Brit.J. Psychiat.(1968),114,1313—1323

Editorial Note: This article was originally published inthe Zeitschrzft fur die gesamte J'feurologie und Psychiatrie in1912 (Vol. 9, pp. 39 1—408). We give it here in translation(on the initiative of Dr. J. N. Curran), in view of thepresent interest in Professor Jaspers's work and in phenomenology in general.

Ti@ SUBJECTIVITY OF PSYCHIC Ev@wrs

In the examination of a psychiatric patient itis usual to distinguish between objective andsubjective symptoms. Objective symptoms include all concrete events that can be perceivedby the senses, e.g. reflexes, registrable movements, an individual's physiognomy, his motor

‘¿�@ activity, verbal expression, written productions,

actions and general conduct, etc.; all measurable performances, such as the patient'scapacity to work, his ability to learn, the extentof his memory, and so forth, also belong here. Itis also usual to include under objective symptoms such features as delusional ideas, falsifications of memory, etc., in other words therational contents of what the patient tells us.These, it is true, are not perceived by the senses,but only understood; nevertheless, this “¿�understanding― is achieved through rational thought,without the help of any empathy into thepatient's psyche.

Objective symptoms can all be directly andconvincingly demonstrated to anyone capableof sense-perception and logical thought; butsubjective symptoms, if they are to be understood, must be referred to some process which,in contrast to sense-perception and logicalthought, is usually described by the same term,“¿�subjective―.Subjective symptoms cannot beperceived by the sense-organs, but have to begrasped by transferring oneself, so to say, intothe other individual's psyche; that is, by empathy. They can only become an inner realityfor the observer by his participating in the otherperson's experiences, not by any intellectual

effort. Subjective symptoms include all thoseemotions and inner processes, such as fear,sorrow, joy, which we feel we can grasp immediately from their physical concomitants;these we thus take to “¿�express―the underlyingemotion. Then there are all those psychicexperiences and phenomena which patientsdescribe to us and which only become accessibleto us at secondhand through the patient's ownjudgment and presentation. Lastly, subjectivesymptoms also include those mental processeswhich we have to infer from fragments of thetwo previous kinds of data, manifested by thepatient's actions and the way he conducts hislife.

It is usual to connect with this classificationinto objective and subjective symptoms a verydefinite contrast of values. According to this,only the objective symptoms offer certainty;they alone form a basis for scientific study,whereas subjective symptoms, though we cannoteasily do without them for our preliminaryassessments, are considered to be quite unreliablefor making final judgments and unfruitful forthe purpose of any further scientific investigation. There is a widespread desire to base ourstudy of mental disorder on objective symptomsalone and ideally to disregard subjective symptoms altogether. This is a viewpoint which hasits adherents—not all equally consistent—inpsychology, just as it has in psychiatry. An“¿�objectivepsychology― is set up in oppositionto “¿�subjectivepsychology―. The former claimsto concern itself with objective data only; itsnatural consequence is psychology without apsyche. The supporters of the latter (who, itshould be said, have never failed to recognize thereal but different values of the former) take intoaccount self-observation, subjective analysis, thedetermination of the different modes of psychiclife and of the specific nature of its phenomena,and ascribe value to such investigations even if

1313

This One

The Phenomenological Approach in Psychopathology

By KARL JASPERS

1314 THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

they are made in the absence of any objectivecriteria. As examples of objective psychology wemay cite the whole field of sense-perception,mnemometrics, performance curves and theircomponents. The last will serve here to illustratethe fact that such investigations do lead quitesystematically to the elimination of everythingthat can be called mental or psychic. It is not thefeeling of fatigue but “¿�objectivefatigue― whichis being investigated. All such concepts asfatiguability, the power of recovery, learningability, practice, the effects of rest periods, etc.,refer to performances that can be measuredobjectively, and it does not matter whether oneis dealing here with a machine, a live but mindless organism, or a human being endowed witha mind. Nevertheless, those who claim to bepurely objective investigators do quite frequentlymake a secondary use of subjective psychicphenomena to further their interpretations ofobjective performances and make comparisonspossible—and, of course, they have every rightto do so. But when this happens, they aremaking use of “¿�subjectivepsychology―, withwhich this paper is to deal. Now, there is nodoubt that objective psychology producesresults which are more obvious, more convincing, and easier for everyone to grasp than doessubjective psychology. But whereas the difference in degree of certainty is simply quantitative,when it comes to the kind of certainty, thedifference is qualitative and fundamental. Thisis so because subjective psychology always aimsat the final realization of the concepts and ideaswhich form the inner representation of psychicprocesses, whereas objective psychology findsits ultimate aim in observation in undisputedfields such as sense-perception and the rationalcontents of thought and by such means asgraphs and statistics.

