupations of 1945 may be seen as

providing n some sense the bourgeois revolutionswhich Germanyand Japan

both missed; if this is the case, then the post-1945 constitutional politics

Stone cited againstMoore seem to bearout his general heory. 43Thus, for

Moore,one way or another, the violent destructionof the traditionalagrarian

ruling class is necessary if democracy is to have a chance in a developing

society - destruction either throughsocial revolution,or internationalwar;

either by the exploited classes, or by foreign powers. Moore believes the

choice is between Jacobin terrorand Nazi horrors.

Black's criticism focused on Moore's contention that his types constituted

successive historical stages. In what sense have democracy, fascism, and

communismsucceededeach other? he asked,arguing hat the introduction

of Communism . . preceded that of fascism. 44What Moore says is that

''conservativerevolutions from above bringabout successfulmodernization

before peasant revolutions do, which is only to say that Germany ndustri-

alized before Russia and China.45 Fascism does not appearin nineteenth-

century Germany,but conservativemodernization,which later culminates n

fascism, does. It is in this sense that what Moore calls the reactionary

experience of industrializationprecedes the communistmethod.

N. Gordon Levin also noted Moore's account of the relationship between

the reactionary experience and fascism. Levin saw Moore arguing con-

traryto the traditional Marxistview that Germanfascismwas not the last

stageof a dyingand threatenedmonopoly capitalism,but rather he defensive

maneuverof a capitalismwhich has never really been triumphant. 46Here

Levin misread Moore. It was democracy that had neverbeen triumphant nGermany,not capitalism; he Germaneconomy was thoroughly capitalistby

the 1930's, but the political system was far from being thoroughly demo-

cratic. Mooreemphasizesthat the reactionaryroad has been as successful as

the bourgeois democratic one at transforming agrarian nto industrial so-

cieties, as GermanyandJapanprove; t is nonsense o believe otherwise,he

writes.47Whatdistinguishes hese two routes is not their successat industri-

alization, but rather he political practiceswhich accompanythat process.

Stanley Rothman, whose review article in the AmericanPolitical Science

Review was the most critical, and most intemperate, summarizedwhat he

believed to be Moore's propositions, which took twenty pages for

Rothmanto disprove: All industrialization as ... been more or less equally

violent and repressive;all ruling classes are ... equally exploitative; and







314

fascism is . .. the necessaryoutcome of so-called 'conservative ndustrializa-

tion.' 48 It is difficult to believe that such a massive failureto understand

Moore's book could not be willful. Mooredoes not say all industrialization

has been equally violent and repressive; he whole point of identifying

distinctive types of modernization or Moore is to distinguish heir different

costs. He concludes that the route of moderation and gradualism reates at

least as much, and probably more suffering than revolutionarymoderniza-

tion, and arguesthat the greatest violence and repression s asoociated with

industrializationunder conservativeauspices.As Joseph Featherstonewrote,

for Moore thereis pointless sufferingand suffering hat leadsto progressand

even to freedom. 49

Moore does not believe that all rulingclasses are equally exploitative. He

arguesthat exploitation has an objective characterwhich canbe measured n

terms of rewardsand privilegescommensuratewith the socially necessary

services rendered by the upper class. 50This varies among societies and

historical periods;Moore arguesthat the less the degree of exploitation, the

greater he chancesfor social stability in a particular ociety.

Moore does not arguethat fascism s the necessaryoutcome of moderniza-

tion under conservativeauspices. He writes that where the [reactionary]

coalition succeedsin establishing tself, there has followed a prolongedperiod

of conservativeand even authoritarian overnment,which, however, fallsfar

short of fascism; in Germany, Italy and Japan, fascism eventually took

power (as it did in Poland, RomanianHungary,Spain and Greece), but it

failed in other countries, even those where the same reactionary syn-

drome was present - notably Russia, India, and early nineteenth-century

England.5'Moorespendsseveralpagesexplainingwhy periodsof conservative

modernization ed to fascist rulein some cases but not others.

One of Moore's most radical conclusions is that revolutionaryviolence has

been a prerequisitefor liberal government constitutional democracy has

succeeded only where a social revolution has taken place. One might think

that many would object to this conclusion, but only one reviewer did:

Lawrence Stone. Stone characterizedMoore's argument as the Catharsistheory of history, and saidhe was in seriousdisagreement with Mooreon

a basic judgmentabout the moral and practical ustificationfor the use of

violence. He arguedagainstMoore that such violence is . . . almost always

self-defeating, citing the FrenchRevolution as a casein which the evil they

did came out of the violence they employed. 52This is indeed exactly the









316

in dealing with contemporary problems of modernizationand democratiza-

tion?

