A. N. Leontiev - Tipos de pensamento - pensamento e cognição sensória (em inglês)

8/21/2019 A. N. Leontiev - Tipos de pensamento - pensamento e cognio sensria (em ingls)

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Journal of Russian and East European Psychology,vol. 43, no. 5,SeptemberOctober 2005, pp. 2540. 2005 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved.ISSN 10610405/2005 $9.50 + 0.00.

A.N. LEONTIEV

Lecture 35. Types of Thinking.Thinking and Sensory Cognition

We begin this semester with the new subject of thinking, one couldsay, a classical subject, rather difficult. You know very well that it is notonly psychology that deals with the processes of thinking. Thinking isalso an object of study in the theory of knowledge, that is, philosophy. Aspecial science also deals with thinkinglogic, in all its aspects andareas.

Thinking became a concern of psychology relatively recently, at atime when psychology had already begun to take shape as an indepen-dent field of knowledge and the first systematic concepts about the psy-chology of thinking and about psychological issues of thinking providedthe content of the so-called psychology of associationism of the nine-teenth century. It was based on a set of very simple, common-knowl-

edge propositions that the main laws guiding the movement of ideas, ofconcepts in the mind of man, are the laws of connections, that is, thelaws of associations. In this context, various types of associations were

described: association through simultaneity, similarity, and contrast. Andseveral special empirical observations were conducted, which paved the


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26 JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN PSYCHOLOGY

way for the introduction of such concepts as perseveration, that is,extending the effect of associations on the subsequent flow of processes.Or, concepts that in modern terms we might call expectation, set,

they called, anticipation. That was the term they used, and others like

it, in psychology of associationism.At the same time, it was characteristic that thinking was always seen

as an internal process, played out in the field of consciousness, in theinternal field. It can be found or described through utterances, that is thesolution to, let us say, associational problems (one idea or concept,

through association, brings forth another), or through direct study not ofthe process itself, but of its product. So, various products of the internalintellectual process, the thinking process, were subject to analysis. You

can see, therefore, that, initially in psychology, the problem of thinkingemerged as the problem of internal thinking. It could also be called ver-bal. Or even verbal-logicala form of discursive thinking, in Rus-

sian, of reasoning thinking, which is an internal, logical process.Naturally, by this time the well-known differentiation between the psy-

chological and the logical approach had emerged. This distinction pre-sented serious difficulty, and if you take old psychology textbooks or oldpsychology courses, you will find in the pages of these textbooks or in thepsychology courses chapters or paragraphs, for example, a chapter on

reason, on syllogisms, that is, essentially a repetition of such chaptersnormally belonging to formal logic. The problem of the logical and thepsychological, in essence, had not been resolved. Pages from textbookson formal logic were transposed into textbooks of psychology.

A significant contribution to the further study of the psychology ofthinking was made by experimentation conducted within the framework

of experimental human self-observation, which also dealt with a verbal-logical process (I have in mind the contribution made by the so-called

Wrzburg school). The Wrzburg school is represented by a number ofvery well-known names, preeminent in the first quarter of our century.


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What exactly has this school given us and why, out of all of associa-tional psychology, have I chosen to make special mention of it?

It is because this school has introduced a fundamental proposition. It

has demonstrated that the cognitive process that we describe as an inter-

nal process, a process of thinking that takes place internally, is not aneffect of the struggle, as has been said, between association, that is,between the associative process, and the process of perseveration. Theassociative process somewhere, at some time, emerges and somewherealong the way dies out. Please note, if there were no activity, there would

be some assortment of ideas, that is, the kind of thinking that followssome paths that have been well-trodden by associations. To this wasadded a very important tenet that is known in these terms: it is the tenet

of determining tendency, or to put it differently, the role of the task thatis organizer of the process and the director of the process. So, the mostimportant condition giving rise to this process is not the internal struggle

of two tendencies, but the presence of a certain task before the subject thatgenerates this fundamental tendency or direction of the thinking process.This was a fundamental historical landmark in the development of psy-chological knowledge about thinking. It should be said that this began theformulation of a very important problem in psychologythe problem ofgeneralization, of concept.

The experimental nature of this research allowed for a number ofunclear questions to come into view and for light to be shed on them, fornew questions to be posed, but there were limitations because researchinto thinking, albeit experimental, was still introspective, that is, foundedon the evidence of the thinker, in this case the experimental subject solv-ing a problem.