The Systematic Study of Subjective Experience

What then are the precise aims of this muchabused subjective psychology? While objectivepsychology, by eliminating everything psychic,transforms itself into physiology, subjectivepsychology wishes to preserve this same psychiclife as its object of study. It asks itself—speakingquite generally—what does mental experience

depend on, what are its consequences, and whatrelationships can be discerned in it? Theanswers to such questions are its special aims.But in approaching each problem subjectivepsychologists have to face the need to make clearboth to themselves and to others what particularpsychic experience is meant, for they areconfronted with a manifold diversity of psychicphenomena which cannot be surveyed or investigated as a whole but from which particularelements must be selected for investigation. Sobefore real inquiry can begin it is necessary toidentify the specific psychic phenomena whichare to be its subject, and form a clear picture ofthe resemblances and differences between themand other phenomena with which they mustnot be confused. This preliminary work ofrepresenting, defining, and classifying psychicphenomena, pursued as an independent activity,constitutes phenomenology. The difficult andcomprehensive nature of this preliminary workmakes it inevitable that it should become forthe time being an end in itself.

So long as such independent, systematicinvestigations had not been undertaken, thisphenomenological approach remained limited toa number of unconnected opinions based onchance incidents or implications and ad hocconstructions; among these some useful pointerscan certainly be found, but it is essential thatthey should be followed up by further research.

Within the sphere of psychological researchE. Husserl has taken the first decisive steptowards a systematic phenomenology, his predecessors in this having been Brentano and hisschool and Th. Lipps. In psychopathology, therehave been a number of attempts to create aphenomenology,* though there has not yet beenconstituted a generally recognized field of

* Kandinsky's Krilisclze und klinische Betrachtwzgen im

Gebiete der Sinnestiiuschungen. Berlin, 1885, is almost entirelyphenomenological in character. Oesterreich's Die Plthnomenologie des Ich in ihren Grundproblemen, Leipzig, 1910, andHacker's “¿�SystematischeTraumbeobachtungen―, Archiv.f.Psych. wl. 21.1, 1911, both conduct systematic phenomenological investigations into phenomena particularly vital forpsychopathology. I have myself made efforts in thisdirection in two papers: “¿�ZurAnalyse der Trugwahmnehmungen― and “¿�DieTrugwahrnehmungen―. (Reprinted inGesammelte Schrzften zur Psychopathologie, Springer-Verlag,Berlin, 1963.)

BY KARL JASPERS 1315

research intended to prepare the ground systematically for the tasks of psychopathologyproper. Since phenomenology does in fact offera productive field of work in which everyone can

take part, some programmatic exposition of itsaims and methods seems indicated.

The Limitations of EmpathyIn everyday life no one ever thinks in terms of

isolated mental phenomena, whether his ownor someone else's. Our inward concern is alwayswith that which is the object of our experience,not with the mental processes which accompanyour experiencing. We understand other people,not through considering and analysing theirmental life, but by living with them in the context of events, actions and personal destinies.Even when we do on occasion give consideration to mental experience as such, we do thisonly in a context of causes and effects as understood by us, or else we make a practice of classifying personalities into categories, etc. We neverfeel prompted to consider a mental phenomenonin isolation, e.g. a perception or a feeling perSe, and to describe it in terms of its appearanceand essence. So with the attitude of a psychiatristto his patient. He can share the patient's experiences—always provided this happens spontaneously without his having to take thoughtover it. In this way he can gain an essentiallypersonal, indefinable and direct understanding,which, however, remains for him a matter ofpure experience, not of explicit knowledge; heacquires practice in understanding, but doesnot build up a store of case material—―experience― in the professional sense—whichwould be more useful to him than mere vaguefeelings and impressions, and which he couldcompare, set in order, or subject to tests.

This attitude of mere sympathetic understanding, which can be enormously satisfying toindividual personalities-so much so that to oneso predisposed this may well become his finalprofessional goal—is, one must admit, “¿�subjective― in a very special sense; and whenspecific assertions or formulations are made onthis basis without any reference to more farreaching study or to any regular system of concepts this well-grounded conceptualization doesindeed deserve to be dismissed as “¿�merelysub

jective― in a derogatory sense. Assertions of thissort cannot be discussed or verified. We mayappreciate this type of understanding; we mayadmire it for the valuable human qualitieswhich it reveals; but we can never give itrecognition as a “¿�science―,whether we meet itin the everyday form practised by civilized andcultivated people over the centuries, or in itsclinical guise as the instinctive concern ofpsychiatrists for their patients.

If, however, we still wish to develop a scienceof psychology, we must realize from the start,on the one hand, that its ideal is a fully conscious understanding of mental processes, onethat can be presented in definite terms andforms, in contrast to the vague or unconsciousunderstanding which is reached only in apersonal and subjective way through the specialattitudes and aptitudes of particular individuals;but we must realize also that psychology cannothope to approach this scientific ideal; instead itmust engage in many promising approaches.These, indeed, open up perspectives, but theirideal solution remains infinitely remote. Thisis why so many people exercise their personalunderstanding purely for their own satisfaction,and from the heights of their vague yet penetrating comprehension they look down condescendingly on all attempts to define conceptsat a conscious psychological level, dismissingthese as innocuous platitudes or trivialities. Yetthe fact that only such deliberately madepsychological determinations constitute contributions to knowledge gives them from ascientific point of view a unique value—butonly from that point of view.