At the same time that he argues that only the communist model offers

realhope for developingcountries ike India, Moore s not enthusiasticover

the prospects of political freedom developing under such governments.

Communism, ike liberalism,he writes, has startedto turn into an ideology

that justifies and conceals numerous forms of repression. The common

feature of both, he writes, is repressive practice covered by talk of

freedom; it is dubious in the extreme that the opressivetendencies in

either systemwill be overcome.60

3. The Case Studies

The simplest kind of critique of Moore's book is for a reviewerto pick the

chapter on which he is a specialist, and attack Moore for ignoringrecent

monographs,for exaggeratingor misunderstanding articulardevelopments,

for comingto the materialwith categoriesthat don't necessarilyfit it - and

to conclude as the basis of one of the case studies that the book is seriouslyflawed, without considering he author'scornparativemethod or his thesis.

However, the increasing nterest in comparative tudies of development has

made such critiquesless tenable, and few in fact appeared n print.No doubt

the practiceof assigningbooks for reviewto writerswith similarcomparative

interests played a role. Severalreviewers n fact explicitly rejectedthe tactic:

LawrenceStone wrote, it is very easy, but perhapsnot very fruitful norvery

generous,for the local expert to pick holes in particularchapters, and EricHobsbawmcommented, it would be easy but pointlessfor the specialists o

criticise any one of the case studies; Hobsbawmexplained that the com-

parativeanalyst does not competewith the specialists,he exploits them and

may have to question them. 6' Nevertheless, the reviews sometimes con-

tained criticism of specific interpretationsin the case studies, and these

deserveconsideration.

Moore'schapteron the AmericanCivil Warevokedmorediscussion han anyother single chapter,apparentlybecausemoreof the reviewerswerehistorians

of the United Statesthanof any other country.

Most frequently discussedwas Moore's argument hat the key to American

democracy lies in the Civil War more than in the Revolution. Reinhard







317

Bendix asked, why discuss the social origin of Americandemocracy by

reference to the Civil Warratherthan the Americanrevolution? and David

Lowenthal similarly suggested that Moore should have focused on the

RevolutionaryWarand the basic tenets of the Declarationof Independence

and the Constitution if he wanted to understand Americandemocracy.62

Perez Zagorin wrote that Moore's view of the Civil War as a bourgeois

revolution was incompatible with his argument that southern plantation

slaverywas economicallycompatiblewith Northerncapitalism. 63Lawrence

Stone askedwhether, if a reactionarycoalition was formedafter the failure

of Reconstruction, the civil war was in fact not negotiable after all, if the

resultshavebeen as decisiveas Mooresupposes. 64

Other reviewers disagreed with these objections, restating Moore's case.

Joseph Featherstone describedMoore'sAmericanchapteras persuasivebut

uneasy, arguingthat Moore has some difficulty fitting America into his

scheme, andobserving hat it is characteristic f his scholarship o lay weak

cardson the table as well as strong. 65MichaelRogin'sevaluationwas more

favorable;he found Moore's bourgeoisrevolution argumentto be bril-

liantly relevant, arguingthat the Civil War delayed and weakened the

foundations of an alliancewhich, . . . in a slave-owningcountry, would have

been profoundly anti-democratic. 66C. Vann Woodwardsimilarly empha-

sized the importance of Moore's argumentthat the Civil Warwas crucial,

agreeing that it broke the power of landed resistanceto democratic and

capitalistadvance. 67

Stanley Rothman also raised a number of objections to Moore'sAmerican

chapter.Moorearguedthat industrialization nder the auspicesof a Prussian-

styled reactionarycoalition of northern industrialistsand southern planters

was an alternative o war in 1960; Rothmanfound this absurd, and went

on to argue that Reconstruction was not liquidated by such a reactionary

coalition.68 He cited Genovese and Woodwardas his authoritieson these

points; however, both have sided with Moore in subsequent publications.69

Finally Rothmanquestioned the analogyMooredrawsbetween slave-owning

planters and Prussian Junkers, arguing that class divisions among white

southernerswere less sharp than in Europe.70Genoveseobjected to the sameanalogy,but on radically differentgrounds;he saw the southernplantersas a

clearly delineated social class, but more reactionarythan the Junkers, who

Genovesesuggestsweremoremodernthan Mooreindicates.71

David Lowenthal, writing in History and Theory, put forward the only







318

objections to appear n print to Moore's favorableevaluation of the goals of

Radical Reconstructionafter the AmericanCivil War the abolition of the

planters as a class and the transformation f formerslaves nto small farmers.