Certain difficulties remained in distinguishing between logical andpsychological content, that is, between the logical and psychological

aspects of this process.It is essential that the complexity of this process be emphasized. I would


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an expression, or rather a reflection of certain connections that we repro-duce. These laws exist in and of themselves. They reflect objective con-nections and the ways in which they are operated. If this is the case, then

there is no place, essentially, for the psychology of thinking, with the

exception of special questions. What are these questions?First, it is understood that man is not born with logical thinking. He

acquires logic. It is not lessons in logic that are necessary, but generali-zations of the experiences of perception, of the experience of communi-cation with other people. Man acquires human norms. Thinkingthat

is what logical norms are.This means it is possible to talk about the psychology of thinking in

the child. This is not the same thing as factual logicright? Thinking

can be ascertained in children, let us say, of a preschool or early schoolage, but it differs from the logical thinking of the adult. Second, patho-logical thinking is a persistent disturbance regarding logical thinking.

There are differences between various types of pathology. Pathologicalthinking also falls beyond the bounds of what we call logic, howeverone might interpret this subject.

And finally, the last thing, so-called creative thinking. Incidentally,this problem was also presented in an excellent way by the Wrzburgschool. It is a problem of so-called productive thinking. The meaning of

this problem can be summed up in the following way. Let us say that weare analyzing some kind of logical operationslet us take an ordinary,banal syllogism, reasoning along a classical model about the mortalityof man, that Socrates is a man, and the conclusion, that is, the result ofthis thinking, consists in the notion that Socrates must be mortal. Yousee, even in this simple syllogism, most elementary in form, certain

difficulties are found consisting in the fact that you must have the firstand second premise in order to reach the conclusion. How do you choose

the first and second premise? You analyze premises and through thisprocess find the required conclusion, but you do not know why those


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is a living beingand so on, but this is a matter for logic. The problemremains, and it is a very subtle problem.

So, I repeat, these were the landmarks we had. The first landmark is

associational psychology, which portrays these processes in the form of a

flow of associations directed by internal tendencies. The second momentoccurs when these processes are identified as goal oriented, they are sub-ject to objectives. And finally, the last, which I would like to particularlyemphasize: the experience of life, practical tasks, which arose before thepsychologist, the expansion of the field of vision of psychology, the ex-

pansion of the possibility for empirical, including experimental, researchinevitably led to something I would conditionally call a refusal to studyonly discursive, or primarily discursive, logical, reasoning thinking. And

then thinking appeared in a nonlogical form, and, consequently, moreclearly. What do I mean by this?These are first and foremost successes in the ontogenic study of think-

ing. You see: thinking is present, but it is not equipped with the norms oflogic, and it is left on its own, to flow in its own way, uncomplicated byhuman thinking, the experience of human practice that has taken shapein the formulas or the laws of logic.

Second, there is the folk psychology or psychology of people,ethnopsychology. Research really picked up on the basis of extensive

ethnographic material collected at the turn of the century, when contactswere made during voyages, during trade, with the help of guides wholaid the way for commerce and sometimes for military occupation, thatis, more often than not. This ethnographic material indicated that thethinking process flowed differently in a number of peoples at a rela-tively low level of socioeconomic developmentthere is a certain unique-

ness. The best-known name, familiar here thanks to translations, is L.Lvy-Bruhl and his work, Primitive Mentality.3A very strange logic is

described there, not at all like the logic we encounter in those belongingto peoples at significantly higher levels of economic, cultural, and so-


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vidual researchers using historical artifacts in the study of the psychologyof thinking. One well-known subject area developed within the Meyersonschool is based on the study of objective historical documents of the an-

cient world, of GreeceGreek art, Greek literatureall expressions of

Greek creativity.Finally, the development of technology led to the problem being

viewed on yet another plane: manual or technical thinkinglet ussay the ability to see quickly which way a gear is going to turn if an-other, linked to it by two or three other gears, turns, let us say, clock-

wise. Or, how to create a whole from several elements. How to puttogether a cube from its separate pieces. Or, along the same lines, theselast tasks: to put something together or take something apart, to deter-

mine direction, visually, using sightthese are very common, for in-stance, in one of our countrys ethnic groups. I personally came uponsuch a game back in 1930putting together a very complex stereomet-

ric figure from pieces of wood. There was this game of patient construc-tion and at the same time of envisioning complex, spatial interrelations,and I saw it.