ISOLATING THE PHENOMENA

Now this attitude, which is not satisfied withunderstanding as mere experience but wishesto promote it to the level of knowledge that canbe communicated, investigated and arguedabout, finds itself faced with an infinity ofmany-sided psychic phenomena, which aregoverned by correlations which are still far fromclear and whose relations of dependence andconsequence have yet to be elucidated. Without doubt, the first step towards a scientificcomprehension must be the sorting out, defining,

1316

differentiating and describing of specific psychicphenomena, which are thereby actualized andare regularly described in specific terms.

We must begin with a clear representation ofwhat is actually going on in the patient, what heis really experiencing, how things arise in hisconsciousness, what are his own feelings, andso forth; and at this stage we must put asidealtogether such considerations as the relationships between experiences, or their summationas a whole, and more especially must we avoidtrying to supply any basic constructs or framesof reference. We should picture only what isreally present in the patient's consciousness;anything that has not really presented itself tohis consciousness is outside our consideration.We must set aside all outmoded theories,psychological constructs or materialist mythologies of cerebral processes; we must turn ourattention only to that which we can understandas having real existence, and which we candifferentiate and describe. This, as experiencehas shown, is in itself a very difficult task. Thisparticular freedom from preconception whichphenomenology demands is not something onepossesses from the beginning, but somethingthat is laboriously acquired after prolongedcritical work and much effort—often fruitlessin framing constructs and mythologies. Whenwe were children, we first drew things as weimagined them, not as we saw them; so aspsychologists and psychopathologists we gothrough a stage where we form our own ideas,in one way or another, of psychic events, andonly later acquire an unprejudiced direct graspof these events as they really are. And so thisphenomenological attitude is to be acquiredonly by ever-repeated effort and by the everrenewed overcoming of prejudice.

How then do we proceed when we isolate,characterize and give conceptual form to thesepsychic phenomena? We cannot portray them,or bring them before our eyes in any way thatcan be perceived by the senses. We can onlyguide ourselves and others by a multipleapproach. We have to be led, starting from theoutside, to a real appreciation of a particularpsychic phenomenon by looking at its genesis,the conditions for its appearance, its configurations, its context and possible concrete contents;

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

also by making use of intuitive comparison andsymbolization, by directing our observations inwhatever ways may suggest themselves (asartists do so penetratingly) and by demonstratingalready known phenomena which appear toplay some part in the formation of the phenomenon studied. All this constitutes an incentive,reinforced by these indirect hints, for others toactualize these phenomena for themselves, whilewe too are encouraged to make use of ourfindings in later studies. The more numerousand specific these indirect hints become, themore well-defined and characteristic do thephenomena studied appear. Indeed, this personal effort to represent psychic phenomena tooneself under the guidance of these purelyexternal hints is the condition under whichalone we can speak of any kind of psychologicalwork at all.

A histologist will provide an exhaustivedescription of particular morphological elements, but he will do it in such a way as to makeit easier for others to see these elements forthemselves, and he has to presume, or elseinduce, this “¿�seeingfor oneself― in those whoreally want to understand him. In the same waythe phenomenologist can indicate features andcharacteristics, and show how they can bedistinguished and confusion avoided, all with aview to describing the qualitatively separatepsychic data. But he must make sure that thoseto whom he addresses himself do not simplythink along with him, but that they see alongwith him in contact and conversation withpatients and through their own observations.This “¿�seeing―is not done through the senses,but through the understanding. This is something quite special, irreducible and ultimate;and if we are to take even one single step forwardin phenomenology we have to train ourselves init and master it—including such things as“¿�representingdata to oneself―, “¿�understanding―,“¿�grasping―or “¿�actualizing―.Only so do weacquire a fruitful critical faculty which will setitself against the framing of theoretical constructions as much as against the barren deadlydenial of any possibility of progress. Whoeverhas no eyes to see cannot practise histology;whoever is unwilling or incapable of actualizingpsychic events and representing them vividly

1317BY KARL JASPERS

cannot acquire an understanding of phenomenology.

THE SEARCH FOR IRREDUCIBLE PHENOMENA

This ultimate irreducible quality of psychicphenomena, which can only acquire identicalmeaning for numbers of people through theincentive and the multiple clues and leadsmentioned previously, may already be found inthe case of the simplest sensory qualities, suchas red, blue, colour, tone; it comes into playalsowith spatial awareness, object awareness, perception, imagery, thought, etc. In psychopathology we have examples in pseudo-hallucination,the déjàvu phenomenon, derealization, heautoscopy, experience of the “¿�double―and so on;though all these terms merely describe groupsof psychic phenomena which are in themselvesstill more subtly differentiated from each other.