Lowenthal spoke of the immorality of destroying a white South, which

had an explicit constitutionalright to slavery.He askedwhether American

democracy could have survived the moral shock of a successful Radical

Reconstruction: that Moore does not even raise such questions is yet

another sign of the great harm done to the criticalfacultiesby an imprudent,

doctrinaire,and evenfanaticalradicalism, Lowenthalwrites.72It is not clear

whether the fanaticalradicalism n questionis that of the RadicalRepubli-

cans, or Moore. Lowenthal's racism was an isolated phenomenon among

Moore'scritics.

Lee Benson'sidiosyncraticcriticismof Moore'sAmericanchapterwas partof

his projectto discreditandeventuallyabolish the establishedhistoriographic

system and to reorient and reorganizethe social sciences. 73 Moore's

chapter represents the best work done to date on Civil Warcausation,

Benson wrote; yet, to understand t is to dismiss it as not worth serious

consideration. t is significantprimarilybecause the seriousnesswith which

it has been taken indicates something must be radicallywrong with the

historiographic ystem. 74

Moore's basic problem in Benson's view is that the question he asked -

what caused the Civil War? is useless. He should have asked who

caused it.75 To the extent that Benson was able to translate Moore's

arguments into answers to this question, it appears that the answer is

northernpoliticians. But, Bensonasked, whatevidencedid he offer . . . tosupport that claim? None. 76 Moore, however, did not attempt to answer

Benson's question; it seems unfair to criticize him for failing to provide

evidencefor an argumenthe didnot make.

Aside from his Americanchapter, Moore'sEnglishcase study was the only

one which was commented on by more than two or three reviewers.

Lawrence Stone argued that Moore's conclusions about the peasants and

revolutiondid not fit the Englishcase very well. Mooreheld that democraticmodernizationrequiredthe destruction of the peasantryas a social class -

the eliminationof agricultureas the primaryactivity of a majority of the

population. And Moore described the enclosures of eighteenth-century

England as a social upheaval which destroyed the whole structure of

English peasant society as embodied in the ruralvillage. Stone wrote that







319

this interpretation flies in the face of modernscholarship, whichhas found

that enclosureswere a slow, relativelyequitable processthat improved he

ruralstandardof living by providingmore food. Stanley Rothmanalso sided

with the revisionistsagainstMoore on the enclosurequestion.77

Hobsbawm, like Stone, observed that Moore's view on enclosures runs

counter to recent fashions in scholarship, but Hobsbawm found Moore's

position perfectly tenable, because Hobsbawm was not convinced that

recent fashions in scholarship had resolvedthe issue- as Stone apparently

was.78 The position Moore took seems to be a reasonable one, which

recognized the revisionist evidence: though the enclosures may not have

been as brutal or as thoroughas some earlierwriters have led us to think.

Moorewrites, they eliminated he peasantquestion fromEnglishpolitics in

a way that did not occur in Germany,France,Russiaor China.79

Stone's second criticismof the English chapterwas that during he CivilWar

the English peasantry remained passive and quiescent, that after 1549

England did not have constant, desperate, ferocious peasant revolts. 80

Stone stated this as a disagreementwith Moore,but in fact it is one of the

problems Moore is investigating:he calls the peasants'role in the Englishcivil

war trivial, rejects many explanationsof that fact, and concludes that the

most importantreason for it was the riseof commercialagriculturebefore the

war.8' However, Moore does conclude that the process of modernization

begins with peasant revolutions that fail, and Stone rightly suggestedthat

this is not the way Mooreexplainsmodernization n England.82

J. H. Plumb argued that Moore exaggerates he extent of bourgeoisrevolu-

tion in 17th century England, .. a great deal of land in 18th century

Englandwas still held for status rather than for profit. 83And Stone agreed

that Moore greatly exaggerates he degree to which English society . .. had

gone over to a competitive, individualistic,commercializedvalue system in

the seventeenth century.84Moore'sargument,however, is not that the value

system changed, but ratherthat the structureof social classesdid: he rejects

analysisof social change n terms of value systems.

