Uma treta sobre ownerqualquer.pdf

7/27/2019 Uma treta sobre ownerqualquer.pdf

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The Beginning of Ownership

Thorstein Veblen

American Journal of Sociology, vol. 4 !"#"$#%

&n the accepte' economic theories the groun' of ownership iscommonly conceive' to be the pro'uctive labor of the owner. Thisis ta(en, without reflection or )uestion, to be the legitimatebasis of property* he who has pro'uce' a useful thing shoul'possess an' en+oy it. On this hea' the socialists an' theeconomists of the classical line $ the two etremes of economicspeculation $ are substantially at one. The point is not incontroversy, or at least it has not been until recently* it hasbeen accepte' as an aiomatic premise. -ith the socialists it hasserve' as the groun' of their 'eman' that the laborer shoul'receive the full pro'uct of his labor. To classical economiststhe aiom has, perhaps, been as much trouble as it has beenworth. &t has given them no en' of bother to eplain how thecapitalist is the pro'ucer of the goo's that pass into hispossession, an' how it is true that the laborer gets what hepro'uces. Spora'ic instances of ownership )uite 'issociate' fromcreative in'ustry are recogni/e' an' ta(en account of as'epartures from the normal* they are 'ue to 'isturbing causes.The main position is scarcely )uestione', that in the normal casewealth is 'istribute' in proportion to $ an' in some cogent sensebecause of $ the recipient0s contribution to the pro'uct. 1ot only is the pro'uctive labor of the owner the 'efinitivegroun' of his ownership to'ay, but the 'erivation of theinstitution of property is similarly trace' to the pro'uctive

labor of that putative savage hunter who pro'uce' two 'eer or onebeaver or twelve fish. The con+ectural history of the origin ofproperty, so far as it has been written by the economists, hasbeen constructe' out of con+ecture procee'ing on thepreconceptions of 1atural 2ights an' a coercive Or'er of 1ature.To anyone who approaches the )uestion of ownership with only aninci'ental interest in its solution as is true of the classical,pre$evolutionary economists%, an' fortifie' with thepreconceptions of natural rights, all this seems plain. &tsufficiently accounts for the institution, both in point oflogical 'erivation an' in point of historical 'evelopment. Thenatural owner is the person who has pro'uce' an article, orwho, by a constructively e)uivalent epen'iture of pro'uctiveforce, has foun' an' appropriate' an ob+ect. &t is conceive' thatsuch a person becomes the owner of the article by virtue of theimme'iate logical inclusion of the i'ea of ownership un'er thei'ea of creative in'ustry. This natural$rights theory of property ma(es the creativeeffort of an isolate', self$sufficing in'ivi'ual the basis of theownership veste' in him. &n so 'oing it overloo(s the fact thatthere is no isolate', self$sufficing in'ivi'ual. All pro'uctionis, in fact, a pro'uction in an' by the help of the community,an' all wealth is such only in society. -ithin the human perio'of the race 'evelopment, it is safe to say, no in'ivi'ual hasfallen into in'ustrial isolation, so as to pro'uce any one useful

article by his own in'epen'ent effort alone. 3ven where there isno mechanical co$operation, men are always gui'e' by theeperience of others. The only possible eceptions to this ruleare those instances of lost or cast$off chil'ren nourishe' by


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wil' beasts, of which half$authenticate' accounts have gaine'currency from time to time. But the anomalous, half$hypotheticallife of these waifs can scarcely have affecte' social 'evelopmentto the etent of originating the institution of ownership. ro'uction ta(es place only in society$only through theco$operation of an in'ustrial community. This in'ustrialcommunity may be large or small* its limits are commonly somewhat