For the actualization to ourselves of all thesephenomenologically ultimate characteristics, wehave such expressions as “¿�seeing―,“¿�viewing―,“¿�feelingoneself into―, “¿�empathy―,“¿�understanding― and so on. These expressions alwaysdenote the kind of ultimate concept-fitting experience which plays the same role in psychologyas sensory perception plays in the naturalsciences. Just as sense-perceptions are evoked bythe demonstration of an object, so this meaningful empathic actualization will be evoked inus by the above-mentioned hints and indications,by our immediate grasp of expressive phenomena and our self-immersion in other people'sself-description. From this terminology it followsthat empathy and understanding are by nomeans simple ultimate phenomena in themselves, but probably contain a whole series ofelements yet to be defined. In the same way asperception, empathy has its tasks to set: first forphenomenology itself, of which it is the veryfoundation, and next for the investigation ofpsychogenesis. At this point we are not concernedwith either of these; we need only to note thecontribution made to our knowledge by thisempathic, understanding experience, and toraise the question of the reliability of this way ofgaining access to the facts. If, on the analogy ofperceptual experience, we recognize empathicexperience as ultimate, the question can be

answered on these lines: in the field of empathicexperience the technical means of retaining whathas been seen but once, for later comparison andother purposes, are so inadequate that far moredifficulties are encountered than in the case ofsensory perception. But in principle reliabilityis established in the same way, i.e. by comparison, repetition and verification of suchempathic experiences as reach actualization. Inboth fields there is much uncertainty; onecannot deny that in the psychological field it isgreater than in the natural sciences, but this isonly a difference of degree.

Whether we are representing our own pastpsychic experiences or those of other people isimmaterial. The only important differenceseems to be between observations which aresystematic, experimental self-observations ofpersisting experiences, and those which areordinary empathic representations. In theinvestigation of psychopathological phenomena,only the latter can really be considered, sincepatients can rarely be induced to carry out selfobservation in the former sense, and then onlyin very favourable conditions, in regard tosimple disturbances such as agnosias or hallucinations in clear consciousness. However, suchempathic representations of phenomena amongthe mentally ill may well be furthered by concepts that have been won from the moreelaborate phenomenological investigations ofthe former kind.

METHODS OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

The methods by which we carry out a phenomenological analysis and determine whatpatients really experience are of three kinds: (i)one immerses oneself, so to speak, in theirgestures, behaviour, expressive movements; (2)exploration, by direct questioning of thepatients and by means of accounts which theythemselves, under our guidance, give of theirown experiences; (@) written self-descriptions

seldom really good, but then all the morevaluable; they can, in fact, be made use of evenif one has not known the writer personally. Inall these instances we are pursuing phenomenology in so far as we are orientated towards sub

1318 THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

jective psychic experience and not towards objective manifestations, which in this context areonly stages in our journey—the means, not theobject, of our investigation. Of all these sourcesof information, good self-descriptions have thehighest value.*

When, using these methods, we try to comecloser to the patient's psychic life, our first impression is of an unsurveyable chaos of constantlychanging phenomena. Our first aim must be tocapture and delimit some particular item andby depicting it to form a conception of it, ofwhich we and others can make permanent use;and we must supply it with a name by which wecan always identify it. Psychopathologicalphenomena seem to call for just such anapproach, one which will isolate, will makeabstractions from related observations, willpresent as realities only the data themselveswithout attempting to understand how theyhave arisen; an approach which only wants tosee, not to explain. Under pathological conditions, numerous psychic phenomena maketheir appearance without meaningful antecedents; psychologically speaking they emergefrom nothing; seen causally they are occasionedby a disease process. Vivid memories of thingsnever experienced; ideas held with a convictionof their truth without any intelligible basis forsuch conviction; moods and emotions appearingspontaneously and not based on any relevantexperiences or ideas; all these, and manyothers, are common examples. These are theobjects ofphenomenological investigation, whichdetermines and represents them as they actuallyare.

Three groups of phenomena can be ascertained in this manner. The first consists of

* For those interested, I lista few of the best self-descrip

tions so far published:

Schreber—Memoirs of a Neurotic. Leipzig, 1903.Thomas de Quincey—Confessions of an Opium Eater.Gerard de Nerval—Aurélie.J. J. David—―Hallucinations.―Neue Rundschau,No. i 7,

874.Kandinsky—―On the study of hallucination.― Archiv. f.