There was little discussion or criticism of the French case study. Stone

devoted one paragrapho variouspoints of disagreement, nd concluded that

Moore's analysis seems acceptable although one could quarrel over

details. 85Rothmanbelieved Mooreunderestimated he costs of the Revolu-

tion and exaggerated ts achievements.86Zagorin chargedthat Moore does









321

exclusion of Sweden and Norway was problematical, and Edith M. Link

wrote in the Journal of Economic History that it is not clear how the

Moorethesiswould explainEasternEuropetoday.94

Moore anticipated these objections in his introduction; smallercountries

depend economically and politically on big and powerful ones, he wrote;

thus the decisive causes of their politics lie outside their own boundaries,

and their political problemsare not really comparableto those of larger

countries. His concern is with innovationthat has led to political power,

not with the spreadand reception of institutions thathave beenhammered

out elsewhere. 95

Moore did not include chapterson RussiaandGermany,which play a central

role in his thesis, but few reviewers criticized these omissions. David

Lowenthalpointed out that Mooredevotes muchless time to the differences

and similaritiesof Russian and Chinese communism than he does to German

and Japanesefascism;he rightly suggestedthat it is the Russian,more than

the Germancase, that poses potentialproblems or Moore's hesis.96

Moore's exclusion of the Russian case certainly does not rest on his own

ignorance;he spent the earlieryears of his careerstudying Soviet politics.97

He writes in the prefaceto Social Originsthat he discarded he draft of a

Russian chapter because first-rate accounts became available during the

course of writingto which it was impossiblefor me to add anything. 98That

is, the story of classrelations n the RussianRevolution is told elsewhere.But

in his bibliography,Moore lists only two books on Russia published since

1949: Franco Venturi'sRoots of Revolution, and Jerome Blum'sLord andPeasant in Russia Neither deals with the twentieth century; neither answers

what for Moore s the absolutelycrucialquestion: what role did the industrial

proletariatplay in the Russian Revolution?If the revolutionwas based on an

anti-capitalisturban proletariat,then it does not fit Moore'sChina-oriented

type of peasant revolution. Moore'sassertionthat the proletariathasnever

played a revolutionaryanti-capitalist role must be abondoned, and some

fourth type of modernizationmust be created to account for the Russian

case.

The problemwith the Russian case is to understand he relationshipbetween

the revolutionary leadership, the urban proleteriat, and the peasantry.

Moore's French case study provides a key: in France, he wrote, the urban

laborers made the bourgeois revolution, while the peasants determined









323

Moore does go on to argue that there may be a point at which quantitative

evidence becomes inapplicable,wherecountingbecomes the wrong procedure

to use. 105 The key question is obviously where the point is. Moore never

says it is wrong to count membersof Parliamentduringthe Civil War,or to

count victims of the Terror, or the number of small farms that survived

enclosure,as long as that countingis done with an awarenessof the natureof

the evidence and the problem under investigation.Hisargument s that there

are qualitativechangesfrom one type of social organization o another -

such as the transition from feudalism o capitalism in which theremay be

an upperlimit to the profitableuse of statistics. '06Can Stone reallybelieve

these cautiousand qualifiedstatementsamountto obscurantism?

4. Conclusion

The critical response to Moore'sSocial Originsmay revealas much about the

present state of social science as it does about the book itself. While the

critics accused Moore of an excessive emphasis on economic factors, the

economistsandeconomichistoriansvirtually gnoredthe book; while Moore's

case studies were all historical, national historians have tended to overlook

them.'07 The academicgroupwhichshowed the greatest nterestwas the new

field of comparativemodernization, which consists mostly of sociologists

and sociologically-orientedhistorians. Criticsof this school were enthusiastic

about the interdisciplinaryand comparativeaspect of the book, but tended

not to discussthe theoretical ssuespresentedby Moore, except for a vigorous

defense of non-Marxistand anti-Marxistpositions. In generalthe critics did

not defend value neutrality, which Mooreattacked, and were impressedby

Moore's case for progressive iolence, but eagerto move on to other topics,instead of considering he implicationsof these issues. Therewere only a few

committed cold warriors;Stanley Rothman described Moore as a former

fellow traveller, and Gabriel Almond indicated that Moore was soft on

communism,but these argumentswere the exception rather han the rule.108

Moorehas demonstrated hat an analysisof changes n the structureof social

classesis the most fruitfulmethod by which to study comparativemoderniza-

tion. The Moore thesis stands - because the critics either did not attemptto make, or else did not succeed at making,arguments hat would lead to its

rejection.As the T.L.S. reviewerwrote, Moore's hesis imposes imitationsas

well as offering opportunities. But the limitations appear fewer, and the

opportunities greater, than in any alternative approach . . this [is] a very

importantbook indeed; t may even be a great one. 109







324

Unfortunately, a large proportion of the critical remarks arose out of a

misunderstanding f Moore'smethod. This suggests hat a majorweaknessof

Moore'sbook is that he did not spell out more clearlythe distinction between

his method of class analysis and the alternative positivist and empiricist

explanations in terms of factors and variables. n this respect his 1959

essay Strategyin Social Science is essential supplementaryreading. 0 As

GianfrancoPoggi wrote in the British Joumal of Sociology, Moore is not

explicit enough ... about his theoretical assumptions and his conceptual

apparatus; t would have been helpful had he clarified the theoretical

significance of this thesis. ' It is unlikely that such a clarificationof his

method would have changedthe minds of his positivistand empiricistcritics,

but at least the issues would be clearer.

