˙¯·Á ÈÈ„

 ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ 5

76y3 ,(Â"Ò˘˙)

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙

˙‡Ó

**ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ *Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

‡Â‰ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ ÈÎ ‡È‰ ¯Ó‡Ó· ˙ÈÏÚÂÓ‰ ‰Úˉ

.("Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ") ÌÈËÒÈχ ÌÈÈÚˆ˜Ó ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ Á˙ÙÏ

‰È˘‰Â ˙È·ÈËÈÊÂÙ ˙Á‡‰ Z ˙Â¯Â˘˜ ˙ÂÊÈ˙ È˙˘ ¯Ó‡Ó‰ Ì„˜Ó ‰Ê Ú˜¯ ÏÚ

˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ÈÎ ‰Úˉ ˙‡ ÒÒ·Ó ¯Ó‡Ó‰ ,˙È·ÈËÈÊÂÙ ‰ÈÁ·Ó .˙È·ÈËÓ¯Â

.‰ÈÏÚ Ô‚‰Ï ڄÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙„Â·Ú ˙‡ „„ÂÚÏ ˙Ó ÏÚ „ÁÂÈÓ· ·ˆÂÚ Í¯Ú

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ‰ÈÙÏ˘ ,˙Ϸ˜Ӊ ‰Ú„‰ ˙‡ ¯Ó‡Ó‰ ÍȯÙÓ ,‰Ê ¯˘˜‰·

˙‚‰ ÈÈ„ Ìȇ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ,Ô· .Ô˘‰ ÚȘ˘Ó‰ ÏÚ Ô‚‰Ï ÌÈ˘˜·Ó

ÌÈÏÂÎȉ ̉ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÈÎ ‰‡¯Ó ¯Ó‡Ó‰ ,˙È·ÈËӯ ‰ÈÁ·Ó .Ôίˆ‰

̉ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÔÎ-ÏÚ ,ÌÈÏÈÚÈ Ô‰ Ș¢ ¯˙ÂÈ· ‰·Âˉ ‰¯Âˆ· Ì„˜Ï

ÏÚ ‰‚‰ .‰ÈÏÚ Ô‚‰Ï Û‡˘Ï Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ÏÚ˘ ˜Â˘‰ ȘÁ˘ ˙ˆÂ·˜

˙‡ ¯È·‚‰Ï Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘ ˙‡ ÏÚÈÈÏ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„Ï ¯˘Ù‡˙ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ

˙‡ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ÌÈÁ˙ÙÓ ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÏÚ Ì‚· ,ÍÎÓ ‰¯˙È .Â˙ÂÏÈÊ

˙¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ˜ÈÂ„Ó ¯ÂÁÓ˙ ˙ÁË·‰ È„È ÏÚ ,Â˙ÂÈ‚‰ ˙‡Â ˜Â˘‰ Ï˘ Â˙¯˘ÂÈ

‰‚‰‰ ‡Â‰ ÏÈÚÈ ˜Â˘ ,Ô· .¯ÁÒÓ‰ Ï˘ ˙˜ÙÒÓ ˙ÂÏÈÊ · ÌȯÁÒ‰ ͯډ

Ô· ÌȯÈÁÓ‰˘ ÍÎ ÏÚ ÍÂÓÒÏ ÏÂÎÈ ¯˘‡ ,Ô˘‰ ÚȘ˘Ó‰ ÏÚ ¯˙ÂÈ· ‰·Âˉ

˙‡ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ÌÈ¯Ù˘Ó ÂÊ Í¯„· .ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ÌÈÈ¢ ˙‡ ÌÈÙ˜˘Ó

.‰ÏÎÏη ÌÈ·‡˘Ó‰ Ï˘ ‰‡ˆ˜‰‰

˜Â˘ Ì„˜Ï ‡Â‰ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ ÈÎ ‰‡¯Ó ¯Ó‡Ó‰

*.˜¯ÂÈ-ÂÈ ,‰È·ÓÂϘ ˙ËÈÒ¯·È‡ ,‡ ˙ȯ˜ ,˙ÈÓ„˜‡‰ ‰È¯˜‰ ,ÌÈËÙ˘ÓÏ ¯ÂÒÙ¯Ù**‰ËϘى ,Á¯Â‡ ¯ÂÒٯ٠,‰È·ÏÈÒÙ ˙ËÈÒ¯·È‡· ÌÈËÙ˘ÓÏ ¯ÙÒ‰ ˙È· ,ÌÈËÙ˘ÓÏ ¯ÂÒÙ¯Ù

.ÔÏȇ-¯· ˙ËÈÒ¯·È‡ ÌÈËÙ˘ÓÏÏÓ ,·ÂÏÂÙ‚Ï„ ·ÏÒÈËÒ ,ÒÈÈ„ ·Â¯ ,ÈÙ˜ ˜'‚ ,Ï· È·‡Ï ÌÈ„ÂÓ Â‡ ˙ÂÏÈÚÂÓ‰ ̉È˙¯ډ ÏÚ„Ï„ ,‡‰Î ˜È ,ÔÓÒ‰ ȯ‰ ,Ô„¯Â‚ Û'‚ ,‚¯·„Ï‚ ˜È ,ÏÈÏ‚ ¯È‡È ,Ò˜ÂÙ ËÈ¯Ó ,‚¯·ÊÈȇ,ËÙ‡‰ÏÈÓ ÒÈ˯˜ ,ȉ‡Ó ÏÂÙ ,ÔÈÈˢÂÂÏ ÒȇÂÏ ,Ô‡ÈËÂÏ ‰¯Ó˙ ,Ì˘Ï ˜ÈÏÂÓ˘ ,˯‚‡Ï,ԇȇӇ¯·ÂÒ Ô‰‡Â‚ ,ÏÈÈÒ È¯‡Ïȉ ,·Â˜ÈϘү ÒÎχ ,ÂÓ¯ ‰Ë¯·Â¯ ,˜Â¯ „‡ ,¯ÂËÒÈÙ ‰È¯˙˜Ì˙¯ „ÚÈ ,È„χ˜Ó Ô¢ ,„È·'ˆ ÒÂÓÏ ÌÈ„ÂÓ Â‡ ¯˜ÁÓ· ˙ÈÂˆÓ ‰¯ÊÚ ÏÚ .„ÏÙ˜ÏÈ ˘Â'‚Â

.‡Ë-ÔÓÏÈÒ ÏËÈ·‡Â

3

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

˙·Á¯ ˙ˆ·˜ ˘ÂÏ˘Ï ÌȘÏÁ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ .Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙

ÏÚ ¯ÂÒȇ ,‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÏÚ ÌȯÂÒȇ ,ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ Z ÌÈÈ„ Ï˘

Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ ˙¯ÈˆÈÏ ˙Ó¯Â˙ Ô‰Ó ˙Á‡ Ï΢ Z ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ

,ÂÙÂÒȇ ڄÈÓ‰ ¯Â˙ȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ˙Â˙ÈÁÙÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ .Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ

ÌÈÈË˜Ó ‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÏÚ ÌȯÂÒȇ‰ .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ìȇ˘Â Ô‰·˘

˙‡ Ìȯȷ‚Ó ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ìȇ˘Â ‰·˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ ˙ÂÏÚ ˙‡

ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ ÏÚ ¯ÂÒȇ‰ ,ÛÂÒ·Ï .˙˜ÈÂ„Ó ˙ÂÈÊÁ˙ ˜ÈÙ‰Ï Ì˙ÏÂÎÈ

‰· ˘È˘ ,˙¯Á˙ .ÌÈÙ È˘‡ Ï˘ Ì„ÈˆÓ ˙¯Á˙ ÈÙÓ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÏÚ Ô‚Ó

,Ú„ÈÓ· Ì˙Ú˜˘‰ ˙‡ ÌÓˆÚÏ ·È˘‰Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙ÏÂÎÈ· Ú‚ÙÏ È„Î

.˜Â˘Ï ıÂÁÓ Ï‡ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˙‡ ÛÁ„È ¯·„ Ï˘ ÂÙÂÒ·˘ ÔÙ‡·

˙ÂίΉ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ÔÈË˜Ó Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ ,„ÂÚ ˙‡Ê

ËÙ˘Ó‰ È˙·˘ Ì‚‰ .Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘· ˙¯ÁÒ‰ ˙¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÏÈÚÙ·

Ï˘ Ì„ÈˆÓ ˙ÂȘÂÁ È˙Ï· ˙¯·Ú‰ ÌÚ Â‡ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÌÚ „„ÂÓ˙‰Ï ÌÈÏ‚ÂÒÓ

˙ÂȘÒÚ‰ ˙ÂËÏÁ‰‰ Ï˘ Ô˙ÂÎȇ ˙‡ ÍÈ¯Ú‰Ï ÌÈÏ‚ÂÒÓ Ìȇ ̉ ,ÌÈωӉ

˙ÂÓÎ ˙‡ ˙ÈÁÙ‰Ï ‡ÂÙ‡ ÈÂ˘Ú ÈËÂÙÈ˘ Á˜ÈÙ .Âχ ÌÈÏ‰Ó ÌÈÏ·˜Ó˘

Ï˘ ˙¯ى‰ ˙ÂÓÎ ˙‡ ‡Ï ͇ ,ÌÈωӉ „ˆÓ ÌÈÂÓ‡ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ ˙¯ى‰

ÌȇÏÓÓ ˙Â¯È‰Ê ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ ˙¯ى ˙ÚÈÓ Ï˘ ‰ÓÈ˘Ó‰ ˙‡ .˙Â¯È‰Ê ˙·ÂÁ

.Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ

‡Â·Ó.‡˜Â˘‰ Ô‚Ó

.1ÌÈÈÒÈÙ‰ ÌȘ¢· ˙ÂÏÈÊ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ(‡)ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÍÂ˙Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÌÂÏÈ‚(·)¯ÁÒÓ· ˙ÂÏÈʉ ˙¯·‚‰

.2˜Â˘‰ ȘÁ˘

.3¯ÂÁÓ˙‰ ÍÈω˙.·ÌÈÏÈÊ ÌÈÏÈÚÈ ÌȘ¢ ˙‚˘‰ :Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„

.1Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ· ‰¯ÈÁ·‰ :ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ ÏÚ ¯ÂÒȇ

.2Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÛÂÒȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙˙ÁÙ‰ :ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ

.3Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙˙ÁÙ‰ :‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÏÚ ÌȯÂÒȇ

.4ÌÈËÂÓ È˙Ï· ÌÈÁÂ˙È Ì„Ș :ÌÈËÒÈχ Ï˘ ‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙ÚÈÓ

.5‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ

.6˙ÂÈ·ÂÈÁ ˙ÂȈÈÁ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰(‡)Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˜Â˘(·)˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰ ˙‡˜· ˙ÈÈ˘Ú˙

.‚Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ÏÚ ‰È¯Â‡È˙‰ ˙ÂÎÏ˘‰.1ȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚.2˜Â˘‰ ÏÚ ˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙Èȯ‡È˙· ˘„ÁÓ ÔÂÈÚ

(‡)ÏÈÚÈ È˙Ï· ˜Â˘ ÁÈÓ‰ ÔÂÚÈˉ(·)ÏÈÚÈ ˜Â˘ ÌÈÁÈÓ‰ ÌÈÂÚÈˉ

4

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

(1)˙ÂÓÈȘ‰ ˙·¢˙‰(2)ÚÈˆÓ ˘„Á‰ Ï„ÂÓ‰˘ ˙·¢˙‰

(‡)ÌÈ˜Ê Ï˘ ÌÏ˘ Ûˆ¯(·)?ÂÙÂÒȇ ˙ÂÏÚ ÏÂÓ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ ˙ÂÏÚ(‚)˙ȂˆÈÈ ‰Ú·Â˙ ˙¯‚ÒÓ· ˘¯„‰ È˘Ù‰ „ÂÒȉ

ÌÂÎÈÒ

‡Â·Ó

͇ ,˙Á¯‰ ‰˘ÈÙ˙‰ ˙‡ ÁÂÊÏ ·ÈÈÁÓ Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘ ÏÚ Á˜ÈÙ‰ ·ÂˆÈÚ· ˜ÈÓÚÓ ÔÂÈ„Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ .1Ô˘‰ ÚȘ˘Ó‰ ÏÚ Ô‚‰Ï ÌÈÙ‡Â˘ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ‰ÈÙÏ˘ ,˙ÈÚËÂÓ‰ÈÈ„ Ï˘ Ì˙¯ËÓ ÈÎ ,‰·‰‰ ÏÚ ÒÒ·˙‰Ï ‰Îȯˆ ‡ˆÂÓ‰ ˙„˜ .Ôίˆ‰ ˙‚‰ ÈÈ„ ÌȇÌÈ·‡˘Ó‰ ˙‡ˆ˜‰ ˙‡ ¯Ù˘Ï ‰Ê ÔÙ‡·Â ,ÌÈÏÈÚÈ ÌÈÈÒÈÙ ÌȘ¢ ‚È˘‰Ï ‡È‰ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈÍ¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ·˘ ÔÙ‡‰ ÏÚ ‰ÓÂ‡Ó ¯ÓÂÏ È„Î Ô·ÂÓÎ Ôȇ ÂÊ ‡ˆÂÓ ˙„˜· .2‰ÏÎÏÎ·Ì¯Ë ÂÊ ‰·Â˘Á ˙ÈÊÎ¯Ó ‰Ï‡˘ ‡˜Â„ ,‰Ú˙Ù‰‰ ‰·¯ÓÏ .Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ˙‡ ÌÈÓ„˜Ó‰È¯Â‡È˙ ˙‚ˆ‰ ˙ÂÚˆÓ‡· ‰Ê È˙ÂÚÓ˘Ó ¯ÒÁ Ô˜˙Ï ˘˜·Ó ¯Ó‡Ó‰ .3‰ˆÓÓ ‰ÚÓÏ ‰˙ÎÊ

.4Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ ˙‡ ‰¯È‰·Ó‰ ,‰ÙȘÓ ˙È˘„Á ,˙ÈÏÏ߈ÈÏ ‡Â‰ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ̄ȘÙ˙ ÈÎ ‡È‰ ¯Ó‡Ó‰ Ï˘ ˙ÈÊίӉ ‰·Â˙‰¯Ó‡Ó‰ ‚ÈˆÓ ,‰¯ÂÓ‡‰ ‰·Â˙‰ ÏÚ ÒÒ·˙‰· .Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ Ì„˜ÏÂ,ÏÈÚÈ Ô‰ ˜Â˘ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ÌÈÓ„˜Ó Ì˙ÂÚˆÓ‡·˘ ÌÈ‚Ӊ Ï˘ ÌÏ˘ ¯Â‡È˙

.Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘ ÏÚ Á˜ÈÙ‰ ˙ÂÈÈ„Ó ÁÂ˙ÈÏ ˙È˯‰Â˜ ˙ÈËÙ˘Ó ˙¯‚ÒÓ ÌÈÚȈÓÂ

1.Ô˘‰ ÚȘ˘Ó‰ ÏÚ ‰‚‰· ËÙ˘Ó‰ È˙· ‰Î¯‡ ‰Ù˜˙ ͢ӷ „˜Ó˙‰ ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,˙ȯ·‰ ˙ˆ¯‡·Schlesinger Inv. Partnership v. Fluor Corp., 671 F.2d 739, 743 (2d Cir. 1982); Feit ‡¯Ì‚ .v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)H.R. REP. NO. 85, 73d Cong., ‡¯ .Ô˘‰ ÚȘ˘Ó‰ ÏÚ ‰‚‰· „˜Ó˙‰ ȘȯӇ‰ Ò¯‚˜‰˙„˜Ó˙‰ ¯˜È·˘ Âȉ .1st Sess. (1933); H.R. REP. NO. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)R.K. Winter “On ‘Protecting the ‡¯ .˙È˯‰Â˜ ‰ÙÂÏÁ ÂÚȈ‰ ‡Ï ͇ ,Ô˘‰ ÚȘ˘Ó· ÂÊÏÚ ‰‚‰Ï ˙Ï·‚ÂÓ‰ ‰Ù˜˘‰‰ ÏÚ ˙¯Â˜È·) Ordinary Investor’” 63 Wash. L. Rev. (1988) 881

.(ÌÈËÂ˘Ù ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó2J.N. Gordon & L.A. Kornhauser “Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities

.Research” 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (1985) 761, 8023R.M. Bushman, J.D. Piotroski, & A.J. Smith “What Determines Corporate ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯

ÈÊίӉ „ȘÙ˙‰ Û¯Á ÈÎ ÌȯÈÚÓ‰) Transparency?” 42 J. Account. Research (2004) 207, 208˙ÂίÚÓ Ï˘ Ô˙ÂÁ˙Ù˙‰Ï ˘È˘ ‰ÚÙ˘‰· ˙˜ÒÂÚ‰ ˙Âȯ‡È˙· Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ Ï˘ ‰È‚ÂÒ‰ ˙‡ÏÓÓ˘˙ÂÈÒÈÙ ˙ÂίÚÓ ÔÈ·˘ Ï„·‰Ï ¯˘‡· ËÚÂÓ ¯˜ÁÓ ÌÈȘ ,˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ‰ÁÈÓˆ ÏÚ ˙ÂÈÓÈÙ ˙ÂÈÒÈÙ

.(ÌÏÂÚ‰ È·Á¯· ˙¢4˙ÚÙ˘‰· ÌÈ„ ‡ Ôȇ .‰Ò¯Â·· ÌȯÁÒ‰ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ· ˜¯Â ͇ „˜Ó˙Ó Ô‡Î ÔÂÈ„‰ ÈÎ ÔÈÈˆÏ ˘È

ÌÈÒÎ ˙¯·Ú‰· ˙ÂίΉ ˙‡˜ÒÚ ÏÚ Â‡ ‰Ò¯Â·Ï ıÂÁÓ ˙ÂÚˆ·˙Ó‰ ˙‡˜ÒÚ ÏÚ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„.ÌÈÈ‚ÂÓ‰ ‡Ï

5

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

Ï˘ ˜ÂÈ„‰ ˙„ÈÓ Ô‰ Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘ Ï˘ Â˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ˙‡ ˙Âڷ˜‰ ˙Âȯ˜ÈÚ‰ ˙ÂÂÎ˙‰ È˙˘,ÏÏÎÎ .5˜ÙÒÓ ˜Â˘‰˘ ˙ÈÒÈÙ‰ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ˙„ÈÓ ,· ÌȯÁÒ‰ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓÌȘÈÂ„Ó Â· ÌȯÁÒ‰ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ̉ȯÈÁÓ˘ ÏÎÎ ˙¯·Â‚ Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘ Ï˘ Â˙ÂÏÈÚȯÈÁÓ· ·Ëȉ Û˜˙˘Ó ¯˙ÂÈ ·¯ Ú„ÈÓ ¯˘‡Î .6¯˙ÂÈ ÏÈÊ ˜Â˘· ¯ÁÒÓ‰˘ ÏÎΠ,¯˙ÂÈ.‰Ï„‚ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ,ÌÈÏÂÚ ¯ÁÒÓ‰ È٘ȉ ¯˘‡Î ,‰ÏÂÚ ¯ÂÁÓÈ˙‰ ˙ÂÎȇ ,ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈÚ„ÈÓ‰ Ï˘ ÂÙÂ˜È˘Ï ÏÚÙÈ ÈÓ ?Âχ ˙ÂÓÈ˘Ó ‡ÏÓÈ ÈÓ ‡È‰ ˙˘˜·˙Ó‰ ‰Ï‡˘‰ ,ÍÎÈÙÏ

?˜Â˘Ï ˙ÂÏÈÊ ˙˜ÙÒ‰ ÍÂ˙ ¯ÈÁÓ·.¯ÂÁ·Ï ˙ÂÈÈ„Ó‰ È·ˆÚÓ ÌÈÏÂÎÈ Ô‰ÈÈ·Ó˘ ,˜Â˘ ȘÁ˘ Ï˘ ˙ˆ·˜ ‰ÓÎ ˙ÂÓÈȘȯ·Ȉ ‡Ï Ú„ÈÓÏ ˙Â˘È‚Ó Ìȉ‰ ,ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ ˙ˆÂ·˜ ‡È‰ ‰Â˘‡¯‰ ‰ˆÂ·˜‰ÈÏÏÎ Ú„ÈÓ „·ÚÏ Ì˙ÏÂÎÈ· ¯˘‡Â ,ÌȯÁÒ ‰Ï˘ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ˘ ‰¯·Á‰ ˙„‡ ÏÚ˙ˆÂ·˜ ‡È‰ ‰ÈÈ˘‰ ‰ˆÂ·˜‰ .Ì˙¢¯·˘ „ÁÂÈÓ‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙‡ Ì‚ ÂÓÎ ,˜Â˘‰ ÏÚ‰¯·Á· ڂ‰ Ú„ÈÓ ÂÏÏη ˜Â˘‰ ˙„‡ ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ ÛÂÒȇ· ÌÈÁÓ˙Ó‰ ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ˙ˆÂ·˜ ‡È‰ ˙È˘ÈÏ˘‰ ‰ˆÂ·˜‰ .ÂÁÂ˙È ÌȯÁÒ ‰Ï˘ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ˘ ˙ÈÙȈÙÒ‰ÈÏÂ˜È˘ ÏÚ ÒÒ·˙‰· ÌÈÂÒÓ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ˜È˙· ÌȘÈÊÁÓ ÌȘ‰ ,˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒÏÚ Â‡ ÏÏη ˜Â˘‰ ÏÚ Ì˙¢¯· ȈӉ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÔÓ ˜˙ÂÓ· ˙‡Ê ,ÔÂÎÒÈÁ/‰Îȯˆ˙ˆÂ·˜ ‡È‰ ‰Â¯Á‡‰Â ˙ÈÚÈ·¯‰ ‰ˆÂ·˜‰ .˯ٷ ÌȯÁÒ Ô‰Ï˘ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ˘ ˙¯·Á‰‰·¯ÓÏ ,˜„ˆ· ‡Ï˘ Z ÌÈÈÓ‡Ó ,ÈÏÂȈ¯ È˙Ï· Á¯Â‡· ÌÈÏÚÂÙ Âχ .˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂȂ˯ËÒ‡ Ì¢ÈÈ· ‡ Í¯Ú ·¯ Ú„ÈÓ ˙‚˘‰· ˙¯˙ÈÓ Ìȉ ̉ ÈÎ Z ¯Úˆ‰˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ˙‡ Ì„˜Ï ˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙ÏÂÎÈ ¯ÒÂÁ ,7ÂÊ ÌÈ„ÓÚÂÓ ˙ÓÈ˘¯ ÁÎÂÏ .˙ÂÙÈ„Ú˙‡ „È˜Ù‰Ï ˘È ÈΠȯ· ,8˜ÈÂ„Ó ¯ÂÁÓ˙· ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ ÌÈÏ‚Ó˘ ÔÈÈÚ‰ ¯ÒÂÁ ,˜Â˘‰Ï˘ ÂÊ Ô‰Â ,˜Â˘· ÌȯÁÒ‰ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ· Ú„ÈÓ ÌÂÏÈ‚ Ï˘ ÂÊ Ô‰ ,˙ÂÓÈ˘Ó‰ È˙˘

.Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ È„È· ‡ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ È„È· ,¯ÁÒÓ‰ ˙ÂÏÈÊ ˙¯·‚‰˙È˙¯Á˙ ‰·È·Ò· ÌÈÏÚÂÙ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÈÎ ,‰Ï‚Ó ÂÊÏ ÂÊ Âχ ˙ˆ·˜ È˙˘ ˙‡Â¢‰

5E.F. Fama “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work” 25 ‡¯J.R. Macey & D.D. ;(Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ· ˜ÂÈ„ Ï˘ ˙Â·È˘Á‰ ˙‡ ˘È‚„Ó‰) J. Fin. (1970) 383Haddock “Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National Market System” 1985 U. Ill.F.A. ;(˜Â˘‰ Ï˘ ˙ÈÒÈÙ‰ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ˙„ÈÓ ˙Â·È˘Á ˙‡ ˘È‚„Ó‰) L. Rev. (1985) 315, 325y326Longstaff “Optimal Portfolio Choice and the Valuation of Illiquid Securities” 14 Rev.K. Nyholm “Estimating the ;(˙ÂÏÈʉ ˙Â·È˘Á ˙‡ ˘È‚„Ó) Fin. Stud. (2001) 407, 407y408ÈÎ ‰Ï‚Ó‰ ¯˜ÁÓ) Probability of Informed Trading” 25 J. Fin. Research (2002) 485, 504˙ÂÈÓÏ ‰‡Â¢‰· ¯˙ÂÈ ‰·¯ ˙ÂÈËȇ· ˘„Á Ú„ÈÓ ÌÈÓÏ‚Ó ÍÂÓ Ô‰· ¯ÁÒÓ‰ ۘȉ˘ ˙ÂÈÓ È¯Ú˘

.(·¯ Ô‰· ¯ÁÒÓ‰ ۘȉ˘6R. Gilson & R.R. Kraakman “The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency” 70 Va.L. Rev. ‡¯

.(1984) 5497,ÔÏ‰Ï Â‡¯ .Ï„ÂÓ‰ ˙‡ ˢÙÏ È„Î ¯Ó‡Ó‰ ͢Ӊ· Ô„È˙ Z ˜Â˘ È˘ÂÚ Ï˘ ÂÊ Z ˙ÙÒ ‰ˆÂ·˜

.‰Èχ ‰ÂÂω ËҘˉ ÌÈÈÏ¢ ˙¯Ú‰8.3.‡ ˜¯Ù ÔÏ‰Ï Â‡¯ ˯ÂÙÓ ÔÂÈ„Ï

6

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ."ÌÈÈËÒÈÏÂÙÂÂÓ ÔÈÚÓ" Ìȇ˙· ÌÈÏÚÂÙ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡˘ „ÂÚ· ,È„ÓÏ˙¯˙ÈÓ Ìȉ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ,˙È˘‡¯ :ÌÈÙÒ ÌÈ·ÂÓ· Û‡ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ ÏÚ ÌÈÙÈ„Ú„ÁÂÈÓ Ú„ÈÓ ÂÏÏη ˜Â˘‰ ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ ÛÂÒȇ· ¯·Â„Ó˘ ÏÎÎ Ô‚ÓÂ Ï„Â‚Ï ‰‡Â˘˙ Ï˘,˙È˘ .ÂÁÂ˙ȷ · ÌȯÁÒ Ô‰Ï˘ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ˘ ˙¯·Á‰ ÔÓ ˙Á‡ ÏÎ ˙„‡ ÏÚÏÚ ڄÈÓ‰ ˜Â˘ ÏÚ ˙ÂÈ·ÂÈÁ ˙ÂȈÈÁ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰ ˙¯ˆÂÈ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÏÈÚÙÚ„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙ÏÂÎÈ· Ôȇ ,ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ ˙ÓÂÚÏ ,˙È˘ÈÏ˘ .˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰ È˙· ÛÚ˘ÂÓÈ˘‰ ˙‡ ÔÓÊ˙Ï Â‡ ˙¯ÁÒ‰ ˙¯·Á‰ ˙ÂÏ·˜Ó˘ ˙ÂȘÒÚ ˙ÂËÏÁ‰ ÏÚ ÚÈÙ˘‰Ï˙Âڷ‰ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ‰˙ÈÁÙÓ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÏÈÚÙ ,˙ÈÚÈ·¯ .ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ·,ÏÈÚÏ˘ ÌÈÓÚˉ ÏÎÓ .Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘· ˙¯ÁÒ‰ ‰¯·Á· ‚‰Â‰ È„È‚‡˙‰ ¯Ë˘Ó‰ ÔÓ˙ˆ·˜ ÈÙ ÏÚÂ) ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ ÈÙ ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˙‡ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ÌÈÙÈ„ÚÓ

.(˙¯Á‡‰ ˜Â˘‰ ȘÁ˘˙È·ÈËÈÊÂÙ ˙Á‡‰ Z ˙Â¯Â˘˜ ˙ÂÊÈ˙ È˙˘ ‚Ȉ .ÂÊ ‰Ù˜˘‰ ˜È„ˆ ÈÁΉ ¯Ó‡Ó·Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ·ˆÂÚ „ˆÈÎ ÌÈ‚„Ó ¯Ó‡Ó‰ ,˙È·ÈËÈÊÂÙ ‰ÈÁ·Ó .˙È·ÈËӯ ‰ÈÈ˘‰Â.ÂÊ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ ÏÚ ‰‚‰ ͯˆÏ ڄÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÏÈÚÙ „„ÈÚ Ï˘ ‰¯ËÓÏ „ÁÂÈÓ·,‰„ÈÁȉ ˜Â˘‰ ȘÁ˘ ˙ˆÂ·˜ ‰˘ÚÓÏ Ì‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÈÎ ,ÁÈÎÂÓ ¯Ó‡Ó‰ ,„ÂÚ ˙‡Ê˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ ,˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ Z ˙ˆ·˜‰ ¯˙È .‰ÓÈÚ ‰·ÈËÈÓ Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘· ‰ÈˆÏ‚¯‰˘.Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„Ó ˙ÏÚÂ˙ ˜ÈÙ‰Ï ,ÌÈ‚‰Â Ìȇ ‡ ,ÌÈÏ‚ÂÒÓ Ìȇ Z ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡Â˙È˘ÚÓ ˙Â·È˘Á Ôȇ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„Ï ,˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙ÈÁ·ÓÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÌÓÂÈ˜Ó ‰‡ˆÂ˙Î ˙Ú‚Ù ,˙‡Ê ˙ÓÂÚÏ ,ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÏÈÚÙ .‰·Â¯ÓÍ¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÌÓÂÈ˜Ó È·ÂÈÁ Á¯Â‡· ˙ÚÙ˘ÂÓ‰ ‰„ÈÁȉ ‰ˆÂ·˜‰ .Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ

.Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˙ˆÂ·˜ ,¯ÂӇΠ,‡È‰˙Ï‚ÂÒÓ‰ ‰„ÈÁȉ ‡È‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˙ˆÂ·˜ ÈÎ ‰‡¯Ó ¯Ó‡Ó‰ ,˙È·ÈËӯ ‰ÈÁ·Ó‰ˆÂ·˜‰ Ì‚ ÔÎ ÏÚ ,ÌÈÏÈÊ ÌÈÏÈÚÈ Ô‰ È˜Â˘ Ï˘ ÌÓ„Ș ˙ÓÈ˘Ó ÌÚ ·Ëȉ „„ÂÓ˙‰Ï,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÏÚ Ì‚· .‰ÈÏÚ Ô‚‰Ï Û‡˘Ï ÌÈÎȯˆ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„˘ ‰„ÈÁȉ‰„ÈˆÓ ÂÊ ‰‚‰ .Ì˙ÂÏÈÊ ˙‡Â Ô‰‰ È˜Â˘ Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ˙‡ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ìȯȷ‚Ó˙ÂÏÈÚÙ· ˙ÂίΉ ‰˜ÒÈÚ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙˘‰ È„È ÏÚ ,ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰ È‚ÂÒ ¯˙È ÌÚ ‰·ÈËÈÓ˙¯˘ÂÈ Ï˘ ˙ȯ˘Ù‡‰ ¯˙ÂÈ· ‰‰Â·‚‰ ‰Ó¯‰ ˙‡ ˙˜ÙÒÓ ÂÊ ‰‚‰ ,„ÂÚ ˙‡Ê .Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘·Íη .9˙ÂÏÈÊ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ¯ÂÁÓ˙· ˜ÂÈ„ ˙ÁË·‰ È„È ÏÚ Â˙ÂÈ‚‰ Ï˘Â ˜Â˘‰

.10˜˘Ó· ÌÈ·‡˘Ó‰ ˙‡ˆ˜‰ ˙¯Ù˙˘Ó Û‡

9M. Kahan “Securities laws and the Social Costs of ‘Inaccurate’ Stock Prices” 41 ‡¯.Duke L. J. (1992) 977, 988

10M.B. Fox, A. Durnev, R. Morck & B. Yeung “Law, Share Price Accuracy and ‡¯¯˜ÁÓ) Economic Performance: The New Evidence” 102 Mich. L. Rev. (2004) 331R. Levine “Financial ;(‰ÏÎÏΉ ÈÚˆȷ ˙‡ ÌÈ¯Ù˘Ó ¯˙ÂÈ ÌȘÈÂ„Ó ˙ÂÈÓ È¯ÈÁÓ ÈÎ ‰Ï‚Ó‰Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda” 35 J. Econ. Lit. (1997)688; V. Brudney “Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal

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(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

˙·ÂÁ :ÌÈÈ„ Ï˘ ˙ÂÈÏÏÂÎ ˙Âȯ‚˘ ˘ÂÏ˘Ï Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ˙‡ ˜ÏÁÏ Ô˙ȉȯ‚˘ ÏÎ .11ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ ÏÚ ˙ÂÏ·‚Ó ‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÏÚ ÌȯÂÒȇ ,ÈÂÏÈ‚¯Â·Ú ˙ÂÈË˜Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙·ÂÁ .Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ Á˙ÂÙÓ ˜Â˘ ˙¯ÈˆÈÏ ˙Ó¯Â˙ ÌÈÈ„ Ï˘ÌÈÈË˜Ó ‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÏÚ ÌȯÂÒȇ‰ .12Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÛÂÒȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÏ˘ Ì˙ÏÂÎÈ ˙‡ Ìȯȷ‚Ó ,Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ Â˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ¯Â·ÚÏÚ ˙ÂÈ‚Ó ÌÈÙ ¯ÁÒÓ ÏÚ ˙ÂÏ·‚‰‰ ,ÛÂÒ·Ï .13˙˜ÈÂ„Ó ˙ÂÈÊÁ˙ ˜ÙÒÏ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÌ˙ÏÂÎÈ· ÌÒ¯ÎÏ ‰ÏÂÏÚ ‰„ÈˆÓ˘ ,ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ Ï˘ Ì„ÈˆÓ ˙¯Á˙ ÈÙÓ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÔÓ Ì˙ÙÈÁ„Ï ‡È·‰Ï Ì‚ ÔÎ ÏÚ ,Ú„ÈÓ· Ì˙Ú˜˘‰ ˙‡ ÌÓˆÚÏ ¯ÈÊÁ‰Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘.Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ÌÈÁÈË·Ó Âχ ÌÈί„· .14‰ˆÂÁ‰ ˜Â˘‰

‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ˙ÈÁÙÓ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ Ï˘ ÂÓÂȘ ,ÍÎÓ ‰¯˙ÈÔÈ·Ï ‰Ï‰‰‰ ÔÈ· ÌÈÒ¯Ëȇ È„Â‚È Ï˘ Ìȯ˜Ó· .˙¯·Á ÈÏ‰Ó Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÏÈÚÙ· ˙ÂίΉ˙‡ Ì„˜Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ ÌÁÂÎ ˙‡ ‰Ú¯Ï ÏˆÏ ‰¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó ÌÈÈÂÙˆ ,‰¯·Á· ˙ÂÈÓ‰ ÈÏÚ·˙¯ˆÂ‰ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ .15˙ÂÈÓ‰ ÈÏÚ· Ï˘ Âχ Ô·˘Á ÏÚ Ì‰Ï˘ ÌÈÈ˘È‡‰ ÌÈÒ¯Ëȇ‰,Ï˘ÓÏ) ‰¯·ÁÏ ÌÈÂÓ‡‰ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ ‰¯Ù‰· ÈÂËÈ· È„ÈÏ ‡Â·Ï ˙ÂÈÂÙˆ ,ÍÎÓ ‰‡ˆÂ˙Ή¯·Á‰ ÈÙÏÎ ˙¯ȉʉ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ ‰¯Ù‰· ‡ ,(˙ÈÓˆÚ ˙¯˘Ú˙‰· ˙ÂÚ‚‰ ˙‡˜ÒÚÌ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ ˙‡ Û¢ÁÏ ˙ÂÚÈÈÒÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙·ÂÁ .16(˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ‡Ï ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ Úˆȷ ,Ï˘ÓÏ),17¯˙ÂÈ ·¯ È˙¯Â˘˜˙ ¯Â˜ÈÒ ˙Â΢ÂÓ ÌÈÂÓ‡ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ ˙¯ى˘ Ì‚‰ .ÌÈωӉ Ï˘„ÂÚ· .18¯˙ÂÈ ‰Â·‚ È˙¯·Á‰ Ԙʠ,¯˙ÂÈ ˙ˆÂÙ Ô‰ ˙¯ȉʉ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ ˙¯ى ‡˜Â„

Securities Laws” 93 Harv. L. Rev. (1979) 322, 341; J.F. Barry “The Economics of OutsideInformation and Rule 10by5” 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. (1981) 1307, 1316; F.H. Easterbrook &.D.R. Fischel “Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers” 35 Stan. L. Rev. (1982) 1, 11

11„ÁÈ· ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ ÏÚ ¯ÂÒȇ ÌÈÈÚ˘ ÌÈÈËÙ˘Ó‰ ÌÈÏÏΉ ˙‡ ı·˜Ï ‚‰ È˙¯ÂÒÓ ÔÙ‡·¯ÁÒÓ ÔÈ· ÌÈÈÁ·Ó ‡ ,͢Ӊ· ¯·ÒÂÈ˘ ÌÈÓÚËÓ ,̯· .‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÏÚ ÌȯÂÒȇ‰ ÌÚ

.ÌÈ˙ÂÂÚÓ ¯ÁÒÓ ڄÈÓ ÌÈÈÚ˘ ,˙ÈÓ¯˙ Ï˘ ÌȯÁ‡ ÌÈÙ‡ ÔÈ·Ï ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ·12P. M. Healy & K. G. Palepu “Information Asymmetry, Corporate ÈÏÏÎ ÔÙ‡· ‡¯

Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature”.31 J. Account. & Econ. (2001) 405

13.3.· ˜¯Ù ÔÏ‰Ï Â‡¯14Z. Goshen & G. Parchomovsky “On Insider Trading, Markets, and ‘Negative’ ‡¯

.Property Rights in Information” 87 Va. L. Rev. (2001) 1229, 1250y125115M.C. Jensen & W.H. Meckling “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency ‡¯

.Costs, and Ownership Structure” 3 J. Fin. Econ. (1976) 305, 354y35516Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963); Principles of 2 ‡¯

Model Bus. Corp. Act Annot. §8.30 at 937y938 (1990); Corporate Governance §4.01;.S. M. Bainbridge Corporation Law and Economics (New York, 2002) 286y304

17Hearing Transcripts Oster Dow Jones .Ô¯‡ ˙˘¯Ù Ï˘ È˙¯Â˘˜˙‰ ¯Â˜ÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯(2003), available at: URL:http://web2.westlaw.com/welcome/NewsAndBusiness/default.wl?TF=1&TC=7&MT=NewsAndBusiness&RS=WLW4.09&VR=2.0&SV=Split&FN=

._top18M.C Jensen “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers” ‡¯

8

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

ÌÈ˘˜˙Ó Ì‰˘ ȯ‰ ,˙ÂȘÂÁ È˙Ï· ˙¯·Ú‰· ‡ ˙ÈÓ¯˙· ÔÈÁ·‰Ï ÌÈÏ‚ÂÒÓ ËÙ˘Ó‰ È˙·˘ÔÈ˘‰Ï ÌÓ‡ ÈÂ˘Ú ÈËÂÙÈ˘‰ Á˜ÈÙ‰ ,ÔÎÏ .19˙ÂȘÒÚ ˙ÂËÏÁ‰ Ï˘ Ô˙ÂÎȇ ˙‡ ÍȯډÏ.˙¯ȉʉ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ ˙¯ى‰ ۘȉ ˙‡ ‡Ï ͇ ,ÌÈÂÓ‡‰ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ ˙¯ى‰ ۘȉ ˙‡ÏÏÎ ˙‡ ÌÈÏÈÚÙÓ Ì‰ ˙ÂȘÒÚ ˙ÂËÏÁ‰ ˙ÈÁ· ˙Ú·Â ,Ì˙Ï·‚Ó· ÌȯÈÎÓ ËÙ˘Ó‰ È˙·˙ÈËÂÙÈ˘ ˙·¯Ú˙‰ ‡È‰ Â˙‡ˆÂ˙˘ ,(business judgment rule-‰) ȘÒÚ‰ ˙Ú„‰ ÏÂ˜È˘˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ ˙¯ى ÌÚ ˙„„ÂÓ˙‰‰ ˙ÓÈ˘Ó ,È·È˘ه ÈËÂÙÈ˘ Á˜ÈÙ ¯„Ú‰· .20˙ÈÏÓÈÈÓ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ ÔÂÒȯ ,˜ÂÈ„ ¯˙ÈÏ .21˙ÂÈ˙¯·Á ˙Âӯ ÏÚ ˜Â˘‰ ÏÚ ‰¯˜ÈÚ· ˙ÏËÂÓ ˙¯ȉʉ.Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ̉ȄȘÙ˙ ¯„‚· ¯˙ ÈÂ˜Ï ÏÂ‰È ÌÚ ˙„„ÂÓ˙‰‰Â ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ È˙Ï·˙ÂȘÒÚ‰ ˙ÂËÏÁ‰‰ Ï˘ Ô˙ÂÎȇ ˙‡ ÍÈ¯Ú‰Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÌÈÏ‚ÂÒÓ ,ÌÈËÙÂ˘Ï „‚ȷÌȯÁÒ‰ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ· ˙ÂÙ˜˙˘Ó Âχ ˙Âίډ ,‰¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó ÌÈÏ·˜Ó˘‡Â‰ Z Ú„ÈÓ‰-ȯÁÂÒÓ ˜ÏÁ ÌȉӉ Z ÌÈËÒÈχ Ï˘ Ì„ÈˆÓ ÛÈ˜Ó ÈÂÒÈÎ .˜Â˘·,̯· .22ÌÈÏ‰Ó Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÏÈÚÙ· ˙ÂίΉ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ „‚ ¯˙ÂÈ· ‰ÏÈÚȉ „‚‰ ˙Ù¯˙,ÌÈÓȇ˙Ó‰ Ú˜¯‰ ȇ˙ ˙‡ ¯ÂˆÈÏ ˘È ,‰Ê΢ È·ÈÒËȇ ÈËÒÈχ ÈÂÒÈÎ ‚È˘‰Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ

.Á˙Ù˙‰Ï Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘Ï ¯˘Ù‡È˘,˙ÂÙÒ ˙ÂÈ·ÂÈÁ ˙ÂȈÈÁ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰ ˙¯ˆÂÈ ÌÈËÒÈχ ·¯˜· ˙¯Á˙ ÈÎ ,ÔÈÈˆÏ ·Â˘Á·¯˜· ˙¯Á˙ ,˙È˘‡¯ .ÌÈÏÈÊ ÌÈÏÈÚÈ Ô‰ È˜Â˘ ˙¯ÈˆÈÓ ˙Âڷ‰ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰Ï ¯·ÚÓÌÈËÒÈχ ·¯˜· ˙¯Á˙‰˘ ÏÎÎ .23Â˙‡ ˙¯Ù˘Ó ڄÈÓ‰ ˜Â˘ ˙‡ ˙Á˙ÙÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ˙‡ ¯Ù˘Ó ,Â„ÈˆÓ ,¯˙ÂÈ ·ÂË Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ ÂÓÂȘ .˜Â˘‰ χ Ú„ÈÓ ¯˙ÂÈ Ì¯ÂÊ ,˙¯·Â‚̉È˙ÂÈÊÁ˙ ˙‡ ¯Ù˘Ó ¯˙ÂÈ ·ÂË Ú„ÈÓ ,ÛÒ· .Ô‰‰ È˜Â˘ χ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó Ï˘ Ì˙Â˘È‚Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ ,˙È˘ .Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÁÂ˙È· ¯˙ȉ ˙Ú˜˘‰ ˙‡ ˙ÈÁÙÓ ,ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ Ï˘Z ˙Â¯Ê ˙¯·Á ˙ÎÈ˘Ó· ÚÈÈÒÓ ,24˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰ È˙· ˜Â˘ ˙ÂÁ˙Ù˙‰Ï ̯Â˙ ÌÈËÒÈχ

76 Am. Econ. Rev. (1986) 323; M.C Jensen “Eclipse of the Public Corporation” (1997)(working paper series) available at: URL:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs

.tract _id =14614919.M.J. Roe “Corporate Law’s Limits” 31 J. Legal Stud. (2002) 233, 239y240 ‡¯20Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. :ȘȯӇ‰ ËÙ˘Ó· ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯

Ct. aff’d 387 N.YS.2d 993 (App. Div. 1976); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc. 744 F.2d255 (2d Cir. 1984); Gearhart Indus. Inc. v. Smith Int’l Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984)Appeal of Spering, 71 Pa. 11 (1872); Hunter v. Roberts, Throp & Co., 83 Mich. 63, 47

.N.W. 131 (1890); Berwald v. Mission Dev. Co., 185 A.2d 480, 482y483 (Del. 1962)21E.B. Rock & M.L. Wachter “Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and ‡¯

.Self-Governing Corporation” 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. (2001) 1619, 162322J.A. Doukas, C. Kim & C. Pantzalis “Security Analysis, Agency Costs, and ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯

ÌÈÁÂ˙È ÈÎ ‰˜ÒÓ· ˙ȯÈÙÓ‡ ‰ÎÈÓ˙) Company Characteristics” 56 Fin. Anal. J. (2000) 54˙¯·Á· ‰ËÈÏ˘‰ ÔÈ·Ï ˙ÂÏÚ·‰ ÔÈ· ‰„¯Ù‰‰ ÔÓ ˙Âڷ‰ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ÌÈ˙ÈÁÙÓ ÌÈÈËÒÈχ

.(˙ÂÈ˷ϯ‰23.(‡).6.· ˜¯Ù ÔÏ‰Ï Â‡¯24.(·).6.· ˜¯Ù ÔÏ‰Ï Â‡¯

9

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

¯ÁÒÓÏ Ì˘¯È‰ÏÂ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ˜ÈÙ‰Ï Z ˙ÂÁÙ È˙¯Á˙ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ˜Â˘ Ô‰·˘ ˙ÂÈ„ÓÓ˙˜ى ˢÙÓ „„ÂÚÓ ,Á˙ÂÙÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ ˜Â˘ Ï˘ ÂÓÂȘ ,„ÂÚ ˙‡Ê .˙ÈÓ˜Ӊ ‰Ò¯Â··

.ÏÈÊ ÏÈÚÈ ˜Â˘· ¯·ÎÓ ‰Ê ÌȯÁÒ Í¯Ú‰ ˙¯ÈÈ˘ ¯Á‡Ó ,È˘Ó‰ ˜Â˘·ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ̄ȘÙ˙ È·‚Ï ÌÂÈÎ ÌÈω˙Ó‰ ÌÈÁÂÎÈ ‰ÓÎ ˘„Á ¯Â‡· ‚ÈˆÓ ¯Ó‡Ó‰.25˙ÂȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ ÔÓÂȘ· ÍÓÂ˙ ÂÂÚÈË ,˙È˘‡¯ .ÌÎÂ˙ È·‚ÏÂ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈÚ„ÈÓ ˙ÂÏ‚Ï ˙‡ ıȯÓ˙ ÌÈωÓÏ ˜ÙÒÏ ÌÈÈÂ˘Ú ˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÁÂ΢ „ÂÚ· ÈÎ Ìȇ¯Ó ‡ÔÎÓ ¯Á‡Ï ÍÂÓÒÏ Ôȇ ,(IPO ‡ ,Initial Public Offering) ˙È¢‡¯‰ ‰˜Ù‰‰ ·Ï˘·˙ÓÈȘ IPO-‰ ·Ï˘·˘ „ÂÚ· .Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ ÈÏÓÈËÙ‡ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ÂÁÈË·È˘ ,˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÁÂÎ ÏÚÔÈ·Ï (‰ÈωÓ ‰¯·Á‰) ¯ÎÂÓ‰ ÔÈ· (ȯËÓÈÒ-‡ Ú„ÈÓ) Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÚÙ Ï˘ ˙È҇Ϙ ‰ÈڷȯÚÙ Ï˘ ‰ÈÚ· Ôȇ È˘Ó‰ ˜Â˘·˘ ȯ‰ ,(ͯډ ¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ÌÈÈχȈËÂÙ ÌÈ˘Î¯) ÌȘ‰Ï˘ ÌÈÈχȈËÂÙ ÌÈÏÚ·) ÌȘ ÔÈ·Ï (ͯډ ¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ÏÚÂÙ· ÌÈÏÚ·) ÌȯÎÂÓ ÔÈ· Ú„ÈÓ.ÌÈωӉ ˙¢¯· ÈÂˆÓ ‰¯·Á‰ ˙„‡ ÏÚ È¯Â·Èˆ ‡Ï‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÏÎ ‡ÏÈÓÓ ,(ͯډ ¯ÈÈÔÙ‡· ÌȘÏÂÁ‰ ÌȘ ÌȯÎÂÓ ·¯˜· ˙¯Á˙· ÌÈÙ˙˙˘Ó‰ Z Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ,ÔÎ ÏÚ„ˆÓ ÈÏÓÈËÙ‡ ÈÂÏÈ‚Ï ÛÂÁ„Ï ÌÈÏÂÎÈ Ìȇ Z Ú„ÂÈÓ ‡Ï‰ ¯ÁÂÒ‰ ˙„ÓÚ ˙‡ ÈÂÈ¢ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙Úˆ·Ó˘ ‰¯·Á È·‚Ï "¯˙ÂÈ· Ú¯‚‰ ˘ÈÁ¯˙‰" ˙Á‰ ıÂÓȇ È„È ÏÚ ‰¯·Á‰È¯ÁÂÒ ,˙ÂÈÓ‰ ÈÏÚ· Ï˘ ‰ÊÏ „‚ÂÓ ÌÈωӉ Ï˘ Ò¯Ëȇ‰˘ ¯Á‡Ó .ÈÏÓÈËÙ‡ ˙˙˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ˙„¯Â‰ È„È ÏÚ "ÈÂÏÈ‚ È·¯Ò" ÌÈÏ‰Ó ¯„ÒÏ ‡Â¯˜Ï ÌÈÏÂÎÈ Ìȇ Ú„ÈÓ‰

.ÔÈ„‰ È„È ÏÚ ·˙ÎÂÈ˘ ÈÏÓÈËÙ‡ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˘¯„ ‰Ê ÌÚËÓ .Í¯Ú‰Ï˘ ÂÈÂÏÈ‚Ï ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙·ÂÁ ˙‡ ÏÈ·‚‰Ï ˙‡ȯ˜‰ ˙‡ ÏΠÏÎÓ ‰Á„ ¯Ó‡Ó‰ ,˙È˘ÌÈωӉ Ï˘ ˙ÈÓˆÚ ˙¯˘Ú˙‰· ˙ÂÚ‚‰ ˙‡˜ÒÚ ˙„‡ ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘Â 26ÁÈ˘˜ Ú„ÈÓ͇ ˜ÂÒÚÏ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ÏÚ ‰ÈÙÏ˘ ,‰Ù˜˘‰‰ ÏÚ ˙ÂÒÒÂ·Ó Âχ ˙‡ȯ˜ .27„·Ï·ÍÎ ,˙ÂÁÈÓ Âχ ˙‡ȯ˜˘ ‡Ï‡ .ÏÈÚÈ ¯ÂÁÓ˙ ˙‚˘‰· ‡Ï ,‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ¯ÂÚÊÓ· ˜¯Â:˙¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÏÈÚÙ· ˙ÂίΉ ‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ Ï˘ „Á‡ ‚ÂÒ ˜¯ ÌÈȘ ÈÎ ,‰‡¯˙¯ȉʉ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ ˙¯ى Ì‚ Ô·˘Á· ÌÈ‡È·Ó˘ ˙ÚÓ ,ÌÓ‡ .ÌÈÂÓ‡ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ ˙¯ىڂÙÈ ‰Ê΢ ̈ӈ Ô΢ ,ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙·ÂÁ ÌÂˆÓˆÓ ÚÓÈ‰Ï Í¯Âˆ‰ ¯‰·˙Ó ,ÌÈωӉ „ˆÓ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ· ˙ÂίΉ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ÔÂÂ‚Ó ˙‡ ¯ÚÊÓÏ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙ÏÂÎÈ· ‰˘ÚÓÏ

.ÌÈωÓ̉·˘ Ìȯ˜Ó· Ì‚ ˜Â˘‰ ÏÚ ˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁÏ ˙˜˜Êȉ· ÍÓÂ˙ ¯Ó‡Ó‰ ,˙È˘ÈÏ˘Ìȯ˜ÁÓ ‰ÓÎÓ ÂÏÚ˘ ÌȇˆÓÓ‰ ÈÎ ,‰Â¯Á‡Ï ÂÚË ÌÈ„ÓÂÏÓ ‰ÓÎ .28ÏÈÚÈ Âȇ Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘ÌÈÏÏ¢ ,ÌÈÏÈÚÈ Ìȇ ‰˘ÚÓÏ ÌȘ¢ ÈΠ„ÓÈÏ ¯˘‡Â ,˙È˙‚‰˙‰‰ ‰ÏÎÏΉ ÌÂÁ˙·

25.1.‚ ˜¯Ù ÔÏ‰Ï Â‡¯26Ô˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙‡ ‡„ÂÂÏ Ô˙È˘ ‰Â‰· ‡ ¯·Ú· ÌÈÚ¯‡Ï ˙Âڂ‰ ˙„·ÂÚÏ ÒÁÈÈ˙Ó "ÁÈ˘˜ Ú„ÈÓ"

„È˙Ú· ÌÈÚ¯‡Ï ˙Âڂ‰ ˙„·ÂÚÏ ÒÁÈÈ˙Ó‰ ,"ͯ Ú„ÈÓ"Ó ÏÈ„·‰Ï ˙‡Ê ,˙ÂÈ·È˘Èȷ‡·Â ˙ÂϘ·.˙ÂÈ·È˘Èȷ‡·Â ˙ÂϘ· Ô˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙‡ ‡„ÂÂÏ Ô˙È ‡Ï˘ ,˙ÂÈÊÁ˙Ï Â‡

27.1.‚ ˜¯Ù ÔÏ‰Ï Â‡¯28.(‡).2.‚ ˜¯Ù ÔÏ‰Ï Â‡¯

10

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

,˙‡Ê ˙ÓÂÚÏ „ÓÏÓ ÂÏ˘ Ï„ÂÓ‰ .29˜Â˘‰ ÏÚ ˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁÏ ˙È˯‡È˙‰ ‰˜„ˆ‰‰ ˙‡ÈÎ ÌÈÁÈÓ ¯˘‡Î ‡˜Â„ ˙ÓˆÚ˙Ó ˜Â˘‰ ÏÚ ˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁÏ ˙˜˜ÊÈ‰Ï ‰˜„ˆ‰‰ ÈÎÏÚ .ÏÈÚÈÏ ˜Â˘‰ ˙‡ ÌÈÎÙ‰˘ Âχ ̉ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ,¯ÂӇΠȯ‰˘ .ÏÈÚÈ Âȇ ˜Â˘‰

.̉ÈÏÚ Ô‚‰Ï ڄÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ· ÍÂÓ˙Ï ¯˙ÂÈ „ÂÚ ·Â˘Á ,ÏÈÚÈ Âȇ ˜Â˘‰ ¯˘‡Î ,ÔÎÏÚ ‰Ó¢ ,ÏÈÚÈ ˜Â˘ ÌÈȘ˙‰· Ì‚ ÂÈÙÏ˘ ,ÔÂÚÈˉ ˙‡ ‰Á„ ¯Ó‡Ó‰ ,˙ÈÚÈ·¯Z ÌÈÏÏΉ ˙‡ ÌÓ˜ÓÏ ¯ÈÊÁ‰Ï ,˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ˙‡ ÁÂÊÏ ËÙ˘Ó‰-È˙·È¯˜·Ó .30‡Â¢ ‚ˆÓ ÏÚ ˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰‰ „ÂÒÈ ˙ÁΉ ¯·„· Z Ϸ˜Ӊ ËÙ˘Ó‰ ȯÙÏ˘ Ì˙ÂÂÎ ˙‡ ‰„ÈÓ‰ ÏÚ ¯˙È ‰ÚÈ˙¯Ó ÂÊ ‰˜ÊÁ ÈÎ ÂÚË ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁÚ„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ˜¯ ‡Ï ˙ˆÙÏ ˙¯·Á ÏÚ ‰ÙÂÎ ‡È‰˘ ¯Á‡Ó ,Ú„ÈÓ Ìˆ¯Ó ˙ÂÏ‚Ï ÌÈωÓ.31̉· ÂÚ‚Ù ‡Ï ‡Â¢‰ È‚ˆÓ˘ ,˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ Ì‚ ‡Ï‡ ,‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ ÏÚ ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰˘È„È ÏÚ ÌÈÓ¯‚‰ ÌȘʉ ÏÂÏÎÓ ˙‡ Ô·˘Á· ÌÈ‡È·Ó ¯˘‡Î ÈÎ ,¯Ó‡Ó· Ìȇ¯Ó ‡̉ .ÌÈ˜Ê È‚ÂÒ ‰ÓÎÏ ÌÈӯ‚ ‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ .¯˙È ˙Ú˙¯‰Ï ÔÂÚËÏ Ô˙È ‡Ï ,‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓÌÈÏÈ„‚Ó ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ Ï˘ Â˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ· ˙ÂίΉ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ÌÈÏÈ„‚Ó.˙¯·Á‰ ÏÎ Ï˘ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ÌÈÏÈ„‚Ó ,˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡,‰˘ÚÓÏ .ÂÏω ÌȘʉ ÏÂÏÎÓ ˙‡ Û˜˘Ó‰ ȈÈÙ ‰ÁÈË·Ó ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁÌȘʉ Ï˘ ¯˙ÂÈ· ÌÈÏÂʉ ÌÈÚÂÓ‰ ̉ ‰¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó˘ ‰Á‰·˘ ,¯Ó‡Ó· Ìȇ¯Ó ‡˙ÂÏ˘¯ ˙ÂÈ‰Ï Ô¯˜ÈÚ· ‰Îȯˆ ‰È‡¯‰ ˙¯ȉʉ ˙Ó¯ ,‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ Ï˘ ÌÈÈËÚ· ÌÈÓ¯‚‰

.˙ÈÓ¯˙ ‡ÏÂÌ˙ÂÚˆÓ‡·˘ ÌÈ‚Ӊ ˙‡ ¯Â˜ÒÈ '‡ ˜¯Ù .ÌÈ·Ï˘ ‰˘ÂÏ˘· ͯÚÈÈ ¯Ó‡Ó· ÔÂÈ„‰˙„ÁÂÈÓ ·Ï ˙Ó¢˙ ˘È„˜È ‰Ê ˜¯Ù .˙ÂÏÈÊ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ÌÈÈÒÈÙ‰ ÌȘ¢‰ ÌÈ‚È˘Ó˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ÚÂ„Ó ¯È·ÒÈ ,ÌÈÈÒÈÙ‰ ÌȘ¢‰ ¯ÂÙÈ˘· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ̄ȘÙ˙Ï˙‡ ÁÈË·‰Ï ,ÌȯÁ‡‰ ˜Â˘‰ ȘÁ˘ ÈÙ ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˙‡ ÛÈ„Ú‰Ï ÌÈÎȯˆ ͯÚ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ô‰·˘ ÌÈί„‰ ˙‡ ˘È‚„Ó '· ˜¯Ù .Á˙ÂÙÓ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ˜Â˘ Ï˘ ÂÓÂÈ˜Ï˘ ˙ÂÈ·ÈËӯ‰ ˙ÂÎÏ˘‰· Ô„ '‚ ˜¯Ù .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ ˜ÂÒÈÚ ˙‡ ÌÈ„„ÂÚÓ Í¯Ú

.˙ÚˆÂÓ‰ ‰È¯Â‡È˙‰

29P.A. Ferrillo, F.C. Dunbar & D. Tabak Ì‚ ‡¯ .225 ÌÈÈÏ¢-˙¯ÚÏ ÍÂÓÒ‰ ·Â˙ÈΉ ÔÏ‰Ï Â‡¯“The ‘Less Than’ Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis: Requiring More Proof From

.Plaintiffs in Fraud-On-The-Market Cases” 78 St. John’s L. Rev. (2004) 81, 107y11630Z ˜Â˘‰ ÏÚ ˙ÈÓ¯˙" ÔÈÏ„È 'Ú Â‡¯ ‰Ê ÔÈÈÚ· ‰ÚÏ‚˙˘ ˙˜ÂÏÁÓ‰ ¯Â‡È˙Ï .(·).2.‚ ˜¯Ù ÔÏ‰Ï Â‡¯

,265y264 ,249 (Ê"˘˙) ÊÎ ÌÈËÙ˘Ó "È˘Ó‰ ˜Â˘· ‡Â˘-È‚ˆÓ ÔÈ‚· ˙ÈËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ÂȯÁ‡‰ ˙ÂÏ·‚.319y317

31P.G. Mahoney “Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets” 78 ‡¯.Va. L. Rev. (1992) 623

11

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

˜Â˘‰ ÔÂ‚Ó .‡

‰Ó¯·Â ˜Â˘· ÌȯÁÒ‰ ÌÈÒΉ Ï˘ ˜ÈÂ„Ó ¯ÂÁÓ˙· ÌÈÈÈÙÂ‡Ó ÌÈÏÈÚÈ ÌȘ¢ÌÈ·‡˘Ó Ï˘ ‰ÏÈÚÈ ‰‡ˆ˜‰ Í¯ÂˆÏ ˙ÈÂÈÁ ÏÈÚÈ ¯ÂÁÓ˙ ˙‚˘‰ .32˙ÂÏÈÊ Ï˘ ˙ÓωÏÚ ‰ËÈÏ˘Ï Á˜ÈÙÏ ,‰ËÈÏ˘‰ ˜Â˘ ¯Â·Ú ,¯˙ȉ ÔÈ· ,ÈÂÈÁ ÏÈÚÈ ¯ÂÁÓ˙ .33˜˘Ó·˙ÂÚˆÓ‡· ÌÈ·‡˘Ó Ï˘ Ì˙‡ˆ˜‰Ï ,˙¯·Á ÈÏ‰Ó Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÏÈÚÙÓ ˙ڷ‰ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÈÈÚ·˙¯Á‡ ˙‡˜ÒÚ ˙ÓÏ˘‰ Ì˘Ï ,È˘Ó‰ ˜Â˘· ˙˜ى (IPO) ˙ÂÈ¢‡¯ ˙Â˜Ù‰Ï˘ ‰Èˆ˜ÂÙ ‡È‰ ÌȘ¢ Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÏÈÊ .34˜Â˘ ȯÈÁÓ ÏÚ ˙ÂÎÓ˙ÒÓ‰ ,‰Ò¯Â·Ï ıÂÁÓ¯ÂÎÓÏ Â‡ ˙Â˜Ï ÌÈÏÂÎÈ ÌȯÁÂÒ‰ ¯˘‡Î ÌÈÏÈÊ ÌÈ·˘Á ÌȘ¢ .35˙ÂÓΠ¯ÈÁÓ ,ÔÓʉ¯ÈÎÓ‰ ‡ ‰ÈȘ‰ ˙ÏÂÚÙ Ï˘ ˙È˙ÂÚÓ˘Ó ‰ÚÙ˘‰ ‡ÏÏ ,È„ÈÈÓ ÔÙ‡· ,˙ÂÏ„‚ ˙ÂÈÂÓÎ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ÌÈ˙ÈÁÙÓ Ì‰˘ ÌÂ˘Ó ,‰ÏÎÏΉ ·ˆÓ ˙‡ ÌÈ·ÈËÈÓ ÌÈÏÈÊ ÌȘ¢ .¯ÈÁÓ‰ ÏÚ,˜Â˘ Ï„ÂÓ ‚Ȉ ‰Ê ˜¯Ù ͢Ӊ· .36˙ÂÚ˜˘‰· ÔÂÓˉ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡Â ,˙‡˜ÒÚ ˙ÈÈ˘Ú Ï˘

.˙ÂÏÈÊ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ÌȘ¢‰ ÌÈ‚È˘Ó Ì˙ÂÚˆÓ‡·˘ ÌÈÎÈω˙‰ ˙‡ ¯È·ÒÓ‰

ÌÈÈÒÈÙ‰ ÌȘ¢· ˙ÂÏÈÊ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ .1

ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÍÂ˙Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÌÂÏÈ‚ (‡)

,ÌÏÂ‚Ó ˙ÂÈ‰Ï Íȯˆ ˙¯·Á Ï˘ ÔÈÈ¢ ˙„‡ ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ,ÌÈÏÈÚÈ ÂÈ‰È ÌȘ¢˘ ˙Ó ÏڷίÂÓ ‰Ê ÍÈω˙ .37˜Â˘· ÌȯÁÒ‰ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÍÂ˙· ,˜È„ӷ ˙¯ȉӷڄÈÓ‰ ÌÂÏÈ‚ ,ÛÂÒ·Ï ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ Ï˘ Â˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ ,Ú„ÈÓ ÛÂÒȇ :˙¢ ˙ÂÏËÓ ˘ÂÏ˘ÓÏÚ ÚÈÙ˘Ó‰ ÚÂ„È È˙Ï· Ú„ÈÓ ¯Á‡ ˘ÂÙÈÁ· ͯΠڄÈÓ ÛÂÒȇ .ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ·Ì˘Ï ˙ÂÈÁ¯Î‰ ˙ÂÏÂÚÙ Úˆȷ· ͯΠڄÈÓ‰ Ï˘ Â˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ .ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓȯÈÁÓ· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÌÂÏÈ‚ .ÂÓˆÚ Ú„ÈÓ‰ Ï˘ Â˙ÂÈӇ ڄÈÓ‰ ¯Â˜Ó Ï˘ Â˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙˜È„·˙¯ÈÈ· ¯ÂÁÒÏ Ê‡Â ,ÂÎ¯Ú ˙‡ Ú·˜Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙‡ Á˙Ï ·ÈÈÁÓ Í¯Ú‰ ˙¯ÈÈ

.ÂÈ¢ ÔÈ·Ï Í¯Ú‰ ¯ÈÈ ¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ· ÌȯÚÙ ÏÚ ÍÓ˙Ò‰· ,ͯÚ

32.Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 6, at p. 554 :‡¯33.Fox et al., supra note 10 ‡¯34.Kahan, supra note 9 :‡¯ ÏÈÚÈ ¯ÂÁÓ˙ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰ Ï˘ ˯ÂÙÓ ÁÂ˙ÈÏ35L.S. Hodrick & P.C. Moulton “Liquidity” (2005) (working paper series), available ‡¯

.at: URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=44954036Kahan, supra note 9, at pp. 1019y1022; Y. Amihud “Illiquidity and Stock Returns: ‡¯

˙ÂÈÂÏÚ· ÔÂÈ„Ï .Cross-Section and Time Series Effects” 5 J. Fin. Market (2002) 31L.R. Glosten & L.E. Harris ‡¯ ¯˙ÂÈ ·Á¯ bid/ask Á¯ӷ ˙‡˷˙Ó‰ ¯˙ÂÈ ˙‰·‚ ‰˜ÒÚ“Estimating the components of the Bid/Ask Spread” 21 J. Fin. Econ. (1988) 123; Harold

.Demsetz “The Cost of Transacting” 82 Q. J. Econ. (1968) 33, 35y3637Gilson & Kraakman, supra ‡¯ ÌÈÏÈÚÈÏ ÍÂÙ‰Ï ÌȘÂÂ˘Ï Ìȯ˘Ù‡Ó‰ ÌÈÎÈω˙· ÛÈ˜Ó ÔÂÈ„Ï

.note 6

12

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

ÈÙȈÙÒ‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ .ÈÏÏÎ Ú„ÈÓ ÈÙȈÙÒ Ú„ÈÓ :Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ ÌÈ‚ÂÒ È˘· ˜ÒÂÚ Ú„ÈÓ ÛÂÒȇ,‰· ÌȘÒÚÂÓ‰ ÌÈωӉ ˙ÂÎȇ Ô‚Π,‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ÌÈ¢ ÌÈÈÈÙ‡Ó ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ ÏÏÂί˜ÁÓ‰ ÈˆÓ‡Ó ˙Áψ‰ ˙¯·˙҉ ÈÒÈÙ‰ ‰„ÓÚÓ ,ȘÒÚ‰ ‰¯·Ú ,˙ÂȘÒÚ‰ ‰È˙ÂÈÎÂ˙ÌÈÈÏÏΉ Ìȇ˙‰ ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ ÏÏÂÎ ˜Â˘‰ ÏÚ ÈÏÏÎ Ú„ÈÓ .‰¯·Á‰ ‰ÚȘ˘Ó˘ ÁÂ˙ÈÙ‰ÂÚ„ÈÓ ,ÏÏη ‰ÈÈ˘Ú˙‰ ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ ,‰È¯Á˙Ó ˙Áψ‰ ÈÈÂÎÈÒ Ô‚Π,‰¯·Á‰ ˙ÏÚÂ٠̉·˘

.˙ÈÓÏÂډ ˙ÈÓ˜Ӊ ‰ÏÎÏΉ ÏÚ.ÚÓ˙˘Ó Ú„ÈÓ ˘¯ÂÙÓ Ú„ÈÓ :Ú„ÈÓ È‚ÂÒ È˘Ï ÒÁÈÈ˙Ó Ú„ÈÓ‰ Ï˘ Â˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ˙ÂÁ„ Ô‚Π,˜Â˘‰ ÏÚ ÈÏÏΉ Ú„ÈӉ ÈÙȈÙÒ‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ È‚ÂÒ ÏÎ ˙‡ ÏÏÂÎ ˘¯ÂÙÓ Ú„ÈÓ¯˘‡ ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ È‚ÂÒ ÏÎ ˙‡ ÏÏÂÎ ÚÓ˙˘Ó Ú„ÈÓ .˙¢„Á ˙ÂÂ˙ÈÚÏ ˙¯‰ˆ‰ ,ÌÈÈÒÈÙ˙Â‰Ê ,¯ÁÒÓ‰ ȯÂÊÁÓ ,¯Ú˘‰ ÈÈÂÈ˘ Ô‚Π,˘¯ÂÙÓ Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ ÂÓÂȘ ÏÚ ˙˙Â‡Ó ÔÈÙȘڷ

.˜Â˘Ï ˙ÂÓ¯ÊÂÓ‰ ‰¯ÈÎӉ ‰È˜‰ ˙Â„Â˜Ù Ï˘ Ô·ÈË ÌȯÁÂÒ‰Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÁÂ˙È :˙„¯Ù ˙ÂÈÂÏÈÚÙ È˙˘ ÏÏÂΠͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÍÂ˙Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÌÂÏÈ‚.ÈÏÏΉ Ú„ÈÓ‰ Ï˘Â ÈÙȈÙÒ‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ Ï˘ Ì˙ÈÁ· ˙‡ ÍȯˆÓ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÁÂ˙È .¯ÁÒÓÂ‰Ê Ôȇ Ô΢ ,ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÍÂ˙Ï ÂÓˆÚÏ˘Î ÈÙȈÙÒ Ú„ÈÓ ˜È„ӷ ÌÏ‚Ï Ô˙È ‡ÏÈ„È˙Ú‰ ‰·ˆÓ ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ ‡ÏÏ ˙ÈÂÏÙ ‰¯·Á Ï˘ ‰˙Áψ‰ ÈÈÂÎÈÒ ˙‡ ÍÈ¯Ú‰Ï È¯˘Ù‡Ú„ÈÓ‰ ¯·ÚÂÓ ‰˙ÂÚˆÓ‡·˘ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ‰ ‰È‰ ¯ÁÒÓ .˙ÈÓÏÂډ ˙ÈÓ˜Ӊ ‰ÏÎÏΉ Ï˘˙„˜٠Ô˙Ó È„È ÏÚ ,¯È˘È ¯ÁÒÓ :˙¯ˆ È˙˘Ó ˙Á‡ ˘Â·ÏÏ ÈÂ˘Ú ¯ÁÒÓ .˜Â˘‰ χ

.¯ÁÒÈ˘ ˙Ó ÏÚ ÌȯÁ‡Ï ˙ˆÚ ˙ˆÏÓ‰ Ô˙Ó ˙ÂÚˆÓ‡· ,ÛÈ˜Ú ¯ÁÒÓ Â‡ ,¯ÁÒÓ

¯ÁÒÓ· ˙ÂÏÈʉ ˙¯·‚‰ (·)

˙È·¯ÓÏ ¯˘Ù‡˙˘ ¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ ÌÈȘ˙‰Ï ˙·ÈÈÁ ,ÌÈÏÈÊ ÂÈ‰È ÌȘ¢˘ ˙Ó ÏÚÌÈӯ‚ ÌÈȯ˜ÈÚ ˙Â¯Â˜Ó ‰˘ÂÏ˘ .˙¯ȉӷ ˙‡˜ÒÚ ˘ÂÓÈÓ ÌȯÎÂӉ ÌȘ‰ÈÂÈ˘Ï ¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ ,˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ ȘÈ˙ ˙Ó‡˙‰Ï ¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ :˙ÂÏÈʉ ˙¯·‚‰Ï˙Ó‡˙‰ .38ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰ ˙Âίډ Ô‚ӷ ‰„ÂÒÈ˘ ¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ ‰Ú˜˘‰/‰Îȯˆ ÒÁȉ‰˘Èί ˙ÂÏÂÚÙ ÌÈÚˆ·Ó ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó˘ ¯Á‡Ó ˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÏÈÊ ˙‡ ‰¯È·‚Ó ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ ȘÈ˙ÂÚ·˜˘ ‰‡Â˘˙‰Â ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙ÂÓ¯Ï ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰ ˜È˙ ·Î¯‰ ˙‡ Ìȇ˙‰Ï È„Î ‰¯ÈÎÓ Â‡¯Á‡Ó ˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÏÈÊ ˙‡ ‰¯È·‚Ó ‰Ú˜˘‰/‰Îȯˆ ÒÁȉ ÈÂÈ˘Ï ¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ .˘‡¯Ó˙Ï„‚‰Ï ‰¯ÈÎÓ ˙ÂÏÂÚ٠‡ ÔÂÎÒÈÁ‰ ˙Ï„‚‰Ï ‰˘Èί ˙ÂÏÂÚÙ ÌÈÚˆ·Ó ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó˘˜Â˘ ȘÁ˘˘ ¯Á‡Ó ˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÏÈÊ ˙‡ ¯È·‚Ó ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰ ˙Âίډ ÔÂÂ‚Ó .‰Îȯˆ‰È¢ ˙Âίډ· ÌȘÈÊÁÓ‰ ÌÈÚȘ˘ÓÏ ÌȯÎÂÓ ˙ÂÎÂÓ È¢ ˙Âίډ· ÌȘÈÊÁÓ‰

.39¯˙ÂÈ ˙‰·‚

38H.R. Stoll “Alternative Views of Market Making” in Market Making and the ‡¯.Changing Structure of the Securities Industries (Mass., 1985) 67y68

39È˙Ï· Ú„ÈÓ· ‡ ˙ÂÚÂÓ˘· ‰¯Â˜Ó˘ ,˙ÈÏÂȈ¯ È˙Ï· ˙‚‰˙‰ È„È ÏÚ ÌÈ˙ÚÏ ÚÂÓ ‰Ê ¯ÁÒÓ˙¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ¯˙ÂÈ ˙·ÂË ˙Âίډ Ì˙¢¯· ÈÎ (˙ÂÚË·) ÌȯÁÂÒ‰ ÌÈÈÓ‡Ó Âχ Ìȯ˜Ó· .ÒÒ·Ó

.̉ȯÁ˙Ó È„È·˘ Âχ ¯˘‡Ó ÌȯÁÒ‰ ͯډ

13

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

˜Â˘‰ ȘÁ˘ .2

È˘‡ :ÌȘÁ˘ Ï˘ ˙ˆ·˜ ˘ÓÁ Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘· ˙ÂÏÚÂÙ ,ÌÈ‚ÈˆÓ Â‡˘ Ï„ÂÓ‰ ÈÙ-ÏÚ˙Â˘È‚Ó Ìȉ ÌÈÙ È˘‡ .˜Â˘ È˘ÂÚ ,˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒ ,˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ ,Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ,ÌÈÙ˙ÏÂÎȉ ˙‡Â ڄȉ ˙‡ Ì‚ ˘È ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡Ï .‰¯·ÁÏ ‰·¯˜ Ì‚ ˘È ̉Ï ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓÏÏÚ ÈÏÏÎ Ú„ÈÓ Ì‚ ÛÂÒ‡Ï ÌÈÏ‚ÂÒÓ ÌÈÙ È˘‡ .Â˙‡ ¯ÁÓ˙Ï ڄÈÓ‰ ˙‡ ÍȯډÏ˙ÚÂÓ ÌÈÏ‰Ó Ì‰˘ ‰¯·Á· ˙È„ÚÏ· ËÚÓΉ Ì˙„˜Ó˙‰ ,˙‡Ê ÌÚ .¯ÁÓ˙Ï ˜Â˘‰.40˜Â˘‰ ÏÚ ÈÏÏÎ Ú„ÈÓ ÌÂÏÈ‚·Â ,‰Î¯Ú‰· ,ÛÂÒȇ· Ô‚ÓÏÂ Ï„Â‚Ï ˙¯˙È ÏˆÏ Ì‰Ó˙‡ ˙ÂÈ·È˘Èȷ‡· ÍÈ¯Ú‰Ï ˙ÏÂÎȉ ÌÈÙ È˘‡Ï Ôȇ ,‰¯·ÁÏ Ì˙·¯È˜ ÁÎÂÏ ,ÍÎÓ ‰¯˙È

.41ÌÓˆÚ Ì‰Ï˘ ˙ÂȘÒÚ‰ ˙ÂËÏÁ‰‰ ͯÚÚ„ÈÓÏ ‰˘È‚ Ôȇ ,Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘· ˙ÏÚÂÙ‰ ‰È˘‰ ÌȘÁ˘‰ ˙ˆÂ·˜ ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÏÒÒ·Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ ,ÂÁÂ˙ÈÏ ڄÈÓ ÛÂÒÈ‡Ï ÌÈ·‡˘Ó ˘È„˜‰Ï ÌÈÏÂÎÈ ÌÈÎÂÓ Ì‰ ͇ ,ÌÈÙÌÈÚȘ˘Ó :‰˘Ó ˙ˆ·˜ È˙˘Ó ÌȷίÂÓ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ .Ì‰Ï˘ ‰Ú˜˘‰‰ ˙ÂËÏÁ‰ ˙‡ÌÈÏÏÂÎ ÌÈÓÎÁÂ˙Ó‰ ÌÈÈÚˆ˜Ó‰ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰ .ÌÈËÒÈχ ,ÌÈÓÎÁÂ˙Ó ÌÈÈÚˆ˜Ó,ÌȯÁ‡ ÌÈÈÚˆ˜Ó ˜Â˘ ȘÁ˘Â ÌÈÙÒÎ ÈÏ‰Ó ,ÌÈÈ„ÒÂÓ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó Ï˘ ·Á¯ Ô‚Ó˙„Â·Ú ÏÚ ,˙¯Á‡ ‡ ÂÊ ‰„ÈÓ· ,ÌÏÂÎ ÌÈÎÓ˙ÒÓ ‰Ú˜˘‰ ˙ÂËÏÁ‰ ˙Ï·˜ Í¯ÂˆÏ ¯˘‡ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ :‰˘Ó ˙ˆ·˜ ˘ÂÏ˘ ÌÈÏÏÂÎ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ .˙ȘÒÚ/˙ÈÒÈÙ ÁÂ˙È.ÌÈÈ‡ÓˆÚ ÌÈËÒÈχ ,(buy-side) ÌȘ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ ,(sell-side) ÌȯÎÂÓ‰˙¯ÈÈ ¯Á‡ ·Â˜ÚÏ ˙Ó ÏÚ ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ È˙· È„È ÏÚ ÌȘÒÚÂÓ ÌȯÎÂÓ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχÌȇ ,ÌÈÁ· ˜Â˘Ï ̉ÈÁÂ˙È ˙‡ Ìȯ¯Á˘Ó Âχ ÌÈËÒÈχ .ÌÎȯډÏ ÌÈÓÈÂÒÓ Í¯Ú‡Â‰ Âχ ÌÈËÒÈχ ÌȘÙÒÓ˘ ÈÂÒÈΉ .̉È˙Âίډ ÒÈÒ· ÏÚ ¯ÁÒÓÓ Áȯ‰Ï ÌÈÒÓÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ Ï˘ ÈÂÒÈΉ .˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰ È˙· Ï˘ ˙ÂÁ˜ÏÏ Ô˙ȉ ˙Â¯È˘ ¯˜ÈÚ·,ÈËÒÈχ‰ ÈÂÒÈΉ ‡˘ÂÓ Ìȉ˘ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈÏ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó Í¢ÓÏ „ÚÂÈÓ ÌȯÎÂÓ‰ÔÈÙȘڷ ÌÈÎÓÂ˙ ÌȯÎÂÓ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ ,ÔÎ ÏÚ .˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰ È˙·Ï ˙¯·Á ÔÎÂÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ .˙ÂÈ¢‡¯ ˙˜ى· ÌÈÓ˙ÁÎ ˙¢ӢӉ ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰ È˙· ˙·ÈËÁ·¯Â„È‚ ˙¯˜ ,˙ÂÓ‡ ˙¯˜ Ô‚Î) ÌÈÏ„‚ ÌÈÈ„ÒÂÓ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó È„È ÏÚ ÌȘÒÚÂÓ ÌȘ‰˙‡ ÌȯÓ¢ Âχ ÌÈËÒÈχ .˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ ȘÈ˙ Ï‰Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ (‰ÈÒÙ ˙¯˜ ,(hedge)

40H.N. Seyhun “The Information ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯ .Ú„ÈÓ „·ÈÚ· ˙ÂÈÚ·Ó ÌÈÏ·ÂÒ ÌÈÙ-È˘‡ ,ÛÒ·ÌÈ˘˜˙Ó ÌÈÙ È˘‡ ÈÎ ÔÈȈÓ) Content of Aggregate Insider Trading” 61 J. Bus. (1988) 1ÏÏÎ ÌÈӯ‚ Ï˘ Ì˙ÚÙ˘‰ ÔÈ·Ï ‰¯·ÁÏ ÌÈ„ÁÂÈÓ‰ ÌÈӯ‚ Ï˘ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰ ÔÈ· ÔÈÁ·‰Ï ÌÈ˙ÚÏ

.(ÌÈȘ˘Ó41D.C. Langevoort “Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations ‡¯

Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cuase Other Social Harms)” 146 U. Pa. L.Rev. (1977) 101, 157 (in particular note 196); J.R. Macey & A.W.A. Boot “MonitoringCorporate Performance: The Role of Objectivity, Proximity and Adaptability in Corporate