Psych., ii,@Klinke—Ja/zr.f. Psych., 9.Kieser—Allgemeine Zeitschr.f. Psych., 10, 423.Engelken—Ibid., 6, 586.Meinert—An Alcoholic Madman. Dresden, igo7.

phenomena known to us all from our ownexperience. They come into existence in thesame way as the corresponding psychic processes which in normal conditions arise out ofothers in an intelligible way; they differ only intheir mode of origin from phenomena, otherwise quite similar, occurring in the mentally ill,e.g. many falsifications of memory. Next, thereare phenomena which are to be understood asexaggerations, diminutions or combinations ofphenomena which we ourselves experience, e.g.the ecstasies of some acute psychoses, pseudohallucinations, perverted impulses. How far our“¿�understanding―can go in such cases, when wecannot base it on any conscious experiences ofa similar kind, is a question that cannot be conclusively answered. Sometimes it seems as if ourunderstanding can go far beyond the possibilitiesafforded by experiences, even if similar ones, ofour own.

The third group of pathological phenomenaare distinguished from the two previous groupsby their complete inaccessibility to any empathicunderstanding. We can only get closer to themby means of analogies and metaphors. We perceive them individually, not through anypositive understanding of them, but through theshock which the course of our comprehensionreceives in the face of the incomprehensible. Inthis group we may perhaps include those“¿�fabricated―thoughts and moods which manypatients report as undoubted experiences (passivity experience), but which we can neveridentify except by using such terms as these, andby a series of observations designed to ascertainwhat these phenomena are not. Some patientswho, notwithstanding their psychosis, haveretained the awareness of their normal mentallife readily admit the impossibility of describingtheir experiences in ordinary language. Onepatient explained: “¿�Partlyone has to do withthings which simply cannot be expressed inhuman language. If I am to be understood, evento some extent, I shall have to use figures ofspeech and analogies which can do no more thanget somewhere near the truth; the only way isto make some comparison with well-known factsof human experience. ...“ In another context: “¿�Onehas also to consider that it is mostlya matter of visions; I have the images in my

BY KARL JASPERS 1319

head, but it is uncommonly difficult to describethem in words, in part frankly impossible.―Some—though not many—of the neologismscoined by patients are based on similar effortsto give a name to their own experiences; onepatient sought to describe a sensation he felt inhis hip more precisely in this way: When askedwhether what he felt was a “¿�twitching―,he said:“¿�No,it isn't a twitching, it's a ‘¿�plotching'.―

From its beginnings, psychiatry has had toconcern itself with delimiting and naming thesedifferent forms of experience; there could, ofcourse, have been no advance at all withoutsuch phenomenological definitions. Delusions,sense-deceptions, depressive and expansive moodchanges and much else have thus been described.All of this will remain the foundation for furtherphenomenological research. Often, however,we have first to clear away a ballast of theoriesconcerning the supposed physical basis orpsychological framework of these phenomena.Numerous phenomenological approaches havebeen smothered almost at once by such theoretical endeavours. We cannot now be satisfiedwith just a few meagre categories, but will devoteourselves without any preconceptions to thephenomena themselves, and whenever we canidentify one we will seek to realize and describeit as completely as possible, without claiming toknow in advance what the phenomenon is byvirtue of our knowledge of psychology. Thecurrent classification of symptoms of insanityinto sense-deceptions and delusions may beuseful in a rough and ready way, but theseterms conceal a hitherto unexplored multitudeof diverse phenomena.

A few examples will illustrate the sort ofphenomena that can be delimited. Kandinskygave a description of pseudo-hallucinations, aparticular kind of pathological imagery. Theydiffer from normal images in their greatersensory concreteness, clarity and detail, theirappearance independently of, and even against,the subject's will, and by the accompanyingexperience of passivity and receptiveness. Onthe other hand, they differ both from truehallucination and from normal perception inthat they do not appear in external space asperceptions do, but in the internal space inwhich images also are experienced. This con

ception of pseudo-hallucinations has beenattacked on the grounds of theoretical considerations. However, the problem is purely a phenomenological and descriptive one. It might bepossible to represent the reported cases in someother more convincing way; one could adduceother cases (self-descriptions, the results of otherinvestigations); but it is only through clearlyrealized representations of this kind thatKandinsky's views could be refuted, never bymere theoretical considerations. The task ofphenomenology is an independent one, andawareness of this will guard against criticismbased on misunderstanding and hence unproductive.

Again, it is not uncommon for patients toreport an experience, of which they are acutelyaware, of there being somebody just behind orabove them. When they look around, this somebody turns round, too; they “¿�feel―it, there reallyis somebody there. But they have no sensationof actual contact, or indeed any sensation, norcan they ever come face to face with the supposedperson. Some of these patients come to theconclusion that there is nobody there, othersremain convinced of the existence of thissomeone whose presence they feel so vividly.Here it is obviously not a matter of sensedeception, since the sense-element is lacking;nor of a delusional idea, since there is an actualexperience which is subjected to an act ofjudgment, and this judgment may be either corrector delusional. A third example, taken from theemotional sphere, will show how, simply by“¿�sinking―oneself in the individual phenomenawithout the aid of any theory or system, one canarrive at a representation and delimitation ofsuch phenomena. For instance, one hears of“¿�feelingsof ecstasy―: among these one canreadily distinguish if not different phenomenaat least different shades of feeling. We are nothere concerned with whether we are right orwrong in any particular instance. One candistinguish in the first place a general enthusiasm,emotion or rapture, embracing everything conceivable; secondly, a deep inner happiness outof which some joy-bringing image will occasionally arise; thirdly, a feeling of exaltation andgrace, of holiness and high significance. Inorder to be of lasting value, such rapidly made

1320 THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

differentiations should then be subjected tofuther phenomenological elaboration.