Given that Moore has demonstrated the superiority of class analysis of

comparativemodernization, he question which remains s one of weaknesses

in his methodand conclusions,aspectsin which the comparative lass analysis

of modernization could be strengthened. The least satisfactory case in

Moore'sbook itself is the Russianone. If the RussianRevolution does not fit

his model of peasant revolution,but is some kind of a proletarianmovement,

it may be necessaryto modify the Moore thesis; thus an analysisof Russian

developments along the lines set out in Social Originswould be one of the

most importantcontributionsto the comparative lassanalysisof moderniza-

tion.'12

The analysisof Europeandevelopmentscould be strengthenedby makinguse

of the Marxian concepts of the feudal mode of production and the

transitionfrom feudalismto capitalism. Moore covers similarground by

analyzing how the links between lord and peasant in traditional society

change with the introduction of commercial agriculture,but he does not

begin with an explicit analysisof the feudalsystem of classrelations. Such

a considerationwould offer a clearer ense of the startingpoint of the process

of change in Europe; it would also providethe opportunity for considering

the relationshipbetween demographicchangeand the social transformations

Moore describes.

The comparativeclass analysis of modernizationwould be furtherstrength-

ened by a fuller and more explicit considerationof the ideological aspectof

these developments - of the mannerin which classesbecome conscious of

their positions, and of the termsin whichthe conflictsarefought out (or not

fought out). Puritanism n seventeenth-centuryEngland,to make a familiar







325

case, hardly enters into Moore's analysis - because it was an urban

phenomenon, and he focuses on rural society - but it obviously plays a

crucialrole in shaping the self-conceptionsand political goals of the popular

revolutionary groups, a role which cannot be understood simply as reflec-

tion or superstructure. Moore'sappendix on reactionaryand revolu-

tionary imagery provides a significant contributionto the study of ideology

in relation to the three types of modernization.)

It would be useful to analyze the histories of smaller countries from the

perspective of comparativesocial class developments. For example, Michael

Walzerhas suggested that the Moorethesis be used to compare Greek with

Yugoslavdevelopments since World War I - by contrastingthe genuinely

indigenous insurrection which established socialist Yugoslavia with the

relatively ophistical ntervention of the Britishand Americans n Greece to

defeat social revolution and lead Greece down the capitalist road. The

question Walzerproposes is, what price has Yugoslaviapaid for destroying,

and Greece for failing to destroy, the social and institutional basis of old

authoritarianismand traditionalistmythology? '114 t seems likely that a

numberof comparative tudies along these lines would be possible - South-

east Asia and LatinAmericabeingobviouschoices.

Moore's concept of the reactionarycoalition of a persistent traditional

landed elite with a weakmodernizingbourgeoisie s one of the richestaspects

of his thesis; t deservescontinuingattention. It shouldbe particularlyhelpful

in analyzing social and political developments in contemporary Latin

America, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Perhaps t would be possible to

distinguishvariations n the revolutionfrom above model to explain why,

in some countries, the reactionarycoalition remains n a traditionalauthori-

tarianphase,while in others it moves toward a fully developedfascism.

Many would appreciateseeingMoore'sargumenton the industrialproletariat

spelled out in greaterdetail. That the most industriallydevelopedcountries

have not had proletarianrevolutions is a commonplaceobservation; t would

be interesting to learn of Moore's evaluation of the relative importanceof

capitalist concessions and repression,of liberal hegemony, of reformism nthe laborbureaucracy, ndof CommunistandSoviet strategy.

Finally, there is the question of the practical implicationsof Moore'sthesis,

of the relationshipof the student of comparativeclass developmentto his

own work. The Weltanschauungwhich informs Moore's work is closer to







326

Weber's heroic pessimism than to Marx's optimistic attempts to unite

theory with revolutionary practice.115Moore works as a politically isolated

individual;he is associatedwith no movement, intellectual or political. As

Peter Nettl wrote, Moore is a loner, ' a radical of great and austere

scholarship. 16 He sees his task not as a political one, but as a personaland

intellectual one - to work until he can comprehendthe whole; to find the

facts, and then face them like a man, howeverunpromising hat may be.