So-called technical thinking was discovered. In order to select candi-dates for the first stage of training as a mechanic, it might be necessaryto see how they handle problems involving spatial thinking. Or prob-

lems involving the relations that are perceived in the immediate me-chanical way or revealed through testing direct mechanical perception,or how they do on tests involving the discovery of relations. That is howthis branch of research emerged. The aristocratic nature of discursivethinking was eliminated. Beyond it, a tremendous number of processeswere discovered that are, first of all, undeniably cognitive; second, that

appear beyond the bounds of the data of sensory perception and aresomehow distinct from that perception. This is not perception, it is think-

ing, but not in the traditional forms of discursive thinking. This wasespecially well presented in the works of yet another school, also from


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thinking of apes. Trials, but trials along a particular line. This is a com-plex process. We have started to talk about animal intellect. And intel-lect, after all, is thinking. But we do have to say thinking in its prehuman

forms. Let us decide it thus: intellect is a broader concept, while think-

ing is more narrow (human intellect, human intellectual behavior).Khlers research was immediately reflected in the research of child

psychology. The same Bhler, and later the other authors, came out withstudies conducted on small children using the same method as Khler.The tasks were the same: to figure out where to position a chair so as to

reach toys that had been hung or placed high up, or to roll a ball out of astructure something like a labyrinth; to work with a cage, but not frominside the cage. On the contrary, the target object is inside the cage and

the child, naturally, is outside the cage and must somehow get the objectout of the cage. In short, a vast number of such methods were devised.But it was characteristic of all of them that they related to thinking in a

very broad sense and did not limit themselves to the confines of reason-ing and discursive thinking, always using the apparatus of logic.

Perhaps, given this broader understanding, success will be achieved(and, perhaps, partial success has already been achieved) in approach-ing an understanding of what is called the creative aspect of thinking,the special nature of the thinking process, something that is sometimes

called intuition, right? That which is designated as visual thinking(this is a very perplexing term). In short, an idea has formed that think-ing can be different, can be qualitatively different, that there can be quali-tatively distinct unique phases in development. Some have merelydescribed the forms, others have connected them historically, that is,tried to make them into a certain progression in phylogenetic develop-

ment: from animal thinking to modern, developed human thinking, orfrom that of a very small child, from a newborn, to an adolescent, with

the full morphological apparatus that we usually use.The terms manual, or sometimes practical, thinking have emerged;


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gence of tool and goal. And some special studies by [E.R.] Jaensch witheideticists allowed a real interdependence to be seen: the movement ofthese things in the phenomenal visual field of a person experiencing

need, necessity just like that, visually: the stick gravitates, moves to-

ward the goal. Khler also used the term in eidetic images, that is, inimages that only a certain portion of people are able to maintain, peoplewho have this eidetic memory. You know what an eideticist is andwhat eidetic images are. An eideticist, when he is asked how to getsomething sees how one moves toward the other, that is, the representa-

tion is visualized. But this is, of course, an extreme, special case. This isan exception, right? Thus, the vivid image is thinking. It can be calledsensory thinking, thinking in images. It can also be called vivid

thinking. Sometimes it can be called visual thinking, because it reliesprimarily on vision.And finally, that from which it all startedthis is thinking in words,

presupposing the presence of verbal concepts, meanings. This is discur-sive thinking, this is logical thinking, this is verbal thinkingit is alsocharacterized this way, but it is all the same, it all refers to the sameprocess.

I draw the same conclusion: at the present time, thinking appearsbefore us as a process that flows in various forms, in such forms as, for

instance, motive, motor action, representations, and living images. Then,we have logical thinking, reasoning, discursive thinking. And this diver-sity of types of thinkingit is, one could say, what constitutes the en-deavor of psychologists (and not only psychologists), who are focusedon the study of this problem, the problem of the specific science of psy-chology: psychophysiology, child psychology, animal psychology, in a

word, the fields that we are studying.And now there can be no talk of psychology generating logic. The

two simply do not go together.Take vivid-motor thinking, also called sympractical thinking, which


