Teoria Funcionalista Valores Gouveia(2014)

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Functional theory of human values: Testing its content and structure

hypotheses

Valdiney V. Gouveia a,⇑,1, Taciano L. Milfont b, Valeschka M. Guerra c

a Department of Psychology, Federal University of Paraíba, Brazilb School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealandc Department of Psychology, Federal University of Espírito Santo, Brazil

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:

Received 17 March 2013

Received in revised form 4 December 2013

Accepted 9 December 2013

Available online 29 December 2013

Keywords:

Human values

Value functions

Value content

Value structure

a b s t r a c t

A theoretical analysis of the functions values fulfill is described by focusing on two widely accepted value

functions: values guide actions and express needs. The interplay between these two functions yields a

three-by-two framework differentiating values according to their pursued goals (personal, central or

social goals) or their expressed needs (survival or thriving needs). The three-by-two framework results

in six subfunctions or basic values (structure hypothesis) assessed with specific marker values forming

the Basic Values Survey (content hypothesis). The present paper tests these theoretical hypotheses in a

large national sample of Brazilian physicians (N = 13,414). The results support both hypotheses and pro-

vide further empirical evidence for the functional theory of values. Discussion centers on the theory as a

refinement of existing value models due to its parsimonious and theoretically-driven approach, and its

merit as an additional theoretical tool for understanding the structure of the value domain.

2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Schwartz’s theory of values is an important legacy in social

psychology that provides conceptual, methodological, and empiri-

cal contributions to map a set of universal values (Maio, 2010;

Schwartz, 2011). Throughout the years the theory has promoted

multiple configurations of the value domain, including seven (Sch-

wartz & Bilsky, 1987), ten (Schwartz, 1992), eleven (Schwartz,

1994) or nineteen (Schwartz et al., 2012) motivational value types.

As a result of these multiple (and somewhat conflicting) configura-

tions, some researchers have tried to identify a congruent pool of

dimensions, suggesting between six and eight motivational types

(Hinz, Brähler, Schmidt, & Albani, 2005; Perrinjaquet, Furrer, Mar-

guerat, Usunier, & Cestre, 2007), whereas others have preferred to

consider only the two bipolar higher-order dimensions of self-tran-

scendence/self-enhancement and conservation/openness (e.g.,

Caprara, Alessandri, & Eisenberg, 2012; Strack & Dobewall, 2012).

We believe these multiple configurations lack parsimony and

theoretical focus, and might also hinder scientific advancement

when studies are to be compared or meta-analyzed. In the present

article we discuss a parsimonious and theory-driven approach

explaining the functions values fulfill that canbe useful in integrat-

ing previous theoretical value models. In particular, the theory

integrates models that conceptualize values as guiding actionsand expressing needs. We start by describing the functional theory

of human values (Gouveia, 1998, 2003, 2013), and then report a

study gathering empirical evidence for its appropriateness in a

large national sample of Brazilian physicians by testing two spe-

cific theoretical hypotheses.

2. Primary functions of values

The functional approach is popular in attitude research (Maio &

Olson, 2000), but research examining the functions that values ful-

fill has received less attention (Gouveia, 2013). Nevertheless, two

primary functions of values can be identified in the psychological

literature: values guide actions (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992)

and are cognitive expressions of needs (Inglehart, 1977; Maslow,

1954). The recognition of these two value functions has led to

the development of the functional theory of human values (Gou-

veia, 1998, 2003, 2013; Gouveia, Milfont, & Fischer, submitted),

which attempts to explain the underlying characteristics of the

value domain structure.

The parsimonious selection of these value functions is in line

with research showing that the general structure of motivational

systems is consistently subsumed by a two-dimensional structure

(Fontaine, Poortinga, Delbeke, & Schwartz, 2008; Grouzet et al.,

2005; Ronen, 1994). However, a theoretical and explicit explana-

tion of the underlying functional characteristics of this structure

has not been explored by the extant literature.

0191-8869/$ - see front matter 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2013.12.012

⇑ Corresponding author. Address: Department of Psychology, Federal University

of Paraiba, 58.051-900 Joao Pessoa, PB, Brazil.