.Governance” 89 Cornell L. Rev. (2004) 356

14

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

ÔÈ· ÌȯÚÙ ¯Â˙ȇ· „ÂÒÈ˘ ¯ÁÒÓ È„È ÏÚ ÌȘÈÙÓ Ì‰ ̉ÈÁ¯ ˙‡Â ,„ÂÒ· ̉ÈÁÂ˙ȇ "ÌίÚ"Ï ÏÚÓ ÌȯÁÒ‰ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ¯Â˙ȇ ,ȯ˜) ̉È˙Âίډ ÔÈ·Ï ˜Â˘‰ ¯ÈÁÓÏ˘ ̉ÈÁÂ˙È· ˘ÂÓÈ˘ ÌȘ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ÌÈ˘ÂÚ Ì˙„Â·Ú Íωӷ .(ÂÏ ˙Á˙ÓÌȉÂÊÓ Ìȇ ÌÈÈ‡ÓˆÚ ÌÈËÒÈχ .ÛÒ ڄÈÓ ¯Â˜ÓÎ ,ÌȯÎÂÓ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰˙ÂÁ˜ÏÏ ÌȯÎÂÓ Ì‰ Ì˙‡˘ ,ÌÈÈËÒÈχ ÌÈÁÂ˙È ÌȯˆÈÈÓ Ì‰Â ,˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ ˙È· ÌÚÌÈÈÚˆ˜Ó‰ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰ ÔÂÂ‚Ó ˙‡ ÌȈ·˜Ó ‡ .̉È˙Â¯È˘ ÏÚ È‰˘ÏΠͯ„· ÌÈÈÂÓ‰

."Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ" ˙¯˙ÂΉ ˙Á˙ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ˙ˆ·˜ ˘ÂÏ˘ ˙‡Â ÌÈÓÎÁÂ˙Ó‰ÍÈ¯Ú‰Ï ,ÛÂÒ‡Ï Ú„È‰ ˙‡Â ˙ÏÂÎȉ ˙‡ ˘È Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÏ ,ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡Ï ‰Ó„·È˘‡Ï „‚ȷ ͇ .˜Â˘‰ ÏÚ ÈÏÏÎ Ú„ÈÓ ÈÙȈÙÒ Ú„ÈÓ Í¯Ú‰ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ· ÌÏ‚ÏÂÚ„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÌÈÏÂÎÈ ,ÌȘ¢·Â ÌÈÙÚ· ¯˙ÂÈ ‰·Á¯‰ Ì˙„˜Ó˙‰ ÁÎÂÏ ,ÌÈÙ‰ÌÈÓÚÙ .Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓÏ ÂÓÂÏÈ‚·Â Ú„ÈÓ ˙ίډ· Ô‚Ӊ τ‚‰ ˙¯˙È ˙‡ ψÏÚ„È ,˙¯Á‡ ‰¯·ÁÏ ÒÁÈ· Ì‚ ˘Ó˘Ï ÌÈÂÒÓ ÛÚ· ˙Á‡ ‰¯·ÁÏ Ú‚Â‰ Ú„È ÈÂ˘Ú ,˙·¯

.42˙¯·Á‰ ÏÎ ÁÂ˙È Í¯ÂˆÏ ÌÈ˘È ‰˙ÂÏÏη ‰ÏÎÏÎÏ ÒÁÈ·,Ú„ÈÓ ‰ÎȯÚÓ ˙ÙÒ‡ ‰È‡ ,˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ ,˜Â˘‰ ȘÁ˘ Ï˘ ˙È˘ÈÏ˘‰ ‰ˆÂ·˜‰È¯ÁÂÒ .43‰ÎȯˆÂ ÔÂÎÒÈÁ ÔÈ· ‰ÈÏÚ ˙Ù„ÚÂÓ‰ ‰‡ˆ˜‰‰ ˙‡ ‰˙Ú˜˘‰· ˙Ù˜˘Ó ‡Ï‡Ì‰ ̇ ,˘„Á Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ „ÈÓ˙Ó ÁÂ˙ÈÏ ˘ÂÙÈÁÏ ÌÈ·‡˘Ó ÌÈ˘È„˜Ó Ìȇ ˙ÂÏÈʉÏÏÎ-ͯ„·) Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ÔÂÂ‚Ó ˜È˙ ˙˘Èί Ï˘ ‰È‚˯ËÒ‡ ÂˆÓ‡È Ì‰ ,ÌÈÈÏÂȈ¯

.44Â˙˜ÊÁ‰ Ï˘Â (Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ‰˘ÏÎ „„Ó ˙˘ÈίÁ¯Â‡· ,‰ˆÂ·˜Î ÔÈ·Â ÌÈ„ÈÁÈÎ ÔÈ· ,ÌÈÏÚÂÙ Z ˙ÈÚÈ·¯‰ ‰ˆÂ·˜‰ Z ˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒͯ„· ÌÈÈÓ‡Ó ˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒ .45‰Ú˜˘‰ Ï˘ ˙¢Ӡ˙¢ ˙ÂËÈ˘ ÈÙ ÏÚ ÈÏÂȈ¯ ‡ÏÌȯ˜Ó· .Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Âȉ ÂÏȇΠÌÈÚȘ˘Ó ̉ ,Í¯Ú ·¯ Ú„ÈÓ Ì˙¢¯· ÈÂˆÓ ÈÎ ÏÏÎÚ„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ÔÈ·Ï ˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒ ÔÈ· ÔÈÁ·‰Ï ÌÈÏ‚ÂÒÓ Ìȇ ÌȯÁ‡‰ ˜Â˘‰ ȘÁ˘ ,ÂχÎ,„Á‡‰ ‰ˆ˜· .˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÔÈ· ˙ÂÈÏÂȈ¯ ȇ Ï˘ ˙¢ ˙ÂÓ¯ ˙ÂÓÈȘ ,Ô· .ÌÈÈ˙ÈÓ‡

42A.R. Admati & P. Pfleiderer “Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regulation ‡¯and Externalities” 13 Rev. Fin. Stud. (2000) 479, 480; B.J. Bushee & C. Leuz “EconomicConsequences of SEC Disclosure Regulation: Evidence from the OTC Bulletin Board”

.39 J. Account. & Econ. (2005) 23343ÌÈÒÎ ¯Á‡ ÌÈ˘ÙÁÓ‰ ,'ʇ¯ËÈ·¯‡‰ È˘‡ Ï˘ ‡È‰ ÂÊ ˙¯˙ÂÎ ˙Á˙ ‰¯ÈÎÊ‰Ï ˘È˘ ˙ÙÒ ‰ˆÂ·˜

.ÌȯÈÁÓ· ˘¯Ù‰‰ ÔÓ Á¯ ˜ÈÙ‰Ï È„Î ¯ÁÒÓÏ ˙ÂÏÂÚÙ ÌÈÚˆ·Ó ,ÌÈ¢ ÌȯÈÁÓ· ÌȯÁÒ‰ ÌÈÓ„ÚÂÓ 'ʇ¯ËÈ·¯‡ ¯ÁÒÓ .ÌÈÓ„ ÌÈÒÎ Ï˘ ÌÈÈÒÁȉ ÌȯÈÁÓ‰ ˜¯ ÌÈÚ‚Â 'ʇ¯ËÈ·¯‡‰ È˘‡ÏÈ˙Ï· ‡Â‰ ÌÈÒΉ ÔÓ „Á‡ ÏÎ Ï˘ È˙ÈÓ‡‰ È¢‰Â ,ÌÈÒΉ È˘ Ï˘ ÌȯÈÁÓ· ÌÈÏ„·‰ È„È ÏÚ,'ʇ¯ËÈ·¯‡‰ È˘‡Ï È˷ϯ Âȇ ‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ È˙ÈÓ‡‰ È¢‰ ˙„‡ ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ‰˘ ¯Á‡Ó .È˷ϯ

.˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒÎ Ì˙‡ ‚ÈÈ˙Ï ˘È44D.D. Haddock & J.R. Macey “A Coasian Model of Insider Trading” 80 Nw. U. L. Rev.

.(1986) 1449, 145345J. Bradford De Long, A. Shleifer, L.H. ‡¯ Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘· ˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ÌÓÂȘ· ÔÂÈ„Ï

Summers & R. J. Waldmann “Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets” 98 J. Pol. Econ..(1990) 703

15

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

˙ÂȂ˯Ë҇ ˙ÂÙ‡ ,˙ÂÚÂÓ˘ ÈÙ ÏÚ ÌÈÏÚÂÙ‰ ,ÌÈÈÏÂȈ¯ È˙Ï· ÌȯÁÂÒ ‡ÂˆÓÏ Ô˙ÈÌÂÈ Íωӷ ˙Âȇ¯˜‡ ¯ÈÁÓ ˙„Â˙ ¯Á‡ ·˜ÚÓ Ô‚Π,ÈÏÎÏÎ ÏÂȈ¯ ˙¯ÒÁ ‰Ú˜˘‰ÌÈÎȯÚÓ ڄÈÓ ÌÈÙÒ‡‰ ,˙ÂÈÓ È˘ÏÓ ‡ÂˆÓÏ Ô˙È ,Ûˆ¯‰ Ï˘ ¯Á‡‰ ‰ˆ˜· .¯ÁÒÓ˙ÂÏ΢ÂÓ ˙ÂÈÏÂȈ¯ ‰Ú˜˘‰ ˙ÂËÏÁ‰ Ï·˜Ï ÌÈÒÓ ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÏ ‰Ó„· ,Â˙‡˙ÂÓÈ˘Ó Úˆȷ· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÓ ÌÈÏÈÚÈ ˙ÂÁÙ ˙ÂÈÓ‰ È˘ÏÓ Ìχ .˙ÈÏÎÏÎ ‰ÈÁ·ÓÁÂ˙È· ¯˙ÂÈ "ÌÈÈËȇ" ̉ ,È˷ϯ‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÏÎ ˙‡ ÌÈ‚È˘Ó Ìȇ ˙ÂÈÓ È˘ÏÓ .ÂÏ‡Ï˘ ÂÊ ˙ÓÂÚÏ ‰˙ÂÁ ̉È˙Âίډ Ï˘ ˜ÂÈ„‰ ˙„ÈÓ ÍÎÓ ‰‡ˆÂ˙Π,ÂÙÒ‡˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰¯·Î˘ ,"Ô˘È" Ú„ÈÓ ÏÚ ¯˜ÈÚ· ÌÈÒÒ·˙Ó ˙ÂÈÓ È˘ÏÓ ,‰˘ÚÓÏ .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ È„È ÏÚ ÂÓÒ¯ÂÙ˘ ÌÈÁÂ˙È Ô‚Π,ͯډ ¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ˜Â˘‰ ¯ÈÁÓ· Û˜˙˘ÓÌÈÈÒÈÙ‰ ÌȈ¯ڷ ¯„¢˘ Ú„ÈÓ ,ÌÈÈÒÈ٠˯Ëȇ ȯ˙‡· ‡ˆÓ˘ Ú„ÈÓ ,ÌȯÎÂÓ‰ÌÚÓȉ· .˙Ú-È·˙η ˙ÂÂ˙ÈÚ· ÂÓÒ¯ÂÙ˘ ÌȯÁ‡ ÌÈÈËÒÈχ ÌÈÁÂ˙È ‰ÈÊÈÂÂÏË·˙¯Ȅ˙· ÌÈ„ÈÒÙÓ ˙ÂÈÓ È˘ÏÓ ,˙ÂÚ˜˘‰-˜È˙-˜ÊÁ‰Â-‰˜ Ï˘ ‰È‚˯ËÒ‡ ıÂÓȇÓÈ˘ÏÓ˘ Ì‚‰ ,ÔÎ ÏÚ .˙ÂÊ·ÊÂ·Ó ‰˜ÒÚ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ· Ìȇ˘Â ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÏ ¯˙ÂÈ ‰·¯ÏÏÎ ÂχΠÌȇ ̉ ‰˘ÚÓÏ ,È˷ϯ ÈÏÎÏÎ Ú„ÈÓÏ Ì˙·Â‚˙· ÌÈÈÏÂȈ¯ Ìȇ¯ ˙ÂÈÓ

.46˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒÎ Ì‚ÈÈ˙Ï ˘È ÔÎ ÏÚ ,ÏÏÎÂ˜Â˘ ÌÈÓÈȘÓ ¯ÁÒÓÏ ÌÈÓ¯Â˙‰ Úˆ˜Ó È˘‡ ̉ ,˜Â˘ È˘ÂÚ ,‰Â¯Á‡‰ ‰ˆÂ·˜‰.Ú·˜ ÒÈÒ· ÏÚ Ì˙¯ÈÎÓÏ Â‡ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ˙˘ÈÎ¯Ï ˙ÂÚˆ‰ ÌÂÒ¯Ù È„È ÏÚ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈÏ,ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈÏ (ask price) ‰¯ÈÎÓ ¯ÈÁÓ (bid price) ‰ÈȘ ¯ÈÁÓ ÌÈÓÒ¯ÙÓ Ì‰˜Â˘‰ È˘ÂÚ .¯ÂÁÒÏ ÌÈÈÈÂÚÓ‰ ÌÈÚȘ˘ÓÏ ‰˜ÒÚÏ „ˆÎ ÌÈ˘Ó˘Ó Í¯Âˆ‰ ˙„ÈÓ·ÂÌÈ˘Ó˙˘Ó ̉˘ ¯Á‡Ó ,Í¯Ú ¯ÈÈÏ ÒÁÈ· ÌÈÓÈȘ‰ ˘Â˜È·‰Â ڈȉ‰ ˙‡ ·Ëȉ ÌȯÈÎÓ.47(bid/ask-‰ Á¯Ó) Ì‰Ï˘ ‰¯ÈÎӉ ‰ÈȘ‰ ȯÈÁÓ ˙‡ Ú·˜Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ ‰Ê Ú„ÈÓ·¯Á‡Ó ,‰¯·Á‰ ÏÚ ÈÙȈÙÒ Ú„ÈÓ È„ Ôȇ ˜Â˘‰ È˘ÂÚÏ ,Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒÏ ‰‡Â¢‰· ,˙‡Ê ÌÚÚ„ÈÓ ¯Â˙ȇ· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó˘ ıÓ‡Ó‰ ˙‡Â ÔÓʉ ˙‡ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó Ìȇ ̉˘È„È ÏÚ Â¯˜ÈÚ· ÚÂÓ Ì‰Ï˘ ¯ÁÒÓ‰˘ ‰„·ÂÚ‰ ¯Â‡Ï .48ÂÁÂ˙È·Â ‰¯·Á‰ ÏÚ ÈÙȈÙÒ

46Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ÌÈ˙ÚÏ ÂÈ‰È ˜Â˘‰ ȘÁ˘Ó ˜ÏÁ˘ ‰Ê Ô·ÂÓ· ÈÏÂȈ˜ÂÙ ‡Â‰ ÌÈÚÈˆÓ Â‡˘ ‚ÂÂÈÒ‰ÂÏÚÙÈ ÌÏÂÚÏ˘ ˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒ Ì˘È ,Ô· .ÌÈÚˆ·Ó ̉˘ ˙ÂÏÂÚÙÏ Ì‡˙‰· ,˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒ ÌÈ˙ÚÏÂÚ„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ˘È ,̯· .˙ÈÚˆ˜Ó ‡ ˙Èχ¢ÏËȇ ˙Â˙ÈÁ Ï˘ ÌÈÓÚËÓ ˙‡Ê ,˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒÎ˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ¯„ÚÏ ˙Âٯˈ‰ È„È ÏÚ ,ÌȯÁ‡‰ Ï˘ Ì˘¯‚Ó· ˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˙‡ ÒÈ·‰Ï ÂÒÈ˘

.˘Ú¯ ¯ÁÒÓ· ˜ÂÒÈÚÂ47R.D. Huang & H.R. Stoll “Dealer versus Auction Markets: A Paired Comparison of ‡¯

Execution Costs on NASDAQ and the NYSE” 41 J. Fin. Econ. (1996) 313, 322y326;S. Dolgopolov “The Relationship Between Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spvn read:a Critical Evaluation of the ‘Adverse Selection’ Model” (2003) (working paper series),-‰ ÁÂÂ¯Ó .available at: ULR:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=440380·˘ ¯ÈÁÓ‰ ÔÈ·Ï (bid) Í¯Ú ¯ÈÈ ˙Â˜Ï ˜Â˘‰ ‰˘ÂÚ ÔÎÂÓ Â·˘ ¯ÈÁÓ· ÔÈ· ¯ÚÙ‰ Âȉ bid/ask˘Â˜È·ÏÂ ÚˆÈ‰Ï Ì‡˙‰· ·Á¯˙Ó Â‡ ¯ˆ˜˙Ó Á¯Ӊ .(ask) ͯډ ¯ÈÈ ˙‡ ¯ÂÎÓÏ ‰ÎÂÓ ‰¯·Á‰

.¯ÁÒ‰ ͯډ ¯ÈÈÏ48I.R.C Hirst “A Model of Market-Making with Imperfect Information” 1 Managerial ‡¯

16

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

Ìȇ ̉˘ Íη ,„Á‡ „ˆÓ ,ÌȯÁ‡‰ ˜Â˘‰ ȘÁ˘ ÌÈ·ÈˆÓ˘ ‰¯ÈÎӉ ‰ÈȘ‰ ˙ÂÚˆ‰È¯ÁÂÒ Ìȇ ˜Â˘ È˘ÂÚ ,¯Á‡ „ˆÓ ,ÌÓˆÚ Ï˘Ó ˙ÂÈ‡ÓˆÚ È¢ ˙Âίډ ÏÚ ÌÈÎÓ˙ÒÓ

.˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ ‡Ï Ì‚Â Ú„ÈÓ

¯ÂÁÓ˙‰ ÍÈω˙ .3

,(price) ¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ·Ï (value) È¢ ÔÈ· ÌȯÚÙ Ìȯ˙‡Ó Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Â‡ ÌÈÙ È˘‡Ì‰Ï˘ Ô¯˙ȉ ÔÓ Á¯ ˜ÈÙ‰Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ ÌȯÁÂÒ Ê‡Â ,Ì˙¢¯·˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÏÚ ÒÒ·˙‰·Íη ,Â˙‡ ÌȘ ̉ ,‰˘ÏΠͯÚ-¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ¯ÒÁ-˙ίډ· ÌÈÈÁ·Ó ̉ ¯˘‡Î .49Ú„ÈÓ·ÌȯÎÂÓ Ì‰ ,Í¯Ú ¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ¯˙È ˙ίډ· ÌÈÈÁ·Ó ̉ ¯˘‡Î :ÍÙȉÏ ;¯ÈÁÓ ˙‡ ÌÈÏÚÓÔÈ· ˙„Ó˙Ó ‰‡Â¢‰ ˙Î¯Ú ÂÊ ‰Ú˜˘‰ ˙ËÈ˘·˘ ¯Á‡Ó .˙„¯Ï ¯ÈÁÓÏ ÌÈӯ‚ ,Â˙‡¯ÁÒÓ ÌÈȘ˙Ó ,¯ÁÂÒ‰ Ï˘ ˙È·È˘ÈÈ·ÂÒ È¢ ˙ίډ ÔÈ·Â ,· ÌÈÈÂÈ˘ ‡ ,¯ÈÁÓ‰,ÔÎ ÏÚ ,¯Â¯· .¯ÁÂÒÏ Ú„ȉ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÒÈÒ· ÏÚ ‰˜„ˆ‰ Ôȇ · ÌÈÈÂÈ˘Ï Â‡ ¯ÈÁÓÏ˘Î˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰ ÍÂ˙ ¯ÁÒÓ Â‡ ,Ú„ÈÓ· ˙ÂÙÈ„ÚÓ ‰‰‰ „ˆ ÏÂÓ ¯ÁÒÓ ,ÂÊ ‰Ú˜˘‰ ˙ËÈ˘·˘„ÈÒÙ‰Ï ÔÂÎÈÒ‰Ó ÚÓ‰Ï Ô˙È ‡Ï ,„ÂÚ ˙‡Ê .„ÒÙ‰· ÌÈÈ˙ÒÈ ,ȯ˜˘Î ‰Ï‚˙È˘ Ú„ÈÓ ÏÚ¯ÁÒÓ‰ ˙ÂÏÂÚÙ Ï΢ ¯Á‡Ó ,˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰ ˜È˙ ÔÂÂÈ‚ È„È ÏÚ ÛÈ„Ú Ú„ÈÓ ÏÚ· ÏÂÓ ¯ÁÒÓ·

.50˘„Á Ú„ÈÓ ˙Ú‚‰ È„È ÏÚ Â‡ ¯ÈÁÓ· ÌÈÈÂÈ˘ È„È ÏÚ ˙ÂÚÂÓÌȯÎÂÓ ,¯ÓÂÏÎ ,˘„Á Ú„ÈÓÏ ¯˘˜ ‡ÏÏ ¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÂÚÙ ÌÈÚˆ·Ó‰ ,˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒÈ˘‡ Ï˘ ̉È˙ÂÏÂÚÙÏ ¯˘˜ ‡ÏÏ Â¯ÁÒÈ ,ÔÂÎÒÈÁ Í¯ÂˆÏ ÌÈ˘Î¯ ÌÈÒÎ ˙Ïʉ ͯˆÏÈ˘‡ ÌÈÏÚÂ٠·˘ ÔÙ‡ Â˙‡· ÌÈÏÚÂÙ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ Ì‡ .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÌÈÙ‰,ÌȘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Â‡ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ ¯˘‡Î ÌȘ ,¯ÓÂÏÎ ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÌÈÙ‰„‚ȷ ÌȯÁÂÒ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ Ì‡ .51„ÈÒÙÈ Ì‰ Z ÌȯÎÂÓ ÂÏω ¯˘‡Î ÌȯÎÂÓ Â‡

˜¯ÂÈ ÂÈ Ï˘ ‰Ò¯Â·· ˜Â˘‰ È˘ÂÚ˘ „ÂÚ· ÈÎ ‡È‰ ‰Úˉ ,Ô·.& Decision Econ. (1980) 12‡¯ .Íη ÌȘÒÂÚ ‡˜Â„ NASDAQ-‰ ˙ү·· ˜Â˘‰ È˘ÂÚ ,ÈËÒÈχ ÁÂ˙È· ÌȘÒÂÚ ÌȇJ. Chai Lin et al. “External Information Costs and the Adverse Selection Problem: AÌχ .Comparison of NASDAQ and NYSE Stocks” 7 Int’l Rev. Fin. Anslysis (1998) 113¯Â‡È˙Î ,ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ Ìȇ ̉ ÈΠ‡ ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ Ì‰ ˜Â˘‰ È˘ÂÚ ÈÎ ÌÈÚÂË Âȇ ÈÎ ˘È‚„‰Ï ·Â˘Á.Ï„ÂÓ‰ ˙‡ ˙ˢÙÓ‰ ‰Á‰Î ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ È˙Ï· ˜Â˘ È˘ÂÚ· ÌÈ˘Ó˙˘Ó ‡ .ÌÏÂÚ‰ Ï˘ È·ÈËÈÊÂÙÌÈÚˆ·Ó ˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ Â·˘ ¯Á‡ Ï„ÂÓ ˘¯„ÈÈ ,ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ ˜Â˘‰ È˘ÂÚ ¯˘‡Î ,ÂÈË·Ó ˙„˜ÓÌȯÁÂÒ „‚Î ¯ÁÒÓ‰ ÔÓ ÌÈ„ÒÙ‰‰ ‰Ê ÔÙ‡·Â ,ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ ÌȯÁÂÒ ÏÂÓ ˙Â¯È˘È ¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÂÚÙ˙ÂÏÂÚ‰ ˙Âȯ˜ÈÚ‰ ˙˜ÒÓ‰ ,Ìχ .˘Ú¯‰Â ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ Ï‡ ˙Â¯È˘È ÌÈÏ‚ÏÂ‚Ó ¯˙ÂÈ ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ

.ÔÈËÂÏÁÏ ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ ˜Â˘ È˘ÂÚ˘ ÁÈ Ì‡ Ì‚ Â˙˘È ‡Ï ‰Ê ¯Ó‡ÓÓ49E.F. Fama “Random Walks in Stock Market Prices” 21 Fin. Analysis J. ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯

ȯÈÁÓ ÍÂ˙Ï Ú„ÈÓ ÌÈ·Ï˘Ó ˜Â˘· Úˆ˜Ó‰ È˘‡ Ì˙ÂÚˆÓ‡·˘ ÌÈÎÈω˙‰ ¯Â‡È˙) (1965) 55.(ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ

50.Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 14, at pp. 1240y1241 ‡¯51ÏÚ .¯ÈÁÓ‰ ÔÓ ˙˜˙ÂÓ ˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ ¯ÁÒÓ‰ ˙ÂËÏÁ‰ .$100 ‡Â‰ ‰ÈÓ Ï˘ ‰¯ÈÁÓ ÈÎ ÁÈ

˙‡ ÌȘ ÌÈÙ È˘‡ ÈÎ ‰˙Ú ÁÈ .$100-· ¯ÎÓÈÂ Â˜È Ì‰ ,ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ ¯„Úȉ· ,ÔÎÌÏ˘Ï Â˘¯„ÈÈ˘ ÌÂ˘Ó Â„ÈÒÙÈ Ì‰ ,̉ Û‡ ÌȘ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ Ì‡ .$110-Ï ‰ÏÂÚ ¯ÈÁӉ ‰ÈÓ‰

17

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ ,ÔÎ ÏÚ .52ÂÁÈÂÂ¯È Ì‰ Z Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Â‡ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ Ï˘ ̉ÈÎωÓÏ‡Ï ,ÚˆÂÓÓ· ÌÈ„ÈÒÙÓ Ìȇ ,˙ÂÈÓ-˜È˙-˜ÊÁ‰Â-‰˜ Ï˘ ‰È‚˯ËÒ‡‰ ÈÙÏ ÌÈÏÚÂÙ‰ÌÈ„ÈÒÙÓ Ì‰ ˙ÂÈÓ ˜È˙ ÌȘ ˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ ¯˘‡Î .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÏ ‡Ï ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ÏÌÈÁȯӠ,(Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Â‡ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ ÌÚ „ÁÈ· ÌȘ ̉ ¯˘‡Î) ˙‡˜ÒÚ‰ ÔÓ ˜ÏÁ·,‰Ó„· .(ÌȯÎÂÓ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Â‡ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ „ÂÚ· ,ÌȘ ̉˘Î) ˙¯Á‡ ˙‡˜ÒÚ ÏÚ˜È˙ ˙‡ ÌȯÎÂÓ Ì‰ ¯˘‡Î ,˙¯Á‡ ÌÈ˙ÚÏ ÌÈÁȯӠ,ÌÈ˙ÚÏ ÌÈ„ÈÒÙÓ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒÂÓÂÎÈÒ· .53Ì˙˜ÊÁ‡ ˙Ù˜˙ ¯Â·Ú ˜Â˘‰ ˙‡Â˘˙ ˙‡ ÌÈÁÈÂÂ¯Ó Ì‰ ÚˆÂÓÓ· .˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰.54ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ ÌȯÁÂÒ „‚Î ¯ÁÒÓ· ÔÂÓˉ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ÔÂÂ‚Ï ÌÈÏÂÎÈ ˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ ,¯·„ Ï˘Â¯ÁÒÈ ¯˘‡Î „ÈÒÙÈ ¯ÈÁÓ· ÌÈÈÂÈ˘ È„È ÏÚ ˙ÚÂÓ Ì‰Ï˘ ¯ÁÒÓ‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ˘ ÌȯÁÂÒ ˜¯

.55¯˙ÂÈ ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ ÌȯÁÂÒ „‚ÎÌȯÁÂÒ ÌÚ ¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ· ÔÂÓˉ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ÔÂÂ‚Ï ÌÈÏ‚ÂÒÓ ˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ˘ Ì‚‰.56¯ÈÁÓ· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÌÂÏÈ‚ Ï˘ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ‰ ÔÓ ˜ÏÁ· Ìȇ˘Â ̉ ÔÈÈ„Ú ,¯˙ÂÈ ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓÈÏ·Ó ,˙¯ȉӷ ‰Ï„‚ ‰˜ÒÚ Úˆ·Ï ˙ÏÂÎȉ ,¯ÓÂÏÎ) ˙ÂÏÈʉ ‰·Â˘Á ˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒÏ

ȯÁÂÒ Ì‡ .$90-Ï „¯ÈÈ ¯ÈÁÓ‰ ,‰ÈÓ‰ ˙‡ ÌȯÎÂÓ ÌÈÙ È˘‡ ¯˘‡Î ,‰Ó„· .‰ÈÓ‰ ¯Â·Ú ¯˙ÂÈ.¯˙ÂÈ ÍÂÓ ¯ÈÁÓ· ‰ÈÓ‰ ˙‡ ¯ÂÎÓÏ ÂˆÏ‡ÈÈ Ì‰˘ ÌÂ˘Ó Â„ÈÒÙÈ Ì‰ ,̉ Û‡ ÌȯÎÂÓ ˙ÂÏÈʉ

52ÏÚ .¯ÈÁÓ‰ ÔÓ ˙˜˙ÂÓ ˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ ¯ÁÒÓ‰ ˙ÂËÏÁ‰ .$100 ‡Â‰ ‰ÈÓ Ï˘ ‰¯ÈÁÓ ÈÎ ÁÈ˙‡ ÌȘ ÌÈÙ È˘‡ ÈÎ ‰˙Ú ÁÈ .$100-· ¯ÎÓÈÂ Â˜È Ì‰ ,ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ ¯„Úȉ· ,ÔΉÈÓ‰˘ ÔÂÂÈÎÓ ÂÁÈÂÂ¯È Ì‰ ,‰ÈÓ‰ ˙‡ ÌȯÎÂÓ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ Ì‡ .$110-Ï ‰ÏÂÚ ¯ÈÁӉ ‰ÈӉȯÁÂÒ Ì‡ .$90-Ï „¯ÂÈ ‰ÈÓ‰ ¯ÈÁÓ ÌȯÎÂÓ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ ÈÎ ‰˙Ú ÁÈ .¯˙ÂÈ ‰Â·‚ ¯ÈÁÓ· ¯ÎÓÈ˙

.‰ÈÓ‰ ¯Â·Ú ¯˙ÂÈ ÍÂÓ ¯ÈÁÓ ÌÏ˘Ï Â˘¯„ÈÈ˘ ÌÂ˘Ó ÂÁÈÂÂ¯È Ì‰ ,ÌȘ ˙ÂÏÈʉ53¯·Â„Ó˘ ÏÎÎ ˙¢ÙÂ˙ Ôȇ "˜Â˘‰ ˙‚‰" ‡ "Ԃ‰ ˜Á˘Ó" Ï˘ ˙ÂÏÂȈ¯‰ ,˙¯Á‡ ÌÈÏÓ·

,Ú„ÈÓÏ Z Ìȇ˙Ó‰ ÈÂ˙ÈÚ·Â Z ˙ÈÂÈ¢ ‰˘È‚ Ì‰Ï Ô˙È˙ ÈÎ ÌÈÙˆÓ Ìȇ ̉ :Âχ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó·R.J. Haft “The Effect of Insider ‡¯ .Ì‰Ó ˙ÏÏ˘ ÂÊ΢ ‰˘È‚˘ ÍÎÓ ÌȘÂÊÈ Ìȇ Ì‚ ̉Âtrading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation” 80 Mich. L. Rev.H. Heller “Chiarella, ;("˜Â˘‰ ˙‚‰" "Ԃ‰ ˜Á˘Ó" Ï˘ ˙ÂÏÂȈ¯‰ ÏÚ ¯·Ò‰) (1982) 1051SEC Rule 14ey3 and Dirks: ‘Fairness’ versus Economic Theory” 37 Bus. Law. (1982)ÌÈÚ„ȉ ÌÈÏ„·‰‰ ÁÎÂÏ ˜Â˘‰ ˙¯˘ÂÈ· ÌȘ٘ÙÓ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó ̇ ˜ÙÒ ÈÎ ÔÈȈӉ) 517, 555y556

.(Ú„ÈÓÏ ˙Â˘È‚· ¯·Â„Ó˘ ÏÎΠ̉ÈÈ·54˙ÂÈÓ¯˙Ó ,ȘÂÁ È˙Ï· ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ˘ÂÓÈ˘‰ ÔÓ Ú·Â Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÚÙ Ï˘ ÌÓÂȘ· ÔÂÓˉ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰

‡ ,(˜Â˘‰ ÏÏÎ ÈÙÏ „ÂÚ ˙‡Ê ÂÏÈ‚˘ Âχ È„È ÏÚ Â‡ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ Âڈȷ˘ Âχ È„È ÏÚ ˙Âڈ·Ӊ)ȯÚÙ „ÂÚ ÏÎ .˜Â˘‰ ÏÚ ÈÏÏÎ Ú„ÈÓ Â‡ ‰¯·Á‰ ÏÚ „ÁÂÈÓ È˯٠ڄÈÓ Ï˘ ȘÂÁ ÈÂÏÈ‚Ó ‰‡ˆÂ˙ÎÈ„È ÏÚ ÌÓÂȘ·˘ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ÌˆÓˆÏ Ô˙È ,ȯ˜Ó ÔÙ‡· ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÏÚ ÌÈÚÈÙ˘Ó Ú„ÈÓ

.˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰ ˜È˙ ÔÂÂÈ‚55W. Wang “Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets:

Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10by5?” 54 S. Cal. L. Rev..(1981) 1217

56ȯÁÂÒ˘ Ì‚‰ ,ÂÏ˘ Ï„ÂÓ‰ ÈÙ ÏÚ .‰˘ÈÓ Ô·˘Á ÏÚ ÌÈÁÈÂÂ¯Ó ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ ÌȯÁÂÒ ÈÎ ,ÏÎÏ È¯·˙Âڷ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ· Ìȇ˘Â ÔÈÈ„Ú Ì‰ ,Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÚÙ Ï˘ ÌÓÂȘ· ÔÂÓˉ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ÌÈÂÂ‚Ó ˙ÂÏÈÊÌÈ„ÈÒÙÓ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÚÙ Ï˘ ÌÓÂȘ·˘ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ÔÂÂ‚Ï ÌÈÏÂÎÈ Ìȇ˘ ˜Â˘‰ È˘ÂÚ .Âχ ÌȯÚÙÓ

.bid/ask-‰ ÁÂÂ¯Ó ˙ÂÚˆÓ‡· ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ Ï‡ Âχ ÌÈ„ÒÙ‰ ÌÈÏ‚Ï‚Ó ,ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ ÌȯÁÂÒÏ

18

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

,‡Â‰ ¯·„‰ ˘Â¯ÈÙ ,ÌÈÏÈÊ Ìȇ ÌȘ¢‰ ̇ .(¯ÁÒ‰ ͯډ ¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÏÚ ÚÈÙ˘˙˘ÏÚ Ï·˜Ï ‰ÈÏÚ ‰È‰È ,Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ‰Ï„‚ ˙ÂÓÎ ¯ÂÎÓÏ ‰ˆÂ¯ ˙ÂÏÈÊ ˙¯ÁÂÒ ¯˘‡Î˘ÚÂˆÈ·Ï ¯˙ÂÈ ‰Î¯‡ ˙Ù˜˙ ÔÈ˙Ó‰Ï ¯ÚˆÓÏ Â‡ ,ͯډ ¯ÈÈ ¯ÈÁÓ· ˙¯ÎÈ ‰„È¯È ‰ÓˆÚ‡ ˙¯ÎÈ ¯Ú˘ ˙ÈÈÏÚ Ï·˜Ï ‰ÈÏÚ ‰È‰È ʇ˘ ,‰Ï„‚ ‰˘Èί Ï˘ ‰¯˜Ó· Ì‚ ÍÎ .‰„˜ى:¯˙ÂÈ ‰ÎÂÓ ‰˜ÒÚ ˙ÂÏÚ ‰˘Â¯ÈÙ ‰‰Â·‚ ˙ÂÏÈÊ ,„‚Ó .ÚÂˆÈ·Ï ‰Î¯‡ ‰Ù˜˙ ÔÈ˙Ó‰Ï˙ÂÏÈÊ ˙ÈÁ·Ï ˙ȯ˜ÈÚ‰ ‰„ÈÓ‰ ˙Ó‡ .ÏÂÊ·Â ˙¯ȉӷ ,‰Ï„‚ ˙ÂÓη ‰˜ÒÚ ÚˆȷȯÁÂÒ˘ ˙Óȇ ÏÎ .bid/ask spread-‰ Z ‰¯ÈÎÓ ¯ÈÁÓÏ ‰È˜ ¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ· Á¯Ӊ ‡È‰‰È˜‰ ¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ· Á¯Ӊ Ï˘ ˙ÂÏÚ· Ìȇ˘Â ̉ ,¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÂÚÙ ÌÈÚˆ·Ó ˙ÂÏÈʉÂ˙ÈÁÙÈ ˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ ,ÔÎ ÏÚ .‰˜ÒÚ‰ ÏÚ ÏËÂÓ‰ ÒÓ ‰Ê ‰È‰ ‰Ó„ ,‰¯ÈÎÓ‰ ¯ÈÁÓÏÚÓÈ‰Ï È„Î (¯˙ÂÈ Í¯‡ ÔÓÊ Í˘ÓÏ ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ ˜È˙· ˜ÈÊÁÈ) Ì‰Ï˘ ¯ÁÒÓ‰ ˙¯Ȅ˙ ˙‡ÌÏ˘Ï ÌÈÂΠ̉˘ ¯ÈÁÓ‰ ˙‡ Â˙ÈÁÙÈ Â‡ ,È„Ó ˙·¯ ÌÈÓÚÙ Á¯Ӊ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ· ˙‡˘ÏÓÏÈÚÏ˘ ˙ÂÏÂÚÙ‰ È˙˘ .57Á¯Ӊ ˙ÂÏÚ· ‰‡È˘‰ ÔÈ‚· ÌÓˆÚ ˙ˆÙÏ È„Î Í¯Ú‰ ¯ÈÈ ÏÚ˙‡ ¯˙ÂÈ „ÂÚ ÌˆÓˆ˙ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ È„È ÏÚ ¯ÁÒÓ‰ ˙¯Ȅ˙ ˙˙ÁÙ‰ :˜Â˘· ˙ÂÚ‚ÂÙÒÂÈ‚ ˙ÂÏÚ ˙‡ ¯˜ÈÈ˙ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ ¯Â·Ú ÌÏ˘Ï ˙ÂÂΉ ˙˙ÁÙ‰ ÂÏȇ ,˜Â˘· ˙ÂÏÈʉ

.˙¯·Á‰ ÏÏÎ ¯Â·Ú Ô‰‰¯ÁÒÓ‰ Ï˘ ÏÏÂΉ ۘȉ‰ ÔÓ ÚÙ˘ÂÓ ‰¯ÈÎÓ‰ ¯ÈÁÓÏ ‰È˜‰ ¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ·˘ Á¯ӉÏÚ ¯ÁÒÓ‰ ۘȉ ˙ÚÙ˘‰ .58(ȯËÓÈÒ-‡ Ú„ÈÓ) ÌȯÁÂÒ‰ ÔÈ· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÚÙ ˙Ó¯ÓÂ,(ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ È˙Ï·Â ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ) ¯˙ÂÈ ÌÈ·¯ ÌȯÁÂÒ ˘È˘ ÏÎÎ :‰¯È˘È ‡È‰ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ˙Ó¯È˘ÂÚ :‰ÙÈ˜Ú ‡È‰ ˙ÂÏÈÊ ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÚÙ Ï˘ ‰ÚÙ˘‰‰ .(ÍÙȉÏÂ) ¯˙ÂÈ ÏÈÊ ˜Â˘‰ ÍÎÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ ÌȯÁÂÒ ÏÂÓ ˙‡˜ÒÚ· „ÒÙ‰Ï ÔÂÂÈ‚Ï Ô˙È È˙Ï· ÔÂÎÈÒ ÈÙ· ÌÈ·ˆÈ‰ ,˜Â˘‰˙‡ ÏÈ„‚˙ Á¯Ӊ ˙Ï„‚‰ .59 bid/ask-‰ ÁÂÂ¯Ó ˙Ï„‚‰ È„È ÏÚ ÌÓˆÚ ÏÚ Â‚È ,¯˙ÂȯÁ‡Ó ,˙‡Ê ÌÚ .¯˙ÂÈ ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ‰ ÌȯÁÂÒÏ ÌÈ„ÒÙ‰‰ ÏÚ Ì˙‡ ‰ˆÙ˙ ˜Â˘‰ È˘ÂÚ ÈÁ¯˙‡˘Ï ˆχÈÈ˘ ˙ÂÏÚ‰ ÔÓ ¯˙ÂÈ ‰Â·‚ Á¯ ÌÈÙˆ ̉ ̇ ˜¯ ¯ÁÒÈ ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ ÌȯÁÂÒ˘

57N.L. Georgakopoulos “Frauds, Markets, and Fraud-On-The-Market: The Tortured ‡¯Transition of Justifiable Relience from Deceit To Securities Fraud” 49 U. Mia. L. Rev.