Whenhe has accomplished hat, he believeshis work is done. Marx,of course,

would havethought otherwise.

NOTES

1. GabrielA. Almond,Reviewof SocialOrigins,AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,

61 (1967), p. 769; Lee Benson, Towardthe Scientific Study of History (Philadelphia,

1972), p. 243; David Lowenthal, Review Essay on Social Origins, History and

Theory, 7 (1968), p. 296; C. E. Black, Review of Social Origins,American Histori-cal Review, 72 (1967), p. 1338. See also Stein Rokkan, Models and Methods in

the Comparative Study of Nation-Building, in T. J. Nossiter, et. al. (eds.). Imagina-

tion and Precision in the Social Sciences (London, 1972), pp. 136-37; Lawrence

Stone, News from Everywhere, New York Review of Books, 9 (24 August 1967),

p. 34; Lester H. Salamon, Comparative History and the Theory of Moderniza-

tion, WorldPolitics, 23 (1970), p. 100; Reinhard Bendix, Review of Social Origins,

Political Science Quarterly, 82 (1967), p. 626; Isaac Kramnik, Reflections on

Revolution: Definition and Explanation in Recent Scholarship, History and

Theory, 11 (1972), p. 40.

2. Stanley Rothman, Barrington Moore and the Dialectics of Revolution: An Essay

Review, American Political Science Review, 64 (1970), p. 82-162. Rothman set thetone for his attack on Moore with an opening epigram taken from Through the

Looking Class. Alice asks Humpty Dumpty whether you can make words mean so

many different things, to which comes the reply, the question is, which is to be

the master - that's all. Rothman thus suggested that Moore is a kind of authoritar-

ian Marxist Humpty Dumpty to whom he seeks to play Alice.

3. Rothman, pp. 62, 63.

4. See also Eugene D. Genovese, Marxian Interpretations of the Slave South, in In

Red and Black: MarxianExplorationsin Southern and Afro-AmericanHistory

(New York, 1972), and E. J. Hobsbawm, KarlMarx'sContribution to Historiogra-

phy, in Robin Blackburn (ed.),Ideology in Social Science (London, 1972).

5. Karl Marx, The GermanIdeology; see also Genovese, pp. 322-25. Gianfranco Poggi

provided a good brief summary of the conceptions that underlie Moore's method:

an intrinsically, objectively exploitative relationship typically binds the upper and

lower strata; the maintainance of this relationship involves the systematic use of

coercion; the critical process is that whereby the productive surplus yielded by the

labor of the majority is extracted from it and allocated within the minority. Poggi,

Reviewof Social Origins,BritishJournalof Sociology, 19 (1968), p. 216.







327

6. Moore, Social Origins, pp. 428, 453-54. Reviewing J. H. Hexter's attack on

Tawney for being an economic determinist, Moore writes, this is simply untrue ...

Tawney has written one of the best eloquent warnings against doctrinaire

determinist history that has ever come to my attention, p. 8, n. 8. Rothman's

critique of Moore simply reiteratcs the Hexter attack on Tawney.

7. Rothman, pp. 66, 67.

8. Stone, p. 34; Bendix, p. 626; Almond, p. 769; Benson, p. 243; Black, p. 1338. Dean

C. Tipps, Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A

Critical Perspective, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 15 (1973),

pp. 199-226, criticizes others but ignores Moore.

9. Rothman, p. 66-67.

10. Rothman, p. 65.

11. Moore, Strategy in Social Science, Political Power and Social Theory (New York,1956).

12. Moore, Strategy,

13. Moore, Strategy, p. 1 17.

14. Lester Salamon was similarly concerned with alternative 'cultural' explanations to

Moore's questions. He suggested it was not the persistence of a pre-modern elite

that contributed to the rise of German fascism but rather the absence of political

skill among the German bourgeoisie. If they had had a greater capacity to

organize, Salamon wrote, they would have been better able to resist the rise of

fascism. But where does political skill come from? Salamon says from cultural

values, p. 19.

15. Moore, Social Origins, p. 486 n. Moore cites Weber's historical work favorably on atleast three occasions: pp. 121, 172, 220.

16. Moore, Social Origins, p. 486. Poggi considered Moore's critique of cultural

explanations to be his outstanding contribution. Poggi, p. 217.

17. Rothman, p. 64. At every point where Rothman offers Weber as an alternative to

Moore, he footnotes not Weber himself, but Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An

Intellectual Portrait - an introductory interpretation which many, including

Moore, reject. See for instance H. Stuart Hughes' review in American Historical

Review, 66 (1960), p. 154-55. Irving Zeitlin, in Ideology and Social Theory also

argues against Bendix for the compatibility of Weber with Marx.