E-mail address: [email protected] (V.V. Gouveia).1 URL: http://vvgouveia.net/

Personality and Individual Differences 60 (2014) 41–47

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Personality and Individual Differences

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / p a i d

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2013.12.012mailto:[email protected]://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2013.12.012http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01918869http://www.elsevier.com/locate/paidhttp://www.elsevier.com/locate/paidhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01918869http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2013.12.012mailto:[email protected]://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2013.12.012http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://-/?-http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1016/j.paid.2013.12.012&domain=pdfhttp://-/?-


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The theory posits that the two value functions form distinct

functional dimensions. The first dimension outlines ‘circle of goals’

based on the type of orientation values serve when guiding human

behaviors (personal, central or social goals). The second dimension

outlines ‘level of needs’ based on the type of motivator values serve

when cognitively representing human needs (survival or thriving

needs). These value functions most likely arise from evolutionary

conditions associated with human development.

In order to survive in a hostile environment, humans need to:

(a) establish bonds with others, while being able to make personal

decisions for one’s own survival, (b) resist threatening group

demands, and (c) make sense of the multiple meanings present

in social interactions (Baumeister, 2005; Tooby & Cosmides,

1990). This demand to simultaneously act autonomously and bond

with a larger group leads to a functional and integrated set of val-

ues that guide actions. The second functional dimension underlies

the expression of needs that would threaten the survival of the

individual, the immediate social group, and the species if not ful-

filled, such as basic biological and social needs (e.g., food, self-con-

trol) as well as needs that become more important once the basic

needs are addressed (Baumeister, 2005; Maslow, 1954; Welzel,

Inglehart, & Klingemann, 2003).

2.1. Guiding actions

Personal and social values are the two terminal value types iden-tified by Rokeach (1973). Individuals guided by personal values

(e.g., an exciting life, inner harmony) are self-centered or intraper-

sonal in focus, while those guided by social values (e.g., true friend-

ship, a world of peace) are society-centered or interpersonal in

focus. Personal and social values lead individuals to emphasize

respectively themselves or the group as the principal unit of

survival (Schwartz, 1992). Empirical studies have also identified

values that are neither completely social nor personal, such as

personal stability, health, knowledge and maturity (Mueller &

Wornhoff, 1990). Although some scholars refer to this set of valuesas representing mixed interests (e.g., Schwartz’s universalism and

security value types) and in opposition to other values (e.g., Sch-

wartz’s stimulation value type), a different perspective is taken

here.

According to the functional theory, values that are neither

exclusively personal nor social are located almost exactly between

personal and social values because they are not restricted to the

dichotomy of self-centered or society-centered interests. This set

of values is thus congruent (and not in opposition) with both

personal and social goals. The theory further posits that this set

of values is the central reference source for the other values inthe sense that they express general purposes of life corresponding

to basic needs (e.g., survival) and more general needs (e.g., self-

actualization). Therefore, the first functional dimension differenti-

ates values according to the orientation of their pursued goals

(type of orientation: personal, central or social goals).

2.2. Expressing needs

Although the correspondence between values and needs is pro-

posed (Maslow, 1954; Rokeach, 1973), there is little empirical re-

search on values as based on needs (Calogero, Bardi, & Sutton,

2009). Nevertheless, the literature suggests that all values can be

classified as materialistic ( pragmatic ) or humanitarian (idealistic )based on the needs they express (Braithwaite, Makkai, & Pittelkow,

1996; Inglehart, 1977). Materialistic/pragmatic values express ba-

sic biological and social needs such as food and control acquisition,

ensuring the survival of the individual, the immediate social group

and the species. Humanitarian/idealistic values express needs that

become more salient when the basic needs have been addressed

(Inglehart, 1977; Maslow, 1954), including needs for information,

self-esteem and intellectual and emotional stimulation (Baumei-ster, 2005).

Materialistic values imply an orientation toward specific practi-

cal goals and normative rules. Individuals guided by materialistic

values tend to think in more biological terms of survival, empha-

sizing their own existence and the conditions to secure it. Human-

itarian values, in contrast, are based on more abstract principles

and ideas. Emphasizing humanitarian values is associated with

creativity and open-mindedness, suggesting less dependence on

material goods. Compared with materialistic values, humanitarian

values are not necessarily directed toward concrete goals, and are

generally non-specific (Braithwaite et al., 1996; Inglehart, 1977).

Materialistic values express survival needs while humanitarian

values express thriving needs. The second functional dimension

thus differentiates values according to their expressed needs (typeof motivator: survival or thriving needs).