vaguely 'efine'* but it always comprises a group large enough tocontain an' transmit the tra'itions, tools, technical (nowle'ge,an' usages without which there can be no in'ustrial organi/ationan' no economic relation of in'ivi'uals to one another or totheir environment. The isolate' in'ivi'ual is not a pro'uctiveagent. -hat he can 'o at best is to live from season to season,as the non$gregarious animals 'o. There can be no pro'uctionwithout technical (nowle'ge* hence no accumulation an' no wealthto be owne', in severalty or otherwise. An' there is no technical(nowle'ge apart from an in'ustrial community. Since there is noin'ivi'ual pro'uction an' no in'ivi'ual pro'uctivity, thenatural$rights preconception that ownership rests on thein'ivi'ually pro'uctive labor of the owner re'uces itself to

absur'ity, even un'er the logic of its own assumptions. Some writers who have ta(en up the )uestion from theethnological si'e hol' that the institution is to be trace' tothe customary use of weapons an' ornaments by in'ivi'uals. Othershave foun' its origin in the social group0s occupation of a givenpiece of lan', which it hel' forcibly against intru'ers, an'which it came in this way to own. The latter hypothesis basesthe collective ownership of lan' on a collective act of sei/ure,or tenure by prowess, so that it 'iffers fun'amentally from theview which bases ownership on pro'uctive labor. The view that ownership is an outgrowth of the customaryconsumption of such things as weapons an' ornaments by

in'ivi'uals is well supporte' by appearances an' has also the)ualifie' sanction of the natural$rights preconception. Theusages of all (nown primitive tribes seem at first sight to bearout this view. &n all communities the in'ivi'ual members eercisea more or less unrestraine' right of use an' abuse over theirweapons, if they have any, as well as over many articles ofornament, clothing, an' the toilet. &n the eyes of the mo'erneconomist this usage woul' count as ownership. So that, if the)uestion is construe' to be simply a )uestion of material fact,as to the earliest emergence of usages which woul' in thelatter$'ay classification be brought un'er the hea' of ownership,then it woul' have to be sai' that ownership must have begun withthe conversion of these articles to in'ivi'ual use. But the)uestion will have to be answere' in the contrary sense if weshift our groun' to the point of view of the primitive men whoseinstitutions are un'er review. The point in )uestion is theorigin of the institution of ownership, as it first ta(es shapein the habits of thought of the early barbarian. The )uestionconcerns the 'erivation of the i'ea of ownership or property.-hat is of interest for the present purpose is not whether we,with our preconceptions, woul' loo( upon the relation of theprimitive savage or barbarian to his slight personal effects as arelation of ownership, but whether that is his own apprehensionof the matter. &t is a )uestion as to the light in which thesavage himself habitually views these ob+ects that pertain

imme'iately to his person an' are set apart for his habitual use.5i(e all )uestions of the 'erivation of institutions, it isessentially a )uestion of fol($psychology, not of mechanicalfact* an', when so conceive', it must be answere' in the


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negative.

The unsophisticate' man, whether savage or civili/e', isprone to conceive phenomena in terms of personality* these beingterms with which he has a first$han' ac)uaintance. This habit ismore unbro(en in the savage than in civili/e' men. All obviousmanifestations of force are apprehen'e' as epressions of

conation $ effort put forth for a purpose by some agency similarto the human will. The point of view of the archaic culture isthat of forceful, perva'ing personality, whose unfol'ing life isthe substantial fact hel' in view in every relation into whichmen or things enter. This point of view in large measure shapesan' colors all the institutions of the early culture $an' in aless 'egree the later phases of culture. 6n'er the gui'ance ofthis habit of thought, the relation of any in'ivi'ual to hispersonal effects is conceive' to be of a more intimate (in' thanthat of ownership simply. Ownership is too eternal an' colorlessa term to 'escribe the fact. &n the apprehension of the savage an' the barbarian thelimits of his person 'o not coinci'e with the limits which mo'ern