.(1995) 671, 702y71158T.H. McInish & B.F. Van Ness “An Intraday Examination of the ÈÏÏÎ ÔÙ‡· ‡¯

Components of the Bid-Ask Spread” 37 The Fin. Rev. (2002) 507; R.D. Huang & H.R.Stoll “The Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: A General Approach” 10 Rev. Fin. Stud.(1997) 995; Y. He & C. Wu “What Explains the Bid-Ask Spread Decline After Nasdaq‰¯Ú˘‰· ˙ȯÈÙÓ‡ ‰ÎÈÓ˙) Reforms?” 12 Fin. Markets, Instit. and Instrum. (2003) 347ÂÓ¯˙ ,‰Î¯Ú˘ ‰Ó¯ÂÙ¯· Ô¯Â˜Ó˘ ,˙¯Á˙‰ ˙¯·‚˙‰ ԉ ˜Â˘‰ ˙ÈÈ˘Ú ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙˙ÁÙ‰ Ô‰˘

.(˜"„Ò‡‰ ˙ү·· bid/ask-‰ ÈÁÂÂ¯Ó ÌˆӈÏ59M. Welker “Disclosure Policy, Information Asymmetry, and Liquidity in Equity ‡¯

Markets” 11 Contemp. Account. Research (1995) 801, 802; J.C. Bettis, J.L. Coles & M.LLemmon “Corporate Policies Restricting Trading by Insiders” 57 J. Fin. Econ. (2000)bid/ask-‰ ÁÂÂ¯Ó ÌÈÙ È˘‡ È„È· ¯ÁÒÓ ÏÚ ˙¯Ò‡ ˙¯·Á Ô‰·˘ ˙ÂÙ˜˙· ÈÎ ÌȘÈÒÓ) 191

.(̈ÓˈÓ

19

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

ÏËÂ˙ Á¯Ӊ ˙Ï„‚‰ Ï˘ ˙È˙ÈÓ‡‰ ˙ÂÏÚ‰˘ ȯ‰ ,bid/ask-‰ ÁÂÂ¯Ó ˙Ï„‚‰ ÏÏ‚· ‰·˙ÂÏÈʉ ÏÚ È¯ËÓÈÒ-‡ Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ ‰ÚÙ˘‰‰ .(˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÏÚÂ) ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ ÏÚÌȯÁÂÒ‰ ¯ÙÒÓ˘ ÏÎÎ .Ì˙¢¯·˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ È¢·Â ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ‰ ÌȯÁÂÒ‰ ¯ÙÒÓ· ‰ÈÂÏ˙.60Ú„ÈÓ· Ì‰Ï ˘È˘ Ô¯˙ȉ Ô˘ ÍÎ ,˙ÓˆÚ˙Ó Ì‰ÈÈ· ˙¯Á˙‰˘ ÏÎΠ,Ï„‚ ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ‰È˘ÂÚÏ „ÒÙ‰Ï ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ Ô˘ ÍÎ ,˙˙ÁÂÙ Ì˙¯Ȅ˙ ˜Á˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÚÙ Ï˘ ÌÈÈ¢˘ ÏÎÎ,‰¯ÈÎÓ‰ ¯ÈÁÓÏ ‰È˜‰ ¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ·˘ Á¯Ӊ ˙‡ ÂÈË˜È ˜Â˘‰ È˘ÂÚ ,ÍÎÓ ‰‡ˆÂ˙Î .˜Â˘‰¯˙ÂÈ ÌÈ‚‡Â„ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ ÈÎ ,‡ˆÓ .Ô˘˙ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ Ï‡ Ï‚Ï‚˙˘ ˙ÂÏÚ‰Â

.61ͯډ ¯ÈÈ ¯ÈÁÓ· Ú„ÈÓ‰ Ï˘ ˜ÈÂ„Ó ÌÂÏÈ‚Ï ¯˘‡Ó ˙ÂÏÈÊÏ̇ .̉È˙ÂÏÂÚÙ ˙‡ ˙ÂÊÁÏ ‰˘˜Â ,ÌÈÈÏÂȈ¯ Ìȇ ͇ ÌÈÈ·È˘‡ ̉ ˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒ¯ÈÁÓ‰ ÏÚ ‰ÚÙ˘‰‰ ˙‡ „Á‡ ˘Ú¯ ¯ÁÂÒ ÏË·È ,ÔÈËÂÏÁÏ È¯˜Ó ÔÙ‡· ÌÈÏÚÂ٠̉.62Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÏ Â‡ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡Ï „ÈÒÙÈ ‡Ï ̉ ÚˆÂÓÓ·Â ,È˘ ˘Ú¯ ¯ÁÂÒ ¯ˆÈ˘Í¯Ú ¯ÈÈÏ ÒÁÈ· ¯„ÚÎ ÏÂÚÙÏ ÌÈÈÂ˘Ú Ì‰ .63¯„ÚÎ ˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÌÈÏÚÂÙ ÌÈ˙ÚÏ ,˙‡Ê ÌÚ˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ ¯„Ú ÏÂÏÚ ‰Ê΢ ‰¯˜Ó· .64ÂÏÏη ˜Â˘Ï ÒÁÈ· ‡ ,ÌÈÂÒÓ ÛÚÏ ,ÌÈÂÒÓ‡ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡Ï ˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ Â„ÈÒÙÈ Ì‡ ‰Ï‡˘‰ .Â˙‡ ˙ÂÂÚÏ ¯ÈÁÓ‰ ÏÚ ÚÈÙ˘‰Ï,"ÔÂÎ"‰ "ÂÈ¢"Ï ÚÈ‚‰Ï ȄΠͯډ ¯ÈÈÏ ˘¯„˘ ÔÓʉ ͢ӷ ‰ÈÂÏ˙ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÏȯÁÂÒ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ ÈÎ ÁÈ .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ È„È ÏÚ Â‡ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ È„È ÏÚ ·˘ÂÁ˘ ÈÙÎ˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒ .Â˙‡ ÌȯÎÂÓ ÔÎ ÏÚ ,¯˙È· ͯÚ‰ ÌÈÂÒÓ Í¯Ú ¯ÈÈ ÈÎ ÌÈÈÓ‡Ó Ú„ÈӉȯÁÂÒ ,Ìχ .ÛÂÒ·Ï „¯ÈÈ ÂÎ¯Ú˘ „Ú Í¯Ú‰ ¯ÈÈ· ˜ÈÊÁÈ Ì‡ „ÈÒÙÈ ‰Ê Í¯Ú ¯ÈÈ Â˜È˘ÍÈ˘ÓÈ Í¯Ú‰ ¯ÈÈ ¯ÈÁÓ Ì‡ ÌÈÈÈ·‰ ˙Ù˜˙· ˙È·ÂÈÁ ‰‡Â˘˙ ‚È˘‰Ï ÌÈÏÂÎÈ ˘Ú¯‰È„È ÏÚ Áȯ‰Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÓ ˙ˆ˜Ó ÌÈ˙ÚÏ ÌÈÒÓ ‰ÈËÚ·˘ ‰·ÈÒ‰ ÂÊ ,Ô· .˙ÂÏÚÏÂχ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ .˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ˙ÂȂ˯ËÒ‡ ıÂÓȇ È„È ÏÚ ˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒÏ ˙Âٯˈ‰ÔÈÈˆÏ ¯˙ÂÓÏ .¯ÈÁÓ‰ „¯ÈÈ Ì¯Ë· "‰Ï‚Ú‰ ÔÓ ıÂÙ˜Ï" ,˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒÏ ÌÎÁ˙‰Ï ÌȘÓȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ‰ÚÙ˘‰‰ ˙‡ ,¯ˆ˜‰ ÁÂÂË· ,ÂÓȈÚÈ ˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒÏ ÌÈÎÙ‰‰ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ÈÎȯÁÂÒÏ Â‡ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡Ï ‰ˆÂ·˜Î „ÈÒÙÈ ˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ ,ͯ‡‰ ÁÂÂË· ,˙‡Ê ÌÚ .˘Ú¯‰

60B. Caramanolis-Cotelli, L. Gardiol, R. Gibson-Asner & N.S. Tuchschmid “Are ‡¯Investors Sensitive to the Quality and the Disclosure of Financial Statements?” 3 Eur.˙ÈÏÈÏ˘‰ ‰¯ÈÁ·‰ ˙ÈÈÚ· ˙‡ ‰˙ÈÁÙÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ ·¯˜· ˙¯Á˙ ÈÎ ÌÈÚÂˉ) Fin. Rev. (1999) 131

.He & Wu, supra note 58 ‡¯Â ;(ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰ Ï˘ adverse selection)61˙ÂÈÓ ÈÏÚ· ‡ ÌÈÏ‰Ó È„È ÏÚ ˙Ó¯‚‰ ˙ÂÈÓ ÈÏÚ·· ‰ÚÈ‚Ù‰ ÔÓ Ì‚ ÌÈ‚‡„ÂÓ ˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ

.˙¯·Á‰ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ̄ȘÙ˙ ‡Â‰ ‰Ê ÔÂÎÈÒ ÈÙÓ ‰‚‰ Ô˙Ó .‰ËÈÏ˘62.˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ ˜È˙ ˙˜ÊÁ‰Â ˙˘Èί Ï˘ ˙Â‚Ó ‰ÚÙ˘‰ ‰˙‡ ˘È Ï„‚ ۘȉ· (random) ȯ˜Ó ¯ÁÒÓÏ

ÌÈÈ˷ϯ Ìȇ Û‡ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ .¯˙ÂÈ ˙‰·‚ ‰˜ÒÚ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ· ‰Î¯ΠÂÊ ‰È‚˯ËÒ‡ ÌχÂ.ÂÊ ‰È‚˯ËÒ‡ ˙ˆÓÂ‡Ó ¯˘‡Î

63D. Hirshleifer & S.H. Teoh “Herd ‡¯ ÌÈÈÒÈÙ ÌȘ¢· herding ‡˘Â· ˙¯ÙÒ ˙¯È˜ÒÏBehaviour and Cascading in Capital Markets: A Review and Synthesis” 9 Eur. Fin.Management (2003) 25; De Long et al., supra note 45; T. Lux “Herd Behavior, Bubbles

.and Crashes” 105 Economic J. (1995) 881y89664.De Long et al., supra note 45, at pp. 704, 715 ‡¯

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Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

Ì‚ ‚ÙÒÈ ˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ ,ÌȯÁÂÒ Ì‰ ‰·˘ ‰‰Â·‚‰ ˙¯Ȅ˙Ï ˙„‰ ,„ÂÚ ˙‡Ê .Ú„ÈÓ‰.‰¯ÈÎÓ‰ ¯ÈÁÓÏ ‰È˜‰ ¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ·˘ Á¯Ӊ ˙ÂÏÚ ˙‡ ¯ÓÂÏÎ ,˙ÂÏÈʉ ˙ÂÏÚ ˙‡ ̉

ÌÈÙ È˘‡ .˜Â˘‰ ȘÁ˘ ˙ˆ·˜ ˘ÓÁ ÏÎ Ï˘ Ô˙ÏÂÚÙ Ï˘ ‰‡ˆÂ˙ ̉ ˜Â˘‰ ȯÈÁÓÈ·È˘ÈÈ·ÂÒ‰ "È¢"‰ ÔÓ ˙ÂÈËÒ ÌȘ˙Ó ,˜Â˘‰ ȯÈÁÓ ¯Á‡ ÌÈ·˜ÂÚ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒÂ-˜È˙-˜ÊÁ‰Â-‰˜" ˙ÈȂ˯ËÒ‡ ÈÙ ÏÚ ÌÈÏÚÂÙ‰ ˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ .Ì‰È„È ÏÚ ·˘ÂÁÓ‰¯ÁÒÓ‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ ˙È·¯Ó˘ ¯Á‡Ó ,ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ· ˙ÂÂÈÚÏ ÌÈӯ‚ Ìȇ "˙ÂÚ˜˘‰È¯ÁÂÒ ÌÈӯ‚ ,Ì‰Ï˘ ˙ÂÈÏÂȈ¯-‡Ï‰ ‰Ú˜˘‰‰ ˙ÂȂ˯ËÒ‡ ¯Â‡Ï .˙ȯ˜Ó ‡È‰ Ì‰Ï˘‰ÈÂÏ˙ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ Ï˘ ˜ÂÈ„‰ ˙„ÈÓ ,ÔÎ ÏÚ .ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ· ˙ÂÂÈÚÏ ˘Ú¯È¯ÁÂÒ È„È ÏÚ ˙ÂÓ¯‚‰ ˙ÂÈËÒ‰ ˙‡ Ô˜˙Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Â‡ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ Ï˘ Ì˙ÏÂÎÈ·È˘‡ Ï˘ Ì˙ÏÂÎÈ˘ ÏÎÎ .65‰Ï‚˙˘ ˘„Á Ú„ÈÓ Í¯Ú‰ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ· ÌÏ‚Ï ÔΠ,˘Ú¯‰È¯ÁÂÒ È„È ÏÚ ˙ÂÓ¯‚‰ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ· ˙ÂÈËÒ Ô˜˙Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘Â ÌÈÙ‰,˙‡Ê ÌÚ .¯˙ÂÈ ÏÈÚÈ ˜Â˘‰ ‰È‰È ÍÎ ,¯˙ÂÈ ‰·ÂË ‰Ï‚˙˘ ˘„Á‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ È„È ÏÚ Â‡ ˘Ú¯‰.66‰‚˘‰ ¯· Âȇ ,"ÌÈÂÎ" „ÈÓ˙ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ Â·˘ ÔÈËÂÏÁÏ ÏÈÚÈ Ï˜˘Ó ÈÂÂÈ˘Ï˘ ͢Ó˙Ó ÍÈω˙· ÌÈÈÂˆÓ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÌÈÈÂÂ˘Ó ÌÈËÂÒ ÌÏÂÚÏ Í¯Ú‰ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ˙ÓÈÂÒÓ ‰Ó¯Ï ˙Âӯ‚ ÌÈÈ¢ ·È·Ò ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ˙„Â˙ .ÈÂÂ˘Ï ¯ÈÁÓ‰ ˙Ó‡˙‰ÏÈÚÈÏ ÍÂÙ‰Ï ˜Â˘‰ ˙‡ ˙ÙÁ„ ڄÈÓ· ÚȘ˘‰Ï ıȯÓ˙ ˙¯ˆÂȉ ‡È‰˘ ,˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ¯ÒÂÁ Ï˘

.67¯˙ÂÈͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ· Ú„ÈÓ ÌÂÏÈ‚· ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ÈÎ ‡ÂÙ‡ ¯¯·˙Ó ÂÊ Ë·Ó ˙„˜Ó,¯˙ÂÈ ‰Ï„‚ ÂÈ¢ ÔÈ·Ï Í¯Ú‰ ¯ÈÈ ¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ· ‰ÈÈËÒ‰˘ ÏÎÎ .‰„ÈÓ Ï˘ ÔÈÈÚ ‡È‰ÂÈ¢ ˙‡ ‡Ë·Ó‰ Í¯Ú Ï‡ ÒÎ˙‰Ï ¯˙ÂÈ ·¯ ÔÓÊ Í¯Ú‰ ¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓÏ ˘¯„˘ ÏÎ΂ÂÂÒÏ È‡¯ ‰Ê Ôȇ ,ÍÎ˘Ó .ÍÙȉÏ ,˙ÂÁÙ ÏÈÚÈ ˜Â˘‰ ÍÎ ,ͯډ ¯ÈÈ Ï˘ È˙ÈÓ‡‰.ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ· ˜ÂÈ„‰ ˙Ó¯ ÏÚ ÒÒ·˙‰· "ÌÈÏÈÚÈ È˙Ï·"Π‡ "ÌÈÏÈÚÈ"Î ÌȘ¢,˙¯Á‡ ˙ÂÙ˜˙· ÌÈÏÈÚÈ È˙Ï·Â ,˙ÂÓÈÂÒÓ ˙ÂÙ˜˙· ÌÈÏÈÚÈ ˙ÂÈ‰Ï ÌÈÈÂ˘Ú ÌȘ¢ÔÓʉ ͢ÓÏ ÌÈÈ¢ ÔÈ·Ï Í¯Ú‰ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ· ‰ÈÈËÒ‰ Ï˘ ‰˙„ÈÓÏ Ì‡˙‰· ÏΉÂÔ˜˙Ï „ÚÂÈÓ‰ ÔÂ‚Ó Ï˘ ¯„Ú‰ ‡ ÂÓÂÈ˜Ï Ì‡˙‰· ÌȘ¢ ‚ÂÂÒÏ ¯˙ÂÈ ÔÂÎ .68‰Ï˘

65S.J. Grossman & J.E. Stiglitz È„È ÏÚ ¯‡Â˙˘ ‰Ê ÏÚ Ô‡Î ¯‡Â˙Ó‰ Ô‚Ӊ ˙‡ ÌÈÒÒ·Ó Â‡“On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets” 70 Am. Econ. Rev. (1980)

.39366.Grossman & Stiglitz, ibid, at p. 393 ‡¯67P.A. Cusick “Price Effects of Addition Or Deletion From the Standard & Poor’s 500 ‡¯

Index — Evidence of Increasing Market Efficiency” 11 Fin. Markets, Instit. & Instrum..(ÔÓʉ ÌÚ ˙¯·Â‚ ˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ˘ ‰Úˉ ˙‡ ˙ȯÈÙÓ‡ ÒÒ·Ó‰) (2002) 349

68B.C. Ayers & R.N. Freeman ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯ .˙¯·Á È‚ÂÒÏ ÒÁÈ· Ì‚ ‰˙˘Ó ˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ“Evidence That Analyst Following and Institutional Ownership Accelerate the Pricing˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ˘ ‰Úˉ ˙‡ ÌÈÒÒ·Ó‰) of Future Earnings” 8 Rev. Account. Stud. (2003) 47˙‡Ê ,ÌÈÈ„È˙Ú ÌÈÁ¯ È·‚Ï Ú„ÈÓ Û˜˘Ï ÌÈÓÈ„˜Ó ¯·‚ÂÓ ÈËÒÈχ ÈÂÒÈÎÏ ˙ÂÎÂʉ ˙¯·Á Ï˘ ͯÚ

.(·¯ ÈËÒÈχ ÈÂÒÈÎÏ ˙ÂÎÂÊ Ôȇ˘ ˙¯·Á Ï˘ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓÏ ‰‡Â¢‰·

21

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

˜Â˘ .È˙ÈÓ‡‰ ÈÂÂ˘Ï ¯·„ Ï˘ ÂÙÂÒ· ÒÎ˙‰Ï ¯ÈÁÓÏ Ì¯‚Ï ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ· ˙ÂÈËÒ· ÌȯÁÒ‰ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ ¯ÂÁÓ˙˘ ‰Ê Ô·ÂÓ· ,"ÏÈÚÈ È˙Ï·" ˜Â˘ ‡Â‰ ‰ÊÎ ÔÂ‚Ó Ôȇ ·˘ÌÈÈ¢ ˙‡ ‡Ë·Ó‰ ͯÚÏ ÂÒÎ˙È Í¯Ú‰ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ˘ ÔÂÁËÈ· Ôȇ ,ÔÈËÂÏÁÏ È¯˜Ó ‡Â‰˘È ·˘ ˜Â˘ ."ÏÈÚÈ È˙Ï·"Ó ÔÁ·ÂÓ· ,"È·È˘ه È˙Ï·"Î ‰Ê΢ ˜Â˘ ¯È„‚ .È˙ÈÓ‡‰˜Â˘· ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓÏ Ì¯Â‚ Ô˜È˙‰ Ô‚Ӣ ‰Ê Ô·ÂÓ· ,"ÏÈÚÈ" ‡Â‰ ¯ÂӇΠÔÂ‚Ó˜Â˘· ."È·È˘ه ˜Â˘"Î ‰ÊÎ ˜Â˘ ¯È„‚ .È˙ÈÓ‡‰ ÌÈÈÂÂ˘Ï ÍÈω˙ Ï˘ ÂÙÂÒ· ÒÎ˙‰ÏȯÁÂÒ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡Â ,ÌÈÈËÈÓ„‰ ÂÈ‰È ˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒ Ì‰·˘ ÔÓÊ È˜¯Ù ÂÈ‰È È·È˘ه˙ÂÈËÒ ÂÈ‰È ‰ÊÎ ˜Â˘· .˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÂÓ¯‚È˘ ¯ÈÁÓ‰ È˙ÂÂÈÚ ˙‡ Ô˜˙Ï ÂÏÎÂÈ ‡Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰,ȯ· .ÔÓÊ Í¯Â‡Ï ÂÓÈȘ˙È Âχ ˙ÂÈËÒ ,È˙ÈÓ‡‰ ÌÈÈÂÂ˘Ó Í¯Ú‰ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ Ï˘ ˙ÂÏ„‚„ÂÚ ÏÎ ,Ìχ .˜Â˘· ÌȯÁÒ‰ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ˜ÈÂ„Ó ‡Ï ¯ÂÁÓ˙ ‰È‰˙ ‰‡ˆÂ˙‰ ÈÎÍ¯Ú Ï‡ ÒÎ˙‰Ï ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÂÏÈÁ˙È ÌÈÂÒÓ ·Ï˘· ,Ô˜È˙‰ ÔÂ‚Ó ˜Â˘· ÌÈȘ͇ ,ÈÏÏÎ ÔÙ‡· È·È˘ه ‰È‰È˘ ÏÂÎÈ ˜Â˘ ,˙¯Á‡ ÌÈÏÈÓ· .È˙ÈÓ‡‰ ÌÈÈ¢ ˙‡ ‡Ë·Ó‰‡ÂÙ‡ ·ÈÈÁÓ ˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ¯ÂÙÈ˘ .˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ¯ÒÂÁ Ï˘ ·ˆÓ ÔÈ·Ï ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ Ï˘ ·ˆÓ ÔÈ· ÚÂÈ.È˙ÈÓ‡‰ ÌÈÈÂÂ˘Ï ÒÎ˙‰Ï ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓÏ Ì¯Â‚‰ Ô‚Ӊ ˙ÂÈ·È˘ه ˙‡ ¯Ù˘Ïͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ Ï˘ ‰ÈÈËÒ‰ ˙„ÈÓ Ô˘˙ ÍÎ ,¯˙ÂÈ È·È˘ه ‰È‰È ‰Ê Ô‚Ӣ ÏÎÎ

.ÌÈÈ¢ χ ¯˙ÂÈ ¯‰Ó ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÂÒÎ˙È ÍΠ,ÌÈÈÂÂ˘Ó ˜Â˘· ÌȯÁÒ‰ÌÈÂÎÈÒ‰ Ï˘Â ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ‰ Ï˘ ‰Èˆ˜ÂÙ ‡È‰ Ô˜˙Ó‰ Ô‚Ӊ Ï˘ ˙ÂÈ·È˘ه‰ ˙„ÈÓÈ˘‡ ‡ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙ÏÂÎÈ .Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÚÙ Ï˘ ÌÓÂȘ Ú˜¯ ÏÚ ¯ÁÒÓ· ÌÈίΉ.Â˙ÂÏÚ·Â Ô˜È˙‰ ÍÈω˙· ͯΉ ÔÂÎÈÒ· ‰ÈÂÏ˙ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ· ˙ÂÈËÒ Ô˜˙Ï ÌÈÙ‰Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ Â˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ ,‰¯·Á‰ ÏÚ ÈÙȈÙÒ Ú„ÈÓ ˜Â˘‰ ÏÚ ÈÏÏÎ Ú„ÈÓ ˘ÂÙÈÁ‰‡ˆÂ˙Î Á¯ ˙˜Ù‰ .˙¯˜È ˙ÂÏËÓ Ô‰ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÍÂ˙Ï ÂÓÂÏÈ‚Â ÂÁÂ˙È ,‰ÊÍȯÚÓ Ú„ÈÓ ¯ÁÂÒ ÈÎ ÁÈ .ÔÎÂÒÓ ÌÊÈÓ ‡È‰ ÂÈÂÂ˘Ï Í¯Ú ¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ· ÌȯÚÙ ¯Â˙ȇӉÈÂÂ˘Ó ÌÈÊÂÁ‡ ‰¯˘Ú· ÍÂÓ‰ ¯ÂÚÈ˘· ˙¯ÁÒ Ó"Ú· ˙ÂÈ˘Ú˙ ˙¯·Á Ï˘ ‰ÈÓ‰ ÈÎÚ‚¯·Â ,‰ÈÓ‰ ˙‡ ˙Â˜Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ¯ÁÂÒ ÏÚ ,‰Ê ¯ÚÙÓ Á¯ ˜ÈÙ‰Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ ."È˙ÈÓ‡‰"¯ÈÁÓ ÌÈ˙ÚÏ Ìχ .Á¯· ‰ÈÓ‰ ˙‡ ¯ÂÎÓÏ ,"È˙ÈÓ‡‰" ÈÂÂ˘Ï ÚÈ‚È ‰ÈÓ‰ ¯ÈÁÓ˘¯˘Ù‡ ;Â˙ίډ· ‰ÚË Ú„ÈÓ‰ ¯ÁÂÒ˘ ÔÎ˙ÈÈ :ÌÈÓÚË ‰ÓÎÓ ˙‡Ê ,‰ÏÂÚ Âȇ ‰ÈÓ‰È˙Ï·Â ˙ÂÚ¯ ˙¢„Á ;‰˙Ùˆ˘ ÂÊÓ ‰Î¯‡ ‰Ù˜˙Ï ¯ÈÁÓ‰ ˙‡ Â˙ÂÂÚÈ ˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒ˘;˜Â˘Ï ¯¯Á˙˘‰Ï ÏÂÏÚ ‰¯·Á‰ ˙„‡ ÏÚ ÈÏÈÏ˘ ‡Â¢ ‚ˆÓ ;ÚÈ‚‰Ï ˙ÂÏÂÏÚ ˙ÂÈÂÙˆ¯ÁÂÒ ÏÚ ÔÎ ÏÚ .ÌÈÓÚË Âχ· ‡ˆÂÈΠ,˙ÂÏÚÏ ÌÈÏÂÏÚ ËÙ‰ ȯÈÁÓ Â‡ ˙ȷȯ‰ ȯÂÚÈ˘‡Â‰˘ ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰ ÏÂϘ˘· È¢‰ ÔÈ·Ï ¯ÈÁÓ‰ ÔÈ· ¯ÚÙ‰ Ï˘ ÂÈ¢ ˙‡ ÍÈ¯Ú‰Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰¯ÚÙ‰ ÔÓ ‰ÈÂÙˆ‰ ‰‡Â˘˙‰ ˙‡ ÍÈ¯Ú‰Ï ÂÈÏÚ ,¯ÓÂÏÎ) ‰Ê ¯ÚÙ "ÒÂÙ˙Ï" ÁÈÏˆÈ Ô·

.(‰È¢ ÔÈ·Ï ‰ÈÓ‰ ¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ·˘‰‡Â˘˙‰ ÌÚ ,˙Âȇ„ ԉ˘ ,˙ÂÈÂÏÚ‰ ˙‡ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ¯ÁÂÒ ‰ÂÂ˘È ,Á¯ ˜ÈÙ‰Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ¯ÚÙ ˘¯„ ÍÎ ,¯˙ÂÈ ˙‰·‚ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ‰˘ ÏÎÎ .È¢‰ ÔÈ·Ï ¯ÈÁÓ‰ ÔÈ·˘ ¯ÚÙ‰Ó ‰ÈÂÙˆ‰,˙‰·‚ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ‰ ¯˘‡Î ÔÎÏ .Á¯ ·È‰Ï È„Î ‰ÈÈÂÂ˘Ï ‰ÈÓ‰ ¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ· ¯˙ÂÈ Ï„‚

22

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ· ÌÈ˘ ÌȯÚÙ "˙ÒÈÙ˙" È„È ÏÚ ÌÈÁ¯ ˜ÈÙ‰Ï ÂÒÈ ‡Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓÏ Â¯˘Ù‡È Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ,˙‡Ê ̘ӷ .ÌÈÈ¢ ÔÈ·Ï ˜Â˘· ÌȯÁÒ‰ ͯډÏÈ„‚‰Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ ˙‡Ê ,¯ÁÒÓ· ·¯Ú˙È˘ ÈÙÏ ,„ÂÚ „ÂÚ ÌÈÈÂÂ˘Ó ˜Á¯˙‰Ï ͯډ„˜Ó˙È ڄÈÓ· Ì˙Ú˜˘‰ ˙‡ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÂÈË˜È ,ÔÈÙÂÏÁÏ .‰ÈÂÙˆ‰ ‰‡Â˘˙‰ ˙‡Â„˜Ó˙È Â‡ ,˙·¯ ˙ÂÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓÏ Ì˙‡ ˘Ó˘È˘ ,˜Â˘‰ ˙„‡ ÏÚ ÈÏÏÎ Ú„ÈÓ ˙‚˘‰·‡È‰ Û‡ ̯‚˙ ÂÊ ‰È‚˯ËÒ‡ .„·Ï· Ì˙Â·È˘Á· ÌÈËÏ· ÈÙȈÙÒ Ú„ÈÓ ÈËȯ٠˙‚˘‰·Â˘Ó˘È ÌÈÈ¢ ÔÈ·Ï ˜Â˘· ÌȯÁÒ‰ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ· ˙ÂÏ„‚ ˙ÂÈËÒ ˜¯˘ ÍÎϯÂÁÓ˙Ï Ì¯‚˙ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Âχ ˙·‚˙Ó ˙Á‡ ÏÎ .Á¯ ˙˜Ù‰Ï Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ.˙ÂÁÙ ÏÈÚÈ Ô‰ ˜Â˘Ï ÍÎÓ ‰‡ˆÂ˙Π,˜Â˘· ÌȯÁÒ‰ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ˙ÂÁÙ ˜È„ÓÍÎ ,¯˙ÂÈ ˙ÂÎÂÓ ÂÈ‰È Ú„ÈÓ ÒÈÒ· ÏÚ ‰Ú˜˘‰· ˙ÂίΉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ‰˘ ÏÎÎ :ÍÙȉÏÂZ ˙ÈÒÁÈ ‰˙ÂÁÙ Â˙Â·È˘Á˘ ‰ÊÎ Ì‚ Z Ú„ÈÓ ˙‚˘‰· ¯˙ÂÈ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÂÚȘ˘È¯ÂÁÓ˙Ï ÏÈ·ÂÈ˘ ÔÙ‡· ,ÌÈÈ¢ ÔÈ·Ï Í¯Ú‰ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ· ÌÈ˘ ÌȯÚÙ Ì‚ ˜˙ÈÂ

.¯˙ÂÈ ÌÈÏÈÚÈ ÌȘ¢Ϡ,˜Â˘· ÌȯÁÒ‰ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ¯˙ÂÈ ˜È„ÓȯÈÁÓ ÔÈ· ¯ÚÙ ¯Â˙È‡Ó Á¯ ˙˜Ù‰Ï ˙¯·˙Ò‰· ͯΉ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙˙ÁÙ‰ Ì‚ ,‰Ó„·Ï„‚˙ ÍÎ ,¯˙ÂÈ ÍÂÓ ‰È‰È ÔÂÎÈÒ‰˘ ÏÎÎ .˜Â˘‰ ˙‡ ÏÚÈÈ˙ ÌÈÈ¢ ÔÈ·Ï Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ˙Ï„‚‰ .ÂÈ¢ ÔÈ·Ï Í¯Ú‰ ¯ÈÈ ¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ·˘ ¯ÚÙ‰ "˙ÒÈÙ˙"Ó Á¯ ˙˜Ù‰Ï ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰¯ÚÙ‰ ÔË˜È ÍΠ,Ï„‚˙ ÔÂ˙ ¯ÚÙ ÏÎÓ ‰ÈÂÙˆ‰ ‰‡Â˘˙‰˘ ÍÎÏ Ì¯‚˙ ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰„ÂÚ· .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ ÂÈ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ÈÂÒÈÎÏ È„ · ‰È‰È˘ È¢‰ ÔÈ·Ï ¯ÈÁÓ‰ ÔÈ· ˘¯„‰˙ÂÏÈÚÙ· ÔÂÓˉ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ÔÓ ÌÈÓÈÂÒÓ ÌÈ·Èί ˙ÈÁÙ‰Ï ÌÈÏÂÎÈ Ìȇ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„˘ÈÈÂÈ˘ Ô‚Π,Â˙ÂÏÈÚÙÏ ÌÈÈ˯‰È‡ ̉˘ ÔÂÎÈÒ È·Èί· ¯·Â„Ó˘ ÌÂ˘Ó ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ¯ÁÂÒÌÈÈÂ˘Ú ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ Ï˘ ÌȯÁ‡ ÌÈ·Èί ,ÈÂÙˆ È˙Ï· Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ Â˙ÙÈ˘ÁÓ ‰‡ˆÂ˙Î ¯ÈÁÓÏ˘ ÌÓÂȘ Ï˘· ˙ÂÓ¯‚‰ ˙ÂÈÂÚËÓ Ú·Â‰ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ̈ӈ ,Ï˘ÓÏ .ÌÈÚÙ˘ÂÓ ˙ÂȉÏÛÂÒȇ ,Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ‡ÏÏ ,Ô· .˙ÂÈÓ¯˙ Ï˘ ˙È·È˘ه ‰Ú˙¯‰ È„È ÏÚ ‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ̉È˙ÂÈÊÁ˙·˘ ˜ÂÈ„‰ ˙„ÈÓ ˙‡ ÏÈ„‚˙ Â˙ÂÓȇ· ¯˙ÂÈ ‰Ï„‚ ‰Ú˜˘‰Â ¯˙ÂÈ ·¯ Ú„ÈÓ¯ÈÈ ¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ·˘ ÌȯÚÙÓ Á¯ ˙˜Ù‰ Ï˘ ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰ ˙‡ ÏÈ„‚˙ ڄÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘Í¯Ή ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ÔÈ˘‰Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ÂÏ‡Î˘ ÌÈˆÓ‡Ó ,Ìχ .69ÂÈ¢ ÔÈ·Ï Í¯Ú‰¯·„ Ï˘ ÂÙÂҷ ̉È˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ¯˙ÂÈ „ÂÚ ÂÏÈ„‚È È¢ ÔÈ·Ï ¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ·˘ ¯ÚÙ‰ ˙„ÈÎÏ·˙Ó¯ ÏÚ ‰¯ÈÓ˘· ÌÈίΉ ÔÂÎÈ҉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ‰ ˙˘‰ .˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ˙‡ ¯·„‰ ÔÈ˘ÈÁ˙ÙÏ ˙Ó ÏÚ ‚È˘‰Ï ˘È˘ ‰Â˘‡¯ ‰¯ËÓ ‡ÂÙ‡ ‰È‰ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ Ï˘ ˜ÂÈ„‰

.ÌÈÏÈÚÈ ÌȘ¢,ÌÈÈÒÈÙ‰ ÌȘ¢· ˙ÂÏÈÊ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ˙‚˘‰· ͯˆ‰Â Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘ Ï˘ ‰Ê Ï„ÂÓ Ú˜¯ ÏÚ

69ÔÂÓˉ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ÔÈ˘È ˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙ÚÙ˘‰ ˙‡ ˙ÈÁÙÈ È·È˘ه 'ʇ¯ËÈ·¯‡ ,‰Ó„·R.J. Gilson & R. Kraakman “The ‡¯ .ÂÈ¢ ÔÈ·Ï Í¯Ú‰ ¯ÈÈ ¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ· ˙ÂÈËÒÓ Á¯ ˙˜Ù‰·Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias” 28 J. Corp.

.L. (2003) 715, 733

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(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙˘‰ È„È ÏÚ ‰Ê ͯˆ ÌÈÓÈ˘‚Ó Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ÈÎ ‰Úˉ ˙‡ ‰˙Ú ÒÒ·.˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÏÈÊ ˙˜Óډ ˜ÈÂ„Ó ¯ÂÁÓ˙ Ï˘ ˙ÂÏËÓ‰ Úˆȷ· ÌÈίΉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ‰Â

ÌÈÏÈÊ ÌÈÏÈÚÈ ÌȘ¢ ˙‚˘‰ :Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ .·

„È˜Ù‰Ï ˙·ÈÈÁÓ ÌÈÏÈÊ ÌÈÏÈÚÈ ÌȘ¢ ˙‚˘‰ ÈÎ ‰ÏÂÚ ÏÈÚÏ ‚ˆÂ‰˘ Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘ Ï„ÂÓÓ.˜Â˘· ˙ÂÏÚÂÙ‰ Âχ ÍÂ˙Ó ˙Á‡ ‰ˆÂ·˜ È„È· ˙ÂÏÈʉ ÏÈÚȉ ¯ÂÁÓ˙‰ ˙ÂÓÈ˘Ó ˙‡.̉· ¯ÂÁ·Ï Ô˙È ‡Ï ÔÎ ÏÚ ,Ú„ÈÓÏ ÌÈ·È‚Ó Ìȇ ˜Â˘‰ È˘ÂÚ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒÌÈ„ÓÚÂÓ‰ ÈÎ ,‡ˆÓ .¯ÂÁ·Ï Ô˙È ‡Ï ̉· Ì‚ ÔÎ ÏÚ ,ÌÈÈÏÂȈ¯ Ìȇ ˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ̉ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ˙¯·‚‰Â ˜È„Ӊ ¯ÂÁÓ˙‰ ˙ÂÓÈ˘Ó ÚÂˆÈ·Ï ÌÈ„ÈÁȉ ÌÈÈχȈËÂÙ‰

.Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Â‡ ÌÈÙ‰-È˘‡,‰Ê „ˆÏ ‰Ê ÌÈȘ˙‰Ï ÌÈÏÂÎÈ Ìȇ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ÌÈÙ È˘‡ ,ÔÏ‰Ï ‰‡¯˘ ÈÙÎÍ¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ .„·Ï· ˙Á‡· Âχ ˙ˆ·˜ È˙˘ ÔÈ·Ó ¯ÂÁ·Ï ‰È„Ó‰ ÏÚ ÔÎ ÏÚÂ˙ÂÓÈ˘Ó ˙‡ „È˜Ù‰Ï Z ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ˘ÂÓÈ˘ ÏÚ ˙ÂÏ·‚‰ ˙Ïˉ È„È ÏÚ Z ¯Á·ÈÈ„ ÌÈÏÚÂÙ ,¯ÂÙ‰ ÏÙ˘ ˙ÚÓ .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ̉Ȅȷ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ˙ÂÏÈÚȉ ˙¯·‚‰¯ÂÚÊÓÏ Z ‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÏÚ ¯ÂÒȇ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ ˙Ïˉ È„È ÏÚ Z Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈÔÂÈ„‰ ͢Ӊ .̄ȘÙ˙ ˙‡ ̇ÏÓ· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ìȇ˘Â ̉·˘ ÌÈÂÎÈ҉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ‰ÂÁÂ˙ÈÙ ˙‡ ˙„„ÂÚÓ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ˙·Ï¢Ӊ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰‰ „ˆÈÎ Û¢ÁÈ ‰Ê ˜¯Ù·

.ÌÈÏÈÊ ÌÈÏÈÚÈ ÌȘ¢ Ì„˜Ó Â„ÈˆÓ˘ ,Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ Ï˘

Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ· ‰¯ÈÁ·‰ :ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ ÏÚ ¯ÂÒȇ .1

‡ ˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ È„È ÏÚ ÌÈÓ¯‚ ¯ÈÁÓ· ÌÈÈÂÈ˘ ̇ ÔÈÁ·‰Ï ÌÈÏÂÎÈ Ìȇ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒÚ„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ,ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ· ··¯Ú˙Ó ˘Ú¯ ¯ÁÒÓ ¯˘‡Î .ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ È„È ÏÚÌÈÏÂÎÈ Ì‰ Ôȇ ,ÈÓȇ ¯ÁÒÓ‰ Ï˘ Â˙Âȉ· ,ÌȯÁÂÒ‰ ˙Â‰Ê ˙‡ ˙Ú„Ï ÌÈÏÂÎÈ Ìȇ,ÍÎ˘Ó .70¯ÁÒÓ‰ ۘȉ· ‡ ¯ÈÁÓ· ˙„Â˙‰ ÁÂ˙È ÍÂ˙Ó ÌÈÙ ˘È‡ Ï˘ ¯ÁÒÓ ¯˙‡Ï

70¯ÈÁÓ‰ ˙ÂÚÂ˙ ‡ ¯ÁÒÓ‰ ÁÙ ÈÎ ÂÚË ,Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 6 ÈÎ ÔÈÈˆÏ È‡¯ÌÈËÒÈχ ˘È ̇ ¯˜ÈÚ· ,ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ ÂÚ·Ë ˙„‡ ÏÚ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ˙‡ Ú„ÈÈÏ ÌÓˆÚÏ˘Î ÌÈÈ¢Ú˙ÂÁÙ‰ ‡È‰ ÂÊ ‰ËÈ˘ ÈΠ„‰ Ìȯ·ÁÓ‰ ,˙‡Ê ÌÚ .ÌÈÙ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙Â‰Ê ˙‡ ˜ÈÒ‰Ï ÌÈÏÂÎȉGilson & .˜ÈÂ„Ó Âȇ ÈËȇ ‡Â‰ "ÁÂÚÙ" Ï˘ ‰Ê ÍÈω˙˘ ÌÂ˘Ó ,ÏÈÚÈ ¯ÂÁÓ˙ ˙‚˘‰· ‰ÏÈÚÈÌÈÓÚË ‰ÓÎÓ ¯˙ÂÈ ˙È˙Â‡ÈˆÓ ÂÏ˘ ‰Á‰‰ ÈÎ ÌÈ¯Â·Ò Â‡ .Kraakman, ibid, at pp. 574y579· Ôȇ˘ ˜Â˘Ï ڂ· ÚӢ‰ Gilson & Kraakman Ï˘ ÌÂÚÈË ÈÎ ÔÈÈˆÏ ·Â˘Á ,˙È˘‡¯ :ÌÈÙÒÂÚ„ÂÓ ¯ÁÒÓ ÔÈ· ÔÈÁ·‰Ï ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ÏÚ ¯˙ÂÈ „ÂÚ ‰˘˜Ó ˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÙÒÂÂ˙‰ .˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒ,˙ȯÈÙÓ‡ ‰ÈÁ·Ó ,˙È˘ .ÁÂÚÙ‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ˙‡ ¯˙ÂÈ „ÂÚ ˙ÈÁÙÈ˘ ÔÙ‡· ,Ú„ÂÓ È˙Ï· ¯ÁÒÓ ÔÈ·ÏÏÚ Ìȯ·Â‚ ÌÈÙ È˘‡ ÈÎ ,¯ÓÂÏÎ) "‰˜ÊÁ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ" ÌÈÏ‚Ó Ìȇ ÌȘ¢‰ ÈÎ ÌÈÏÚÓ‰ ÌȇˆÓÓJ.E. Finnerty “Insiders ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯ .ÁÂÚÙ‰ ˙ÈȂ˯ËÒ‡ ˙ÂÈ˘ÚÓ· ¯˙ÂÈ „ÂÚ ÌÈÓÒ¯ÎÓ (˜Â˘‰