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to the demands of logic. We must differentiate it, we must distinguish itfirst and foremost from other forms of understanding. You know, afterall, that this is a fundamental distinctionbetween immediate, sensory

perception and cognition in the form of thinking. This is a generally

accepted distinction, firmly established and understood by everyone. Per-ception and thinking are two levels of cognition, two forms of cognition.And the second, of course, cannot exist without the first. The connectionhere is unambiguous, unidirectional in a certain sense. Francis Bacon,whom Vygotsky and many other authors have cited, once said, There is

nothing in the intellect that did not first exist in feelings. Any material-ist will insist on that point of view. In this sense we are all sensualists,we all recognize sensory perception, the data of sensation, of percep-

tion, to put it another way, as the source of our knowledge. And now wehave yet another level. Here we have sympractical, or manual thinking,vivid, vivid-action, and reasoning thinking? What makes them all dif-

ferent from immediate-sensory perception?I am posing this question and devoting so much time to it in order to

clear the path ahead, to eliminate certain misunderstandings. And theydo arise. I know that they arise quite often, and I would like in advanceto prevent serious misunderstandingsdistinguishing poorly betweenperception and thinking, a distinction using false criteria.

Perception provides a vivid image, but thinking? You could say thatit is abstract. But thinking can have as its product something concrete,represented in a concrete, sensory image. It does not pass using thiscriterion. The presence of verbal generalizations? But, if you will allow,are not verbal generalizations part of the process of perception of theobjective world, of sensory perception? I can clearly see a microphone;

I perceive it as a microphone. We talked quite a bit about this when welooked at perception. There is a unique semantic of perception that ex-

presses objectivity, human perceptual objectivity. So, there is no suchcriterion. And, in general, one could say that perception gives us an


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There is a problem that has demanded quite a bit of time from animalresearchers. This is the problem of stimulus equivalence. The mostordinary experiment with the formation of a skill and a conditional con-

nection, if you like. A connection to what? In this case it is a connection

to the appearance of a triangle. In the animal, a high-order animal, thefollowing connection has been made: where there is a triangle, there isfood. One needs to go in the direction of the triangle and do somethingpreconditioned. And now let us switch this triangle that we, as investi-gators, were using and that the animal knew from previous experiments,

and replace it with another stimulus and see which stimuli will be equiva-lent and which will not. That is, which stimuli will elicit the reactionthat has been learned, drilled in and established, and which will not.

What will be related to that which came before, and what will be differ-entiated? Then we can go into differentiation as far as we like, withgreat accuracythese are Pavlovs famous tenets. Well, here is the tri-

angle. Let us disconnect it. It had solid lines, now let us use dotted lines.Let us try simply using three dots. It was blacklet us make it white ona dark background, or maybe even colored. Do you understand what Imean by varying the stimulus? And then let us conduct a series of ex-periments and we will see: there has been a generalizationhere is whathas been included, and here is what has been excluded; and with this

animal the following happenedthis is the way his generalization went.We performed this experiment on rats, monkeys, and different kinds ofanimals with different behavior, ecologies, and a different basis. We gotanswers to these questions about generalization. Not to mention experi-ments with people, of the analyticity and visualization of their percep-tion, of the endowment of the image with meaning, that is, of the use of

speech, or verbal meanings.So some other criteria must be found. And then, perhaps, we really

will see not the breaking away of thinking from sensation, but rathertheir relationship, their transitions, and most important, the transforma-


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Let us go ahead and answer the question of how we distinguish be-tween the level of cognition that we call the level of thinking, and thelevel that we call the level of sensory cognition, the level of perception.

I would like to proceed in the following way: I myself will put for-

ward a certain hypothesisI would like to make use of this pedagogictechnique todayand then together we will consider in detail how thishypothetical criterion looks in relation to various specific processes andphenomena about which we know something more or less adequately. Iwould write two such formulas, but, comrades, please recognize their

conditionality. These are not some symbolic nomenclature; for my ownconvenience I simply want to make this visual. So, you see that whenwe look at perception, we find this process is always included in the

interaction between the perceiving subject and the perceived object, re-gardless of what it is. It must have one property: it must be able to act onone of the sensory organs, right? On many of them at once or just on

one, but it must have an effect, right? And finally, the other conditionit must be an object of our activity, this object.