The methods of psychopathological phenomenology have now been discussed (grasp of expressive movements, exploration of patients' experience, and self-descriptions); also the indirect leadsby which we are guided towards our own representation of the phenomena (noting their genesis,the conditions and circumstances under whichthey appear, their content, any already wellknown elements they may contain, the symbolicindications, etc.); and the only question thatremains is how we can provide an incentive forothers to form their own representations of thephenomena in the light of all that has beenbrought forward. In a work on phenomenology,therefore, individual cases will be presented,general descriptions will be derived from them,and a terminology will be established. Thatphenomenology deals only with immediatelypresented data is no reproach to it, merely thestatement of a fact. But it will always be difficultto find how one can lead from the individualcase to a more general understanding and amore complete delimitation. It must be borne inmind that the experiences of individual patientsare infinitely manifold; that phenomenologyonly extracts from them some general featurewhich can be found equally in some other caseand therefore can be called the same feature,whereas the infinity of individual experiencecontinues to change. We therefore have theposition that on the one hand phenomenologyabstracts from an infinity of constantly changingconstituents, and on the other hand is definitelyorientated towards the perceptible and theconcrete, not the abstract. Only where something can be reduced to “¿�reality―and becomesan immediate datum, i.e. becomes concrete, canit form the subject for phenomenology.

CLASSIFYING GROUPS OF PHENOMENA

Let us assume that, in the ways describedabove, a number of phenomena can be delineated and clarified. We now seem to findourselves once more in the presence of a freshchaos of innumerable phenomena which havebeen described and defined, but still cannotsatisfy our scientific needs. Delimitation must be

followed by the bringing of phenomena intosome kind of order, so that we can becomeaware of the diversity of psychic life in a systematic way, and make it possible to survey themup to the limits we have progressively reached.Phenomena can be arranged in quite differentways according to the purpose one has in view.For example, they can be arranged accordingto their origin, their physical determinants,their contents, their significance from someparticular point of view, such as the logical,ethical or aesthetic. All these principles ofclassification should be made use of in theirrightful place; but for phenomenology itselfthey are not very satisfactory. We seek a classification which will arrange psychic phenomenaaccording to their phenomenological affinitieswith each other, somewhat in the way thatinfinite numbers of colours are arranged in thespectrum in a manner which is phenomenologically satisfying. Now in the present state ofphenomenology, it would seem that there existnumerous groups of phenomena between whichno relationship can be perceived. Senseperceptions and ideas, hallucinations anddelusions, seem to be phenomena separated bya gulf rather than united by transitions. Suchtotally unrelated phenomena can only be placedunder separate headings and cannot be organizedinto any particular pattern within the psychiclife.

But there are other groups of phenomenawhich can be related and arranged systematically. Between these, transitions can usually bemade out (as between colours). An exampleof such a systematic arrangement of relatedphenomena can be given in the case of pseudohallucinations. On close consideration of individual cases, it appears that transitions existbetween normal imagery and the completelydeveloped pseudo-hallucination (which neverbecomes substantial but always remains in theinternal psychic space, that occupied byimagery). Surveying these phenomena, it ispossible to find four main points of contrast,between which they can oscillate through awhole series of transitions. If, then, we candescribe each phenomenon in terms of where itcan be approximately located in the series, weshall have satisfactorily characterized in pheno

BY KARL JASPERS 1321

menological terms that particular phenomenon,lying as it does somewhere between an imageand a pseudo-hallucination. These four pointsof contrast are as follows:

This example, which will not be discussedfurther here, shows how we set about groupingrelated phenomena on a purely phenomenological basis, using only those aspects of thephenomena which are really experienced as thepoints of difference, and excluding any addednotions or theories. Further, it shows how vitalit is to distinguish between phenomenologicaltransitions and phenomenological gaps. Transitions will allow us to place phenomena in theirorder, but where there are gaps we can onlyenumerate or contrast opposites. It is at thesame time evident that to recognize a group ofphenomena as a phenomenologically new one,separated by a gap from those already recognized, is something only to be decided aftercareful consideration of clear evidence. Atpresent, however, when so many people seek toreduce psychic data to the narrowest andsimplest terms possible, it is preferable to acceptrather too many phenomena—they can beorganized later—than to lapse into someshallow psychological system made up of just afew elements.