24

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

.˙ÂÈ·˜Ú·Â ˙ÂÚÈ·˜· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˙‡ ÂÒÈ·È Ì‰ ,¯ÂÁÒÏ ÌÈÙ È˘‡Ï ÌȯÈ˙Ó ¯˘‡ÎÂÈ‰È ÌÏÂÚÏ Ì‰ ,Ú„ÈÓÏ ÌÈ·È‚Ó ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ¯Á‡ ÌÈ·˜ÂÚ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ˘ ¯Á‡ÓÏ˘ ‰¯ÈÁÓ ÈÎ ,Â˙¢¯·˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÏÚ ÒÒ·˙‰· ,ÔÈÓ‡Ó‰ ËÒÈχ ÂÏË .71„ÈÒÙÓ‰ „ˆ·ÒÒ·˙‰· ‰ÈÓ‰ ˙‡ ¯ÎÂÓ ÌÈÙ ˘È‡ ÈÎ ‰˙Ú ÁÈ .‰È¢ ˙‡ ˜È„ӷ Û˜˘Ó ˙ÓÈÂÒÓ ‰ÈÓÂȇ ËÒÈχ‰˘ ¯Á‡Ó .˙„¯Ï ‰ÈÓ‰ ¯ÈÁÓÏ Íη ̯‚ ,Â˙¢¯·˘ ÈÏÈÏ˘ ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ ÏÚÏ˘ ¯ÒÁ ˙ίډΠ‰ÈÓ‰ ¯ÈÁÓ· ‰„ȯȉ ˙‡ ˘¯ÙÈ ‡Â‰ ,ÌÈÙ‰ Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ ÂÓÂÈ˜Ï Ú„ÂÓ¯Á‡Ï ˜¯Â ,ÁÂˆÏ ÍÈ˘ÓÈ ‰ÈÓ‰ ¯ÈÁÓ .‰˙Â˜Ï ¯‰ÓÈ ÔÎ ÏÚ ,(‰ÏÂÊ ‰ÈÓ‰) ‰ÈÓ‰ È¢‰ÈÓ ‰˜˘ ¯Á‡Ó „ÈÒÙ‰ ÈÎ ËÒÈχ‰ ÔÈ·È ,¯Â·Èˆ‰ ˙ÏÁÏ ÍÂÙ‰È ÈÏÈÏ˘‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰˘¯ÁÒÓ‰ ÏÏ‚· ‰ÏÚÈ ‰ÈÓ‰ ¯ÈÁÓ .È·ÂÈÁ ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓÏ ÒÁÈ· Ì‚ ÏÁ ÔÂ‚Ó Â˙‡ .È„Ó ‰¯˜È¯˙È· ‰Î¯Ú‰ ‰ÈÓ‰ ÈÎ ÂÁȉ· ,72(short) ¯ÒÁ· ¯ÂÎÓÈ ËÒÈχ‰Â ,ÌÈÙ‰ ˘È‡ Ï˘ÂÏ ÌÈÓ¯‚ ˙ÂÏÚÏ ÍÈ˘ÓÓ ‰ÈÓ‰ ¯Ú˘ ÈÎ ,‰Ó ÔÓÊ ¯Â·ÚÎ ˙ÂÏ‚Ï È„Î ˜¯ ,(‰¯˜È ‰ÈÓ‰)ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ÔÂÂ‚Ï ÌÈÏ‚ÂÒÓ Ìȇ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ .‰ÏÂÊ ‰ÈÓ ¯ÒÁ· ¯ÎÓ˘ ¯Á‡Ó ÌÈ„ÒÙ‰‰Ú˜˘‰ ˙ÈȂ˯ËÒ‡ Ô΢ ,73ÌÏÂÓ ˙ÂÓÈÚ· „ÈÒÙÈ „ÈÓ˙ ,ÌÈÙ È˘‡ ÏÂÓ ¯ÁÒÓ· ÔÂÓˉ

and Market Efficiency” 31 J. Fin. (1976) 1141; H.N. Seyhun “Insiders’ Profits, CostsÌȇ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ,¯ÓÂÏÎ .of Trading and Market Efficiency” 16 J. Fin. Econ. (1986) 189ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙Â‰Ê ˙‡ ˜ÈÒ‰Ï Â‡ ÌÈÙ‰ Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ ÂÚ·Ë ÏÚ ¯ÁÒÓ‰ Íωӷ „ÂÓÚÏ ÌÈÏ‚ÂÒÓ,ÍÎÓ ‰¯˙È .ÌÈÈÏӯ‰ ‰Ï‡Ó Ìȉ·‚ ÌÈÁ¯ ˜ÈÙ‰Ï ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡Ó ÚÂÓÏ ¯˘Ù‡È˘ ÔÙ‡· ÌÈÙ‰¯·ÎÓ ‰Ê Âڈ·˘ ¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÂÚÙ ˙„‡ ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ ÂÏÈÙ‡ ÌȈÓÓ Ìȇ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ÈÎ ¯·˙ÒÓJ.F. Jaffe “Special Information and Insider ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯ .Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈÏ ˙¢¯‰ È„È ÏÚ ÂÁ„ÂÚ„ÈÓ· ÊÈ¯Ê ˘ÂÓÈ˘Ó Á¯ ˜ÈÙ‰Ï ÌÈÈÂ˘Ú ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó ÈÎ ÔÚÂˉ) Trading” 47 J. Bus. (1974) 410„ÈÈÓ Z ˙ȘȯӇ‰ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ ˙¢¯ Ï˘ ÌÈÈÓ˘¯‰ ˙ÂÁ„‰ Z Official Summary-· ÌÂÏ‚‰H.S. Kerr “The Battle of Insider Trading vs. Market Efficiency” 6 ¢‰Â ;(ÌÓÂÒ¯Ù ¯Á‡Ï˙‡ ‰˘ÚÓÏ ‰Îω ˙ÚÂÓ ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÏÈÚÙ ÈÎ ÔÚÂˉ) J. Port. Mgt. (1980) 47ÌÚ (Official Summary-· ȈӉ Ú„ÈÓ· ˘ÂÓÈ˘ ˙ÈÈ˘Ú È„È ÏÚ ˙Ù„ÂÚ ‰‡Â˘˙ ˜ÈÙ‰Ï ˙¯˘Ù‡‰R. Goldie “Are Some Insiders More ‘Inside’ Than Others? Comment” 10 J. Port. Mgt.˙‡ˆÂ˙ ÈÎ ¯¯·˙Ó Kerr Ï˘ ¯˜ÁÓ· ˙ÂÈ‚ÂÏ„Â˙Ó ˙ÂÈÂÚË Ô˜È˙ ¯Á‡Ï ÈÎ ÔÈȈӉ) (1983) 75‰‡Â˘˙ ˜ÈÙ‰Ï È„Î Official Summary-· ˘ÂÓÈ˘ ˙¢ÚÏ ÌÈÏÂÎÈ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó ÈÎ ˙„ÓÏÓ Â¯˜ÁÓ

.(˙Ù„ÂÚ71.Haddock & Macey, supra note 44, at pp. 1458y145972Í¯ÂˆÏ ˙Úˆ·˙Ó ÂÊÎ ‰¯ÈÎÓ .¯ÎÂÓ‰ ˙ÂÏÚ·· Âȇ˘ Í¯Ú ¯ÈÈ ¯ÎÓ ‰·˘ ‰¯ÈÎÓ ‡È‰ ¯ÒÁ· ‰¯ÈÎÓ

ÁÈÓ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ¯ÁÂÒ ,Á"˘ 100 ‡Â‰ ͯډ ¯ÈÈ ¯ÈÁÓ˘ ÁÈ .‰ÈÂÙˆ ÌȯÈÁÓ ˙„ȯÈÓ ÌÈÁ¯ ˙˜Ù‰¯ÂÁÒÏ ÔÂÂÎ˙Ó Âȇ˘ ÚȘ˘ÓÓ Í¯Ú‰ ¯ÈÈ ˙‡ ‰ÂÂÏ ¯ÎÂÓ‰ .Á"˘ 60 ˙ÂÈ‰Ï ÔÂΉ ¯ÈÁÓ‰ ÏÚ˘¯ÈÁÓ‰ ¯˘‡Î ÔÓÊ ¯Â·ÚÎ .Á"˘ 100 Ï·˜Ó ͯډ ¯ÈÈ ˙‡ ¯ÎÂÓ ,‰Î¯‡ ‰Ù˜˙ ͢ӷ ͯډ ¯ÈÈ·ÛÒ·) ‰ÂÂÏÓÏ Â˙‡ ¯ÈÊÁÓ ͯډ ¯ÈÈ ˙‡ ‰¯ÊÁ· ˘Î¯ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ¯ÁÂÒ ,Á"˘ 60 Ï˘ ¯ÈÁÓÏ „¯ÂÈ40 Ï˘ Á¯ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ¯ÁÂÒ ˜ÈÙ‰ ÂÊ ‰˜ÒÚÓ .(ͯډ ¯ÈÈ· ˘ÂÓÈ˘‰ ÔÈ‚· ‰ÏÓÚ ‰ÂÂÏÓÏ ˙ÓÏ¢Ó˙‡ ˘ÂÎ¯Ï ıχÈÈ ‡Â‰ ,Á"˘ 150-Ï Ï˘ÓÏ ,‰ÏÂÚ ¯ÈÁӉ ‰ÚÂË Ú„ÈÓ‰ ¯ÁÂÒ Ì‡ ,Ô·ÂÓÎ .Á"˘

.„ÒÙ‰ ‚ÂÙÒÈ ÔÎÏ ¯˙ÂÈ ‰Â·‚ ¯ÈÁÓ· ‰¯ÊÁ· ͯډ ¯ÈÈ73ÈÎ ‰‡¯Ó‰) W. Bagehot “The Only Game in Town” 2 Fin. Analysts J. (1971) 12 ‡¯

„ÈÓ˙ ˜Â˘‰ È˘ÂÚ ,˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ ,˜Â˘ È˘ÂÚ ,ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ ÌȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ÌÓÂȘ ˙‡ ÌÈÁÈÓ Â·˘ Ï„ÂÓ·.(ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ‰ ÌȯÁÂÒÏ ÌÈ„ÈÒÙÓ

25

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

ÌȯÁÂÒ˘ ˙Ú Ïη ÌÈ„ÒÙ‰ ‰·ÒÓ ÂÏ ˙Á˙Ó Â‡ ÔίÚÏ ÏÚÓ ˙ÂÈÓ ¯Â˙ȇ ÏÚ ˙ÒÒ·ӉڄÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ,ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ·¯ ¯ÁÒÓ ÌÈȘ˙Ó ¯˘‡Î ,ÍÎÓ ‰‡ˆÂ˙Î .ÛÈ„Ú Ú„ÈÓ ÏÚ· ÏÂÓ

.74˜Â˘‰ ÔÓ Â‡ˆÈÈ ¯·„ Ï˘ ÂÙÂÒ·Â ,Ú„ÈÓ· Ì˙Ú˜˘‰ ˙‡ ÌÓˆÚÏ ·È˘‰Ï ÌÈÏÂÎÈ ÌȇÏÚ ˙ÈËÙ˘Ó ‰Ï·‚‰ ÂÏË .‰˙˘Ó ‰‡ˆÂ˙‰ ,¯ÂÁÒÏÓ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ ÌÈÚÂÓ ¯˘‡ÎÈ˘‡ ,‰Ê ÏÏÎ ÈÙ ÏÚ .75"ÚÓȉ-‡-‰Ï‚" Ï˘ ÏÏΉ ÏÚ ˙ÒÒ·Ӊ ,ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ„ÁÈ· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÏÚ ÒÒ·˙‰· ¯ÂÁÒÏ Ê‡Â ,Ì˙¢¯·˘ ÌÈÙ‰ Ú„ÈÓ ˙‡ ˙ÂÏ‚Ï ÌÈÏÂÎÈ ÌÈÙ‰¯˘‡ „Ú ,ÌÈÙ‰ Ú„ÈÓ ˙‡ ˙ÂÏ‚ÏÓ ¯ÂÁÒÏÓ ÚÓÈ‰Ï Â‡ ,˜Â˘· ÌȘÁ˘‰ ¯˙È ÏÎ ÌÚ¯È˙Ò‰Ï ıȯÓ˙ ¯„Úȉ· .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙‡ ˙ÂÏ‚Ï Ì˙‡ ·ÈÈÁ˙˘ ˙¯Á‡ ˙ÈËÙ˘Ó ‰·ÂÁ ̘˙Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ ,Û˘Á ÌÈÙ‰ Ú„ÈӢΠ.76Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙‡ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ ÂÏ‚È ,Ú„ÈÓÏ˘ ËÚÂÓ ¯ÙÒÓ ˜¯ ˜Â˘· ‰È‰È ‰ÏÈÁ˙· .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÔÓ Á¯ ˙˜Ù‰ ÏÚ Ì‰ÈÈ· ÌȯÁ˙Ó.̉ÈÈ· ‰ËÚÂÓ ˙¯Á˙ Ï˘· Ú„ÈÓ· ‰Ú˜˘‰ ÏÚ ‰‚ȯÁ ‰‡Â˘˙ Â‚È˘È˘ ,Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ·˘ ,̄˜‰ ·Ï˘Ï ‰‡Â¢‰· ÏÈÊ ˙ÂÁÙ ÏÈÚÈ ˙ÂÁÙ ‰È‰È ˜Â˘‰ ,ÂÊ ¯·ÚÓ ˙Ù˜˙·Ì‰ÈÈ· ˙¯Á˙‰Â ‰‚¯„‰· Ï„‚È Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ¯ÙÒÓ ,Ìχ .77¯ÂÁÒÏ Â˘¯Â‰ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ÏÈÊ ÏÈÚÈ ˜Â˘ ˙‚˘‰ ÍÂ˙ ,È˙¯Á˙ ¯ÂÚÈ˘Ï Ú„ÈÓ· ‰Ú˜˘‰ ÏÚ ‰‡Â˘˙‰ ˙‡ ˙ÈÁÙ˙

.78¯˙ÂÈ

74M.J. Fishman & K.M. Hagerty “Insider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯ÌȘÈÊÁÓ ıÂÁ È˘‡ ÈÎ ÌÈÁÈÓ Â·˘ Ï„ÂÓ· ÈÎ Ìȇ¯Ó‰) Prices” 23 Rand J. Econ. (1992) 106ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ‰ ÌȯÁÂÒ‰ ¯ÙÒÓ ,ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ È„È·˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÓÂÚÏ ¯˙ÂÈ ¯˜È ˜ÈÂ„Ó ˙ÂÁÙ Ú„ÈÓ·H.E. Leland “Insider ;(ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ È„È·˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ Ï˘ ÈÒÁȉ ˜ÂÈ„‰ ˙„ÈÓ Ï˘ ‰Èˆ˜ÂÙÎ ˙ÁÂÙÏ„ÂÓ· ÈÎ ‰‡¯Ó‰) Trading: Should it be Prohibited?” 100 J. Political Econ. (1992) 859ÌȯÁÂÒ È„È·˘ ‰ÊÓ ˜ÈÂ„Ó Ú„ÈÓ ¯˙ÂÈ· ÈËÒÈÏÂÙÂÂÓ ÔÙ‡· ÌȘÈÊÁÓ‰ ÌÈÙ È˘‡ ÌÈÁÈÓ Â·˘.(¯ÁÒÓ· ÌÈÙ˙˙˘Ó ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ ¯˘‡Î ˙˙ÁÂÙ „ÈÓ˙ ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ‰ ÌȯÁÂÒ‰ Ï˘ Ì˙Á¯ Z ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ

75SEC v. Texas Gulf ;353y351 'Ú· ,337 (4)‚ „"Ù ,χ¯˘È ˙È„Ó ' ·Âʯ 4675/97 Ù"Ú Â‡¯Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) & cert.

.denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971)76R. Narayanan “Insider Trading and the Voluntary Disclosure of Information by ‡¯

¯ÁÒÓ ÏÚ ¯ÂÒȇ‰ Ï˘ ˙È„Ù˜ ‰ÙÈ· ÈÎ ˜ÈÒÓ‰) Firms” 24 J. Banking & Fin. (2000) 395.(˙¯·Á „ˆÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ۘȉ· ÏÂ„È‚Ï ‰‡È·Ó ÌÈÙ È˘‡ Ï˘

77R. Kabir & T. Vermaelen “Insider Trading Restrictions and the Stock Market: ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯Evidence from the Amsterdam Stock Exchange” 40 Euro. Econ. Rev. (1996) 1591ÏÚ ,1987 ˙˘ Ê‡Ó ,ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ ÏÚ ˙ÂÏ·‚‰ ˙ÏË‰Ï ˘È˘ ‰ÚÙ˘‰‰ ˙‡ ÌÈÁ·‰)‰˙Ï‚˙ ÈΠ˙ÂÏÈÊ ˙ÂÁÙ ÂÎÙ‰ ÂÊ ‰Ò¯Â·· ˙ÂÈÓ‰ ÈÎ ÌȘÈÒÓ ;Ì„¯ËÒÓ‡· ‰Ò¯Â·‰ ˙‚‰˙‰

.(ÌÈÁ¯ ˙„‡ ˙ÂÈ·ÂÈÁ ˙¢„ÁÏ ˜Â˘‰ ˙Ó‡˙‰ ˙¯ȉӷ ‰„È¯È Û‡78ÏÈ·ÂÓ ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ ÈÎ ÌÈÚÂˉ) Fishman & Hagerty, supra note 74, at pp. 118y119 ‡¯

R.M. Bushman, ‡¯ .Ï„ÂÓ· ÌÓ‡ ÌÈÎÓÂ˙ ÌÈȯÈÙÓ‡ Ìȯ˜ÁÓ .(˙ÂÁÙ ÌÈÏÈÚÈ ˜Â˘ ȯÈÁÓÏJ.D. Piotroski & A.J. Smith “Insider Trading Restrictions and Analysts Incentives toFollow Firms” (January 2003) (working paper series), available at: URL:http://papers.ÈÂÒÈΉ Ï˘ ˙ÂÈ·ÈÒËȇ‰ ˙„ÈÓ ÈÎ ÌÈÏ‚Ó‰) ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=373520(‰Â˙ ‰È„Ó· ¯˜ÁÓ‰ ‡˘Â ˙¯·Á‰ ˙‡ ÌÈÂÂÏÓ‰ ÌÈËÒÈχ Ï˘ ÚˆÂÓÓ ¯ÙÒÓ) ÈËÒÈχ‰˙¢ӢÓ ‰È„Ó ‰˙‡· ¯ÁÒÓÏ ˙ÂÓ¢¯‰ ˙ÂÈÓ˜Ӊ ˙¯·Á‰ ¯ÂÚÈ˘) ÈËÒÈχ‰ ÈÂÒÈΉ ۘȉÂ

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Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ ÏÚ ‰Ï·‚‰‰ ˙‡ ÌÈ˙ÚÏ ¯ÙÈ ÌÈÙ È˘‡ Ï˘ ̈ÓÂˆÓ ¯ÙÒÓ ˜¯ ̇‰„ÈÓ· ˙ÈÁÙÓ ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· Ï·‚ÂÓ ¯ÁÒÓ .„˜Ù˙Ï ÏÎÂÈ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˜Â˘ ,ÌÈÙ˙˜ÙÒÓ ‰‡Â˘˙ Ì‰Ï ¯È˙ÂÓ Í‡ ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ‰ÈÂÙˆ‰ ‰‡Â˘˙‰ ˙‡ ˙ÓÈÂÒÓȯÁÂÒ ˜Â˘ Ï˘ ÂÈ˙ÂÏ·‚ ˙‡ ÌÁÂ˙ ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ‰ ۘȉ .79ÌÈÏÈÚÙ ¯‡˘È‰Ï È„Îۘȉ ¯˘‡Î ;Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ Á˙Ù˙È ,Ï·‚ÂÓ ‰Ê ۘȉ ¯˘‡Î .Ú„ÈÓ‰È˘‡ ÔÈ· ‰Ê ‰ÙÂÏÁ˙ ˘ه .Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ ˜Â˘ ¯ˆÂÂÈ ‡Ï ,·Á¯ ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ‰

.ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ ÏÚ ¯ÂÒȇ‰ ˙·‰Ï Á˙ÙÓ‰ ‡Â‰ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ÌÈÙ¯ÁÒÓ ÏÚ ¯ÂÒȇ‰ ÔÓ ˙Ù˜˙˘Ó‰ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ ÈÙ ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˙Ù„Ú‰¯˘‡· ˙ÂÈ„ÚÏ·Ó Ìȉ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ ,˙È˘‡¯ :80˙·ÈÒ ‰ÓÎÓ ˙˜„ˆÂÓ ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ·ÚÈÙ˘‰Ï ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡Ï ¯˘Ù‡Ó ˙¯Á˙ ÈÙÓ Ì„Â„È· .Ì˙¢¯·˘ ÌÈÙ‰ Ú„ÈÓ· ˘ÂÓÈ˘ÏÚ„ÈÓ‰Ó ÚÂÓÏ ڄÈÓ‰ ˙ÙÈ˘Á „ÚÂÓ ˙‡ ˙ÂÁ„Ï Ì˙ÏÂÎÈ· ;Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ÔÂÓÊ˙ ÏÚ‰¯·Á‰ ȘÒÚ· Ú‚ÙÏ ÍÎ·Â È„Ó Ì„˜ÂÓ Â˙ÂÏ‚Ï Â‡ ,˙ȯ˘Ù‡‰ ˙¯ȉӷ ˜Â˘Ï ÚÈ‚‰ÏÓÈÂÏÈ‚ „ÚÂÓ ÏÚ ÚÈÙ˘‰Ï ÌÈÏÂÎÈ Ìȇ Ì˙ÓÂÚÏ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ .81¯ÁÒ ‰Ï˘ ͯډ ¯ÈÈ˘ÌÈÏÚÂÙ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ .ÂÈχ ·È‚‰Ï ÌÈ·ÈÈÁ ͇ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚· ÌÈËÏ¢ Ìȇ ̉ ;Ú„ÈÓ‰˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÍÂ˙Ï ÌÈ˘„Á Ú„ÈÓ ÈËȯ٠ÌÏ‚Ï ÔÎ ÏÚ Ìȯ˙ÂÁ ,„‡Ó È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘·È¯ÁÂÒ ,˙È˘ .82·È¯È ËÒÈχ ̉ÈÏÚ ¯·‚È ÔÎ ‡Ï ̇˘ ,˙ȯ˘Ù‡‰ ˙¯ȉӷ ˜Â˘· ͯډ

Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ ÏÚ ˙ÂÏ·‚Ó ˙ÙÈÎ‡Ï È¢‡¯ ıÓ‡Ó ‰˘Ú˘ ¯Á‡Ï ÌÈÏ„‚ (ÈËÒÈχ ÈÂÒÈÎÏ ‡˘ÂL.N. ;(˜˘Ó· ˙ÂÈÊÂÎȯ ˙ÓÈȘ Ô‰·˘ ˙ÂÈ„Ó·Â ÌÈÁÓˆ ÌȘ¢· „ÁÂÈÓ· ·Â˘Á ‰Ê Ï„Ȃ ÈΠ,ÌÈÙBeny “A Comparative Empirical Investigation of Agency and Market Theories of InsiderTrading” (February 2004) (working paper series), available at: URL:http://papers.ssrn.ÏÚ ÌȯÒ‡‰ ÌȘÂÁ‰ Ô‰·˘ ˙ÂÈ„Ó· ÈÎ ‰Ï‚Ó‰) com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=193070ÌÈÁ¢˜ ÂÏω ÌȘÂÁ‰ Ô‰·˘ ˙ÂÈ„Ó· ÈΠ,˙ÂÁÙ ÌÈÏÈÊ ÌȘ¢‰ ,¯˙ÂÈ ÌÈÏ˜Ó ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓU. Bhattacharya & H. ;(Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ· ¯·Â„Ó˘ ÏÎÎ ¯˙ÂÈ ÌÈÏÈÚÈ Í¯Ú‰ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ,¯˙ÂȉÙÈ· ÈÎ ÌÈÏ‚Ó‰) Daouk “The World Price of Insider Trading” 57 J. Fin. (2002) 75Ï˘ Ô‰‰ ¯ÈÁÓ· ˙È˙ÂÚÓ˘Ó ‰„ȯȷ ‰¯Â˘˜ ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ ÏÚ ÌȯÒ‡‰ ÌȘÂÁ Ï˘ ˙È¢‡¯

.(‰È„Ó‰79J. Shin “The Optimal Regulation of Insider Trading” 5 J. Fin. Intermediation (1996) ‡¯

ÌȯÁÂÒ ,ÌÈÙ È˘‡ ÏÏÂΉ Ï„ÂÓ· ̉È˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ÌÈÈÏÓÈËÙ‡‰ ‰ÙÈ·‰ ÈˆÓ‡Ó ˙‡ ÌÈ·Ï˘Ó‰) 49ۘȉ· ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ ÈÙÏÎ ˙ÂÏ·ÂÒ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ÈÎ ÌÈÏ‚Ó ;˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ ,ÌÈÈÚˆ˜Ó ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ

.(˙ÈÏÓÈËÙ‡ ˙ȯÂËÏ‚¯ ˙ÂÈÈ„Ó ˙ÂÂ‰Ï ÈÂ˘Ú ÌÈÂÒÓ80Goshen & Parchomovsky, ‡¯ .·˙΢ ̄˜ ¯Ó‡Ó· ‰·Á¯‰· ÂÁ˙ÂÙ ÔÏ‰Ï Â‚ˆÂÈ˘ ÌÈÂÚÈˉ

:ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ˘ÂÓÈ˘‰ „‚ „Ú· ÌÈÓÚˉ" ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù '‚ Ԣ‚ 'Ê Â‡¯ ÔÎ .supra note 14.321 ('‚ ͯΠ,‚"Ò˘˙ ,˙ίÚÓ‰ ˘‡¯ ·˘ÂÈ ˜¯· Ô¯‰‡) ¯‚Ó˘ ¯ÙÒ "˙˘„ÂÁÓ ‰Î¯Ú‰

81.¯˙ÂÈ ‰‰Â·‚ ‰Ï‚Ӊ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÔÎÂ˙ ÏÚ È·ÈËÏÂÙÈÓ Á¯Â‡· ÂÚÈÙ˘È ÌÈÙ È˘‡˘ ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰ Û‡P. Dunn “The Impact of Insider Power on Fraudulent Financial Reporting” ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯

.30 J. Management (2004) 39782P.C. O’Brien “Forecast Accuracy of Individual Analysts in Nine Industries” 28 J. ‡¯

˙„‡ ÏÚ È¯ÈÙÓ‡ ¯˜ÁÓ ÏÚ ÒÒ·˙‰· ,˙ÚÂˉ) Account. Research (1990) 286, 303y304Ï˘ ·ÂÏÈ˘ ˙Â¯È‰Ó ÏÚ Ì‰ÈÈ· ÌȯÁ˙Ó ÌÈËÒÈχ ÈÎ ,˙ÂÈËÒÈχ ˙ÂÈÊÁ˙·˘ ˜ÂÈ„‰ ˙„ÈÓJ. Jacob, T.Z. Lys & M.A. Neale “Expertise in Forecasting Performance ;(˘„Á Ú„ÈÓ

27

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

˜Â˘ Ú„ÈÓ ÌÂÏÈ‚Ï ,ÁÂ˙ÈÏ ,˘ÂÙÈÁÏ Ô‚Ӊ τ‚‰ Ô¯˙È ˙‡ ÏˆÏ ÌÈÏ‚ÂÒÓ Ú„ÈÓ‰Ì˘ÂÈÓ ˙ÂÈ‰Ï ÈÂ˘Ú ‰ÈÈ˘Ú˙Ï Â‡ ˜˘ÓÏ Ú‚Â· ¯·ˆ˘ Ú„È .ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ· ÈÏÏÎ˙Ú· ÚÈÈÒÏ ÈÂ˘Ú ˙Á‡ ‰¯·ÁÏ ÒÁÈ· ¯·ˆ‰ Ú„È ,‰Ó„· .˙·¯ ˙¯·Á Ï˘ ÔÁÂ˙È Í¯ÂˆÏ˙¯·Á ,ÌÏ‚ ȯÓÂÁ ‰Ï ˙˜ÙÒÓ‰ ˙¯·Á ˙ӂ„ ,‰Èχ ˙Â¯Â˘˜‰ ˙¯Á‡ ˙¯·Á ÁÂ˙ÈÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡Ï˘ Ì‚‰ ,˙È˘ÈÏ˘ .‰Ï˘ ˙¯Á˙Ó Ô‰˘ ˙¯·Á ‡ ,ÌȯˆÂÓ ‰ÓÓ ˙¢Î¯‰¯ÁÒ ‰Ï˘ ͯډ ¯ÈÈ˘ ‰¯·Á‰ ÏÚ ÈÙȈÙÒ Ú„ÈÓ ¯Á‡ "˘ÙÁ"Ï ˙ÏÂÎÈ· ÌÈÂÒÓ Ô¯˙ÈÌ˙ÏÂÎÈ· ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ ÏÚ ÌÈÙÈ„Ú Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ,(ÌÈÙ È˘‡ Ì˙Âȉ ̈ÚÓ Ú·Â‰ Ô¯˙È)ÌȯˆÈÈÓ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡˘ „ÂÚ· .ͯډ ¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÍÂ˙Ï ÂÓÏ‚Ï ڄÈÓ Ï˘ ‰Ê ‚ÂÒ Á˙ÏȯÁÂÒ ,ÌÓˆÚ Ì‰Ï˘ ˙ÂȘÒÚ‰ ˙ÂËÏÁ‰‰ È·‚Ï ˙„„· ˙È·È˘Èȷ‡-È˙Ï· È¢ ˙ίډÏÏÎÏ ˙ÂÏÏÎ˙˘Ó‰Â ,ÂÊ· ÂÊ ˙¯Á˙Ó‰ ,˙·¯ ˙ÂÈ·È˘Èȷ‡ È¢ ˙Âίډ ÌȯˆÈÈÓ Ú„ÈÓÏÚ Ú·˜˘ ¯ÈÁÓÓ ¯˙ÂÈ È˙ÂÎȇ ‡Â‰ ˜Â˘‰ ¯ÈÁÓ .ÂÏÂÎ ˜Â˘‰ Ï˘ ˙È·È˘Èȷ‡ ‰Î¯Ú‰ÌÈ·‡˘ÓÏ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ¯˙ÂÈ ‰·Âˉ Ì˙Â˘È‚Ï ˙„‰ ,˙ÈÚÈ·¯ .ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ ȄȉÊÚ ˙¯Á˙Ï ,¯ÁÒÓ‰ ˙‡ Ú„ÈÎ ÚÈÓ‰ ,̉È˙ÂÚ„ Ô‚ÓÏ ,¯ÁÒÓÏ ÌÈ„ÚÂÈÓ‰ ÌÈÈÒÈÙÚ„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ,(83ȯ·Ȉ Ú„ÈÓÏ ÒÁÈ· „ÁÂÈÓ·) Ú„ÈÓ· Ô¯˙È ÏΠψÈÏ ÒÁÈ· ̉ÈÈ·˙È˙Â‰Ó ‡È‰ ‰Â¯Á‡‰ ‰„˜‰ .ÌȘ¢· ˙ÂÏÈʉ ˙¯·‚‰· ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡Ó ¯˙ÂÈ ÌÈ·ÂËÈÙ ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˙‡ ÛÈ„Ú‰Ï ‰ËÏÁ‰‰ ,Âχ ˙·ÈÒÓ .˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙ÈÁ·Ó

.˙ÂÏÈÚȉ ˙‡ ‰¯È·‚Ó ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡

Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÛÂÒȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙˙ÁÙ‰ :ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ .2

ÌÈ˘¯„ ̉ ,˙ÂÏÈÊ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ˙˜ÙÒ‡ Ï˘ „ȘÙ˙‰ ˙‡ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ È„È· ÌȄȘÙÓ ¯˘‡ÎȯÈÁÓ· ÂÓÏ‚Ï ÂÁ˙Ï ,Â˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙‡ ‡„ÂÂÏ ,Ú„ÈÓ ÛÂÒ‡Ï :˙‡·‰ ˙ÂÏËÓ‰ ˙‡ Úˆ·Ï,¯˙ÂÈ ˙ÂÎÂÓ Âχ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ˘ ÏÎÎ .˙ÂÈÂÏÚ· ͯΠ˙ÂÏËÓ‰Ó ˙Á‡ ÏÎ Úˆȷ .ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ,84ÌÈÈÂÂ˘Ï Í¯Ú‰ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ· ÌȯÚÙ ÌÚ „„ÂÓ˙‰Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙ÏÂÎÈ ˙¯·Â‚ ÍÎ

ÔÈ· ˙¯Á˙ ÈÎ ÌÈÚÂˉ) of Security Analysts” 28 J. Account. & Econ. (1999) 51, 79Ï˘ ˙ÏÏÂΉ ‰‡ˆÂ˙‰ .(Ìȯ˘ÎÂÓ ˙ÂÁÙ ÌÈËÒÈχ Ï˘ ˜Â˘‰ ÔÓ Ì˙ËÈÏÙÏ ˙ӯ‚ ÌÈËÒÈχÔÈ·Ï ÌÈÙ È˘‡ ÔÈ· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÚ٠̈ӈ ‡È‰ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ ÈÙ ÏÚ Ì˙لډ ÌÈËÒÈχ· ‰¯ÈÁ·R. Frankel & X. Li “Characteristics of a Firm’s Information ‡¯ .‰¯·ÁÏ ıÂÁÓ˘ ÌÈӯ‚Environment and the Information Asymmetry Between Insiders and Outsiders” 37 J.ÈËÒÈχ ÈÂÒÈÎÏ ˙ÂÎÂʉ ˙¯·Á· ÌÈȈÈÁ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó) Account. & Econ. (2004) 229, 232

.(Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÚÙÓ ˙ÂÁÙ ÌÈÏ·ÂÒ ¯˙ÂÈ ·Á¯ ۘȉ·83D.T. Roulstone “Analyst Following and Market Liquidity” 20 Contemp. Account. ‡¯

·Á¯ ÈËÒÈχ ÈÂÒÈÎ ,ȯ·Ȉ Ú„ÈÓ ÌȘÙÒÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ˘ ¯Á‡Ó ÈÎ ÔÚÂË) Research (2003) 551.(˙ÂÏÈÊÏ È·ÂÈÁ ÔÙ‡· ¯Â˘˜ ¯˙ÂÈ

84˜ÂÈ„Ï È·È˘ه Á¯Â‡· ̯Â˙ ȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ÈÎ ˜ÈÒÓ) Fox et al., supra note 10 ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯D. Gelb & P. Zarowin “Corporate Disclosure Policy and ;(Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ Ï˘ ¯˙ÂÈ ·¯the Informativeness of Stock Prices” (June 2000) (working paper series), available at:¯·‚ÂÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚˘ ÌȘÈÒÓ) URL:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=235009

28

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ÏÚ ,Í΢ ÔÂÂÈÎ .85˜Â˘· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÏÈÚ٠ۘȉ ¯·Â‚ ÍÎÂÂÓÂÏÈ‚Â Â˙ÂÈÓ‡ ‡Â„È ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÛÂÒȇ Ï˘ ˙ÂÏËÓ· ˙ÂίΉ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ‰˙‡ ÔÈ˘‰Ï Û‡˘Ï

.86ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ·¯ˆÂÂÈ˙ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ ¯„Úȉ· .Ú„ÈÓ ÛÂÒȇ Ï˘ ˙ÂÏÚ‰ ˙‡ ˙Â˙ÈÁÙÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ‡‰˙ ÂÊ ˙ÂÏÈÙΠ,È˯٠ڄÈÓ ˙ÂÏ‚Ï È„Î Ú„ÈÓ ¯ÁÂÒ ÏÎ ÚȘ˘È˘ ÌȈӇӷ ˙ÂÏÈÙÎÁÎÂÏ „‡Ó ‰‰Â·‚ ‰È‰˙ Âχ ÌÈˆÓ‡Ó ˙Ú˜˘‰· ‰Î¯Ή ˙ÂÏÚ‰ .87˙ÈÊ·Ê· Ô·ÂÓÎ

¯·„ ,‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ÌÈÈ„È˙Ú ÌÈÁ¯ È·‚Ï ¯˙ÂÈ ·¯ Ú„ÈÓ ÌȘÙÒÓ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ˘ ÍÎÏ ‡È·ÓP.M. Healy, K. Palepu, & A.P. ;(˜Â˘‰ ·ˆÓ ˙‡ ·ÈËÈÓ‰ Ú„ÈÓ ˜ÙÒÓ ¯˙ÂÈ ·¯ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ÈÎ „ÓÏÓ‰Hutton “Do Firms Benefit from Expanded Voluntary Disclosure?” (YEAR) (workingpaper series), available at: URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=¯ÒÁ ˙Âίډ Ï˘ Ô٘ȉ· ‰„ȯÈÏ ‰‡È·Ó ȯËÂω ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ۘȉ· ‰ÈÏÚ˘ ÌȘÈÒÓ) 55451

.(˙ÂÈ„ÒÂÓ ˙˜ÊÁ‡·Â ÈËÒÈχ‰ ÈÂÒÈΉ ۘȉ· ,˙ÂÏÈÊ· ‰ÈÈÏÚÏÂ85M.H. Lang & R.J. Lundholm “Corporate Disclosure Policy and Analyst ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯

ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙ÂÈÈ„Ó ˙‚ȉӉ ˙¯·Á ÈÎ ÌȘÈÒÓ) Behavior” 71 The Accounting Rev. (1996) 467,ÌÈËÒÈχ Ï˘ ¯˙ÂÈ ˙˜ÈÈÂ„Ó ˙ÂÈÊÁ˙Ï ,¯˙ÂÈ ·¯ ÈËÒÈχ ÈÂÒÈÎÏ ˙ÂÎÂÊ Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÙÈ˘Á· ¯˙ÂÈ ‰·È„C. ;(˙ÂÈËÒÈχ‰ ˙ÂÈÊÁ˙· ˙ÂÈ˙„Â˙ ˙ÂÁÙÏ ˙ÂÈËÒÈχ‰ ˙Âίډ‰ ÔÈ· ¯˙ÂÈ ÌÈ˘ ÌȯÚÙÏBotosan & M. Stanford-Harris “Motivations for Changes in Disclosure Frequency andIts Consequences: An Examination of Voluntary Quarterly Segment Disclosures” 38 J.ۘȉ· ÈËÒÈχ ÈÂÒÈÎÏ ÏÈ·ÂÓ ¯˙ÂÈ Ï„‚ ۘȉ· ȯËÂÏ ÈÂÏÈ‚) Account. Research (2000) 329B.J. Bushee & C.F. Noe “Corporate Disclosure Practices, Institutional Investors, ;(¯˙ÂÈ ·Á¯˙˜ÊÁ‡ Ï˘ ÔÓÂȘ ÌȘÈÒÓ) and Stock Return Volatility” 38 J. Account. Research (2000) 171

.(¯˙ÂÈ ˙·Ȅ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙˜È˘¯Ù Ô‰Ï ˘È˘ ÈÓÎ ˙‚¯Â„Ó‰ ˙¯·Á· ¯˙ÂÈ Ï„‚ ۘȉ· ˙ÂÈ„ÒÂÓ86J.C. Coffee Jr. “Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯

‡Â‰ ȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ÈÎ ÔÚÂË) Disclosure System” 70 Va. L. Rev. (1984) 717, 728y729M.H. Lang, ;(˙ÈËÒÈχ‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ‰ ۘȉ ˙‡ ‰ÏÈ„‚Ó‰ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ˙ÈÈ˘Ú˙Ï ‰È„ÈÒ·ÂÒ ¯„‚·K.V. Lins, C. Leuz & D.P. Miller “ADRs, Analysts, and Accuracy: Does Cross Listingin the U.S. Improve a Firm’s Information Environment and Increase Market Value?”˙Âү·· ÏÂÙÎ ÌÂ˘È¯ ˙ÂÓ¢¯‰ ˙¯·Á ÈÎ ÌȘÈÒÓ) 41 J. Account. Research (2003) 317˙¯·ÁÏ ˙ÈÒÁÈ ¯˙ÂÈ ˙˜ÈÂ„Ó ˙ÂÈËÒÈχ ˙ÂÈÊÁ˙Ï ¯˙ÂÈ ·¯ ÈËÒÈχ ÈÂÒÈÎÏ ˙ÂÎÂÊ ˙ÂȘȯӇ‰¯˙ÂÈ ‰·¯ ‰„ÈÓÏ ¯˙ÂÈ ·¯ ÈËÒÈχ ÈÂÒÈÎÏ ˙ÂÎÂʉ ˙¯·Á ÈÎ ÔΠ,ÏÂÙÎ ÌÂ˘È¯ ˙ÂÓ¢¯ Ôȇ˘O.K. Hope and P.F. Pope ;(¯˙ÂÈ ‰‰Â·‚ È¢ ˙Î¯Ú‰Ï Ì‚ ˙ÂÎÂÊ ˙ÂÈËÒÈχ‰ ˙ÂÈÊÁ˙· ˜ÂÈ„ Ï˘“Disclosure Practices, Enforcement of Accounting Standards and Analysts’ ForecastÈÂÏÈ‚ ÈÎ ‡ˆÂÓ) Accuracy: An International Study” 41 J. Account. Research (2003) 235‰ÊÎ ÈÂÏÈ‚˘ „ÓÏÓ‰ ¯·„ ,˙ÂÈËÒÈχ ˙ÂÈÊÁ˙· ˜ÂÈ„‰ ˙„ÈÓÏ È·ÂÈÁ Á¯Â‡· ¯Â˘˜ ‰¯·Á‰ ˙Ó¯·‰„ÈÓ ÌÚ ‰¯Â˘˜ ÌÈȇ·˘Á ÌÈω Ï˘ ¯˙ÂÈ ˙È„Ù˜ ‰ÙÈ· ÈΠ,ÌÈËÒÈÏ‡Ï Í¯Ú ·¯ Ú„ÈÓ ˜ÙÒÓC.A. Frost, E.A. Gordon & A.F. Hayes “Stock Exchange ;(˙ÂÈÊÁ˙· ˜ÂÈ„ Ï˘ ¯˙ÂÈ ‰·¯Disclosure and Market Liquidity: An Analysis of 50 International Exchanges” (2002)(working paper series) available at: ULR:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstra˙ίÚÓ Ï˘ ‰˙ÓˆÂÚ ‰ÈÙÏ˘ ‰¯Ú˘‰Ï ÌÈÈ˙ÂÚÓ˘Ó ÌÈȯÈÙÓ‡ ÔÈÎÂÓÈ˙ ÌȇˆÂÓ) .ct_id=355361˙ÂÏÈÊÏ È·ÂÈÁ ÔÙ‡· ÌÈ¯Â˘˜ (Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ˆÙ‰ ÔΠ‰ÙÈ·‰Â Á˜ÈÙ‰ ,ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ÈÏÏÎ) ‰Â˙ ÈÂÏÈ‚ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ίÚÓ ,‰Ò¯Â·‰ τ‚ ˙‡ ÌÈ‚ˆÈÈÓ‰ ÌÈ˙˘Ó‰ ˙ÚÙ˘‰ ˙‡ ÌÈϯËÓ˘ ¯Á‡Ï ˙‡Ê ,˜Â˘‰

.(Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙·È·Ò ˜Â˘‰ ÏÂÏ΢ ˙„ÈÓ ÌÈÈÚ˘ ÌÈ˙˘Ó Ï˘ ÛÒ ¯ÙÒÓÂ87.Coffee, ibid, at pp. 733y734 ‡¯

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(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

˙Â˘È‚ Ôȇ ,¯ÁÒ ‰Ï˘ ͯډ ¯ÈÈ˘ ‰¯·ÁÏ ÌÈȈÈÁÎ ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÏ˘ ‰„·ÂÚ‰¯ÈÈ˘ ‰¯·Á‰ ÈÙ˙Πχ Âχ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙¯ȷÚÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ .‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ÈÓÈÙ‰ ‰Ï‰ÈÏÚ„ÈÓ ˙‚˘‰ ˙ÂÏÚ ,¯ÁÒ ‰Ï˘ ͯډ ¯ÈÈ˘ ‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ‰˙ÈÁ·Ó .¯ÁÒ ‰Ï˘ ͯډ˜ÂÒÈÚ‰ ÌˆÚ Ï˘ ȇÂÂÏ ¯ˆÂ˙ ‡Â‰ ‰Ê Ú„ÈÓ ,‰˘ÚÓÏ .ÈÏÓÈÈÓ ‡Â‰ ‰È˜ÒÚ ÏÚ ÈÙȈÙÒ‰˙ÈÁÙÓ˘ ,ÈÂÏÈ‚ Ï˘ ‰„ÈÁ‡ ˙ÂÎ˙Ó ÌÈ·ÈÈÁÓ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ,ÛÒ· .88‰¯·Á‰ ωȷ˙¯Á‡ ˙¯·Á È„È ÏÚ Â˜ÙÂÒ˘ ÌÈÂ˙Ï Â˙‡Â¢‰ ˙‡Â 89Ú„ÈÓ ÁÂ˙È Ï˘ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ‰ ˙‡

.90˜Â˘· ÌȯÁÒ Ô‰Ï˘ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ˘.ÈÂÂ˘Ï ¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ· ÌȯÚÙ ¯Â˙ȇ· ÔÂÓˉ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ Ì‚ ˙Â˙ÈÁÙÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙·ÂÁÔÂÎÈÒ‰ Ô˘ ÍÎ ,‰Â˙ ‰¯·Á ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ ¯˙ÂÈ ‰·¯ ˙ÂÓÎ ˙ÈÏ‚˘ ÏÎÎ ,˙È˘‡¯‰Ï‚˙Ó˘ ÏÎÎ ,˙È˘ .91ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ˘ÂÓÈ˘ ÍÂ˙ ¯ÁÒÓ· Ϙ˙È‰Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ÈÒÈÒ·‰ ‰È¢ ˙ίډ· ͯΉ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ Ô˘ ÍÎ ,˙ÓÈÂÒÓ ‰¯·Á ˙„‡ ÏÚ ¯˙ÂÈ ·¯ Ú„ÈÓ̇ ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ È„È ÏÚ ˙ÂÏ‚˙‰Ï ÈÂ˘Ú Û˘Á Âȇ˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÔÓ ˜ÏÁ .92‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘Ô˙È ‰È‰È ‡Ï Û˘Á Âȇ˘ Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ ¯Á‡ ˜ÏÁ ͇ ,Ú„ÈÓ ÛÂÒȇ ˘ÂÙÈÁ· ÂÚȘ˘È‰¯·Á˘ Ô˙ȉ· .Ú„ÈÓ ÛÂÒȇ· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ‰Ï„‚ ‰Ú˜˘‰ ˙¯ÊÚ· ÂÏÈÙ‡ ÈÂÏÈ‚ÏÔ˙Ó ‡˘Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ȇ È„È ÏÚ ,Ï˘ÓÏ) ‰È¢ ˙‡ ÏÈ„‚‰Ï È„Î ÈÂÏÈ‚Ó ÚÓÈ‰Ï ÌÈ˙ÚÏ ‰È¢Ú,Ï˘ÓÏ) ÌÈωӉ ÏÚ ˙ÂÙÁÏ È„Î ÌÈ˙ÚÏ (Â˙Ï˘Î‰ ˙‡ ÚÂÓÏ ˙Ó ÏÚ ‚ÂÊÈÓ ˙‡¯˜Ï.˙ÈÏÈÏ˘ ˙ÂÚÓ˘Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ȇ ÏÎÏ ÒÁÈÈÏ Ô˙È ‡Ï ,(ÌÈÈÏÂ‰È ÌÈÏ˘Î ˙¯˙Ò‰ È„È ÏÚ

88D.W. Diamond “Optimal Release of Information by Firms” 40 J. Fin. (1985) ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯Ìȇ˘Â˘ ˙ÏÏÂΉ ˙ÂÏÚ‰ ÔÓ ‰ÎÂÓ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ¯Â¯Á˘ Ï˘ ‰¯·ÁÏ ˙ÂÏÚ‰ ¯˘‡Î ÈÎ ÌÈ‚„Ó) 1071

.(Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙‡ ‰Ï‚Ó ‰¯·Á‰ ̇ ˙‡˘ÂÓ ‰Á¯‰ ,È‡ÓˆÚ ÔÙ‡· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙‚˘‰· ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰89M.J. Fishman & K.M. Hagerty “The Optimal Amount Of Discretion to Allow in

ͯ„Ï ¯˘‡· ˙Ú„‰ ÏÂ˜È˘ ˙Ï·‚‰ ÈÎ Ìȇ¯Ó) Disclosure” 105 Quart. J. Econ. (1990) 427ÏÈ·ÂÓ ,ÌÈÏ·Â˜Ó ÌÈȇ·˘Á ÌÈ˯„ËÒ ÈÙ ÏÚ ˙ÂÏ‚Ï ˙¯·Á Ï˘ Ô·ÂÈÁ ,¯ÓÂÏÎ ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚

.(¯˙ÂÈ ‰Â·‚ È·ÈËÓ¯ÂÙȇ Í¯Ú ÏÚ· ÈÂÏÈ‚Ï90ÌȘÂÁ ÈÙ ÏÚ ‚Â‰Ï ÌÈÏ‰Ó ˙„„ÂÚÓ ‰ÙÈ· ÈÎ ‰‡¯Ó) Hope and Pope, supra note 86 ‡¯

Ï˘ ÌÈÈ„È˙Ú‰ ‰ÈÁÂÂ¯Ï ¯˘‡· ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ Ï˘ ˙‡„‰ ȇ ˙„ÈÓ ˙‡ ˙ÈÁÙÓ‰ ·ˆÓ ,ÌÈȇ·˘Á‰·Â˘Á ‰ÙÈ· ËÚÂÓ ‡Â‰ ÈËÒÈχ‰ ÈÂÒÈΉ ̉·˘ Ìȯ˜Ó· ¯˙ÂÈ ·Â˘Á ÍÙ‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ÈΠ,‰¯·Á‰

.(˙Âȇ·˘Á ˙ÂËÈ˘· ¯ÂÁ·Ï ¯˙ÂÈ ·¯ ˘ÙÂÁ Ô˙È ¯˘‡Î ¯˙ÂÈ91S. Luo “The Impact of Public Information on Insider Trading” 70 Econ. Letters ‡¯

.(ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ Ï˘ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ ÌˆÓˆÓ È¯Â·Èˆ Ú„ÈÓ ÈÎ ˜ÈÒÓ‰ Ï„ÂÓ) (2001) 5992D. Byard & K.W. Shaw “Corporate Disclosure Quality and Properties of Analysts ‡¯

„ˆÈÎ ÔÁ·˘ ¯˜ÁÓ) Information Environment” 18 J. Account., Auditing & Fin. (2003) 355̉È˙ÂÈÊÁ˙· ÌÈ·Ï˘Ó ÌÈËÒÈχ˘ Ú„ÈÓ· ˜ÂÈ„‰ ˙„ÈÓ ÏÚ ˙¯·Á Ï˘ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙ÂÎȇ ‰ÚÈÙ˘Ó„ÁÂÈӉ ÈÏÏΉ Ú„ÈÓ· ˜ÂÈ„‰ ˙„ÈÓ ˙‡ ¯È·‚Ó ¯˙ÂÈ È˙ÂÎȇ ÈÂÏÈ‚˘ ‡ˆÓ ÌÈÈ˙˘ ÌÈÁ¯ È·‚ÏC.J. Simon “The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on ;(̉È˙ÂÈÊÁ˙· ÌÈ·Ï˘Ó ÌÈËÒÈχ˘Investor Information and the Performance of New Issues” 79 Am. Econ. Rev. (1989) 295ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰ Ï˘ ÈÂÊÈÁ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÚË Û˜È‰ ,¯ÓÂÏÎ Z ˙ÂÈÏӯ·‡‰ ˙‡¢˙‰ ¯ÂÊÈÙ ÈÎ ˜ÈÒÓ‰ ¯˜ÁÓ)M.B. Fox “Measuring Share Price ;(Securities Act-‰ ˙˜È˜Á ¯Á‡Ï ˙¯ÎÈ ‰¯Âˆ· ˙ÁÙ Z.(‰Î¯Ú‰ Ô˙Ó·˘ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ÔÈË˜Ó ¯˙ÂÈ ·¯ Ú„ÈÓ) Accuracy” 1 Berkeley Bus. L. J. (2004) 113

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Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

¯˘‡Î ,ȯ˘Ù‡ ¯·„‰ ¯˘‡Î Ú„ÈÓ‰ ¯Á‡ ˘ÂÙÈÁ· ÚȘ˘‰Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÂˆÏ‡È ÔÎÏ˙Âίډ .‰¯·Á‰ È¢ ÏÚ Â˙ÂÚÓ˘Ó ˙‡ ÍÈ¯Ú‰Ï Ì‰ÈÏÚ ‰È‰È ¯Â˙È‡Ï Ô˙È Âȇ Ú„ÈÓ‰Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÌÈ·ˆÈ ÂÈÙ·˘ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ¯·Â‚ ÍΠ,˙˜ÈÂ„Ó È˙Ï· ˙ÂÈ‰Ï ˙ÂÈÂÙˆ ÂχÎ˙‡ ˙Â˙ÈÁÙÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ ,˙È˘ÈÏ˘ .È¢ ÔÈ·Ï ¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ· ÌȯÚÙ "˙ÒÈÙ˙"· ÔÂÏ˘ÈÎϯÙÒÓ ˙Ï„‚‰ È„È ÏÚ Ì˙ÂÏÈÚÙ· ÔÂÓˉ ˘Ú¯‰ ÔÂÎÈÒ ˙‡Â ˘Ú¯‰-ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙ÚÙ˘‰ÌÈ٘ȉ· ˜Â˘· ÌÈÏÈÚÙ ˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ ¯˘‡Î ,¯ÂӇΠ.93Ì˙ÂÏÈÚÙ È٘ȉ ڄÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒȯÁÂÒ ˙Ó‚Ó „‚Î ¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÏÂÚÙ Úˆ·Ó‰ Ú„ÈÓ ¯ÁÂÒ .¯ÈÁÓ‰ ˙‡ ÌÈ˙ÂÂÚÓ Ì‰ ÌÈÏ„‚˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ˘ ÔÂÎÈÒ ‡˘Â (ÔίÚÏ ÏÚÓ ‰·¯‰ ÂÏÚ˘ ˙ÂÈÓ ¯ÒÁ· ¯ÎÂÓ ,Ï˘ÓÏ) ˘Ú¯‰·ÒÈ˘ ÔÙ‡· ,Íȯډ˘ ÈÙÎÓ ¯˙ÂÈ ‰Î¯‡ ‰Ù˜˙Ï Â˙ÂÏډϠ¯ÈÁÓ‰ ˙‡ ˙ÂÂÚÏ ÂÎÈ˘ÓÈ˙‡ ÌˆÓˆÏ Ì˙ÏÂÎÈ· ˘È ¯˙ÂÈ ‰˜ÊÁ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙ÚÙ˘‰˘ ÏÎÎ .ÌÈ„ÒÙ‰ ÂωÚÙ˘‰‰˘ ,Ô‡ÎÓ .˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒÓ Ú·Â‰ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ̈ӈÏ ,˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˙ÚÙ˘‰

.94Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘· ‰ÎÈÓ˙ ‡È‰ ˙ÂȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ ˙ÏÏÂΉpositive) ˙ÂÈ·ÂÈÁ ˙ˆÁ‰ ˙¯ˆÂÈ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ·¯˜· ˙¯Á˙ Ï˘ ‰ÓÂȘ·˙ÎÂÓ‰ Û˜È‰Ï ¯·ÚÓ ,ÛÒ ڄÈÓ ¯ˆÂÈ Á˙ÂÙÓ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ˜Â˘ .(externalitiesÈ˘ ˘È ÛÒ‰ Ú„ÈÓÏ .ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰ ÏÎÏ ,ÌÈÁ· ,˘È‚ ÂÎÙ‰ ,ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙·ÂÁ È„È ÏÚÏÚ ÈÙȈÙÒ Ú„ÈÓÏ ,È˙¯Á˙ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ˜Â˘· ¯·‚ÂÓ‰ ˘Â˜È·‰ ,˙È˘‡¯ :˙¯˜ÓÈÎ„Ú Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÏ‚Ï ıȯÓ˙ ÌÈωÓÏ ˜ÙÒÈ ,ÌȯÁÒ ‰Ï˘ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ˘ ‰¯·Á‰ÔÓ ˙‰ÈÏ ‰¯ËÓ· ˙‡Ê ,˜ÂÁ‰ È„È ÏÚ ·˙ÎÂÓ‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ Û˜È‰Ó ¯˙ÂÈ ·¯ ۘȉ· ,ÛËÂ˘Â¯Á‡Ó ,‰˘ÚÓÏ .95Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ È„È ÏÚ ‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ¯·‚ÂÓ ÈÂÒÈη ˙ÂÓÂÏ‚‰ ˙ÂÏÚÂ˙‰˙·¯ ˙¯·ÁÏ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÂÓ¯‚È ,È˙¯Á˙ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ˜Â˘ ˙„„ÂÚÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ˘ÈÂ˙ÈÚ· ¯·Â„Ó˘ ÏÎÎ ,ȯÂË„Ó‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ¯Ë˘Ó ÏÚ Â˙ÂÎȇ· ‰ÏÂÚ‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ¯Ë˘Ó ıÓ‡ÏÌȘÊÁ ÌȈȯÓ˙ ÌÈÓÈȘ˘ Ì‚‰ ,˙È˘ .96Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÈ˷ϯ·Â ,ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ۘȉ· ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚ÌÈÁÂ˙È ¯˙ÂÈ ÂÙ˘ÁÈ ,È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘·˘ ȯ‰ ,ÈËÒÈχ‰ ÁÂ˙ȉ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ ˙ÂÈ„ÂÒ ÏÚ ¯ÂÓ˘Ï

93N.L. Georgakopoulos “Why Should Disclosure Rules Subsidize Informal Traders” ‡¯˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒÏ Ì¯‚È ÈÂÏÈ‚ ÈÎ ÔÚÂË ‡Â‰ ÛÒ· .16 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. (1996) 417, 424‰˜ÒÓÏ ÏÈ·Â‰Ï Ì‚ ÏÂÎÈ ‰Ê ÔÂÚÈË ÈÎ ÌÈ¯Â·Ò Â‡ Ìχ .˙ÂÚËÂÓ‰ ̉È˙ÂÂÓ‡ ˙‡ ˘„ÁÓ ÍȯډÏ

.˙ÂÚËÂÓ‰ ̉È˙Âίډ ˙‡ ˜ÊÁÏ ÏÂÏÚ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ,˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ÌË·Ó ˙„Â˜Ó :‰ÎÂÙ‰94Ï˘ „·ÈÚ ڄÈÓ‰ ÛÂÒȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ˙Â˙ÈÁÙÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ ‰ÈÙÏ˘ ‰ÚËÏ ˙ÓÈÂÒÓ ‰ÎÈÓ˙

ÔÈ·Ï ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ¯ÙÒÓ ÔÈ· ,Ìȯ˜ÁÓ ¯ÙÒÓ· „ÚÂ˙˘ ,È·ÂÈÁ‰ ̇˙Ó· ‡ˆÓÈ‰Ï ‰ÈÂ˘Ú ÌÈËÒÈχ‰.supra note 85; Healy et al. supra note 84 ‡¯ .ÈÂÏÈ‚

95‰‡¯Ó‰ ˙ÂȯˆÈ¢ ˙¯·Á Ï˘ ¯˜ÁÓ ÌȂȈÓ) Caramanolis-Cotelli et al., supra note 60 ‡¯˙ÂÁ„·˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÎȇ ‚Â¯È„Ó È·ÂÈÁ È˙ÂÚÓ˘Ó Á¯Â‡· ˙ÂÚÙ˘ÂÓ ˙ÂÈÏӯ·‡ ˙‡¢˙ ÈÎ

.(˙Â˙ȇ· „ȘÙ˙ ˙‡ÏÓÓ ‰¯·Á Ï˘ ÈÒÈÙ‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙ÂÈÈ„Ó ÈΠ,ÌÈÈ˙˘96˙ÂÈ„Ù˜‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙Â˘È¯„Ï ˙ÂÙÂÙÎ Ôȇ˘ ,˙Â¯Ê ˙¯·Á ÂÈÙÏ˘ ‡ˆÓÓ‰ ˙‡ ¯È·Ò‰Ï È„Î ˘È Íη

A.W. Alford & ‡¯ .˙ÂȘȯӇ ˙¯·Á ˙ÓÂÚÏ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÚÙ Ï˘ ‰ÈÚ· ˙¯ˆÂÈ Ôȇ SEC-‰ Ï˘J.D. Jones “Financial Reporting and Information Asymmetry: An Empirical Analysis ofthe SEC’s Information-Supplying Exemption for Foreign Companies” 4 J. Corp. Fin.

.(1998) 373

31

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

ÌȘÏÁ ‡ ,ÌÈÈËÒÈχ ÌÈÁÂ˙È ˙ÙÈ˘Á .ÌÈȘÂÂÈ˘ ÌÈÓÚËÓ ¯˜ÈÚ· ,˜Â˘Ï ÌÈÈËÒÈχ˘„ÁÓ ÍÈ¯Ú‰Ï Ì‰Ï ˙¯˘Ù‡Ó ڄÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÏ ÛÒ ڄÈÓ ˙˜ÙÒÓ ,ÂÏ‡Î˘ ÌÈÁÂ˙È Ï˘˙ÂÈÂÏÚ‰ ˙Â˙ÁÂÙ ÂÊ Í¯„· .ÂÓÒ¯ÂÙ˘ ÌÈÁÂ˙ÈÏ ‰‡Â¢‰· Ì‰Ï˘ ÁÂ˙ȉ ˙ÂÎȇ ˙‡˙ÂÈË˜Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ˘ „ÂÚ· .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÏÎ ¯Â·Ú ÂÁÂ˙È·Â Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÛÂÒȇ· ˙ÂίΉ˘ÂÙÈÁ· ÌȈӇÓ ÔÓÊ ÂÚȘ˘È Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï΢ ̘ӷ) Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÛÂÒȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ ,(ÌÏÂÎÏ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙‡ ‰Ï‚Ó ‰¯·Á‰ ,Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÒÈÙ ‰˙‡ ¯Á‡¯Ù˙˘Ó ¯ˆ˜˙Ó ‰„ÈÓω ÍÈω˙) Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÁÂ˙È ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ˙ÓÈÂÒÓ ‰„ÈÓ· ˙ÈÁÙÓ

.(˙È„„‰ ‰È¯Ù‰ ˘È ¯˘‡Î,˙ÂÏÈʉ ˙‡ ˙Â¯Ù˘Ó Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÏÚ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁÏ ˘È˘ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰‰ ,ÛÂÒ·Ï¯Â·ÈˆÏ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ۘȉ˘ ÏÎÎ ,˙È˘‡¯ .˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì·ˆÓ ˙‡ Û‡ ˙·ÈËÈÓ ÍηÂÌȯÚÙ˘ ¯Á‡Ó .ÌȯÁÂÒ‰ ÔÈ· Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÚÙ ÌÈÓÈȘ ̉·˘ Ìȯ˜Ó‰ ÌÈ˙ÁÂÙ ÍÎ ,¯·Â‚Ì˙¯Ȅ˙ ̈ӈ ÔÈË˜È ,‰¯ÈÎÓ ¯ÈÁÓÏ ‰È˜ ¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ·˘ Á¯Ӊ ˙Ï„‚‰Ï ÌÈӯ‚ Âχ˙ÁÂÙ ÍÎ ,¯·Â‚ ¯Â·ÈˆÏ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ۘȉ˘ ÏÎÎ ,˙È˘ .˙ÂÏÈʉ ˙‡ ÏÈ„‚È Á¯Ӊ ˙‡,Ô· .Á¯Ӊ Â˙ȇ Ô˘ ˜Â˘‰ È˘ÂÚÏ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ;Âχ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÚÙ Ï˘ ÈÂÙˆ‰ È¢‰ÌȯÁ‡ ÌȯÁÂÒ ÈÙ ÏÚ Ô¯˙È ‚È˘‰Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÌÈÏÂÎÈ ,¯Ù˙˘Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚‰˘ ÏÎÎ.97ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓÏ ˙Â˘È‚ Ï˘ ‰ÈËÚ· ‡Ï ȯ·Ȉ Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ ¯˙ÂÈ È˙ÂÎȇ ÁÂ˙È ˙ÂÚˆÓ‡·˙ÂÓ„˜Ó ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÛÂÒȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ˙„ҷÒÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ ,˙È˘ÈÏ˘˙˘ÏÁ ÍÎ ,¯˙ÂÈ ‰˜ÊÁ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÔÈ· ˙¯Á˙‰˘ ÏÎÎ .Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ÔÈ· ˙¯Á˙ .‡ÂÏÓ· ̉Ȅȷ˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ Ô¯˙È ˙‡ ÏˆÏ ÌÈ„„· Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙ÏÂÎÈÈ˘ÂÚ Ï˘ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ‰È˘Ó ,Ú„ÈÓ· ˙¯˙È Ï˘ ÌÈÈ¢ ˙‡ ˙˜Á¢ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ˙¯˘Ù‡‰ ˙‡ ¯˙ÂÈ „ÂÚ ˙ÓˆÓˆÓ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÔÈ· ˙¯ˆÂ˘ ˙¯Á˙‰ ,˙ÈÚÈ·¯ .98˜Â˘‰‰¯·Á‰ ÏÚ ÈÙȈÙÒ Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÏ‚Ï ÌÈωÓÏ ıȯÓ˙ Ô˙Ó È„È ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÚÙ Ï˘ ÌÓÂȘÏÌȯÁÂÒ „‚ ¯ÁÒÓ·˘ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ˙ÈÁÙÓ Âχ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰ ÏÂÏÎÓ .ÛË¢ ÈÎ„Ú ÔÙ‡·Ô˘ ‰¯ÈÎÓ ¯ÈÁÓÏ ‰È˜ ¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ·˘ Á¯Ӊ ÔÎÏ ,˜Â˘‰ È˘ÂÚ ÌÈÙ˘Á ÂÈχ˘ ,ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ¯ÁÒÓ‰ ۘȉ ˙‡ ‰„ÈˆÓ ÏÈ„‚˙ ¯˙ÂÈ ‰‰Â·‚ ˙ÂÏÈÊ .˙ÂÏÈʉ ˙„ÈÓ ˙¯·Â‚ÂÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ÏÚ Ì˙ˆÙÏ È„Î ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ È„È ÏÚ ˙˘¯„‰ ‰‡Â˘˙‰ ˙‡ ÔÈ˘˙ ˙ÂÏÈʉ‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ Ô‰‰ ÒÂÈ‚ ˙ÂÏÚ· ‰„ȯȉ ˙¯·‚ÂÓ‰ ˙ÂÏÈʉ .Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÚÙ Ï˘ ÌÓÂȘ·˘

.˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈÏ È·ÂÈÁ Á¯Â‡· ÂÓ¯˙È

97.(˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ ÌÚ ·ÈËÈÓ ÌÈÙ È˘‡· Ú‚Â٠ȯ·Ȉ Ú„ÈÓ˘ ˜ÈÒÓ) Luo, supra note 91 ‡¯98‰˙ÈÁÙÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ ·¯˜· ˙¯Á˙ ÈÎ ÌÈÚÂË) Caramanolis-Cotelli et al., supra note 60 ‡¯

B. Trueman “The Impact of ;(ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó Ï˘ [adverse selection] ˙ÈÏÈÏ˘‰ ‰¯ÈÁ·‰ ˙ÈÈÚ· ˙‡Analyst Following on Stock Prices and the Implications for Firms’ Disclosure Policies”ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ¯ÙÒÓ ÔÈ· È·ÂÈÁ ¯˘˜ ÌÈȘ ÈÎ ‰‡¯Ó) 11 J. Account, Audting & Fin. (1996) 333¯ÒÂÁ Ï˘ ‰¯È˘È ‰‡ˆÂ˙ ‡Â‰ ‰Ê ¯˘˜ ÈΠ,‰¯·Á‰ ˙ÈÈÓ Ï˘ ÈÂÙˆ‰ ‰¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ·Ï ‰¯·Á ÌÈÒÎÓ‰

.(˜Â˘· ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ‰ ÌȯÁÂÒ‰ ¯ÙÒÓ ˙‡ ˙‰ÊÏ ˜Â˘‰ ȘÁ˘ ˙ÏÂÎÈ

32

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙˙ÁÙ‰ :‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÏÚ ÌȯÂÒȇ .3

¯·Â„Ó .ÌÈÙÒ‡ ̉˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ Ï˘ Â˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ· ÌÈ·‡˘Ó ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÍÈω˙ .99Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÌÈÎÓ˙ÒÓ Ì¯Ë· „ÂÚ ˙ÂÚ˜˘ÂÓ‰ ,‰ÚÈÓ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ·ÌȯÂÒȇ ¯„Úȉ· .ÛÈ˜Ú Ú„ÈÓÏ Ô‰Â ,˘¯ÂÙÓ Ú„ÈÓÏ Ô‰ ÒÁÈÈ˙Ó Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ.Ú„ÈÓ ÈËȯ٠Ì˙‡ ˙ÂÓȇ ÏÚ ÌÈ·‡˘Ó ÂÊ·Ê·È Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÏÎ ,‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÏÚȯÁÂÒ˘ ¯Á‡Ó ,„ÂÚ ˙‡Ê .˙ÈÊ·Ê· Ô·ÂÓÎ ‡È‰ ÂÊ ÌÈˆÓ‡Ó ˙ÂÏÈÙÎ ,˙È˙¯·Á ‰ÈÁ·Ó.È„ÓÏ ‰‰Â·‚ ˙ÂÈ‰Ï ‰ÈÂÙˆ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ Ï˘ Â˙ÂÏÚ ,ıÂÁ È˘‡ ̉ Ú„ÈÓ‰Âχ Ô‚Π,ÛÈ˜Ú Ú„ÈÓ È˙ÂÂÈÚ ˙ÂϘ· ¯˙‡Ï ÌÈÏ‚ÂÒÓ Ìȇ Ì„·Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ,ÛÒ·ÂÊÎ ‰ÏËÓ .100(matched orders- wash sales ,Ï˘ÓÏ) È·È˘ÈÙ ¯ÁÒÓÓ ÌÈڷ‰¯ÂÒȇ‰ .101Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ˙¢¯ Ï˘ ÂÊ ÂÓÎ ˙‚¯Â‡Ó ˙ÈÊÎ¯Ó ‰ÙÈ· ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙ίÚÓ ˙·ÈÈÁӂȈ‰Ï ¯ÂÒ‡ .Ú„ÈÓ‰ Ï˘ Â˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ÔÈË˜Ó ‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÏډȈÏÂÙÈÓ Úˆ·Ï ¯Â҇ ˙ÂÈ˙Â‰Ó ˙„·ÂÚ ËÈÓ˘‰Ï ¯ÂÒ‡ ,˘¯ÂÙÓ Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ ‡Â¢ ‚ˆÓ,wash sales) ˙ÂÈ˙·ÏÓ ¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÂÚÙ Úˆ·Ó ‡ ‡Â¢ ‚ˆÓ ¯ˆÂÈ˘ ÈÓ .102ÛÈ˜Ú Ú„ÈÓ·ÏÂÊ .103„ÁÈ Ì‚ ˙ÂÈÁ¯Ê‡Â ˙ÂÈÏÈÏÙ ˙ÂȈ˜ÒÏ ÈÂÙˆ (‰Ê· ‡ˆÂÈΠ,matched ordersÏÏÎ ÏÚ ¯˘‡Ó Ú„ÈÓ‰ ¯Â˜Ó ÈÙ˙Î ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ ÏË ˙‡ ÏÈË‰Ï ¯˙ÂÈÈÙ‡‰ ÁÎÂÏ ,ÍÎÓ ‰¯˙È .˙ÂÈÊ·Ê·Â ˙ÂÏÂÙÎ ˙‡ˆÂ‰ ‡ÈˆÂ‰Ï ÂˆÏ‡È˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ˙ÂȯÁ‡ ˙Ïˉ ,(„Á‡Ó ‰ÎÂÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚ Ï˘ ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰) ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ¯Â˙ȇ Ï˘ È˙¯·˙Ò‰‰ÌÈ˜Ê ÏÚ ˙ÒÒ·Ӊ ˙ÈÁ¯Ê‡ ˙ÂȯÁ‡ ¯˘‡Ó ¯˙ÂÈ ‰·ÂË ‰Ú˙¯‰ ¯ÂˆÈÏ ‰ÈÂ˘Ú ˙ÈÏÈÏÙ

99.Mahoney, supra note 31 ‡¯100.Í¯Ú ¯ÈÈ· È·È˘ÈÙ ¯ÁÒÓ ¯ÂˆÈÏ ˜Â˘· ÌȘÁ˘ Ï˘ ˙ÂÂÈÒÈ ˙·˜Ú· ÌȯˆÂ Âχ Ú„ÈÓ È˙ÂÂÈÚ

„„· Ô˜Á˘ È„È ÏÚ ˙Â˙ȉ ˙¯˙ÂÒ ¯ÁÒÓ ˙„˜ٷ Â¯Â˜Ó wash sales ‚ÂÒÓ È·È˘ÈÙ ¯ÁÒÓ¯Ú˘·Â ¯ÁÒÓ‰ ȯÂÊÁÓ· ‰ÈÈÏÚÏ Íη ̯‚Ï ‰Ùȇ˘ ÍÂ˙Ó ,Â˙ËÈÏ˘·˘ ÌÈ¢ ¯ÁÒÓ ˙·˘ÁÏÍ¯ÂˆÏ ÌȘÁ˘ ‰ÓÎ ÔÈ· ‰ÏÂÚÙ ÛÂ˙È˘ ¯‡˙Ó matched orders ‚ÂÒÓ È·È˘ÈÙ ¯ÁÒÓ .‰ÈÓ‰˙ÂÓ‡Â˙Ó ‰¯ÈÎÓ ‰ÈȘ ˙Â„Â˜Ù Ï˘ „¯Ù· ‰Ó¯Ê‰ È„È ÏÚ ˙‡Ê ,˙ÓÈÂÒÓ ‰ÈÓ· ¯Ú ¯ÁÒÓ ˙¯ÈˆÈÓ"Ù ,ͷʯ ' χ¯˘È ˙È„Ó 1327/86 (‡"˙) Ù"Ú ,Ï˘ÓÏ Â‡¯ .(ÔÂÓÊ˙·Â ,˙ÂÓη ,¯ÈÁÓ·),È˙·ÏÓ ¯ÁÒÓ ˙‰ÊÏ ÌÈÏÂÎÈ Ìȇ ÌÈËÒÈχ ,ÈÓȇ ‡Â‰ ¯ÁÒÓ‰˘ ¯Á‡Ó .309 (2)Ë"Ó˘˙

.˙È˙ÈÓ‡ ¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ ˙Úˆ·˙Ó ÈÎ ÂÁÈÈ ÔÎ ÏÚÂ101S. Thel “$850,000 in Six Minutes — The Mechanics of Securities ¢‰Â ‡¯

.Manipulation” 79 Cornell. L. Rev. (1994) 219, 285102L.D. Lowenfels “Sections 9(a)(1) and 9(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of ‡¯

1934: An Analysis of Two Important Anti-Manipulative Provisions under the FederalSecurities Laws” 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. (1991) 698; Koeppe & Co. v. S.E.C., 95 F.2d 550

.(7th Cir. 1938)103;591 (Ò"˘˙) Ï ÌÈËÙ˘Ó "ÌÈ‰Ê ‡Ï ÌÈÓ‡˙ :Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ· ‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙" Ԣ‚ 'Ê Â‡¯

' „˜¯Ó 8573/96 Ù"Ú ;658y657 ,642 (2) „"Ù ,χ¯˘È ˙È„Ó ' ÔȘ‡Â 5052/95 Ù"ÚThe Securities ‡¯ ȘȯӇ‰ ËÙ˘Ó· ˙ÂÏÈ·˜Ó‰ ˙‡¯Â‰Ï .481 (5)‡ „"Ù ,χ¯˘È ˙È„Ó

.Exchange Act of 1934 §9(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 789y7811 (1988)

33

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

Ì‚ ÍÎÓ ‰‡ˆÂ˙Π,¯˜˘Ï ıȯÓ˙‰ ˙‡ ‰˙ÈÁÙÓ ˙¯ÙÂ˘Ó ‰Ú˙¯‰ .104ÏÚÂÙ· ÂÓ¯‚˘.‰ÚÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙Â˙ÁÂÙ

Á¯ ˙˜Ù‰· ÔÂÓˉ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ Ì‚ ÌÈ˙ÈÁÙÓ ‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÏÚ ÌȯÂÒȇڄÈÓ‰ ¯ÁÂÒ ÏÚ ÚÈÙ˘‰Ï ˙ÂÏÂÎÈ ‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ .È¢ ÔÈ·Ï ¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ·˘ ÌȯÚÙÓ˙ÈÊÁ˙‰ ¯˘‡Î ,˙È˘Â ,˙Úˆ·˙Ó ˙ÈËÒÈχ‰ ‰„·ډ ¯˘‡Î ,˙È˘‡¯ :Ìȯ˘˜‰ È˘·‡È‰ ,‰Ï˘ ÁÂ˙ȉ ˙‡ ‰ÈÎÓ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙¯ÁÂÒ ¯˘‡Î .˘ÓÓ˙‰Ï ˙„ÓÂÚ ˙ÈËÒÈχ‰.Ú„ÈÓ‰ Ï˘ Â˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙‡ ˙ӇϠ‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ ÈÙÓ ˙Â¯È‰Ê ÈÚˆÓ‡Ï ˜˜ÊÈ‰Ï ‰ÏÂÎȯÁ‡Ï ‰ÓÏ˘Â‰ ÁÂ˙ȉ ˙„·ڢ ¯Á‡Ï ˙Â¯È‰Ê ÈÚˆÓ‡ ËÂ˜Ï ¯˙ÂÈ ‰˘˜ ,˙‡Ê ÌÚ‰ÊÂÁ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ¯ÁÂÒ ÈÎ ÁÈ .ÁÂ˙È Â˙‡ ÍÓÒ ÏÚ ¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÏÂÚÙ ‰ÚˆÈ· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙¯ÁÂÒ˘Ì‡ .¯ÒÁ· ‰ÈÓ‰ ˙‡ ¯ÎÂÓ ÔÎÏ ‰˘‰ ÛÂÒ „Ú 20%-· ÁˆÈ ˙ÓÈÂÒÓ ‰ÈÓ ¯ÈÁÓ ÈίÈÁÓ ‰ÏÚÈ ,˙ÂÈ·ÂÈÁ "˙¢„Á" ‰·Â ‡Â¢ ˙¯‰ˆ‰ ‰¯·Á‰ ˙ω‰ ÌÒ¯Ù˙ ‰˘‰ ÛÂÒ·˜ÈÙ‰Ï ÂÏÎÂÈ ‡Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ .¯ÒÁ‰ ˙¯ÈÎÓÓ ÌÈ„ÒÙ‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ¯ÁÂÒÏ ÂÓ¯‚ÈÈ ‰ÈÓ‰ÏÎ .‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ ÌÂÒ¯Ù È„È ÏÚ ÏÎÂÒÓ Ì‰È˙ÂÈÊÁ˙ ˘ÂÓÈÓ Ì‡ Ú„ÈÓ· Ì˙Ú˜˘‰Ó Á¯˙Ó ÏÚ ˙‡Ê ,ÌÈȘ‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÏÎ ˙‡ ˜ÒÂÙ È˙Ï· ÔÙ‡· ˙Ó‡Ï ÂˆÏ‡ÈÈ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÌ‚ ,˙‡Ê ÌÚ .È¢ ÔÈ·Ï ¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ·˘ ÌȯÚÙÓ Á¯ ˙˜Ù‰ ȇ Ï˘ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ˙ÈÁÙ‰ÏÌȯÚÙ "ÒÂÙ˙Ï" ÂÁÈÏˆÈ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ˘ ‰ÁÈË·Ó ‡Ï „ÈÓ˙Ó Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÓȇ Ï˘ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙÌÈÏ‚Ó ˙Â¯È‰Ê ÈÚˆÓ‡· ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ¯˘‡Î ÂÏÈÙ‡ .È¢ ÔÈ·Ï ¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ·‡Â¢‰ ‚ˆÓ ÏÚ ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰˘ ˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÏÈÚÙ˘ ÔÎ˙ÈÈ ÔÈÈ„Ú ,‡Â¢‰ ‚ˆÓ ˙‡ÔÓ Á¯ ˜ÈÙ‰Ï ˙¯˘Ù‡‰ ˙‡ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÓ ÚÓ˙ ¯ÈÁÓ‰ ˙‡ ˙ÂÂÚÏ ÌÈÎÈ˘ÓÓÂÈÚˆÓ‡ ˙‡ ÌȯÚÊÓÓ ‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÏÚ ÌȯÂÒȇ .È¢‰ ÔÈ·Ï ¯ÈÁÓ‰ ÔÈ·˘ ¯Úىͯډ ¯ÈÈ È¢ ÔÈ·˘ ¯ÚÙ‰ ÔÓ Á¯ ˙˜Ù‰ ȇ Ï˘ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ÌÈ˙ÈÁÙÓ ˙¯ȉʉ

.¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ·Ï˙ÈËÒÈχ‰ ‰„·ډ Ï˘ ‰Î¯Ú ˙‡ ÌÈ¯Ó˘Ó ‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÏÚ ÌȯÂÒȇ ,ÛÒ·ÌÈ„·ÚÓ ڄÈÓ ÏÚ ÌÈÎÓ˙ÒÓ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ÔÈËÈÂÓ‰ ÏÚ ÌÈ‚ÓÂÌȯÎÂÓ ,ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÓ ˜ÏÁ .¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÂÚÙ ÌÈÚˆ·Ó ÌÏÂÎ ‡Ï ͇ ,Â˙‡ÌÈÏÂÎÈ Ìȇ ÌÈËÒÈχ ,¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ ‡ÏÏ .ÌȯÁ‡ ÌÈÚȘ˘ÓÏ ÌÈÈÒÈÙ ÌÈÁÂ˙ÈÈÎ ÁÈÎÂ‰Ï Ì˙ÏÂÎÈ· ˘È ̇ ÂÏÈÙ‡ ,‡Â¢‰ ‚ˆÓ Ï˘ Â¯Â˜Ó „‚Î ‰ÚÈ·˙ ˘È‚‰ÏÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ÔÓ ÌÈÈÒÈÙ ÌÈÁÂ˙È ÌÈ˘Î¯‰ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó ,Ìχ .105‰Ê ‚ˆÓ ÏÚ ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰˙ÂÈÓ¯˙ ,‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ .ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ˙ÂÈÊÁ˙ ˙‡ ÌÈ˙ÂÂÚÓ‰ ‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓÓ ‰Ú¯Ï ÌÈÚÙ˘ÂÓ.Ì„È ÏÚ ˜ÙÂÓ‰ ÁÂ˙ȉ È¢· ÌÈÚ‚ÂÙ ,ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ˙ÂÈÊÁ˙ ˙‡ ÌÈ˙ÂÂÚÓ ˙ÂȈÏÂÙÈÓÂÂÈ‰È ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰˘ ¯ÈÁÓ‰ ˙ÁÙÈ ,ÁÂ˙È· ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰ Ï˘ ÌÂÓ‡ ˙ÁÙÈ ÍÎÓ ‰‡ˆÂ˙Î

104D.R. Fischel & D.J. Ross “Should the Law Prohibit ‘Manipulation’ in Financial.Markets?” 105 Harv. L. Rev. (1991) 503

105˜ÂÁÏ (‡)‚38 ÛÈÚÒ ÁÂÎÓ ÏÁ‰˘ ÈÙÎ) 1968yÁ"΢˙ ,Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ˜ÂÁÏ (1)(‡)31 ÛÈÚÒ Â‡¯˙¯ÈÈ ˘Î¯ ‡ ¯ÎÓ˘ ÈÓ" ÈÙÏΠ͇ ˙ÂȯÁ‡ ÏÚ ¯·„Ó‰ (È˘Ó‰ ˜Â˘· ˙¯·Á ÈÁÂÂÈ„ ÏÚ Ï"‰.Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730y731 (1975) ‡¯ ÔÎ ."ͯÚ

34

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ˆχÈÈ Ì˙„·ÚÏ È‡¯ ȈÈÙ Ôȇ· .ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ È˙Â¯È˘ ¯Â·Ú ÌÏ˘Ï ÌÈÎÂÓÏ˘ ‰Î¯Ú ÏÚ ÌÈÂ‚Ó ‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÏÚ ÌȯÂÒȇ‰ ,˙ȈÓ˙· .˜Â˘‰ ÔÓ ˙‡ˆÏ

.ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ Ï˘ ÔÈËÈÂÓ‰ ÏÚ ˙ÈËÒÈχ‰ ‰„·ډ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰ Ï‚ÚÓ ‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÏÚ ÌȯÂÒȇ Ì‚ ÌȯˆÂÈ ,ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙·ÂÁÏ ‰Ó„·ÏÚ ÌȯÂÒȇ‰ ÌÈÏ˜Ó ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÓȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙˘‰ È„È ÏÚ .È·ÂÈÁ·¯˜· ˙¯Á˙‰ ˙‡ Ìȯȷ‚Ó Íη ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˜Â˘Ï ‰ÒÈΉ ÏÚ ‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙˙¯·˙Ò‰‰ ˙‡ ‰„ÈˆÓ ‰ÏÈ„‚Ó Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ·¯˜· ˙¯·‚ÂÓ‰ ˙¯Á˙‰ .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ˙ÂÈÓ¯˙· ˜ÂÒÚÏ ˙¯·Á Ï˘ ıȯÓ˙‰ ˙‡ ‰˙ÈÁÙÓ Íη ,˙ÂÈÓ¯˙ ‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ ¯Â˙ȇÏ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ „ÂÚ ÔÈË˜Ó ˜Â˘Ï ‰ÚËÓ Ú„ÈÓ ÌÒ¯ÙÏ ˙ÁÙÂÓ‰ ıȯÓ˙‰ .˙ÂȈÏÂÙÈÓ·Â

.‰‡Ï‰ ÍΠ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ‰ÚÈÓ‰Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÏÚ ‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÏÚ ÌȯÂÒÈ‡Ï ˘È˘ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰‰ ,ÛÂÒ·Ï˙˙ÁÙ‰ ,˙È˘‡¯ .˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì·ˆÓ ˙‡ Ì‚ ˙Â¯Ù˘Ó ÍΠ,˙ÂÏÈʉ ˙‡ ˙Â¯Ù˘ÓÚ„ÈÓ È¯ÚÙ Ï˘ ÌÓÂȘ· ÔÂÓˉ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ˙ÈÁÙ˙ ‡Â¢ ‚ˆÓ· ˙ÂϘ˙È‰Ï ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰ÌÈÚ„ÂÓ ‡Ï ˜ÏÁ È˙ÈÓ‡‰ ·ÈËÏ ÌÈÚ„ÂÓ ˜ÏÁ˘ ,‡Â¢ ‚ˆÓ Ï˘ ÂÓÂȘ ÌˆÚ È¯‰˘)˙ÈÁÙÈ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ ÁÂ˙ÈÙ ,˙È˘ .(ȯËÓÈÒ-‡ Ú„ÈÓ ‰ÂÂ‰Ó ,ÂÈχ‡ÏÓ ÔÙ‡· ÏˆÏ ˙ÏÂÎȉ ˙‡ ˜Á˘˙ ˙¯Á˙‰˘ ¯Á‡Ó ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÚÙ Ï˘ ÌÈÈ¢ ˙‡ÌȯÁÂÒ „‚ ¯ÁÒÓÏ ˜Â˘‰ È˘ÂÚ Ï˘ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ˙Â˙ÈÁÙÓ Âχ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰ .106Ú„ÈÓ ˙¯˙È.‰¯ÈÎÓ ¯ÈÁÓÏ ‰È˜ ¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈ·˘ Á¯Ӊ ˙‡ ÌˆÓˆÏ ˜Â˘‰ È˘ÂÚÏ ˙Âӯ‚ ,ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ˙‡ Ìȯȷ‚Ó Ô‰‰ ÒÂÈ‚ ˙ÂÏÚ ˙‡ ÌÈÈË˜Ó ,˙ÂÏÈʉ ˙‡ Ìȯȷ‚Ó ¯˙ÂÈ Ìȯˆ ÌÈÁ¯Ó

.˙ÂÏÈÚȉ

ÌÈËÂÓ È˙Ï· ÌÈÁÂ˙È Ì„Ș :ÌÈËÒÈχ Ï˘ ‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙ÚÈÓ .4

˙ÂÓȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ;ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ ˙Ïˉ ˙ÂÚˆÓ‡· ,¯ÂӇΠ,˙Â˙ÁÂÙ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÛÂÒȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ˙˜Ù‰Ï ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰Â ;‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÏÚ ¯ÂÒȇ ˙Ïˉ ˙ÂÚˆÓ‡· ˙Â˙ÁÂÙ Ú„ÈÓ‰,ÌÈÙ ¯ÁÒÓ ÏÚ ¯ÂÒȇ‰ ˙ÂÚˆÓ‡· ‰Â˘‡¯·Â ˘‡¯· ˙¯·Â‚ Ú„ÈÓ· ‰Ú˜˘‰Ó Á¯.‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÏÚ ¯ÂÒȇ ˙Ïˉ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ ˙Ïˉ ˙ÂÚˆÓ‡· Ì‚ ÔÈÙȘڷÂÈÈ„Ó ˙Â¯È˘È ˙ÚÙ˘ÂÓ ‰È‡˘ ‰„ÈÁȉ ‰ÓÈ˘Ó‰ ‡ÂÙ‡ ‡È‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÁÂ˙È ˙ÓÈ˘ÓÌÈ„ÓÂÚ‰ ÌÈ·‡˘Ó·Â „„·‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ ¯˘Î· ‰ÈÂÏ˙ ‡Ï‡ ,Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ

.Â˙¢¯Ï‡È‰ ,Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„Ó ˙Â¯È˘È ˙ÚÙ˘ÂÓ ‰È‡ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÁÂ˙È ˙ÓÈ˘Ó˘ „ÂÚ·

106M. Klock & D.T. McCormick “The Impact of Market Maker Competition on ‡¯Nasdaq Spread” 34 Fin. Rev. (1999) 55; S. Wahal “Entry, Exit, Market Makers andthe Bid-Ask, Spread” 10 Rev. Fin. Stud. (1997) 871; Dolgopolov, supra note 47, at pp.

.64y65

35

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

˙¯Á˙‰˘ ÏÎÎ .Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ È„È ÏÚ ˙·˙ÎÂÓ‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙·ÂÁÓ ÔÈÙȘڷ ˙ÚÙ˘ÂÓÌÈÙ˘ÂÁ ÌÈÓÈÂÒÓ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˜Â˘ Á˙Ù˙Ó ÍÎ ,˙Á˙Ù˙Ó Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˜Â˘·‰ÙÈ˘Á ‚È˘‰Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ ˙‡Ê ,˙ȘÂÂÈ˘ ‰È‚˯ËÒ‡Ó ˜ÏÁÎ ÌÈίÂÚ Ì‰˘ ÌÈÁÂ˙ȉ ˙‡‰‡ˆÂ˙‰ .Ì‰È¯Â˘ÈÎ ˙‡ ÍÈ¯Ú‰Ï ÌÈÈχȈËÂÙ ˙ÂÁ˜ÏÏ ¯˘Ù‡Ï ȄΠ‡ ˙È˙¯Â˘˜˙ÌȯÁ‡ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒÏ Ìȯ˘Ù‡Ó ,ÌÈÁ· ˜Â˘· ÌÈÓÒ¯Ù˙Ó‰ ÌÈÈËÒÈχ ÌÈÁÂ˙È˘ ,‡È‰È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ „ÂÓÈω ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ˙ÈÁÙÓ ‰Ê ÍÈω˙ .̉ Ì˙„Â·Ú ˙ÂÎȇ ˙‡ ÍȯډÏ

.Ú„ÈÓ‰˙ÂÈÂÏÚ Ï˘ ˜¯ ‰È‡ ˙ȯ˜ÈÚ‰ ‰ÈÚ·‰ ,ÈËÒÈχ ÁÂ˙È· ¯·Â„Ó˘ ÏÎÎ ÌÏÂ‡Ï˘ ˙ÂÈÚ· ,¯ÓÂÏÎ) ÈËÒÈχ‰ ÁÂ˙ȉ ¯ÂˆÈÈ· ˙ÂίΉ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ‡Ï‡ ,˙Â¯È˘ÈȯÁÂÒ ÏÏÎ ÔÈ·Ó .107(Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÔÈ· ˙˙ÂÂÚÓ ˙¯Á˙ ,ÌÈËÂÓ ÌÈÈËÒÈχ ÌÈÁÂ˙ȯ˘‡ ,108(sell-side) ¯ÎÂÓ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ ·¯˜· „ÁÂÈÓ· ˙¢˜ Âχ ˙ÂÈÚ· ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ÌÈÁÂ˙È· ˙‡Ë·˙Ó‰ ‚Ȉ ˙ÂÏÚ ÌȯˆÂÈ Âχ ÌÈËÒÈχ .ÌÈÁ· Ì˙„Â·Ú ˙‡ ÌÈÓÒ¯ÙÓ¯ˆÈÈÏ ¯ÎÂÓ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ Ï˘ ÌÂÈÒÈ· ,¯˙ȉ ÔÈ· ,Ì¯Â˜Ó˘ ,ÌÈËÂÓ ÌÈÈËÒÈχÌÈÈËÒÈχ‰ ̉ÈÁÂ˙È ˙‡ ÌÈÙ˘ÂÁ ̉˘ ÍÎ ÏÚ ‰ˆÙ˙˘ ‰ÒΉ Ì˙‡ ˜ÈÒÚÓ˘ ˜·Ï˙Ó¯‚‰ ‰ÈÚ·‰ ˙‡ Ìȯ¯ÂÚÓ Ìȇ ˜Â˘· ÌÈÏÚÂÙ‰ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ˙È·¯Ó ,˙‡Ê ÌÚ .109ÌÈÁ·ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó 110(buy-side) ‰Â˜‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ .¯ÎÂÓ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ È„È ÏÚ,111ÌÈÁ· ÌÈÈËÒÈχ‰ ̉ȯˆÂÓ ˙‡ ÌÈÓÒ¯ÙÓ Ìȇ˘ ÌȯÁ‡ ÌÈÈ„ÒÂÓ Â‡ ÌÈÈÚˆ˜Ó

107J.E. Fisch & H.A. Sale “The Securities ‡¯ ÌÈËÒÈχ ·¯˜· ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÚ· Ï˘ ÛÈ˜Ó ÁÂ˙ÈÏAnalyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts” 88 Iowa L. Rev. (2003) 1035,C.R. Chen, K.C. Chan & T.L. Steiner “Are All Security Analysts Equal?” ‡¯ ÔÎ .1041Ï˘ ̉ȯ˘˜ È„È ÏÚ ˙ÂÓ‰ÂÊÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ ˙ˆÏÓ‰ ÈÎ Ìȇ¯Ó) 25 J. Fin. Research (2002) 415

.(Ìȯ˜ÒÓ Ì‰˘ ˙¯·Á‰ ÌÚ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ȘÈÒÚÓ108˙ÂÈÓ ˙‡ ˜ÈÙÓ Ì‚ ¯˘‡ ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰Ï ˜· È„È ÏÚ ˜ÒÚÂÓ‰ ËÒÈχ ‡Â‰ ¯ÎÂÓ‰ ÌÚËÓ ËÒÈχ

J.L. Orcutt “Investor ‡¯ ÌÈËÒÈχ È‚ÂÒ Ï˘ ‰¯È˜ÒÏ .ËÒÈχ‰ È„È ÏÚ ˙¯˜ÂÒÓ‰ ‰¯·Á‰Skepticism v. Investor Confidence: Why the New Research Analyst Reform Will Harm

.Investors” 81 Denv. U. L. Rev. (2003) 1, 6y13109S.J. Choi & J.E Fisch “How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal for

Securities Intermediaries” 113 Yale L. J. (2003) 269, 285y286; Fisch & Sale, supraZ. Gu & J.S. Wu “Earning Skewness and Analyst ‡¯ ÔÎ .note 107, at pp. 1043y1056˙‡ ÌÈÒÒ·Ó ,ÏÈÚÏ˘ ‰ÈÈˉ‰ ˙‡ ÌȯÈÎÊÓ) Forecast Bias” 35 J. Account. & Econ. (2003) 5ÌÈËÒÈχ ̇‰" ˜Ò˜ '˜Â ¯· 'Á .(‰ÚÙÂ˙Ï ÌÈÏ˘Ó ¯·Ò‰ ÌÈÚȈÓ ˙ȯÈÙÓ‡ ‰ÈÁ·Ó ‰ÓÂȘ˙¯„Ò "?ÌÈÈÈÚ È„Â‚ÈÏ Ï‡ÈˆËÂÙ‰ ˙‡ ÔÈ·Ó ˜Â˘‰ ̇‰Â Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘ ÏÚ ÌÈÚÈÙ˘Ó ˙ÂÈÓ Ï˘(2004 ¯·Â˘‡· ÌÒ¯ÂÙ) 6 'Ú (12 'ÒÓ ˙¯·ÂÁ) ¯˜ÁÓ‰ ˙˜ÏÁÓ Ï‡¯˘È ˜· Z ÔÂÈ„Ï ÌȯӇÓ

.(Èχ¯˘È‰ Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘· Ï"‰ ‰ÈÈˉ‰ ˙‡ ÌȉÊÓ)110ÌÈÙ‚ .˙ÂÓ‡ Ô¯˜ Ô‚Π,ÌÈÈ„ÒÂÓ ÌÈÙ‚ È„È ÏÚ ˜ÒÚÂÓ‰ ËÒÈχ ‡Â‰ ‰Â˜‰ ÌÚËÓ ËÒÈχ

ÌÈÁÂ˙ȉ ˙‡ ¯Â·ÈˆÏ ÌÈÚÈˆÓ Ìȇ Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘· Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ· Ì‰Ï˘ ÌÙÒÎÓ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó Âχ.̉Ȅ·ÂÚ ÌÈÚˆ·Ó˘ ÌÈÈËÒÈχ‰

111̉È˙ˆÏÓ‰ ˙‡ ÌȯÎÂÓ ,‰˘ÏÎ „ÒÂÓ È„È ÏÚ ÌȘÒÚÂÓ Ìȇ˘ ÌÈÈ‡ÓˆÚ ÌÈËÒÈχ ˘È ,‡Ó‚„Ï.ÌÈÈÂÓÏ

36

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

Ìȇ ,Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ· ¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÚˆÓ‡· ̉È˙ÂÈÊÁ˙ ÏÚ ˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰ ÍÂ˙ Á¯ ÌȘÈÙÓ ‡Ï‡‰È‡ ‰ÈÚ·‰ ,ÂÊ ‰Â¯Á‡ ‰ˆÂ·˜ È·‚Ï .112ÔÂÂÎ˙Ó· ˙ÂËÂÓ ˙ÂÈËÒÈχ ˙ÂÈÊÁ˙ ÌȯˆÈÈÓ˙Ï·˜·Â ,ÁÂÂË È¯ˆ˜ ÌÈÈËÒÈχ ÌÈÁÂ˙È ˙Îȯڷ ‡Ï‡ ,ÔÂÂÎ˙Ó· ˙ÂËÂÓ ˙ÂÈÊÁ˙ Ô˙Ó·Ï˘ Ô‰ÈÚˆȷ ˙ίډ Í¯ÂˆÏ ÁÂÂË ¯ˆ˜ ˜Ù‡· ˘ÂÓÈ˘· Ô„ÂÒÈ˘ ‰Ú˜˘‰ ˙ÂËÏÁ‰¯ÎÂÓ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ Ï˘ ‰¯˜Ó·˘ „ÂÚ· ,ÔÏ‰Ï ¯·ÒÂÈ˘ ÈÙÎ ,˙‡Ê ÌÚ .113˙¯·ÁÔȇ ‰Â˜‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ Ï˘ ‰¯˜Ó· ,‰Èˆ¯ ‡È‰ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ Ì˙·¯Ú˙‰

.˜Â˘‰ È„È ÏÚ ¯˙ÙÈ‰Ï ‰ÈÚ·‰ ÏÚ ,‰Ó„ ˙·¯Ú˙‰· ͯˆÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ· Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ‰¯ÈÁ·‰ :¯ÎÂÓ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ· ÏÈÁ˙ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÏÈÚÙ· ˙ÂίΉ ‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ÔÈ· ‰¯ÈÁ· Ì‚ ‰ÂÂ‰Ó ,ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ ÈÙÌ‰Ï˘ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ˘ ˙¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó ˙ÂÏÈÚÙÓ ˙Âڷ‰ ‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ÔÈ·Ï ,Ú„ÈÓ‰˙ÂίΉ ‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ Ï˘ ‰ÈÚ·‰ ˙‡ ‰ÙȯÁÓ ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ ˙¯˙‰ .˜Â˘· ÌȯÁÒ¯Ë˘Ó·˘ ¯Á‡Ó ,Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘· ÌȯÁÒ Ì‰Ï˘ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ˘ ˙¯·Á ÈÏ‰Ó ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ·Ìȯ˙‰ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡Â ˜Â˘‰ ÔÓ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÌȇˆÂÈ ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ˘ÂÓÈ˘ ¯È˙Ó‰˙‡ ˙„„ÂÚÓ ¯˘‡ ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ‰ ˙Ï·‚‰ ,„‚Ó .ÌÓˆÚ ÏÚ ÂÁ˜ÙÈ ‡Ï ˜Â˘·¯ÎÂÓ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ Ï˘ ‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ Ï˘ ‰ÈÚ· ˙¯ˆÂÈ ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÏÈÚÙ˙¯·‚ÂÓ‰ ˙È˙¯Â˘˜˙‰ ˙ÂÈÈÚ˙‰‰ ÁÎÂÏ .˙ÂËÂÓ ˙ÂÈËÒÈχ ˙Âίډ ÌÈÓÒ¯ÙÓ ¯˘‡˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ÈÎ ÔÂÚÈËÏ ˙Â˙Ù˙‰Ï Ô˙È ,¯ÎÂÓ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ Ï˘ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÈÈÚ··ÏÏη Ô¯Â˜Ó˘ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚÓ ¯˙ÂÈ ˙ÂÎÂÓ ˙¯·Á ÈÏ‰Ó ˙ÂÏÈÚÙÓ ˙Âڷ‰ ‚Ȉ‰Ï˘ ‰ÈÚ· ‡È‰ ˙¯·Á ÈÏ‰Ó ˙ÂÏÈÚÙÓ ˙ڷ‰ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÈÈÚ· .‡È‰ ‡Ï ,114Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÈ˷ȉ ÏÂÏÎÓ ÏÚ ‰ÚÈÙ˘Ó ÂÊ ‰ÈÚ· .115˙Âȯ·Ȉ‰ ˙¯·Á‰ Ïη ˙Á¯‰ È„È‚‡˙ ¯Ë˘ÓÏÚ Ì‚ ÂÓÎ ,(ÔÈÈÚ ÈÏÚ· ÌÚ ˙‡˜ÒÚ ‰ÚËÓ ÁÂÂÈ„ ,ÈÂ˜Ï ÏÂ‰È Ô‚Î) ˙È„È‚‡˙‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ‰˜ÏÁ ˙¯·Á ÈÈ„ ,Ô· .116ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ· ¯ÁÒÓ· ˙˜ÙÒÓ È˙Ï· ˙ÂÏÈÊ ÏÚ ˙ÂÁ ¯ÂÁÓ˙˙ÓÂÚÏ .ÌÈωӉ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙÓ ˙Âڷ‰ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ¯ÚÊÓÏ ÌÈÙ‡Â˘ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„Ó

112P.A. Griffin “A League of Their Own? Financial Analysts’ Responses to Restatements˙¯‚ÒÓ· ÔÁ·) and Corrective Disclosures” 18 J. Account., Auditing & Fin. (2003) 479˙¯·Á Ï˘ Ô˜È˙ ˙ÂÚ„Â‰Ï First Call-‰ Ï‚ÚÓ ÏÚ ÌÈÓ‰ ÌÈËÒÈχ Ï˘ Ì˙·Â‚˙ ˙‡ ¯˜ÁÓÏ˘ Ì˙·Â‚˙ ˙‡ ‰Â¢‰Â ,Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ· ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ¯·„· ˙ÂÚËÏ ÂÏȷ‰˘ ,ÌȘ˙Ó ÌÈÈÂÏÈ‚ÏÂ,ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ Z ˙¯Á‡‰ ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ‰ ÌȯÁÂÒ‰ ˙ˆ·˜ ˘ÂÏ˘ Ï˘ Ô˙·Â‚˙Ï ÌÈȈÈÁ ÌÈËÒÈχÈ˙Ï· ÔÙ‡· ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ ˙¯Á‡‰ ˙ˆ·˜‰˘ Ì‚‰˘ ‰ÏÈ‚Â Z ˙„ÒÂÓ ,¯ÒÁ· ÌȯÎÂÓ‰ ÌȯÁÂÒÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ¯Á‡Ï ˜¯ ÌÈ·È‚Ó Ì˙ÓÂÚÏ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ,Ô˜˙Ó‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ̯˷ ÌÈ˘„ÂÁ ¯ÙÒÓ È˙¯‚˘

.(Ô˜˙Ó‰113S.E. Stickel “Reputation and Performance among Security Analysts” 47 J. Fin. ‡¯

(1992) 1811y1836; J.M Cote & D.L. Sanders “Herding Behavior: Explanation and.Implications” 9 Behavioral Research Account. (1997) 20

114H.G. Manne “A Free Market Model of a Large Corporation System” 52 Emory L. J..(2003) 1381, 1387y1390

115.Jensen, supra note 18 ‡¯116.Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 14 ‡¯

37

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÈÈÚ· .‰Ù˜È‰· ˙Ï·‚ÂÓ ‰ÈÚ· ‡È‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÈÈÚ· ,˙‡ÊZ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ‰ˆÂ·˜ ˙˙Ï ˜¯ ˙Ú‚Â ‡È‰Â ,Ú„ÈÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚ Ï˘ ‰ÈÚ· ‡È‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰˙¯ÈÈÏ ÒÁÈ· ˙ÂËÂÓ ˙ÂÈÊÁ˙ ˜ÙÒÏ ÌÈÏÂÏÚ‰ Z ¯ÎÂÓ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ˙ˆÂ·˜Ï‡È‰ ¯ÎÂÓ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ Ï˘ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÈÈÚ·˘ ¯Á‡Ó .117˙ÂÓÈÂÒÓ ˙¯·Á Ï˘ ͯÚ

.118‰Óȇ˙Ó ‰ÈˆÏ‚¯ ˙ÂÚˆÓ‡· ‰˙‡ ÌˆÓˆÏ Ô˙È ,‰˙‰ӷ Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÈÈÚ·ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ ÌÈÈÈÙ‡Ó‰ ,˙˙ÂÂÚÓ‰ ˙¯Á˙‰Â ÌÈËÂÓ‰ ÌÈÈËÒÈχ‰ ÌÈÁÂ˙ȉ,119(selective disclosure) ˙¯·Á ÈÏ‰Ó Ï˘ ‰ÏÙÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚Ó ÁÂÓˆÏ ÌÈÏÂÏÚ ,¯ÎÂÓ‰120Ì˙‡ ˜ÈÒÚÓ‰ ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰ ˙È· Ï˘ Ò¯Ëȇ‰ ˙‡ Ì„˜Ï ÌÈËÒÈχ Ï˘ Ì˙Ùȇ˘Ó ‡˙ÂÈÚ·‰ È„ÓÓ ˙‡ ÌÈÓˆÓˆÓ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ .121Ì‰Ï˘ È˘È‡‰ ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰ ˜È˙ ˙‡ Â‡È„È ÏÚ ,123Ú„ÈÓÏ ˙ÈÂÈ¢ ˙Â˘È‚ ˙ÈÈÙÎ È„È ÏÚ ,122‰ÏÙÓ‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙Ï·‚‰ È„È ÏÚ ÂÏω˙Â˘È¯„ ˙ÂÚˆÓ‡· .124ÌÈÈ„ÒÂÓ Â‡ ÌÈÈ˘È‡ ÌÈÈÈÚ È„Â‚È ‰˜ÒÚ‰ ÈÒÁÈ ˙ÙÈ˘ÁÏ ‰˘È¯„

.125Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÁÂ˙È Ï˘ Â˙¯˘ÂÈ ˙‡ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ìȯȷ‚Ó ÂχÌȇ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ͇ ,¯˙ÂÈ ˙ÈÒÈÒ· ‡È‰ ‰Â˜‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ Ï˘ ‰ÈÚ·‰

117ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ 60% ,¯ÎÂÓ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈÈËÒÈχ 30% ‡È‰ ÌÈ‚ÂÒ ÈÙÏ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ˙‚ÏÙ˙‰.Fisch & Sale, supra note 107 (notes 18y19) ‡¯ .ÌÈÈ‡ÓˆÚ ÌÈËÒÈχ 10%-Π,‰Â˜‰

118,˙ÚˆÂÓ‰ ÂÊ ˙ÓÈȘ‰ ‰ÈˆÏ‚¯‰ ˙‡ ÌÈÁ˙Ó ÌȂȈÓ) III ˜ÏÁ· ,Fisch & Sale, ibid ‡¯.(ÛÒ Ô¯˙Ù ÌÈÚȈÓÂ

119Á˙Ó ¯‡˙Ó) J.C. Coffee Jr “Is Selective Disclosure Now Lawful?” N.Y. L. J. (1997) 5˙¯Á· ‰ˆÂ·˜Ï ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ ÌȘÙÒÓ ‰¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó ‰¯„È‚·˘ È·È˘ÏÒ ÈÂÏÈ‚ Ï˘ ‰˜È˘¯Ù‰ ˙‡

.(˜Â˘Ï ¯ÒÓ Ú„ÈÓ‰˘ ÈÙÏ ÌÈËÒÈχ Ï˘120H.W. Lin & M.F. ;(˙ÂÓÈÚ‰ ˙‡ Ìȯ‡˙Ó) II.B ˜ÏÁ· ,Fisch & Sale, supra note 107 ‡¯

McNichols “Underwriting Relationships, Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts and InvestmentRecommendations” 25 J. Account. & Eco. (1998) 101; R. Michaely & K.L. Womack“Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations”Editorial Staff “SEC Warns Investors Against ‡¯ ÔÎ ;12 Rev. Fin. Stud. (1999) 653

.Sell-Side Conflicts” Investor Relations Bus. (2001) 1121.(˙ÂÓÈÚ‰ ˙‡ Ìȯ‡˙Ó) II.A ˜ÏÁ· ,Fisch & Sale, ibid ‡¯122.1970yÏ"˘˙ ,(ÌÈÈ„ÈÈÓ ÌÈÈ˙Ù˜˙ ˙ÂÁ"„) Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ˙˜˙Ï 30- (‡)2 ˙˜˙ ,Ï˘ÓÏ Â‡¯123˙ÂÚÙ˘‰‰ ˙‡ ÌÈÁ˙Ó) Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 14, at pp. 1269y1273 ‡¯

R.B. Thompson & R. King “Credibility and Information in Securities ;(FD ‰ÈˆÏ‚¯ Ï˘‰ÚÙ˘‰‰ ˙‡ ÌÈÁ˙Ó) Markets after Regulation FD” 79 Wash. U. L. Q. (2001) 615F. Helfin, K.R. Subramanyam & Y. Zhang “Regulation FD and the ;(FD ‰ÈˆÏ‚¯ Ï˘ÌȂȈÓ) Financial Information Environment: Early Evidence” 78 Account. Rev. (2003) 1Ï˘ ˙¯ÙÂ˘Ó Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ (1) :FD ‰ÈˆÏ‚¯ ‰Ó˘ÂÈÈ˘ ¯Á‡Ï Í¯Ú˘ ¯˜ÁÓ Ï˘ ‡ˆÓÓ‰ ˙‡˙ÂÈÂÚË· ÈÂÈ˘Ï ÌÈȯÈÙÓ‡ ÔÈÎÂÓÈ˙ ¯„Úȉ (2) ÌÈÁ¯ ÏÚ ˙ÂʯΉ ÈÙÏ „ÂÚ ˙ÂÈÓ È¯ÈÁÓ‰Ùˆ‰ ,ȯËÂω ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ۘȉ· ˙¯ÎÈ ‰ÈÈÏÚ (3) Ô¯ÂÊÈÙ· ‡ ÌÈËÒÈχ Ï˘ ÌÈÁ¯ ˙ÂÈÊÁ˙·

.(˙¯·Á Ï˘ ÌÈÁÂÂ¯Ï ¯Â˘˜‰Â ,„È˙Ú ÈÙ124.Fisch & Sale, supra note 107, at pp. 1068y1069 ‡¯125L. Boni & K.L. Womack “Wall Street Research: Will New Rules Change Its ‡¯

‰˜È˜Á „Ú ÌÈÈÂÙˆ ÌÈÒ¯Ëȇ‰ È„Â‚È ÈÎ ÌȯÈÚÓ) Usefulness?” 59 Fin. Anal. J. (2003) 25, 29.(ÌÂÁ˙· ‰˘„Á

38

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

hedge) ¯Â„È‚ Ô¯˜ È„È ÏÚ ˜ÒÚÂÓ‰ ËÒÈχ Ï˘ „˜ÙÈ˙ ̇ .ÂÊ ‰ÈÚ· ¯Â˙ÙÏ ÌÈÏÂÎÈ,‰Ê ÁÂÂË ¯ˆ˜ ˜Ù‡ ÂÙ˜˘È Ï·˜È ‡Â‰˘ ‰Ú˜˘‰‰ ˙ÂËÏÁ‰ ,ÔÂÚ·¯ È„Ó Í¯ÚÂÓ 126(fund¯ÁÒÓ‰ ˙‡ ÏÈ„‚‰Ï ‰ÏÂÏÚ ˙ÂÈ·ÈËϘÙÒ ˙ÂÈÊÁ˙Ï ‰Èˉ .˙ÂÈ·ÈËϘÙÒ ˙ÂÈ‰Ï ÂËÈÈÂȯÈÁÓ ÂÒÎ˙È Í¯‡‰ ÁÂÂË·˘ Ì‚‰ .127¯ˆ˜‰ ÁÂÂË· ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ¯ÒÂÁÏ Ì¯‚Ï ˘Ú¯‰ÌÈÈ˙„Â˙ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÂÈ‰È ¯ˆ˜‰ ÁÂÂË·˘ ȯ‰ ,128ÈÏÎÏΉ ÌÈÈ¢ χ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈÏ˘ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ Ï„‚ ÍÎ ,¯˙ÂÈ ıÂÙ ¯ˆ˜ ÁÂÂËÏ ÈËÒÈχ ÁÂ˙È˘ ÏÎÎ .129˙ÂÂÚ˙‰Ï ÌÈÏÂÏÚÂÈÏ‰Ó Ï˘ ‰Ú˜˘‰‰ ÈÏÂ˜È˘· ˙ÂÂÈÚÏ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ Ì‚ ÂÓÎ ,¯ˆ˜‰ ÁÂÂË· ˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ¯ÒÂÁ

.˙¯·Á‰ÏÚ Áȯ‰Ï ÌÈÈÂ˘Ú ÁÂÂˉ ¯ˆ˜ ˜Ù‡‰ ˙ÈÈÚ· ÏÚ ¯·‚˙‰Ï ÌÈÏÂÎȉ ˙„ÒÂÓ ,Ô·‡È‰ ÁÂÂˉ ¯ˆ˜ ˜Ù‡‰ ˙ÈÈÚ· ÏÚ ˙¯·‚˙‰ ,˙‡Ê ÌÚ .¯ˆ˜ ÁÂÂË ÈÚȘ˘Ó Ô·˘Á˘‡¯Ó ËÒÈχ‰ È¯Â˘ÈÎ ˙‡ ÍÈ¯Ú‰Ï ˙·ÈÈÁÓ ÂÊ ‰ÈÚ· ÌÚ ˙„„ÂÓ˙‰ .˙·Î¯ÂÓ ‰ÓÈ˘Ó˙·ÈÈÁÓ Â‡ Z ÏÚÂÙ· ÂÈ‚˘È‰ ÏÚ ÒÒ·˙‰· (ex-post) „·ÚÈ„· ‡Ï Z (ex-ante)ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÚˆȷ· ÌÈÈÈÚ˙Ó Ìȇ˘ ͯ‡ ÁÂÂË ÈÚȘ˘Ó Ï˘ ÂÈ„ Ï„‚ ¯‚‡Ó ˙¯ÈˆÈ,ÏÚÂÙ· ÂÈ‚˘È‰ „ÂÒÈ ÏÚ ‡Ï ÂÈ˙ÂËÏÁ‰ „ÂÒÈ ÏÚ ,˘‡¯Ó ËÒÈχ ˙ίډ .¯ˆ˜‰ ÁÂÂË·¯Á‡ È˷ϯ Ú„ÈÓ˘ ‡„ÂÂÏ ,ËÒÈχ‰ ÈÙ· „ÓÚ˘ ÌÈÂ˙‰ ͯÚÓ ˙‡ ÔÂÁ·Ï ˙·ÈÈÁÓ.˙ÂÓÈȘ‰ ‰Ú˜˘‰‰ ˙Âȯ˘Ù‡ ÏÎ ˙‡ ‰Â¢Ӊ ¯ÂÁÓ˙ Ï„ÂÓ ¯ÂˆÈÏ ,ÂÓÓ ËÓ˘ ‡Ï.ËÒÈχ‰ È˙Â¯È˘ ˙‡ ‡ÏÈÓÓ ¯˙ÈÈÓ ÂÏω ˙ÂÓÈ˘Ó‰ ÏÎ ˙‡ Úˆ·Ó ¯·Î˘ ÈÓ˘ ,‡˜Ú ‡„˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰ Ô¯˜ ÈÚˆȷ ˙‡ ÌÈÂÂ˘Ó ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó .Í·ÂÒÓ ‡Â‰ ͯ‡ ÁÂÂË ÈÚȘ˘Ó ÛÂÒȇ¯˙ÂÈ ˙·ÂË ˙‡ˆÂ˙ ‰‚È˘Ó ˙Á‡ ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ Ô¯˜ ̇ .˙¯Á‡ ˙¯˜ Ï˘ Ô‰ÈÚÂˆÈ·Ï Ì‰Ï˘ÈÏ‰Ó .130ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó ‰Èχ ¯·ÚÈ ,„·Ï· ÏÊÓ ˙ÂÎÊ· ˙‡Ê ,˙¯Á‡ ˙¯˜Ó ¯ˆ˜‰ ÁÂÂË·„ÂÚ· ,‰Ú˜˘‰ Í¯ÂˆÏ ¯˙ÂÈ ÌÈ·¯ ÌÈ·‡˘Ó Ì˙¢¯Ï „ÓÚÈ ¯˙ÂÈ ·¯ ÛÒÎ ÂÁÈÂÂ¯È ÂÊ Ô¯˜Í¯‡ ÁÂÂË ÈÏÂ˜È˘ „ÂÒÈ ÏÚ ‰ÚȘ˘Ó‰ Ô¯˜ .‰Ï‡ ÏÎÓ Â‰ÈÈ ‡Ï ˙¯Á‡ ˙¯˜ ÈÏ‰Ó˘˙Â‚È˘Ó ˙¯Á‡ ˙¯˜˘ „ÂÚ· ,·¯ ÔÓÊ Í¯Â‡Ï ˙ÈËȇ ‰ÁÈÓˆ ‡ ÌÈ„ÒÙ‰ ˙‡¯‰Ï ‰ÏÂÏÚÏ˘ ‰‡ˆÂ˙ ̉ Âχ ÌÈ„ÒÙ‰˘ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó ÚÎ˘Ï ËÂ˘Ù ‰Ê Ôȇ .‰ÁÈӈ ÌȯȄ‡ ÌÈÁ¯

126,‡¯ .ÌÈÈ„ÒÂÓ ÌÈÚȘ˘ÓÏ Â‡ ÌÈÚˆÓ‡ ÈÏÚ· ÌÈÚȘ˘ÓÏ È˯٠‰Ú˜˘‰ ¯È˘ÎÓ ‰È‰ ˙¯„‚Ó Ô¯˜.W. Fung & D.A. Hsieh “A Primer on Hedge Funds” 6 J. Emp. Fin. (1999) 309 ,Ï˘ÓÏ

127A. Shleifer & L.H. Summers “The Noise Trader Approach to Finance” 4(2) J. Econ. ‡¯.Prespectives (1990) 19

128J.M. Poterba & L.H. Summers “Mean Reversion in Stock Prices: Evidence and ‡¯,ÌȯÈÁÓ‰ ˙ÂÒÎ˙‰ Ï˘ ‰ÚÙÂ˙‰ ˙‡ ÌÈ„Ú˙Ó) Implications” 22 J. Fin. Econ. (1988) 27˜Ù‡ Ô˙ȉ· ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰ ÌÈÏ·˜Ó˘ ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰ ˜È˙ ˙ÈÈ· ˙ÂËÏÁ‰ ÏÚ Â˙ÚÙ˘‰ ˙‡ ÌÈ„ÓÂÏÂ

.(‰Ú˜˘‰‰129E.F. Fama & K.R. French “Permanent and Temporary Components of Stock Prices” ‡¯

96 J. Pol. Econ. (1988) 246; A. Shleifer & R.W. Vishny “The New Theory of the Firm:.Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and Firms” 80 Am. Econ. Rev. (1990) 148

130N.N. Taleb ‡¯ ÏÈÚÏ ˙¯‡Â˙Ó‰ ‰ÚÙÂ˙‰Â Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ· ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰ ˙ÈÈ˘Ú˙ Ï˘ ÈÂÚ·ˆ ¯Â‡È˙ÏFooled by Randomness: The Hidden Role of Chance in the Markets and in Life (New

.York, 2001)

39

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

‡ ˙ÏÂÎÈ ¯ÒÂÁ Ï˘ ‰‡ˆÂ˙ ‡Ï ,ͯ‡ ÁÂÂËÏ ˙·˘ÂÁÓ ˙Ú„ÂÓ ‰Ú˜˘‰ ˙ÈȂ˯ËÒ‡Ï˘ ‰È‚˯ËÒ‡· ¯ÂÁ·Ï ̯ʉ ÌÚ ˙ÎÏÏ ÛÈ„Ú˘ ˙‡ˆÂÓ ˙·¯ ˙¯˜ ,ÍÎ˘Ó .131Ô¯˘Î