Into this system, however developed it might be, go all processes thatwe call interaction. Whatever the subject brings with him, whatever previ-ous experience might refract this effect and take part in this interaction. Itmay be individual experience. It may be the experience of an entire

species. In animals, species experience is literally biological, heredi-tary. This is what we find as inherent in the subject. Now, what otherkind of experience could there be? Species experience in other senses:sociohistorical, acquired experience, and, third, individual experience.There are species phylogenic and species historical experiencethatwhich is acquired and learned by each new generation. It is not written

down and prepared, but it also is not built on the basis of individualgeneralization. This is the experience of generations, the experience of

social practice, reflected in language, in the system of concepts, of mean-ings that are acquired by a child to one degree or another, right? And it is


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the second? Objectobject? No. Subjectobjectobject. Now let ustry to see whether this is the way it is and what it means.

Here, everything is represented in the following way: we can take a

hackneyed example that I have used before. It is very simple. What I am

talking about is the possibility, thanks to this scheme, of going beyondthe limits of the properties immediately accessible to our sensory organs,that is, to our perception. This scheme, the second one, goes beyondthose boundaries, and the first one does not go beyond them. Now, aboutthe illustration I was just talking about.

The threshold of my musculocutaneous sensitivity, as we know, is rathercrude and lies within a fairly small range. Essentially, I have to go beyondthe boundaries of that range, that is, go beyond the bounds of the capabili-

ties afforded me by my organs of perception, my sensory organs. How doI do that? I cannot distinguish between the hardness of this material andthat. I tried touching themthis one is hard and that one is also hard.

They are equally hard. This is beyond the bounds of the capabilities of mysensory perception. I cannot answer this question on the basis of this giveninteractionIobject and objectI. So, I interact with this object andI interact with that object and I say that they are both hard, but I cannotdifferentiate. But now, perhaps, I will try something. I will do this: I willscratch here and seethere is no scratch, and now something else hap-

pens: I scratch thereand a scratch appeared. What did I do? I intro-duced, I determined an interaction of two objects and by changing one ofthem I could judgeI issued a judgmentabout a property of the other.That object turned out to be harder. I did not know that and was not able tofind it out. It was beyond the limits accessible to my sensory organs.

I do not know whether this or that element is contained in a given

substance and I cannot find that out because the substance is far awayfrom me (let us say, it is some planet or other heavenly body). But, can

I get a spectrogram? I can. And before me is a developed spectrogram. Isee a black linethat is hydrogen, you see? How can I know? By the


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besides what is given through sensation, through perception, throughcognition. But the range of our sensitivity differs from the range of ourperception because, in studying the interaction of things, we discover

the properties that are not revealed to us through the interaction between

perceiving subject and object. Then a very important theoreticalthinking becomes clear that was expressed by Marx in his contentionthat, initially, thinking is directly intertwined with practical action.Beyond that there can be other observations, perhaps, even more validones: essentially, tools are a true abstraction. Productive action is gen-

erally an experiment. Productive action in the broad sense, productiveaction removed from its result, is an experiment. I have in mind a repre-sentation of a certain result that I have to achieve, a substantive, objec-

tive result of my objective action. I can, of course, immediately switchto an action with this material, with the object of labor, assuming I willget a certain result. But I can also do something else. I can try things. I

can make a preliminary test. And then will that test be practical or cog-nitive action? If I bend something, not in order to create a bow, but to seehow pliant this material is, because I could discard it and pick anotherwith the help of tests. So, as long as I have not started to make itwhat isthis? Is this a practical or cognitive activity? It must be cognitive. What isit separate from? From the immediate product that I need. It might, by

chance, be the same, or it might not be. I bend itit is not pliant enough;I bend anotherit is pliant enough, it would be suitable, and I continue towork on it. I subject the properties of an object, the properties of a mate-rial that are hidden from me in a direct contact, to reliable testing usingdirect action in order to apply this cognitive element of my practical ac-tion. I can go through an experimental stage. This is how experiments

came about. Therefore, in Marx we encounter the idea that industry andexperiment are the first forms in which human thinking is expressed. In-

dustrial action, labor action, and experiment! Why experiment? It is apractical action separate from the need to achieve a practical result, an


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Let me ask a clarifying question (with a purely didactic purpose), sothat everything will be perfectly clear.

When we say that an action is taking place with the help of trial and

error, are the trials chaotic? Or are they not chaotic? Even at the level of

animal psychology? Is everything tried, or just certain things? They arenot chaotic.