3. Content and structure of the value functions

The functional dimensions can be mapped on a three-by-two

framework, with three broad pursued goals (personal, central or

social goals) and two broad expressed needs (survival or thriving

needs). The interplay between goals and needs yields six specific

subfunctions or basic values. Figure 1 presents the three-by-two

Values as guides of actions (circle of goals)

Personal goals(the individual by

itself)

Central goals(the general

purpose of life)

Social goals(the individual in

the community)

V a l u e s a s e x p r e s s i o n s o f n e e d s

( l e v e l o f n e e d s )

Thriving needs

(life as source of

opportunities)2

Excitement

Values

Emotion

Pleasure

Sexuality

Suprapersonal

Values

Beauty

Knowledge

Maturity

Interactive

Values

Affectivity

Belonging

Support

Survival needs

(life as source ofthreats)1

Promotion

Values

Power

Prestige

Success

Existence

Values

Health

Stability

Survival

Normative

Values

Obedience

Religiosity

Tradition

Fig. 1. Facets, dimensions and basic values. Note. (1) Under pressing conditions that impose existential threats. (2) Under permissive conditions that provide existentialsecurity.

42 V.V. Gouveia et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 60 (2014) 41–47


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framework, indicating the specific marker values used to represent

each of the six basic values further described below.

3.1. Existence values

The most basic physiological needs and the need for security are

cognitively represented by existence values (Maslow, 1954; Ronen,

1994). These values are compatible with personal and social goals

within the expression of survival needs because the principal

purpose of existence values is to assure the basic conditions for

individual biological and psychological survival. As such, existence

values are the source of reference for promotion and normative

values.

3.2. Promotion values

These values express survival needs and focus on personal

goals. Promotion values stem from a personal and materialistic ori-

entation and are essential for securing self-esteem (Maslow, 1954;

Ronen, 1994). Although driving personal and material accomplish-

ments, such values are also important for successful social interac-

tions and institutional functioning (Schwartz, 1992). Individuals

guided by promotion values view hierarchy as an important

demonstration of personal competence. Such individuals also cher-

ish their own personal benefits and are practical decision-makers.

3.3. Normative values

These values also express survival needs, but have a focus on so-

cial goals. Normative values cognitively represent the need for

security and control as well as the pre-conditions for the satisfac-

tionof basic needs (Korman, 1974; Maslow, 1954; institutional and

social demands according to Schwartz, 1992). These values focus

on social rules with a materialistic guiding principle, reflecting

the importance of preserving one’s culture and conventional

norms. Endorsing these values also implies a vertical orientation

(Gouveia, Albuquerque, Clemente, & Espinosa, 2002), wherebyobedience to authority is important.

3.4. Suprapersonal values

Like existence values suprapersonal values also focus on central

goals, but express thriving needs. Suprapersonal values represent

the higher-order needs of aesthetics, cognition and self-actualiza-

tion (Maslow, 1954; Ronen, 1994), emphasizing more abstract

ideas over absolute or material goals (Inglehart, 1977) and leading

to a better understanding and mastery of the physical and social

realms (Baumeister, 2005). Suprapersonal values are the source

of reference for excitement and interactive values.

3.5. Excitement values

These values represent thriving needs with a focus on personal

goals. The physiological need for gratification, variety and pleasure

(i.e., hedonism; Maslow, 1954; Ronen, 1994) is cognitively repre-

sented by excitement values. These values express a more personal

orientation and non-conformity, contributing to a promotion of

change and innovation (Gouveia, 2013). Individuals guided by such

values tend not to be orientated toward material goals in the long

run (Guerra, Gouveia, Sousa, Lima, & Freires, 2012).

3.6. Interactive values

These values also represent thriving needs, but have a focus on

social goals. Interactive values are essential in regulating, estab-lishing and maintaining one’s interpersonal relationships. The

common fates and affective experiences of individuals are stressed

by these values, representing the needs of belonging, love and

affiliation (Korman, 1974; Maslow, 1954). Individuals guided by

interactive values view social contact as a goal in itself.