biological science woul' recogni/e. 7is in'ivi'uality isconceive' to cover, somewhat vaguely an' uncertainly, a prettywi'e fringe of facts an' ob+ects that pertain to him more or lessimme'iately. To our sense of the matter these items lie outsi'ethe limits of his person, an' to many of them we woul' conceivehim to stan' in an economic rather than in an organic relation.This )uasi$personal fringe of facts an' ob+ects commonlycomprises the man0s sha'ow* the reflection of his image in wateror any similar surface* his name* his peculiar tattoo mar(s* histotem, if he has one* his glance* his breath, especially when itis visible* the print of his han' an' foot* the soun' of hisvoice* any image or representation of his person* any ecretions

or ehalations from his person* parings of his nails* cuttings ofhis hair* his ornaments an' amulets* clothing that is in 'ailyuse, especially what has been shape' to his person, an' moreparticularly if there is wrought into it any totemic or other'esign peculiar to him* his weapons, especially his favoriteweapons an' those which he habitually carries. Beyon' these thereis a great number of other, remoter things which may or may notbe inclu'e' in the )uasi$personal fringe. As regar's this entire range of facts an' ob+ects, it is tobe sai' that the /one of influence of the in'ivi'ual0spersonality is not conceive' to cover them all with the same'egree of potency* his in'ivi'uality sha'es off by insensible,penumbral gra'ations into the eternal worl'. The ob+ects an'facts that fall within the )uasi$personal fringe figure in thehabits of thought of the savage as personal to him in a vitalsense. They are not a congeries of things to which he stan's inan economic relation an' to which he has an e)uitable, legalclaim. These articles are conceive' to be his in much the samesense as his han's an' feet are his, or his pulse$beat, or his'igestion, or the heat of his bo'y, or the motions of his limbsor brain. 8or the satisfaction of any who may be incline' to )uestionthis view, appeal may be ta(en to the usages of almost anypeople. Some such notion of a pervasive personality, or apenumbra of personality, is implie', for instance, in the giving

an' (eeping of presents an' mementos. &t is more in'ubitablypresent in the wor(ing of charms* in all sorcery* in thesacraments an' similar 'evout observances* in such practices asthe Tibetan prayer$wheel* in the a'oration of relics, images, an'


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symbols* in the almost universal veneration of consecrate' placesan' structures* in astrology* in 'ivination by means ofhair$cuttings, nail$parings, photographs, etc. erhaps the least'ebatable evi'ence of belief in such a )uasi$personal fringe isaffor'e' by the practices of sympathetic magic* an' the practicesare stri(ingly similar in substance the worl' over$from thelove$charm to the sacrament. Their substantial groun' is the

belief that a 'esire' effect can be wrought upon a given personthrough the means of some ob+ect lying within his )uasi$personalfringe. The person who is approache' in this way may be afellow$mortal, or it may be some potent spiritual agent whoseintercession is sought for goo' or ill. &f the sorcerer or anyonewho wor(s a charm can in any way get at the penumbra of aperson0s in'ivi'uality, as embo'ie' in his fringe of)uasi$personal facts, he will be able to wor( goo' or ill to theperson to whom the fact or ob+ect pertains* an' the magic ritesperforme' to this en' will wor( their effect with greater forcean' precision in proportion as the ob+ect which affor's the pointof attac( is more intimately relate' to the person upon whom theeffect is to be wrought. An economic relation, simply, 'oes not

affor' a han'le for sorcery. &t may be set 'own that whenever therelation of a person to a given ob+ect is ma'e use of for thepurposes of sympathetic magic, the relation. is conceive' to besomething more vital than simple legal ownership. Such meager belongings of the primitive savage as woul' un'erthe nomenclature of a later 'ay be classe' as personal propertyare not thought of by him as his property at all* they pertainorganically to his person. Of the things comprise' in his)uasi$personal fringe all 'o not pertain to him with the same'egree of intimacy or persistency* but those articles which aremore remotely or more 'oubtfully inclu'e' un'er his in'ivi'ualityare not therefore conceive' to be partly organic to him an'