For while the ideal of phenomenology is aninfinity of irreducible psychic qualities, classifiedand ordered to permit of their survey, thereexists another, opposite ideal, that of the fewestpossible ultimate elements, as in chemistry.According to this school, all complex psychicphenomena could be derived from such ele

ments, and all psychic phenomena could besatisfactorily presented by breaking them downinto those elements. To be consistent, such anattitude must envisage the possibility of makingdo with a single ultimate psychic atom, everything psychic being built up from varying configurations of this particle. This ideal takes itscue from the natural sciences, and certainly hasa meaning in relation to the origins of psychicqualities. Just as the infinite variety of colourscan be traced to purely quantitative differencesin wave-length, so one could wish to explain theorigins of psychic qualities and perhaps establishdifferent classifications on this basis. Forphenomenology itself, however, such requirements seem quite pointless. The aim of phenomenological analysis is to increase its awarenessof psychic phenomena by clearly delimitingthem. As one procedure among others, phenomenology brings to light psychic qualities thatappear as constituents of what is being studied.This breaking down of complex structures intoconstituents is only one way of proceeding; butthose who adopt the point of view alreadydescribed, which is valid only in relation to theorigination of psychic phenomena, speak as ifit were the only way. They would, for example,explain perception by analysing it into theelements of sensation, spatial perception andintentional act, whereas true phenomenologywould first compare perception with imagery,which is composed of the same elements, andcome to the conclusion that perception must becharacterized as an irreducible psychic quality.Even when occasionally the conception of“¿�analysisinto ultimate elements― does, like thatof “¿�analysisas a delimitation of ultimatequalities―, appear to present itself as purelyphenomenological and uninfluenced by thegenetic point of view, it still tends to relapse atevery opportunity into confusion with geneticconsiderations: once again complex psychicstructures are said to arise from combinations ofelements. Phenomenology, on the other hand,rejects the ideal of the fewest possible elements;on the contrary it has no wish to restrict theinfinite variety of psychic phenomena, only, asfar as possible (for the task is, of course, boundless), to try to make them more lucid, preciseand individually recognizable at any time.

Ful ly-formed pseudo-hallucination

i. Clear-cut, complete in

detail.2. The sensory elements

are each adequatelyperceived, as in normalperception.

3. There is consistencyand easy retention.

4. It is involuntary; nothing can be called forthor changed by choice.Associated with feelingsof passivity and receptivity.

Normal imagery

1. Vague, incomplete in

detail.2. A few sensory elements

are adequately perceived, or none. e.g. animagined face is neutralin tone.

3. The images dissolve, disperse, have constantly tobe recreated.

4. Itisvolitional;itcan beinvoked or changed bychoice. Feelings arethose of activity.

1322 THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

THE BOUNDARIES OF PHENOMENOLOGY

In the foregoing we have presented, if only inbroad outline, the aims and methods of phenomenology, which has, of course, been practisedsince psychiatry began, but has never yet beengiven its opportunity for unfettered development. Since it has suffered most harm frombeing confused with other lines of research, wewill briefly restate what it is that phenomenology does not intend to pursue, and with whatphenomenology should not be confused.

Phenomenology concerns itself only withactual experiences, only with the perceptibleand concrete, not with any factors that may bethought to underlie psychic events and are thesubject of theoretical constructs. For every oneof its findings phenomenology must ask: hasthis actually been experienced? Does this reallypresent itself to the subject's consciousness?Phenomenological findings derive their validityfrom the fact that the various elements of thepsychic reality can be evoked repeatedly. Itsfindings can thus only be refuted if the facts of acase have previously been wrongly representedor are not represented correctly; they can neverbe refuted by demonstrating their impossibilityor error on the basis of some theoretical proposition. Phenomenology can gain nothing fromtheory: it can only lose. The accuracy of aparticular representation cannot be checked byits conformity to general criteria; phenomenologymust always find its standards within itself.

Phenomenology, then, deals with what isactually experienced. It views psychic events “¿�asfrom within―, and brings them into immediaterealization. It therefore does not concern itselfwith external manifestations, with motor phenomena, expressive movements as such, nor withany kind of objective performance. We havealready explained to what extent expressivemovements and self-descriptions can be used asthe means, but not as the subject, of phenomenology.

Further, phenomenology has nothing to dowith the genesis of psychic phenomena. Thoughits practice is a prerequisite for any causalinvestigation it leaves genetic issues aside, andthey can neither refute nor further its findings.Causal studies relating to colour, perception,etc. are alien to it; yet such factual investigations

have been less of a danger than those “¿�cerebralmythologies― which have sought to interpretphenomenology and replace it by theoreticalconstructions of physiological and pathologicalcerebral processes. Thus Wernicke, who in factdid make important phenomenological discoveries, distorted them by interpretations interms of “¿�connectivefibres―,“¿�sejunctions―andthe like. These sort of constructs constantlyprevent phenomenological investigations fromreaching their proper goal. At first the originatorsof such constructs must necessarily practisephenomenology, but having reached this theorythey feel on safer ground, and with a remarkable failure to recognize their own sources theydeclare all phenomenological conclusions to be“¿�highlysubjective―.