18. Talcott Parsons, The System of Modern Societies (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., (1972).19. E. J. Hobsbawm, Review of Social Origins, American Sociological Review,

32 (1967), p. 36.

20. Genovese, pp. 345, 348.

21. Genovese, pp. 346, 347.

22. Genovese, p. 348.

23. Bendix, p. 626.

24. Michael Rogin, Review of Social Origins, Book Week,4 ( 1 January 1967), p. 5.

25. Genovese, p. 353 n. 58.

26. C. Vann Woodward, Comparative Political History, Yale Review, 56 (1967),

p. 453.

27. Lawrence Stone, Causes of the English Revolution (New York, 1972), p. 148 n. 5.28. Lord and Peasant, Times Literary Supplement,3434 (21 December 1967),

p. 1231.

29. Joseph Featherstone, Modern Times, New Republic, 156 (7 January 1967),

p. 347.

30. J. H. Plumb, How It Happened, New York Times Book Review, 171 (9 October

1966), p. 11. See also James H. Meisel, Origins: A Dialogue. Tape-Recorded,







328

Michigan Quarterly Review, 7 (1968), pp. 135-38; A. L. Stinchcombe, Review of

Social Origins,HarvardEducationalReview, 37 (1967), p. 291-92.

31. Hobsbawm, Review, p. 882.32. Moore, Social Origins, p. 414.

33. However, Moore does not attempt to deal with the thorny issues in the Marxian

critique of the notion of justice. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cam-

bridge, 1971); Allen W. Wood, The Marxian Critique of Justice, Philosophy and

Public Affairs, 1 (1972), pp. 244-82.

34. Moore, Social Origins, p. 508; Gareth Stedman Jones and Robin Blackburn criticize

Moore for overlooking the connection between the imperialism he condemns and

the bourgeois democracy he admires. Jones, The History of U.S. Imperialism, in

Blackburn, Ideology in Social Science, p. 219-20; 1 1.

35. Featherstone, pp. 34, 36.36. Stone, New YorkReview, p. 32.

37. Stone, p. 32.

38. Stone, p. 32.

39. Black, p. 1338.

40. Stone, p. 32.

41. Furthermore, Stone does not seem to recognize that Rostow's stages of economic

growth notion is radically incompatible with Moore's version of Marxian class

analysis of modernization, that Moore emphatically rejects the understanding of

industrialization in terms of the one-dimensional concept of take-off: that is the

whole point in developing a theory of different types of modernization.

42. Michael Walzer, The Condition of Greece, Dissent, 14 (1967), p. 429.43. N. Gordon Levin Jr., Paths to Industrial Modernity, Dissent, 14 (1967), p. 241.

44. Black, p. 1338.

45. Moore, Social Origins, p. 414.

46. Levin, p. 241.


48. Rothman.

49. Featherstone, p. 34.


51. Moore, Social Origins, pp. 437, 442. Rothman also criticized Moore for failing to

see the irony and genuine tragedy in the historical developmentshe

describes;Rothman says Moore lacks the sense that history consists of tragic encounters

among men equally caught up in their own limitations. (p. 81) I would agree that

Moore's book does lack this kind of ahistorical pseudo-significant thought.

52. Stone, p. 34. Stone's criticism of Moore is reviewed in Henry Bienen, Violence and

Social Change (Chicago, 1968), p. 79.

53. At the same time that Stone deplores Moores' defense of revolutionary violence by

arguing that such violence is evil, Stone characterizes German fascism as a

short-term transition phase. Some might see an inconsistency in Stone's evalua-

tion of revolutionary violence in comparison to reactionary violence.


55. Rogin, p. 5.56. Woodward, p. 453; Almond, p. 769.

57. Almond, p. 770.

58. Featherstone, p. 37; see also Werner L. Gundersheimer, Journey to Synthesis,

Reporter, 36 (9 March 1967), p. 59; Gilbert Shapiro, Review of Social Origins,

American Sociological Review, 32 (1967), p. 820; Black, p. 1338. On the other







329

hand, Rothman believes the Moore thesis is not applicable... to much of the

'ThirdWorld.' Rothman, p. 61-62.

59. Moore, Social Origins, pp. 408-10. Kramnik observes that Moore is virtually aloneamong theorists of modernization in advocating this position.