partly his property simply. The alternative 'oes not lie betweenthis organic relation an' ownership. &t may easily happen that agiven article lying along the margin of the )uasi$personal fringeis eliminate' from it an' is alienate', either by 'efault throughlapse of time or by voluntary severance of the relation. But whenthis happens the article is not conceive' to escape from theorganic relation into a remoter category of things that are owne'by an' eternal to the person in )uestion. &f an ob+ect escapesin this way from the organic sphere of one person, it may passinto the sphere of another* or, if it is an article that len'sitself to common use, it may pass into the common stoc( of thecommunity. As regar's this common stoc(, no concept of ownership, eithercommunal or in'ivi'ual, applies in the primitive community. Thei'ea of a communal ownership is of relatively late growth, an'must by psychological necessity have been prece'e' by the i'ea ofin'ivi'ual ownership. Ownership is an accre'ite' 'iscretionarypower over an ob+ect on the groun' of a conventional claim* itimplies that the owner is a personal agent who ta(es thought forthe 'isposal of the ob+ect owne'. A personal agent is anin'ivi'ual, an' it is only by an eventual refinement $ of thenature of a legal fiction $ that any group of men is conceive' toeercise a corporate 'iscretion over ob+ects. Ownership impliesan in'ivi'ual owner. &t is only by reflection, an' by eten'ingthe scope of a concept which is alrea'y familiar, that a

)uasi$personal corporate 'iscretion an' control of this (in'comes to be impute' to a group of persons. 9orporate ownership is)uasi$ownership only* it is therefore necessarily a 'erivativeconcept, an' cannot have prece'e' the concept of in'ivi'ual


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ownership of which it is a counterfeit. After the i'ea of ownership has been elaborate' an' hasgaine' some consistency, it is not unusual to fin' the notion ofpervasion by the user0s personality applie' to articles owne' byhim. At the same time a given article may also be recogni/e' aslying within the )uasi$personal fringe of one person while it isowne' by another $ as, for instance, ornaments an' other articles

of 'aily use which in a personal sense belong to a slave or to aninferior member of a patriarchal househol', but which as propertybelong to the master or hea' of the househol'. The twocategories, a% things to which one0s personality eten's by wayof pervasion an' b% things owne', by no means coinci'e* nor 'oesthe one supplant the other. The two i'eas are so far fromi'entical that the same ob+ect may belong to one person un'er theone concept an' to another person un'er the other* an', on theother han', the same person may stan' in both relations to agiven ob+ect without the one concept being lost in the other. Agiven article may change owners without passing out of the)uasi$personal fringe of the person un'er whose self it hasbelonge', as, for instance, a photograph or any other memento. A

familiar instance is the mun'ane ownership of any consecrate'place or structure which in the personal sense belongs to thesaint or 'eity to whom it is sacre'. The two concepts are so far 'istinct, or even 'isparate, asto ma(e it etremely improbable that the one has been 'evelope'out of the other by a process of growth. A transition involvingsuch a substitution of i'eas coul' scarcely ta(e place ecept onsome notable impulse from without. Such a step woul' amount tothe construction of a new category an' a reclassification ofcertain selecte' facts un'er the new hea'. The impulse toreclassify the facts an' things that are comprise' in the)uasi$personal fringe, so as to place some of them, together with

certain other things, un'er the new category of ownership, mustcome from some constraining eigency of later growth than theconcept whose province it inva'es. The new category is not simplyan amplifie' form of the ol'. 1ot every item that was originallyconceive' to belong to an in'ivi'ual by way of pervasion comes tobe counte' as an item of his wealth after the i'ea of wealth hascome into vogue. Such items, for instance, as a person0sfootprint, or his image or effigy, or his name, are very tar'ilyinclu'e' un'er the hea' of articles owne' by him, if they areeventually inclu'e' at all. &t is a fortuitous circumstance ifthey come to be owne' by him, but they long continue to hol'their place in his )uasi$personal fringe. The 'isparity of thetwo concepts is well brought out by the case of the 'omesticanimals. These non$human in'ivi'uals are incapable of ownership,but there is impute' to them the attribute of a pervasivein'ivi'uality, which eten's to such items as their footprints,their stalls, clippings of hair, an' the li(e. These items arema'e use of for the purposes of sympathetic magic even in mo'erncivili/e' communities. An illustration that may show this'isparity between ownership an' pervasion in a still strongerlight is affor'e' by the vulgar belief that the moon0s phases mayhave a propitious or sinister effect on human affairs. Theinconstant moon is conceive' to wor( goo' or ill through asympathetic influence or spiritual infection which suggests a)uasi$personal fringe, but which assure'ly 'oes not imply

ownership on her part.