Lastly, phenomenology must be kept separatefrom what we call the “¿�geneticunderstanding―of psychic events, i.e. the comprehension of theirmeaningful relationships. This is a unique formof understanding which only applies to psychicevents; it grasps as self-evident how one psychicevent emerges from another; how a manattacked should be angry, a betrayed loverjealous. We have made use of the word “¿�understanding― both for the “¿�representations―ofphenomenology and for this “¿�grasp―of thepsychic connections. To avoid confusion theformer is termed “¿�staticunderstanding―; it isthe basis on which their definition must rest,and comprehends only data, experiences, modesof consciousness and delimitation. The latter wecall “¿�geneticunderstanding' ‘¿�—theunderstanding of the meaningful connections between onepsychic experience and another, the “¿�emergence of the psychic from the psychic―. Nowphenomenology itself has nothing to do withthis “¿�geneticunderstanding― and must betreated as something entirely separate; yet,where required, it may legitimately studyregular sequences of psychic events, if these areactually experienced and as such together forma phenomenological unit sui generis. An example,perhaps, is the experience of the Will. But sucha phenomenological sequence is quite a differentthing from a meaningful flow of psychic eventsemerging one from the other. We restrictphenomenology to whatever can be understood“¿�statically―.

BY KARL JASPERS 1323

If we look at psychopathology as a whole,obviously our most essential interest lies in whatis “¿�geneticallyunderstandable―, in extraconscious causal connections, and in theascertainment of the physical basis of psychicprocesses—in other words, in the way things arerelated. Phenomenology only makes known to usthe different forms in which all our experiences,all psychic reality, take place; it does not teachus anything about the contents of the personalexperience of the individual, nor anything aboutthe extra-conscious basis on which psychic eventsseem to float like a thin layer of foam on thesurface of the sea. Penetrating these extraconscious depths will always be more attractivethan merely demonstrating phenomenologicalfindings, yet the completion of this latter task isan essential prerequisite for all further investigation. It is only in the setting of these phenomenologically established forms that actual life,accessible to our immediate understanding,unfolds itself; and it is, after all, in order toarrive at a better comprehension of this psychiclife that we are prompted to investigate its extraconscious relationships.

FUTURE TASKS FOR PHENOMENOLOGY

In conclusion we will indicate a few specifictasks for phenomenology. Not one field ofpsychopathological phenomenology can as yetbe regarded as fully worked over. Even wherethe nature of a phenomenon is apparentlyclear-cut, as with some kinds of hallucinations,really good case-material that can serve toenlarge and verify one's experience is so scantythat careful and detailed case-descriptions arestill of great value. Much work still needs to bedone on the different types of hallucination,especially those of the higher senses, which oughtto be thoroughly investigated. An obviousinstance is the problem of visual hallucinationsoccurring simultaneously with real perceptionsin objective space. The phenomenology ofdelusional experiences has hardly been treatedat all; all that exists so far on this subject is to be

found in publications on emotional changes asthe first symptom in paranoia. The phenomenology of pathological emotions is unbelievablyscanty. The best is contained in the excellentwork ofJanet, in which, however, little value isplaced on careful delimitation or classification.The subjective experience of one's own personality has been treated systematically by Oesterreich. For all these problems phenomenologicaldescriptions by psychiatrists with material tohand, as well as self-descriptions more penetrating than those so far available, would be ofthe greatest value.

In histology, when examining the cerebralcortex, one is required to account for everyfibre, every nucleus. In the same way phenomenology demands that we should account forevery psychic phenomenon and every experiencethat comes to light in the investigation of ourpatients or in their own self-descriptions. Weshould in no circumstances be content with ageneral impression extracted from the totalpicture, but should get to know, as regards eachdetail, how it is to be viewed and assessed.Then, if we practise this method for some time,much will appear less startling to us because ithas been frequently observed; whereas thosewho only go on “¿�generalimpressions― will nothave made themselves aware of the phenomenain question, and so, every time these do come totheir notice through the momentary direction oftheir “¿�impressionability―,they will appear asnovel and surprising. But the practised phenomenologist will pay attention to what is reallynew and unknown, and may then be justifiablysurprised; one need not be afraid that surpriseswill ever cease! Needless to say, many psychiatrists already make it their practice to act onthese lines and would rightly think it an impertinence if we claimed to be telling themsomething new. But the phenomenologicalapproach is not yet so widespread as not torequire repeated efforts to promote it. One mayhope that its application will further enrich ourknowledge of what the psychiatric patient reallyexperiences.