Since the proposed model is based on primary value functions

discussed in the extant literature, it has similarities with existing

models, particularly with those of Schwartz (1992) and Inglehart

(1977). Testing similarities with the Schwartz model, Gouveia

(2003) analyzed together the ten motivational types and the six

basic values. Despite the numerical difference, the motivational

types were easily identified according to the functional dimen-

sions. For example, promotion values subsumed Schwartz’s

achievement and power, normative values incorporated Schwartz’s

conformity and tradition, while existence values (reflecting sur-

vival needs) are underrepresented in Schwartz’s value instrument

and model (see also Gouveia, Milfont, Fischer, & Schultz, 2007).

The functional theory also resembles the Inglehart (1977) model

as both make a distinction between materialistic/pragmatic versus

humanitarian/idealistic values. Notwithstanding these similarities,

the functional theory strikes new conceptual ground by reconciling

distinct value traditions into a single framework. The proposed

theory is thus an improvement or refinement of existing models.

4. Hypotheses and study overview

The present study further evaluates the usefulness of the func-

tional theory of values. Building on the theoretical considerations

just presented, we proposed hypotheses related to the content

and structure of the value functions. The hypotheses are in line

with the configuration depicted in Figure 1.

First, value items used in several measures (e.g., Braithwaite &

Scott, 1991) were selected as the marker values for the six specific

subfunctions or basic values. We hypothesize that the selected 18

marker values will be strong indicators of their correspondent ba-

sic values (Hypothesis 1). Second, the horizontal axis in Figure 1

corresponds to the circle of goals (personal, central or social). Wethus predict that values reflecting central goals will be located in

the center of the multidimensional space, and located on either

side will be values reflecting personal or social goals (Hypothesis 2a). Finally, the vertical axis corresponds to the level of needs, with

values expressing survival and thriving needs expected to be pro-

jected into two separate regions in the proposed two-dimensional

space (Hypothesis 2b).Besides testing these theoretical hypotheses, the present study

also assesses the psychometric properties of the Basic Values Sur-

vey and its appropriateness for measuring the proposed value

space in a large national sample of Brazilian physicians. Analysis

of this data has been reported in another publication (Fischer, Mil-

font, & Gouveia, 2011), but the studies have completely distinct

aims. While Fischer and colleagues examined the influence of so-

cial context on the structure of values at an aggregated level (i.e.,

physicians data grouped within Brazilian states), the present study

focuses on individual-level analyses, the particular hypotheses de-

rived from the theory, and the psychometric properties of the Basic

Values Survey.

5. Method

5.1. Participants and instrument

The participants were 13,414 physicians (70% males) between

the ages of 22 and 85 (M = 40.8, SD = 10.14) from all 26 Brazilian

states and the Federal District. Participants completed an online

questionnaire investigating Brazilian physicians’ professionalcharacteristics, which also included the Basic Value Survey (BVS;

V.V. Gouveia et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 60 (2014) 41–47 43

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Gouveia, 2003). The BVS is composed of 18 marker values with two

brief descriptions presented after each value (see Supplementary

Online Material). Participants rated each item-value on a 7-point

scale, ranging from 1 (completely unimportant ) to 7 (of the utmost importance), considering how important each value was for themas a guiding principle in their life.

The alpha coefficients ranged from .53 (interactive) to .60 (nor-

mative) (amean

= .56), and the mean inter-item correlations ranged

from .28 to .33 (average = .30; see Table S1). Consistent reliability

indicators were also observed across subsamples from the five

geo-social regions in Brazil: North, n = 655; Northeast, n = 2518;Central-West, n = 1397; Southeast, n = 6968; and South, n = 1876

(see Table S2). Low alphas are not uncommon in value measures

(e.g., Schwartz, 2005), and these results provide indication of

acceptable internal consistency and homogeneity for research pur-

poses on values. All six basic values were positively correlated, with

correlations ranging from .12 to .47 (average = .35; see Table S1).

5.2. Procedure

The questionnaire was available on the internet for six months.

Participants had to enter their physician’s register number andbirth date to access the questionnaire. Only registered physicians

could take part in the study and participants could only complete

the questionnaire once. Participants’ identification was later dis-

carded to preserve their anonymity. The average completion time

was 15 min.

6. Results

6.1. Content hypothesis

To test the content hypothesis, confirmatory factor analyses

were performed using the covariance matrix among the 18 values

as input and maximum likelihood estimation procedures in LISREL.