Ownership is not a simple an' instinctive notion that isnaively inclu'e' un'er the notion of pro'uctive effort on the one


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han', nor un'er that of habitual use on the other. &t is notsomething given to begin with, as an item of the isolate'in'ivi'ual0s mental furniture* something which has to beunlearne' in part when men come to co$operate in pro'uction an'ma(e wor(ing arrangements an' mutual renunciations un'er thestress of associate' life $ after the manner impute' by thesocial$contract theory. &t is a conventional fact an' has to be

learne'* it is a cultural fact which has grown into aninstitution in the past through a long course of habituation, an'which is transmitte' from generation to generation as allcultural facts are. On going bac( a little way into the cultural history of ourown past, we come upon a situation which says that the fact of aperson0s being engage' in in'ustry was prima facie evi'ence thathe coul' own nothing. 6n'er serf'om an' slavery those who wor(cannot own, an' those who own cannot wor(. 3ven very recently $culturally spea(ing $ there was no suspicion that a woman0s wor(,in the patriarchal househol', shoul' entitle her to own thepro'ucts of her wor(. 8arther bac( in the barbarian culture,while the patriarchal househol' was in better preservation than

it is now, this position was accepte' with more un)uestioningfaith. The hea' of the househol' alone coul' hol' property* an'even the scope of his ownership was greatly )ualifie' if he ha' afeu'al superior. The tenure of property is a tenure by prowess,on the one han', an' a tenure by sufferance at the han's of asuperior, on the other han'. The recourse to prowess as the'efinitive basis of tenure becomes more imme'iate an' morehabitual the farther the 'evelopment is trace' bac( into theearly barbarian culture* until, on the lower levels of barbarismor the upper levels of savagery, the goo' ol' plan prevailswith but little mitigation. There are always certain conventions,a certain un'erstan'ing as to what are the legitimate con'itions

an' circumstances that surroun' ownership an' its transmission,chief among which is the fact of habitual acceptance. -hat hasbeen currently accepte' as the status )uo$veste' interest $ isright an' goo' so long as it 'oes not meet a challenge bac(e' byirresistible force. roperty rights sanctione' by immemorialusage are inviolable, as all immemorial usage is, ecept in theface of forcible 'ispossession. But sei/ure an' forcibleretention very shortly gain the legitimation of usage, an' theresulting tenure becomes inviolable through habituation. Beatipossi'entes. Throughout the barbarian culture, where this tenure byprowess prevails, the population falls into two economic classes:those engage' in in'ustrial employments, an' those engage' insuch non$in'ustrial pursuits as war, government, sports, an'religious observances. &n the earlier an' more naive stages ofbarbarism the former, in the normal case, own nothing* the latterown such property as they have sei/e', or such as has, un'er thesanction of usage, 'escen'e' upon them from their forebears whosei/e' an' hel' it. At a still lower level of culture, in theprimitive savage hor'e, the population is not similarly 'ivi'e'into economic classes. There is no leisure class resting itsprerogative on coercion, prowess, an' immemorial status* an'there is also no ownership. &t will hol' as a rough generali/ation that in communitieswhere there is no invi'ious 'istinction between employments, as

eploit, on the one han', an' 'ru'gery, on the other, there isalso no tenure of property. &n the cultural se)uence, ownership'oes not begin before the rise of a canon of eploit* but it isto be a''e' that it also 'oes not seem to begin with the first