61. Stone, p. 32; Hobsbawm, p. 82. A similar view was expressed by Gundersheimer,

p. 58; see also Review of Social Origins, Virginia Quarterly Review, 43 (1967), p.

cliv.

62. Bendix, p. 627; Lowenthal, p. 267. A similar view was expressed by Joseph Gus-

field, Review of Social Origins, Social Forces,46 (1967), p. 114.

63. Perez Zagorin, Theories of Revolution in Contemporary Historiography, Political

Science Quarterly, 88 (1973), p. 41.

64. Stone, p. 34.


66. Rogin, p. 5:

67. Woodward, p. 451.

68. Rothman, p. 73.

69. Genovese; Woodward.

70. Rothman, p. 72.

71. Genovese's criticism of Moore's American chapter was discussed above in the

section on Moore's method.

72. Lowenthal, p. 272.

73. Benson, p. 228-29.

74. Benson, pp. 228, 247.75. Benson. p. 234.

76. Benson, p. 242.

77. Stone, pp. 21, 33; Rothman, pp. 67-69.

78. Hobsbawm.

79. Moore. p. 426.

80. Stone, p. 33.

81. Moore, pp. 453, 477.

82. Moore, p. 453.

83. Plumb, p. 11.

84. Stone, p. 32.

85. Stone, p. 33.

86. Rothman, p. 70-71.

87. Zagorin, p. 41.

88. Moore, p. 107-08.

89. Gayl D. Ness, Review of Social Origins, American Sociological Review, 32 (1967),

p. 819; Rothman, p. 77.

90. Ness, p. 819.

91. Rothman, p. 79; Gusfield, p. 115. See also H. D. Harootunian, Review of Social

Origins;Journal of Asian Studies, 27 (1968), pp. 372-74.

92. Rothman, p. 74-75.

93. Rokkan, p. 141.94. Edith M. Link, Review of Social Origins, Journal of Economic History, 27 (1967),

p. 261.

95. Moore, p. xiii. Walzer's success at using the Moore thesis to analyze Greek politics

should be recalled in this regard;see above.

96. Lowenthal, p. 260.

97. Moore, Soviet Politics: The Dilemma of Power; USSR: Terror and Progress.







330

98. Moore, p. xii.

99. Moore, p. 110. I am indebted to Juan Corradi for this argument.

100. Moore, p. 410; Lowenthal, p. 275.101. Richard Frank, Augustan Elegy and Catonism, in Aufstieg und Niedergang der

romischen Welt, vol. II, p. 2. (1974).

102. Gilbert Shapiro found that Moore's minor disgressions on statistical studies

increase confusion and disorient the reader; Gabriel Almond considered

Moore's polemics with the statisticians to be often unessential and diverting,

but unlike Shapiro he found Moore to offer a useful corrective to the quantitative

theory of know ledge so influential today. Joseph Featherstone wrote, Moore's

careful work is a standing rebuke to social scientists who imagine that quantitative

data, like virtue, is its own reward. Shapiro, p. 820; Almond, p. 768; Featherstone,

p. 36.

103. Stone, p. 34.


105. Moore, p. 519.

106. Moore, p. 519.

107. For instance, Colin Lucas' review essay on the social interpretation of the French

Revolution discussed dozens of obscure articles but ignored Moore's chapter on

France: Nobles, Bourgeois and the Origins of the French Revolution, Past and

Present, 60 (1973), pp. 84-126.

108. Rothman, p. 81. When Moore objected in print to Rothman's characterization,

Rothman replied that his source of information on Moore's fellow-travelling was

my memory of classes of his which I attended in the early 1950s, in which heindicated what his sympathies had been earlier. (p. 182); Almond, p. 769.

109. TimesLiterarySupplement,p. 1231.

110. Moore, Strategy. Poggi, p. 217. Along these lines, see Leopold Haimson.

111. Poggi, p. 217.

112. Along these lines, see Leopold Haimson.

113. I am indebted to Robert Brenner for this analysis.

114. Walzer, p,429. Walzer's own view is that Yugoslavia is today the better society, or

at least the one for which we can entertain higher hopes.

115. Wolfgang Mommsen, Max Weber's Political Sociology and his Philosophy of World

History, in Dennis Wrong (ed.), Max Weber (Englewood Cliffs, 1970), pp. 183-

94. Moore emphatically rejects the narrow liberal nationalism and limited concep-

tion of democracy that characterized Weber's political writing, particularly in the

World WarI period.

116. Peter Nettl, Return of the Intellectual, New Statesman, 73 (6 October 1967),

p. 438..

Theory and Society, 2 (1975) 301-330? Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam - Printed in The Netherlands

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