Standard goodness-of-fit statistics were used to assess model fitand to compare competing models. We tested four alternative

models against our hypothesized six-factor model. Since the six

basic values were all positively interrelated, we first tested an

undifferentiated one-factor latent model with all items. We then

fitted oblique latent models. The level of needs might be a parsi-

monious explanation of the value structure; hence we tested a

correlated two-factor latent model differentiating values express-

ing survival versus thriving needs. Third, a correlated three-factor

latent model was tested by differentiating personal, central and so-

cial values. Finally, we proposed that central values form the core

of the values structure; therefore, we tested a correlated five-factor

latent model combining existence and suprapersonal values.

As can be seen in Table 1 and Figure S1, the six-factor model

without any constraint or change to improve fit was statisticallybetter fitting than other theory-based alternatives. We also cross-

validated the six-factor model across the five geo-social regions

in Brazil. Configural equivalence of the six-factor model was

confirmed (CFI = .91, RMSEA = .08). These results support Hypothe-

sis 1 and indicate that participants distinguish six basic values as

measured by the BVS.

6.2. Structure hypotheses

To test the structure hypotheses, we first employed a confirma-tory Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) with proximity transforma-

tions into z -transformed Euclidean distances with PROXSCAL algorithm in SPSS. Like a confirmatory factor analysis, a confirma-

tory MDS compares a theoretical model to the observed data; but

instead of fixing relations between items and factors the researcher

fixes the coordinates of the observed data in the multidimensional

space based on the theoretical model.

The confirmatory MDS was performed by specifying the theo-

retical structure shown in Figure 1, and then comparing to the fit

of the observed structure. A two-dimensional structure was im-

posed in line with the theory and because it best represents the

dimensionality of the value space (Fontaine et al., 2008). The

following parameters were specified for the first dimension:

excitement [1.0], promotion [1.0], existence [0.0], suprapersonal[0.0], interactive [1.0], and normative [1.0]. For the second

dimension the following parameters were specified: excitement

[0.5], promotion [0.5], existence [1.0], suprapersonal [1.0],

interactive [0.5], and normative [0.5]. Tucker’s coefficient of con-

gruence (also known as Tucker’s phi) was used as a measure of

model fit, with values higher than .90 indicating good fit ( van de

Vijver & Leung, 1997).

Figure 2a and 2b respectively show the results of the uncon-

strained and confirmatory MDS. The unconstrained solution clearly

shows that the personal-central-social distinction was more well-

defined than the survival-thriving distinction. Nevertheless, the

Tucker’s phi of .98 indicates that forcing the location of the marker

values to fit the theoretical structure provides good fit.

We then ran a generalized procrustes analysis in the GPA soft-

ware (Commandeur, 1991) and Orthosim (Barrett, 2005) to com-

pare the coordinates of the unconstrained and confirmatory MDS

configurations (see Table S3), with values close to .90 or higher

indicating acceptable fit. The total fit between the configurations

was .81. In line with Figure 2a, the double-scaled Euclidean

similarity coefficient showed that the first dimension had a better

congruence match (.90) than the second dimension (.55). These re-

sults confirm Hypothesis 2a: central values were located between

personal and social values. Less support was observed for Hypoth-

esis 2b suggesting that survival and thriving values are separated

into two regions.

7. Discussion

The present article describes a theoretical model that focuses on

the functions human values fulfill. Two primary value functions

Table 1

Fit indices for alternative models.

Model v2 (df) GFI CFI RMSEA (CI90%) SRMR ECVI CAIC Dv2 (df)

One-factor 19702.25 (135) .86 .84 .10 (.10–.11) .074 1.47 20080.40 –

Two-factor 19600.62 (134) .86 .85 .10 (.10–.11) .074 1.47 19989.27 101.63* (1)

Three-factor 14835.71 (132) .89 .88 .091 (.090–.092) .066 1.11 15245.37 4764.91* (2)

Five-factor 13360.51 (125) .90 .89 .089 (.088–.090) .066 1.00 13843.70 1475.20* (7)

Six-factor 13170.15 (120) .90 .90 .090 (.089–.091) .064 .99 13705.86 190.36* (5)

Note. N = 13,414. One-factor model: all values combined. Two-factor model: values expressing survival versus thriving needs. Three-factor model: values focusing on social

versus central versus personal goals. Five-factor model: central values combined. v2 = chi-square, df = degrees of freedom, GFI = goodness-of-fit index, CFI = comparative fit

index, RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation, CI90% = 90% confidence interval, SRMR = standardized root meansquare residual, ECVI = expected cross-validation

index, CAIC = consistent Akaike information criterion.* p < .001.