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beginning of eploit as a manly occupation. &n these very ru'eearly communities, especially in the unpropertie' hor'es ofpeaceable savages, the rule is that the pro'uct of any member0seffort is consume' by the group to which he belongs* an' it isconsume' collectively or in'iscriminately, without )uestion ofin'ivi'ual right or ownership. The )uestion of ownership is notbrought up by the fact that an article has been pro'uce' or is at

han' in finishe' form for consumption. The earliest occurrence of ownership seems to fall in theearly stages of barbarism, an' the emergence of the institutionof ownership is apparently a concomitant of the transition from apeaceable to a pre'atory habit of life. &t is a prerogative ofthat class in the barbarian culture which lea's a life of eploitrather than of in'ustry. The perva'ing characteristic of thebarbarian culture, as 'istinguishe' from the peaceable phase oflife that prece'es it, is the element of eploit, coercion, an'sei/ure. &n its earlier phases ownership is this habit ofcoercion an' sei/ure re'uce' to system an' consistency un'er thesurveillance of usage. The practice of sei/ing an' accumulating goo's on in'ivi'ual

account coul' not have come into vogue to the etent of foun'inga new institution un'er the peaceable communistic regime ofprimitive savagery* for the 'issensions arising from any suchresort to mutual force an' frau' among its members woul' havebeen fatal to the group. 8or a similar reason in'ivi'ualownership of consumable goo's coul' not come in with the firstbeginnings of pre'atory life* for the primitive fighting hor'estill nee's to consume its scanty means of subsistence in common,in or'er to give the collective hor'e its full fightingefficiency. Otherwise it woul' succumb before any rival hor'ethat ha' not yet given up collective consumption. -ith the a'vent of pre'atory life comes the practice of

plun'ering $ of sei/ing goo's from the enemy. But in or'er thatthe plun'ering habit shoul' give rise to in'ivi'ual ownership ofthe things sei/e', these things must be goo's of a somewhatlasting (in', an' not imme'iately consumable means ofsubsistence. 6n'er the primitive culture the means of subsistenceare habitually consume' in common by the group, an' the manner inwhich such goo's are consume' is fie' accor'ing to an elaboratesystem of usage. This usage is not rea'ily bro(en over, for it isa substantial part of the habits of life of every in'ivi'ualmember. The practice of collective consumption is at the sametime necessary to the survival of the group, an' this necessityis present in men0s min's an' eercises a surveillance over theformation of habits of thought as to what is right an' seemly.Any propensity to aggression at this early stage will, therefore,not assert itself in the sei/ure an' retention of consumablegoo's* nor 'oes the temptation to 'o so rea'ily present itself,since the i'ea of in'ivi'ual appropriation of a store of goo's isalien to the archaic man0s general habits of thought. The i'ea of property is not rea'ily attache' to anything buttangible an' lasting articles. &t is only where commercial'evelopment is well a'vance' $ where bargain an' sale is a largefeature in the community0s life$that the more perishable articlesof consumption are thought of as items of wealth at all. Thestill more evanescent results of personal service are still more'ifficult to bring in un'er the i'ea of wealth. So much so that

the attempt to classify services as wealth is meaningless tolaymen, an' even the a'ept economists hol' a 'ivi'e' opinion asto the intelligibility of such a classification. &n thecommon$sense apprehension the i'ea of property is not currently


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attache' to any but tangible, ven'ible goo's of some 'urability.This is true even in mo'ern civili/e' communities, wherepecuniary i'eas an' the pecuniary point of view prevail. &n ali(e manner an' for a li(e reason, in an earlier, non$commercialphase of culture there is less occasion for an' greater'ifficulty in applying the concept of ownership to anything butobviously 'urable articles.