Have you understood the sense in which the problem has been turnedupside down? Things are not chaotic, although they may be portrayed aschaotic. I recall something I saw: a fence, and by the fence a chicken

(the chicken, as is well known, is frankly not among the smartest ofanimals, but is a really stupid bird); but if you put it in a really ridiculoussituationyou start to chase it with a broom or something, it rushes

about here and there and goes through a hole in the fence, and now you,thank goodness, have finished waving your threatening broom. Yourepeat the experiment and gradually, what happens? The number of nec-

essary trials is reduced. Theoretically, we are told that there is a learningcurve, and you can look and see if such a curve always really appears. Ifit is a very idiotic situation, then in animals it always appears. But if youjust slightly bring the situation of this experiment closer to a situationthat resembles real life, you will see that in the best case you will get acertain start to the curvea decline, and then suddenly the curve falls

vertically and the solution appears with so-called good mistakes. Yousimply introduced it into a situation what an ethologist would now rec-ognize as appropriate for observing animals, that is, a situation that doesnot resemble one where, let us say, a rabbit is taught to play the flute, butmore like one where a rabbit is taught to play the drums. I am sure youunderstand the difference? One relies on an acting mechanism and the

other has nothing at all to rely on.So, I would say, simplifying things completely (comrades, today I

am talking with you, and not reading you a lecture; I want to give youthis idea as simply as I can from the start), I insist that perception can


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are able to pick up only small pieces. If I want to find out whether asolution is slightly acidic or slightly alkaline, I try tasting it, but I cannottell. I cannot say, because the threshold is fuzzy. But, if a litmus paper

turns pink, it is acid, if you pleaseif it turns blue, then it is alkaline. I

can judge the chemical property based on the color. I can determine thepresence of hydrogen based on the black spectral lineI use one todetermine the other. I test these connections, I develop them, I deter-mine the rules by which these connections operate, and that is how logicemerges, because if these connections are made more complex, the ob-

ject moves farther away. If the object is mediated multiple times, then Ihave to pass through the paths of mediation, and this is practically im-possible unless the theoretical thinking that is essential to conscious-

nessthinking that does not rely directly on practical interactions,however complex and far-removed they may becomes into effect. Wehave to use some guiding thread so we do not lose our way, some appa-

ratus. And this apparatus, the means, the thread, are the logical appara-tus that does not allow us to become lostto the contrary, it shows usthe way. But the process, in essence, remains the same at any level ofdevelopment in any form. These complex relations are not immediatelyevidentthe transition from I and object to I and judgment madeabout one object based on the change in another. I need to determine

the height of a tree, but there is a river between me and the tree. It isfrightfully cold and I am not planning to swim across the river. I am notplanning to catch pneumonia. And in any event, I cannot cross the river.I cannot swim and I do not have the necessary means. I cannot walk tothe tree. But do I need to go to it or not? Can I substitute a theoreticalprocess for the practical process of measuring the distance to the tree?

Who does not know elementary geometry, which teaches how to calcu-late such a value? I am able to do this. For this there is a theory and

theoretical thinking. We are forever shortening the path. We incorpo-rate theoretical links, with which we arm our thinking, and we deter-


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fore, the intricate, abstract sciences remain all the same within the boundsof the function that they fulfill; they are incorporated inside the process.Logic can never become a subject of perception, no kind of logic. The

subject of perception is still the person. Its true object is the world, reality.

And, not only the reality that is capable of exerting its direct effect on thesensory organs, but also all actuality that takes the form of interactions.

And is the reality that does not possess the attribute of interactingwith anything hidden from man? Such reality does not exist. It is notreality, but unreality, negative reality, since we always see interaction

between the elements of the world. Behind interaction there is the worlditself, right? There is nothing else. So, a noninteracting world is totalnonsense. And a world that does not know interaction is unknowable.

But there is no such world, not under any circumstances. On that note, Iend the introduction to this topic.

Notes

1. See A.M. Matiushkin, ed., The Psychology of Thinking [Psikhologiiamyshleniia] (Moscow, 1965).

2. SeeNew Ideas in Philosophy [Novye idei v filosofii], Collection 16, Psychol-ogy of Thinking[Psikhologiia myshleniia] (St. Petersburg, 1914).

3. L. Levi-Briul [Lvy-Bruhl], Primitive Mentality[Pervobytnoe myshlenie](Moscow, 1930).


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A. N. Leontiev - Tipos de pensamento - pensamento e cognição sensória (em inglês)