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were selected – values guide actions and express needs – and a

three-by-two framework was proposed based on their interplay.The three-by-two framework yields six basic values (existence,

promotion, normative, suprapersonal, excitement, and interactive)

and marker values were selected from the values literature asobserved indicators. Theoretical hypotheses were supported in a

Fig. 2. Spatial representation of the marker values from (a) unrestricted and (b) confirmatory multidimensional scaling. Note. Triangles refer to social values, circles to central

values and squares to personal values. Black symbols refer to survival values and white symbols refer to thriving values.


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large national Brazilian sample of physicians. The theory has been

previously tested with student populations (Gouveia, Milfont, &

Fischer, submitted) and outside Brazil (Ardila, Gouveia, & Medei-

ros, 2012; Gouveia et al., 2010), but the present study provides

the first empirical test of the three-by-two framework in a national

sample constituted exclusively by non-students.

The prediction that the 18 marker values would be good indica-

tors of their corresponding theoretical basic values was confirmed.

This finding provides support for the Basic Values Survey as a psy-

chometrically-sound measure for assessing the proposed theoreti-

cal model. Instead of having an extensive list of values and then

creating value dimensions ex post facto based on empirical data,

the proposed framework was theoretically driven and determined

beforehand, and only then were the specific marker values selected

to represent the proposed dimensions.

Besides providing a more parsimonious and theory-driven ap-

proach, this procedure also means that researchers could select

other value markers as indicators of the core basic values. Indeed,

it seems more reasonable to work with the core basic dimensions

of values, avoiding specific and less fundamental facets – an ap-

proach that has been supported by others (Strack & Dobewall,

2012). Although researchers are encouraged to select and use dis-

tinct marker values, the findings reported in the present study and

others (Gouveia, 2003; Gouveia, Milfont, & Fischer, submitted) pro-

vide strong empirical support for the use of the Basic Value Survey

as a tool for testing the functional theory.

In line with the theoretical model depicted in Figure 1, values

focusing on central goals are located between values with personal

and social goals. The prediction that values expressing survival and

thriving needs are projected into two separate regions in the two-

dimensional space was not fully supported. Results using the same

dataset (Fischer et al., 2011) as well as other values research (Fon-

taine et al., 2008) have shown that the dimension representing

personal versus social values is relatively more stable than the

dimension representing survival versus thriving values. These find-

ings combined with the nature of the present sample could explain

this unexpected result.Overall, the empirical evidence accumulated so far strongly sug-

gests that the two functional dimensions and the six basic values

resulting from their interplay can parsimoniously explain the

structure of the value space. Going beyond earlier studies showing

that motivational systems are organized in a two-dimensional

structure (Fontaine et al., 2008; Grouzet et al., 2005; Ronen,

1994), the theory is the first to explicitly propose the functional

interplay between the two dimensions. The usefulness of the

theory has also been shown by initial studies using the model to

predict external variables, including sexual liberalism (Guerra

et al., 2012) and organizational commitment (Gouveia, Milfont,

Fischer, & Coelho, 2009).

Future studies should attempt to test the functional theory in a

broad cross-cultural sample, and also test the usefulness of themodel in predicting other criterion variables. Future studies should

also attempt to test other hypotheses derived from the theory, in

particular the compatibility and congruence hypotheses (Gouveia,

2013). Drawing from two primary functions values fulfill, and

providing a parsimonious and theory-driven account of the value

domain, the functional theory of values improves upon current

dominant value models. We believe the functional theory is an

additional theoretical tool for understanding the structure of the

value domain.

Acknowledgements

This research was partially supported by a Grant (308388/2011-

9) from the Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technolog-ical Development (CNPq) awarded to Valdiney V. Gouveia.

Preparation of this manuscript was also partially supported by a

Marsden Fast Start Grant from The Royal Society of New Zealand

(Te Putea Rangahau a Marsden) awarded to Taciano L. Milfont.

Valdiney V. Gouveia and Taciano L. Milfont contributed equally

to the writing of this article. The authors thank Christian Welzel

and Paul Barrett for their comments and encouragements during

the preparation of this manuscript. The authors also thank Ronald

Fischer for his contribution in the development of the functional

theory of human values and his comments on an earlier draft of

this manuscript.

Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in

the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2013.12.012.

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