But 'urable articles of use an' consumption which are sei/e'in the rai's of a pre'atory hor'e are either articles of generaluse or they are articles of imme'iate an' continue' personal useto the person who has sei/e' them. &n the former case the goo'sare consume' in common by the group, without giving rise to anotion of ownership* in the latter case they fall into the classof things that pertain organically to the person of their user,an' they woul', therefore, not figure as items of property orma(e up a store of wealth. &t is 'ifficult to see how an institution of ownership coul'have arisen in the early 'ays of pre'atory life through thesei/ure of goo's, but the case is 'ifferent with the sei/ure ofpersons. 9aptives are items that 'o not fit into the scheme of

communal consumption, an' their appropriation by their in'ivi'ualcaptor wor(s no manifest 'etriment to the group. At the same timethese captives continue to be obviously 'istinct from theircaptor in point of in'ivi'uality, an' so are not rea'ily broughtin un'er the )uasi$personal fringe. The captives ta(en un'er ru'econ'itions are chiefly women. There are goo' reasons for this.3cept where there is a slave class of men, the women are moreuseful, as well as more easily controlle', in the primitivegroup. Their labor is worth more to the group than theirmaintenance, an' as they 'o not carry weapons, they are lessformi'able than men captives woul' be. They serve the purpose oftrophies very effectually, an' it is therefore worth while for

their captor to trace an' (eep in evi'ence his relation to themas their captor. To this en' he maintains an attitu'e of'ominance an' coercion towar' women capture' by him* an', asbeing the insignia of his prowess, he 'oes not suffer them tostan' at the bec( an' call of rival warriors. They are fitsub+ects for comman' an' constraint* it ministers to both hishonor an' his vanity to 'omineer over them, an' their utility inthis respect is very great. But his 'omineering over them is theevi'ence of his prowess, an' it is incompatible with theirutility as trophies that other men shoul' ta(e the liberties withhis women which serve as evi'ence of the coercive relation ofcaptor. -hen the practice har'ens into custom, the captor comes toeercise a customary right to eclusive use an' abuse over thewomen he has sei/e'* an' this customary right of use an' abuseover an ob+ect which is obviously not an organic part of hisperson constitutes the relation of ownership, as naivelyapprehen'e'. After this usage of capture has foun' its way intothe habits of the community, the women so hel' in constraint an'in evi'ence will commonly fall into a conventionally recogni/e'marriage relation with their captor. The result is a new form ofmarriage, in which the man is master. This ownership$marriageseems to be the original both of private property an' of thepatriarchal househol'. Both of these great institutions are,accor'ingly, of an emulative origin.

The varying 'etails of the 'evelopment whereby ownershipeten's to other persons than capture' women cannot be ta(en uphere* neither can the further growth of the marriage institutionthat came into vogue at the same time with ownership. robably at


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a point in the economic evolution not far subse)uent to the'efinitive installation of the institution of ownership$marriagecomes, as its conse)uence, the ownership of consumable goo's. Thewomen hel' in servile marriage not only ren'er personal serviceto their master, but they are also employe' in the pro'uction ofarticles of use. All the noncombatant or ignoble members of thecommunity are habitually so employe'. An' when the habit of

loo(ing upon an' claiming the persons i'entifie' with myinvi'ious interest, or subservient to me, as mine has become anaccepte' an' integral part of men0s habits of thought, it becomesa relatively easy matter to eten' this newly achieve' concept ofownership to the pro'ucts of the labor performe' by the personsso hel' in ownership. An' the same propensity for emulation whichbears so great a part in shaping the original institution ofownership eten's its action to the new category of things owne'.1ot only are the pro'ucts of the women0s labor claime' an' value'for their serviceability in furthering the comfort an' fullnessof life of the master, but they are valuable also as aconspicuous evi'ence of his possessing many an' efficientservants, an' they are therefore useful as an evi'ence of his

superior force. The appropriation an' accumulation of consumablegoo's coul' scarcely have come into vogue as a 'irect outgrowthof the primitive hor'e$communism, but it comes in as an easy an'unobtrusive conse)uence of the ownership of persons.

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Uma treta sobre ownerqualquer.pdf