.132¯ˆ˜ ÁÂÂËÏ ‰ÈˆÏ˜ÙÒ/‰Ú˜˘‰˙·¯Ú˙‰ ˙¯ÊÚ· ‰¯˙ÂÙÏ Ô˙È ‡Ï˘ ,˙ÈÒÂÙÈË ˜Â˘ ˙ÈÈÚ·· ¯·Â„Ó ,˙‡Ê ÌÚ‰ÓÎ ,ÌӇ .˜Â˘· ÌÈÓÈȘ ÌÈÁ¯ ˙˜Ù‰Ï ÂÊ ‰ÈÚ· Ô¯˙ÙÏ ÌȈȯÓ˙‰ .˙ÈËÙ˘ÓÛÒη ˘ÂÓÈ˘ ‡ ,"ÈÏ·Ò" ÛÒη ˘ÂÓÈ˘ ,ÔÈËÈÂÓ ˙ÂÚˆÓ‡· ÂÊ ‰ÈÚ· ¯˙Ù ˙„ÒÂÓÏη .¯ˆ˜‰ ÁÂÂË· ˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ Ì‚ ¯·‚˙ ,Ï„‚˙ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó Ï˘ ÂÊ ‰ˆÂ·˜˘ ÏÎÎ .È˯ÙÁÂÂˉ ¯ˆ˜ ˜Ù‡‰ ˙ÈÈÚ· ÁÎÂÏ ÔÈ‚ÙÓ ˜Â˘‰˘ ÌÈ˙ÂÂÈÚ‰ ÂÈ‰È ÈÎ ˘È‚„‰Ï ˘È ,‰¯˜Ó‡Ï ·ˆÓ· ¯ÂÙÈ˘ .È˘ÙÂÁ ˜Â˘· ÂÈχ ÚÈ‚‰Ï Ô˙È˘ ¯˙ÂÈ· ·Âˉ ·ˆÓ‰ Â‰Ê ,ÂÈ‰È ¯˘‡„ÂÓÈÏ Ï˘ ,˙ÂÈ˙¯·Á ˙ÂÓ¯Â Ï˘ ,ÍÂÈÁ Ï˘ ‰‡ˆÂ˙Î ‡Ï‡ ,ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙·¯Ú˙‰Ó ÚÈ‚È

.˜Â˘ ȈȯÓ˙ ˙¯ˆÂÂȉ Ï˘Â ˜Â˘‰

˙¯·Á ÈÈ„Â ‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ .5

‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙˙ÁÙ‰· ¯·Â„Ó˘ ÏÎÎ ˙¯·Á‰ ÈÈ„ ˙‡ ÌÈÓÈÏ˘Ó Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„È„È· „ȘىÏÓ ÌÈÚÓ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ,˙È˘‡¯ .133‰¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó ˙ÂÏÈÚÙÓ ˙Âڷ‰ڄÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ‰ ˙Ï·‚‰ È„È ÏÚ Â˙ÂÏÈÊ ˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ˙¯·‚‰ ˙ÂÓÈ˘Ó ˙‡ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ÈÈ„ ,˙È˘ .ÌÓˆÚ ÏÚ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ Á˜ÈÙ· ÔÂÓˉ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ÌÈÚÂÓ ‰Ê ÔÙ‡·Â ,ÌÈÙÁ˜ÈÙ‰ ˙‡ ÌÈÏ˘Ó‰ ,˜Â˘‰ ¯ÈˆÈ Á˜ÈÙ ÔÂ‚Ó ˙ÂÈÓ‰ ÈÏÚ·Ï ÌȘÙÒÓ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ.134Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ Ì„Ș È„È ÏÚ ‰¯·Á‰ ÔÂȯ¢¯È„ Úˆ·Ó˘ ÈÓÈÙ‰

131.ËÙ‡· ԯ ˙‡ ‰Ê΢ ‚ȯÁÎ ¯ÈÎÊ‰Ï ÌÈ˙Ù˙Ó Âȉ˘ ˘È132B. Trueman “Analyst Forecast and Herding Behavior” 7 Rev. Fin. Stud. (1994) ‡¯

97y124; S.E. Stickel “Reputation and Performance among Security Analysts” 47 J..Fin. (1992) 1811y1836; Hirshleifer & Teoh, supra note 63

133,(ÌȂȈ‰) ÌÈÏ‰Ó ÔÈ·Ï (ÌÈÁÏ¢‰) ˙ÂÈÓ ÈÏÚ· ÔÈ· :È„È‚‡˙‰ ‰·Ó· ˙ÂÓÈȘ ‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÚ· ˘ÂÏ˘(ÌÈÁÏ¢‰) ÌÈ˘Â ÔÈ·Â (ÌȂȈ‰) ‰ËÈÏ˘‰ ˙ÂÈÓ ÈÏÚ· ÔÈ·Ï (ÌÈÁÏ¢‰) ËÂÚÈÓ ˙ÂÈÓ-ÈÏÚ· ÔÈ·Ï˘ Â˙Ú˜˘‰ ÏÚ ËÏ¢ ‚Ȉ‰ ÂÏω ÌÈÒÁȉ ˙ÂίÚÓÓ ˙Á‡ Ïη .(ÌȂȈ‰) ˙ÂÈÓ‰-ÈÏÚ· ÔȷςȈ‰ ÏÂÎÈ ,‚ÈˆÏ ÁÏ¢‰ ÔÈ· Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÚÙ ‚ÈˆÏ ÁÏ¢‰ ÔÈ· ÌÈÒ¯Ëȇ „Â‚È ÏÏ‚· .ÁÏ¢‰‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÚ· ÌÚ ˙„„ÂÓ˙‰‰ .ÂÁÏ¢ Ï˘ Ò¯Ëȇ‰ Ô·˘Á ÏÚ ÂÏ˘ È˘È‡‰ Ò¯Ëȇ‰ ˙‡ Ì„˜Ï˙¯·Á‰ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ˙ȯ˜ÈÚ‰ Ì˙¯ËÓ .‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ Ô˙ÂÎÏ Ï·Â˜Ó˘ Z ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ· ‰Î¯ΠÂÏωÏÚ ‰¯·Á‰ ÔÂȯ¢¯È„ ÏÚ ÔÂÓ‡ ˙·ÂÁ ˙Ïˉ È„È ÏÚ ¯˜ÈÚ· ,‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ¯ÚÊÓÏ ‡È‰‰È¯Â‡È˙Î '‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÈÈÚ·'" Ԣ‚ 'Ê Â‡¯ .È„È‚‡˙‰ ¯Ë˘Ó‰ ÈÂ‚Ó ÏÚ ‰„Ù˜‰Â ,‰¯·Á‰ ÈωÓ'‡ ˙Îȯڷ) ‰È'ˆ˜Â¯Ù ¯ÈËÏ‡Â‚Ï Ô¯ÎÊ ¯ÙÒ Z ËÙ˘Ó È¯Â·ÈÁ "ÌÈ„È‚‡˙‰ ÈÈ„Ï ˙„Á‡ÓR.R. Kraakman, P. Davies, H. ;239 (Ê"˘˙ ,ÂÏÈ·‡¯ '‡ 'Ó ‰È'ˆ˜Â¯Ù '‡ ,ıÈ˘ÙÈÏ ' ,˜¯·Hansmann, G. Hertig, K.J. Hopt, H. Kanda & E.B. Rock Anatomy of Corporate Law

.— A Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford, 2004) 22134K.H. Chung & H. Jo “The Impact of Security Analysts’ Monitoring and Marketing ‡¯

Ìȇ¯Ó) Functions on the Market Value of Firms” 31 J. Fin. & Quant. Anal. (1996) 493˜Â˘‰ È¢ ÏÚ È·ÂÈÁ È˙ÂÚÓ˘Ó Á¯Â‡· ˙ÂÚÈÙ˘Ó ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ Ï˘ ˜ÂÂÈ˘‰Â Á˜ÈÙ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÈÚÙ ÈÎ

40

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

„˜ÙÈ˙ ˙„‡ ÏÚ Í¯Ú È·¯ ÌÈ˙Â˙ȇ ÔÂȯ¢¯È„Ï ÌȘÙÒÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ ÈÁÂ˙È ,Ô·,‰Ï‰‰‰ ˙ÂÎȇ ÏÚ ·Â˘Á ·Â˘Ó ˜ÙÒÓ È˙¯Á˙ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ˜Â˘ ,˙È˘ÈÏ˘ .135ÌÈωӉÈ˙Â˙ȇ ,˙ÈÚÈ·¯ .‰¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó ÌÈÏ·˜Ó˘ ¯Î˘‰ ˙ÏÈ·Á ‰·Â‚ ÏÚ ¯È˘È ÔÙ‡· ÚÈÙ˘ÓÂÏÚ ÌÚÈ·ˆ‰· ‰¯·Á· ˙ÂÈÓ‰ ÈÏÚ· ˙‡ ÌÈÚ„ÈÈÓ ÌÈωӉ ˙ÂÎÈ‡Ï ¯˘‡· ÌÈËÒÈχ‰˙ÂÈÓ ˙ÈÈ˜Ï ¯˘‡· ˙ÂÈÓ‰ ÈÏÚ· ˙ËÏÁ‰ ÏÚ ÌÈÚÈÙ˘Ó ,˙ÂÈÓ ÈÏÚ· ˙ÙÈÒ‡· ˙ÂËÏÁ‰ÌÈ·ÈËÈÓ ÌÈωӉ ˙ÂÎȇ ˙„‡ ÏÚ ÌÈ˙Â˙ȇ‰ ,ÛÂÒ·Ï .Ô˙¯ÈÎÓÏ Â‡ Ô˙˜ÊÁ‰Ï ,‰¯·Á‰

.‰¯·ÁÏ È‡¯˘‡ ȘÙÒ ÌÚ ‰ËÈÏ˘‰ ˜Â˘ ÌÚ Ì‚‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÚ· ÏÚ ÈËÂÙÈ˘‰ Á˜ÈÙ‰ ˙‡ Û‡ ÌÈÓÈÏ˘Ó ˜Â˘‰ ¯ˆÈÈÓ˘ Á˜ÈÙ‰ È‚ÓÈ˙˘Ó ˙Á‡· ÚÈÙÂ‰Ï ˙ÂÈÂ˘Ú ‰¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ· ˙ÂÂÓˉ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ .‰¯·Á·˙ÂÚ‚‰ ˙‡˜ÒÚ ˙ÈÈ˘Ú ,‰¯·Á‰ ÔÓ ‰·È‚ :˙ÂÂÎÓ ‰ÏÈË ‡È‰ ‰Â˘‡¯‰ :˙Â¯ÂˆÏ˘ Ìȯ˜Ó‰ ÏÎ ÌÈ‚ÂÂÒÓ ˙¯·Á‰ ÈÈ„· .‰Ê· ‡ˆÂÈΠÌÊ‚ÂÓ ¯Î˘ ˙ÏÈË ,ÌÈÈÈÚ „‚ȷ‡È‰ ‰ÈÈ˘‰ ‰¯Âˆ‰ .136‰¯·ÁÏ ÌÈÂÓ‡‰ ˙·ÂÁ ˙¯Ù‰ Ï˘ ˙¯˙ÂΉ ˙Á˙ ˙ÂÂÂÎÓ ˙ÂÏÈË,137ÌÈωӉ Ì˘ ˙‡ ¯È„‡‰Ï ˙„ÚÂÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ È˙Ï·Â ˙ÂÈÓÂÏ‚Ó ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ :ÈÂ˜Ï Ï‰È˙ÂȘÒÚ ˙ÂËÏÁ‰ ˙Ï·˜ ,‰¯·Á‰ Í¯Ú ˙‡ ÌÈ˙ÈÁÙÓ‰ ˙ÂÈÂËÏ˙˘‰Â ÌÈ‚ÂÊÈÓÏ ‰ÓÎÒ‰Ï˘ ˙¯˙ÂΉ ˙Á˙ ÈÂ˜Ï ÏÂ‰È Ï˘ Ìȯ˜Ó ÌÈ‚ÂÂÒÓ ˙¯·Á‰ ÈÈ„· .‰Ê· ‡ˆÂÈΠ˙Â˙ÂÂÚÓ˙‡ ÌȘ˙¯Ó ˙ÂÂÎÓ ‰ÏÈË Ï˘ Ìȯ˜Ó˘ „ÂÚ· .138‰¯·Á‰ ÈÙÏÎ ˙¯ȉʉ ˙·ÂÁ ˙¯Ù‰

.139‰·¯‰· ‰¯ÂÓÁ ‰ÈÚ· Șω ωȉ ‡˜Â„ ‰ÂÂ‰Ó ,¯Â·Èˆ‰ ˙‡Â ˙¯Â˘˜˙‰‰ÏÈË È‰ÈÊ .‰¯·ÁÏ ÌÈÂÓ‡‰ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ ˙¯ى ÌÚ „„ÂÓ˙‰Ï ÌÈÏ‚ÂÒÓ ËÙ˘Ó‰ È˙·˙ÂËÏÁ‰‰ ˙ÂÎȇ ÏÚ ˙ÈËÂÙÈ˘ ˙¯Â˜È· ˙¯·Ú‰ ·ÈÈÁÓ Âȇ ‰¯·Á‰ ÔÓ ‰·È‚ ‡ ˙ÂÂÎÓËÙ˘Ó‰ È˙· ÌÈÏ‚ÂÒÓ ,˙ÂÂÎÓ ‰ÏÈË ‰Ù˘Á˘ ˙ÚÓ ,ÔÎ ÏÚ .‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ˙ÂȘÒÚ‰ÌÚ ˙„„ÂÓ˙‰‰ ˙ÓÈ˘ÓÏ ÌÈÓȇ˙Ó Ìȇ ËÙ˘Ó‰ È˙· ,˙‡Ê ˙ÓÂÚÏ .140‰Ù¯˙ ˜ÙÒÏ

R.C. Moyer, R.E. Chatfield & P.M. Sisneros “Security Analyst Monitoring ;(˙¯·Á Ï˘Activity: Agency Costs and Information Demands” 24 J. Fin. & Quant. Anal. (1989)Doukas et al., ;(ÌÈËÒÈχ ÌÈÚˆ·Ó˘ Á˜ÈÙ‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙÏ ÌÈȯÈÙÓ‡ ÔÈÎÂÓÈ˙ ÌȘÙÒÓ) 503Á˜ÈÙ Ï˘ ‰Èˆ˜ÂÙ ÌȇÏÓÓ ÌÈÈËÒÈχ ÌÈÁÂ˙È˘ ÍÎÏ ˙ȯÈÙÓ‡ ‰ÎÈÓ˙ ˜ÙÒÓ) supra note 22J.N. ;(‰¯·Á· ‰ËÈÏ˘‰ ÔÈ·Ï ˙ÂÏÚ·‰ ÔÈ·˘ ‰„¯Ù‰‰ ÔÓ ˙Âڷ‰ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ‰˙ÈÁÙÓ‰Gordon “Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information Order ofM.J. Epstein & K.G. ‡¯ ÔÎ .Sarbanes-Oxley” 35 Conn. L. Rev. (2003) 1125, 1132¯˜ÁÓ) Palepu “What Financial Analysts Want” 80 Strategic Finance (1999) 48, 50Ì‰Ó 87% ÈÎ ‰ÏÚ‰ ,ÌÓÂÁ˙· "ÌÈ·ÎÂÎ" ÌÈ·˘Á‰ ,¯ÎÂÓ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ 140 ·¯˜· Í¯Ú˘

.(‰¯·Á‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ ÏÚ È‡¯Î ÌÈÁ˜ÙÓ Ìȇ ˙¯·Á Ï˘ ÌÈÂȯ¢¯È„ ÈÎ ÌÈÈÓ‡Ó135.Gordon, ibid, at p. 1132136A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, 98 A2D 581 (N.J. 1953); Cinerama ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯

Inc. v. Technicolor Inc., 663 A2d 1156 (Del. 1995); Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas &.Electric Co., 121 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1918)

137.B.S. Black “Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers” 41 Stan. L. Rev. (1989) 597, 627 ‡¯138.supra note 16 ‡¯139.supra note 19 ‡¯140R.B. Thompson & R.S. Thomas “Shareholder Litigation: Reexamining the Balance ‡¯

41

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

˙ÂËÏÁ‰ ÏÚ ˙¯Â˜È· ˙¯·Ú‰ ·ÈÈÁÓ ÈÂ˜Ï ÏÂ‰È È‰ÈÊ˘ ¯Á‡Ó ,˙¯ȉʉ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ ˙Â¯Ù‰Ï˘ ˙ÂȘÒÚ‰ ̉È˙ÂËÏÁ‰ ˙˜È„· ˜¯Ù‰ ÏÚ ‰„ÓÚ ¯˘‡Î .‰¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó Ï˘ ˙ÂȘÒÚ,141(business judgment rule-‰) ȘÒÚ ˙Ú„ ÏÂ˜È˘ ¯·„· ÏÏΉ ıÓ‡ ,˙¯·Á ÈωÓ,‰¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó ˙ÂËÏÁ‰·˘ ȘÒÚ‰ ÔÂȂȉ· ˜Ù˜ÙÏÓ ÂÚÓÈÈ ËÙ˘Ó‰ È˙· ÈΠڷ˜‰¯È˙‰ ,¯‡ÂÂÏ„· Ì‚ ÂÓΠχ¯˘È· ˜˜ÂÁÓ‰ ,„ÂÚ ˙‡Ê .142¯˙ÂÈ· ÌÈȈȘ Ìȯ˜Ó· ‡Ï‡ÈÙÏÎ ˙¯ȉʉ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ ‰¯Ù‰ ÔÈ‚· ÈÙÒΠȈÈÙ ÌÂÏ˘˙Ó Ìȯ¢¯È„ ¯ÂËÙÏ ˙¯·Áω¯·Ú ˙¯ȉʉ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ ˙¯ى ÌÚ ˙„„ÂÓ˙‰Ï ˙ÂȯÁ‡‰˘ ‡È‰ ‰‡ˆÂ˙‰ .143‰¯·Á‰Ï˘ ˙ÂÚÙÂ˙ ÌÚ ÌÈ„„ÂÓ˙Ó ÂÈ˙„ÒÂÓ ˜Â˘‰ ÈÂ‚Ó ,Ô· .˜Â˘‰ χ ËÙ˘Ó‰ È˙·ÓÏ˘ ‰¯„Ò‰˘ „ÂÚ· ,ÌȯˆÂÓ‰ ˜Â˘·Â Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘· ˙¯Á˙‰ ˙ÂÚˆÓ‡· ¯˜ÈÚ· ÈÂ˜Ï Ï‰È

.144˙ÂÈ˙¯·Á ˙Âӯ ËÙ˘Ó‰-È˙· Ï˘ ̘ÏÁ ˙Ó ˙¯˙ ˙ÂÂÎÓ ‰ÏÈË ˙ÂÏÈÚÙZ ‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ÈÂ˜Ï Ï‰ȷ Ô¯Â˜Ó˘ Âχ Z ¯˙ÂÈ ˙ÂÈ˙‰Ӊ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ,ÌÈωӉ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ ¯Á‡ ÌÈ·˜ÂÚ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˜Â˘ ˙¯ÊÚ· ˙Â˙ÁÙÂÓȯÈÁÓ ÍÂ˙ χ ÂÁ˙È ÂÙÒ‡˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙‡ ÌÈÓÏ‚Ó ˙ÂȘÒÚ‰ ̉È˙ÂËÏÁ‰ ˙‡ ÌÈÎȯÚÓÚ„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÌÈÈÂ˘Ú ,ȯ˜ÈÚ‰ ̄ȘÙ˙ Âȇ Â‰Ê˘ Ì‚‰ .ÌÈÈ˷ϯ‰ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈÏÎÎ .145ÌÈÏ‰Ó È„È· ‰·È‚ ˙ÂÂÂÎÓ ˙ÂÏÈË ,˙ÂÈÓ¯˙ Ì‚ ¯˙‡Ï ˙¯·Á‰ ¯Á‡ ÌÈ·˜ÂÚ‰.146‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙˙ÁÙ‰· ¯˙ÂÈ ÏÈÚÈ ‰Ê ˜Â˘ ‰È‰È ÍÎ ,¯˙ÂÈ Á˙ÂÙÓ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˜Â˘˘ÔÈ·Ï ,„È‚‡˙· ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ˙ÈÁÙ‰Ï ‡Â‰ ̄ȘÙ˙˘ ,˙¯·Á‰ ÈÈ„ ÔÈ· ‰Á·‰‰È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ Ï˘ Â˙ÂÁ˙Ù˙‰ ˙‡ „„ÂÚÏ ‡Â‰ ̄ȘÙ˙˘ ,Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„˙‡ „„ÂÚÏ ‡Â‰ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙˘ „ÂÚ· .147˙ÈÚÓ˘Ó „Á ‰È‡ ,Ú„ÈÓ,˙ÂÙ‡Â˘‰ ˙‡¯Â‰ Ì‚ ÌÈÏÈÎÓ Âχ ÌÈÈ„ ,Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ Ï˘ Â˙ÂÁ˙Ù˙‰˙ˆ¯‡· ÍÎÏ ˙‡ӂ„ .148È„È‚‡˙‰ ¯Ë˘Ó‰ ‰·Ó ˙‡ ¯Ù˘Ï ,‡ÏÓ Â‡ ȘÏÁ ÔÙ‡·

Between Litigation Agency Costs and Management Agency Costs” (2002) (working paperseries), available at: URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=336162.(ÌÈÂÓ‡‰ ˙·ÂÁ ˙¯ÙÂÓ Ì‰·˘ Ìȯ˜Ó· ¯˙ÂÈ Ìȉ·‚ ‰Áψ‰ ÈÈÂÎÈÒ Ú·Â˙Ï ˘È ¯Â‡τ· ÈÎ ÌÈÚÂË)

141.‰ÂÂÏȉ ·Â˙ÈΉ ,supra note 20 ‡¯142¯·Ò‰‰ ȯ·„ ;764y760 (Ò"˘˙ ,‰ÈÈ˘ ‰¯Â„‰Ó) ÔÈ„‰Â ˘„Á‰ ˜ÂÁ‰ Z ˙¯·Á ˉ· 'È Â‡¯

Smith v. ‡¯ ;1991y‡"˘˙ (‰¯˘Ó ȇ˘Â ˙ÂȯÁ‡) (4 'ÒÓ) ˙¯·Á‰ ˙„˜٠Ô˜È˙Ï Á"ˆ‰Ï.Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (1985)

143.Delaware General Corporation Law §102(b)(7), 8 Del. Code. Ann. (1999) ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯144.Rock & Wachter, supra note 21 ‡¯145.(‰¯·Á· ˙ÈÓ¯˙ Û˘Á˘ ËÒÈχ) Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983) ˙˘¯Ù ˙„·ÂÚ Â‡¯146.‰ÂÂÏȉ ·Â˙ÈΉ ,supra note 134 ‡¯147R.B. Thompson & H.A. Sale “Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections ‡¯

˙¯ÈÈ· ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÔÈ‚· ˙ÂÈÈ„˙‰ „ˆÈÎ ÌȯȷÒÓ) Upon Federalism” 56 Vand. L. Rev. (2003) 857.(È„È‚‡˙ ¯Ë˘Ó Ô‚ÓÎ ˙˘Ó˘Ó ͯÚ

148R.B. Thompson “Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law ‡¯,˙Âү·‰ „ˆÈÎ Ìȯ‡˙Ó) and Federal Regulations” 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. (2003) 961.(˙¯·Á· ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ¯ÚÊÓÏ È„Î ÂÈ„ÁÈ ÌÈÏÚÂÙ ˙ȯ·‰ ˙ˆ¯‡· ˙Èϯ„Ù‰ ‰Ï˘ÓӉ ,¯Â‡τ

42

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

‡ÏÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ÌÈ·ÈÈÁÓ‰ ,(ÈҘ¯Ù) ÁÈÏ˘ ˙ÂÚˆÓ‡· ‰Ú·ˆ‰‰ ÈÏÏη ‡ÂˆÓÏ Ô˙È ˙ȯ·‰„ÁÂÈÓ ÍÈω ÌÂȘ ˙·ÈÈÁÓ‰ ˜ÂÁ ˙‡¯Â‰· ;149˙ÂÈÓ‰ ÈÏÚ· ˙Ú·ˆ‰ ̯˷ ‰¯·Á‰ „ˆÓ,151 Sarbanes-Oxley Act-·Â ;150(ȘȯӇ‰ Williams Act-‰ Ô‚Î) ˘Î¯ ˙Úˆ‰ ͯˆÏÁÂÂÈ„ ˙¯„ˆÂ¯Ù ¯È„‚Ó ,˙¯Â˜È·‰ ˙„ÚÂ Ï˘Â ÔÂȯ¢¯È„‰ Ï˘ ÌÈÂÒÓ ‰·Ó ·ÈÈÁÓ‰˙‡ӂ„‰Ó „Á‡ Ïη .152˙¯·Á‰ ÈÁÂÂÈ„ Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÎȇ ˙ÁË·‰ Í¯ÂˆÏ ˙‡Ê ÏΠ,˙ÂÓÈÂÒÓ

.Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ˜Â˘ Ï˘ „„ÈÚ ‡Ï ȄȂ‡˙ ¯Ë˘Ó ‰·Ó· ˙·¯Ú˙‰ ˙‡¯Ï Ô˙È ÏÈÚÏ˘ÌÈ·¯ ,˙È˘‡¯ .Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„· Û˜˙˘Ó‰ ÌȄȘÙ˙‰ "·Â¯ÈÚ"Ï ÌÈÓÚË ‰ÓÎ ÌÈÓÈȘ.Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˜Â˘ Ï˘ ÂÁÂ˙ÈÙ ÏÚ ¯È˘È ÔÙ‡· ÌÈÚÈÙ˘Ó È„È‚‡˙‰ ¯Ë˘Ó‰ È·ÈίÓÓ˙ÂÓȇ ˙ÂÏÚ ˙‡ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ¯Â·Ú ˙Â˙ÈÁÙÓ ˙¯ÙÂ˘Ó ˙Âȇ·˘Á ˙Âӯ ,‰Ó‚Â„Ï¯Ë˘Ó‰ ÏÂÚÈÈ Ï˘ „ȘÙ˙‰ Ïˉ ˙ȯ·‰ ˙ˆ¯‡·˘ „ÂÚ· ,˙È˘ .153Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÈÓ‡‰ÓÈÚ˘ ˙È˙ÈÓ‡‰ ˙¯Á˙‰ ‰ÚÈ‚Ó ,ÏÚÂÙ·˘ ȯ‰ ,˙ÂÈ„Ó‰ ÔÈ· ˙¯Á˙‰ ÏÚ È„È‚‡˙‰Ï˘ÓÓ‰ Ï˘ ÂÂÂÈÎÓ Z ¯Â‡τ Z ˙ÂÈ„‚‡˙‰‰ ۘȉ· ‰ÏÈ·ÂÓ‰ ‰È„Ó‰ ˙„„ÂÓ˙ÓÏÂ‰È ÈÈÈÚ· ·¯Ú˙‰Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ Èϯ„Ù‰ Ï˘ÓÓ‰ ˙‡ ˘Ó˘Ó‰ ȯ˜ÈÚ‰ ÈÏΉ .154Èϯ„Ù‰˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„· ˘ÂÓÈ˘ ‡Â‰ ,"˙È˙Á˙Ï ı¯ÈÓ" ÈÙÓ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ¯ÈÒ‰Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ „È‚‡˙‰¯Â·Ò Èϯ„Ù‰ Ï˘ÓÓ‰˘ È„È‚‡˙ ¯Ë˘Ó Ï˘ ˙Âχ˘ ,ÔÎ ÏÚ .ÌÈÈϯ„Ù ÌÈÈ„ Ìȉ˘ ,ͯډ

.155Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ È„È ÏÚ ˙¯„ÒÂÓ ˙ÂÈ„Ó‰ È„È ÏÚ ˙‡ÈÎ ÂÏÙÂË ‡Ï ÈΉ‚‰‰ .˙¯·Á‰ ÈÈ„ ÔÈ·Ï Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ÔÈ· ·Â˘Á ¯˘˜ ‰˘ÈÁÓÓ ÂÊ ˙¯Á˙˙ÂÈÓ ÈÏÚ·· Ú‚ÙÏ Ï˜ ¯˘‡Î .156Ô‰‰ È˜Â˘ Ï˘ Ì‚Â˘‚˘Ï ˙ÈÁ¯Î‰ ˙ÂÈÓ ÈÏÚ· ÏÚ¯·„· ˜È¯·Ó ÈËÒÈχ ÁÂ˙È .Á˙Ù˙‰Ï Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ ˜Â˘Ï ‰˘˜ ,Ì˘ÂÎ¯Ó ÌÏ˘ÏÂÌȇ ¯Â·Èˆ‰ ·¯˜Ó ˙ÂÈÓ ÈÏÚ· ̇ ˙ÏÚÂ˙ ¯ÒÁ ‡Â‰ ‰¯·Á Ï˘ ÌÈÈ„È˙Ú‰ ‰ÈÚˆȷ

149M.A. Eisenberg Corporations and Other Business Organizations: Cases and ‡¯¯Á‡Ï ˙¯·Á ÈÈ„ Ï‚Ò-·È·Á '‡ ;Materials (New York, 8th Unabridged, 2000) 285y288

.326y324 ('· ͯΠ,„"Ò˘˙) ˘„Á‰ ˙¯·Á‰ ˜ÂÁ150.Eisenberg, ibid, at pp. 1136y1140151.Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107y204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) ‡¯152.B. Kim “Sarbanes-Oxley Act” 40 Harv. J. on Legis. (2003) 235 ‡¯153P. Jain, J. Kim & Z. Rezaee “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Market Liquidity” ‡¯

(year) available at: URL:http://web2.kelley.iu.edu/FEA/FEA_Papers/03_Session_V_˙‡ ¯ÙÈ˘Â Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÚÙ ˙‡ ˙ÈÁÙ‰ Sarbanes-Oxley-‰ ˜ÂÁ ÈÎ ÌȘÈÒÓ) Accounting.pdfN.H. Aronson “Preventing Future Enrons: ;(˙¯·Á Ï˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÙȘ˘Â Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚Implementing The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002” 8 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. (2002) 127,Sarbanes-Oxley-‰ ˜ÂÁ ˙·˜Ú· ˙Âȇ·˘Á ˙˜È˘¯Ù· ÌÈÈÂÙˆ‰ ÌÈÈÂÈ˘· Ô„) 136y137

.(˙¯·Á‰ ÈÁÂÂÈ„· ˙¯·Â‚ ˙ÂÙȘ˘Ï ÈÙˆ·Â154Eisenberg, supra note 149, at pp. 101y107; M.J. Roe “Delaware’s Competition” 117

.Harv. L. Rev. (2003) 588155.Roe, ibid ‡¯156B.S. Black “The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets” ‡¯

.48 Ucla L. Rev. (2001) 781

43

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

ÌÈÈÂ˘Ú Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ .ËÂÚÈÓ‰ ˜˘ÂÚ Ï˘· ̉˘ÏÎ ÌÈÈ„È˙Ú ÌÈÁÂÂ¯Ó ˙‰ÈÏ ÌÈ„È˙Ú,‰ÚÈ‚Ù ÈÙÓ ˙ÂÈÓ‰ ÈÏÚ· ÏÚ Ô‚‰Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ ‰¯·Á‰ ÏÚ Á˜ÈÙ È˙Â¯È˘ ˜ÙÒÏ ˙ÂÒωÙÈ· ˙ÂËÈ˘Â ˙ÂÈ˙Â‰Ó ˙ÂÈÂÎÊ ‡ˆÓ· Ôȇ˘ ÏÎÎ ˙ÏÁÂ˙ ȯÒÁ ̉ Âχ ˙ÂÂÈÒÈ Í‡˙ÈÊÂÎȯ ˙ÂÏÚ· ˙ÓÈȘ Ô‰·˘ ,χ¯˘È ˙ӂ„ ˙ÂÈ„Ó· „ÁÂÈÓ· ÔÂÎ ¯·„‰ .˙ÂÈ·È˘ه˙¯Á˙‰ ‰ÈÂ˘Ú ,ÂÊ Ë·Ó ˙„Â˜Ó .157ËÙ˘Ó‰ È˙· „ˆÓ ˙È·È˘ه ‰ÙÈ· ¯„Úȉ „ˆÏ˙‚‰‰ ̇ .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˜Â˘ ˙‡ ¯Ó˘Ï ˙ÂÂÎÓÎ ÒÙ˙È‰Ï Èϯ„Ù‰ Ï˘ÓÓ‰ „ˆÓ‰‡ˆÂ˙Π,¯·„ Ï˘ ÂÙÂÒ· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˜Â˘ Ú‚ÙÈÈ ,˙ÂÏÈÚÈ Ôȇ ˙ÂÈÓ ÈÏÚ·Ï ˙Â˙ȉ

.Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘ Ì‚ Ú‚ÙÈÈ ÍÎӂȈ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ .˙¯·Á‰ Ï˘ Ô·ˆÓ ˙‡ Ì‚ ‰·ÈËÈÓ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙˙ÁÙ‰ ,„ÂÚ ˙‡Ê‰‡Â˘˙‰ ˙‡ Ì‚ ÍΠ,ÌȯÁÒ Ô‰Ï˘ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ˘ ˙¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ÔÈÈ¢ ˙‡ ˙ÂÈË˜Ó¯Â·Ú ÌÏ˘Ï Ì˙ÂÂÎ ˙‡ ÌÈ˙ÈÁÙÓ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ .˜Â˘‰ Ï˘ ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ ˜È˙ ÏÚ ˙ÏÏÂΉ.‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ Ï˘ ÔÓÂȘ·˘ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ Û˜˘Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ (discounting) ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈÏ„‚ ÍÎ ,¯˙ÂÈ ˙‰·‚ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ˘ ÏÎÎ .˙¯·ÁÏ Ô‰‰ ÒÂÈ‚ ¯ÈÁÓ ‰ÏÂÚ ÍÎÓ ‰‡ˆÂ˙ΉÏÈ·ÂÓ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ Á˙ÙÏ ˙Ó ÏÚ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ۘȉ ˙Ï„‚‰ .ÔÂÂȉ‰ ¯ÂÚÈ˘˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ ,¯˙ÂÈ ˙ÂÎÂÓ ‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚÏ ‰·Â‚˙·˘ ¯Á‡Ó .‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙˙ÁÙ‰Ï

.ÍÎÓ ‰‰ÈÈ ÂÏÂÎ ˜Â˘‰Â ,Ô‰‰ ÒÂÈ‚ ˙ÂÏÚ Ô˘˙ ,¯˙ÂÈ ÌÈÎÂÓ ÔÂÂȉ ȯÂÚÈ˘Ï Â˜˜„ÊȉÈÙÏ˘ ,ԇΠÌÈ‚ÈˆÓ Â‡˘ ‰„ÓÚ‰ ˙‡ ¯˜È· ‡Â‰ Paul Mahoney ·˙΢ ¯Ó‡Ó·Ì„ȘÙ˙ ,Â˙Ù˜˘‰Ï .158Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ ˜Â˘ ˙ÂÁ˙Ù˙‰Ï ̯˙Ï Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ÏÚÈÏ‰Ó ˙ÂÏÈÚÙÓ ˙Âڷ‰ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ÔÈ˘‰Ï ‰È‰ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ȯÂËÒȉ‰˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ÏÚ ,ȉ‡Ó Ï˘ Â˙Ú„Ï .159‡ÏÓÏ ÍÈ˘Ó‰Ï Ì‰ÈÏÚ˘ „ȘÙ˙‰ ‰Ê ,‰¯·Á‰˙Â˘È¯„ ˙·ˆ‰· ,˙ÂÓÈ‡Ï Ô˙ȉ ÁÈ˘˜ Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ ÂÈÂÏÈ‚ ·ÂÈÁ· ̇˙‰· „˜Ó˙‰Ï ͯÚÂÓÎ ,‰¯·Á‰ ÔÓ ÌÈÏ·˜Ó ÌÈÏ‰Ó˘ ˙·ˉ‰Â ¯Î˘‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚·Â ,˙ÂÈ¯Ó˘ ˙Âȇ·˘ÁÔ„ÂÒÈ˘ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙ÂÚÈÙÂÓ È‰‡Ó ˙Ú„Ï˘ ¯Á‡Ó .160ÔÈÈÚ ÈÏÚ· ÌÚ ˙‡˜ÒÚ Ì‚‰¯ÂÓ˙ ˙Ï·˜ Ï˘ ‡ ,ÔÈÈÚ ÈÏÚ· ÌÚ ˙‡˜ÒÚ Ï˘ ,˙ÈÓ¯˙ Ï˘ ‰¯Âˆ· ÌÈωӉ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ·˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ¯ÂÚÊÓ Ï˘ ‰¯ËÓ‰ ˙‡ ‚È˘‰Ï È„Î ˙Ï·‚ÂÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ· È„ ,‰¯·Á‰ ÔÓ ˙ÓÊ‚ÂÓ̇Â˙Ó È‡Â·˘Á Ú„ÈÓ ,‰¯·Á‰ „È˙ÚÏ Ú‚Â‰ ,ͯ Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÏ‚Ï ·ÂÈÁ ˙Ïˉ .Âχ ‚ȈÌÂ˘Ó ,˙ÈÊ·Ê· ‰È‰ ˙¯Á‡ ȘÒÚ Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÒÈÙ (current values accounting)ÁÂ˙ÈÙ Ï˘ ‰Ó„Ӊ ‰¯ËÓ‰ χ ˙ÂÂÎÓ ‡È‰ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ˙ÈÁÙ‰Ï Ì˜ӷ˘

.161ȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙ÂÚˆÓ‡· ÌÈÏÈÚÈ ÌȘ¢

157Z. Goshen “The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets ‡¯.(‰Ó‚„Π‰ÈÏËȇ ˙‡ ¯‡˙Ó‰) Reality” 91 Cal. L. Rev. (2003) 393, 435

158P.G. Mahoney “Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems” 62 U. ‡¯.Chi. L. Rev. (1995) 1047

159.Ibid, at pp. 1051y1052160.Ibid, at pp. 1105y1111161.Ibid

44

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

˙ڷ‰ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÈÈÚ· ÏÚ „·Ï· ˙ȘÏÁ ˙·˙‰ ÏÚ ˙ÒÒÂ·Ó ÂÊ ‰Ù˜˘‰ ,‡˜Ú ‡„.‰ÈÚ·‰ È„ÓÓ ˙˘‰· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ̘ÏÁ ÏÚ ,‰¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÏÈÚÙÓÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙·ÂÁ ˙‡ ÏÈ·‚‰Ï ˘È ÈÎ ¯Â·Ò ,ÌÈÂÓ‡‰ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ ˙Â¯Ù‰Ó „¯ËÂÓ Mahoney‰ÚË· ˙Ó‡ ˘È˘ Ì‚‰ ,Ìχ .„·Ï· ÂÊ ‰ÈÚ· ÌÚ ˙„„ÂÓ˙‰Ï Ìȇ˙˙˘ ÍΠȯÂ˄Ӊȯ‰ ,ÌÈÂÓ‡‰ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ ˙¯ى· Ô¯Â˜Ó˘ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ˙ÈÁÙÈ ÔÈÈ„Ú Ï·‚ÂÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚˘Ï˘ ˙¯ى· Ô¯Â˜Ó˘ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚÏ ‰ÚÓ ˙˙Ï È„Î ÂÊÎ ˙Ï·‚ÂÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ· Ôȇ˘˙¯ȉʉ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ ˙¯ى ÏÚ Á˜ÙÏ ÌÈÏ‚ÂÒÓ Ìȇ ËÙ˘Ó‰ È˙· ,¯ÂӇΠ.˙¯ȉʉ ˙·ÂÁ,ÌÏÈ·‚‰Ï ÈÂ˜Ï ÏÂ‰È Ï˘ ÌÈÎÏ‰Ó ¯˙‡Ï ÌÈÏÂÎÈ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˜¯ .‰¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó „ˆÓ¯ÒÂÁ· ÌÈ‚‰Â ˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ ,Ú„ÈÓ ¯Á‡ ÌÈ˘ÙÁÓ Ìȇ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ ,¯ÂӇΠ,Ô΢˙·ÂÁ ‰Ï·‚‰ ÂÏȇ .ÌÓˆÚ ÏÚ Á˜ÙÏ ÌÈÈÂÙˆ Ìȇ˘ ȇ„ ÌÈÙ‰ È˘‡ ÂÏȇ ,˙ÂÈÏÂȈ¯‚ÂÒ ÏÎ Ï˘ ÂÙÂÒȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ˘ ȯ‰ ,˙ÂÂÂÎÓ ˙ÂÏÈË ‰·È‚ ÂÈÈÚ˘ Ú„ÈÓÏ Í‡ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰Â˙ÈÁÙÈ ˙‰·‚ Ú„ÈÓ ÛÂÒȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ .˙ÂÏ„‚ Âȉ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ìȇ˘Â Ô‰·˘ ¯Á‡ Ú„ÈÓÏ˘ ۘȉ‰ ˙‡Â ÈËÒÈχ ÈÂÒÈÎÏ ÂÎÊÈ˘ ˙¯·Á‰ ¯ÙÒÓ ˙‡ ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ¯ÙÒÓ ˙‡

.ÂÂÚÈË· ȉ‡Ó ÌÏÚ˙‰ ÂÊ ‰„Â˜Ó .‰¯·Á ÏÎ ˙Ù˘Á ÂÈχ˘ ÈÂÒÈΉ¯Á‡Ó ,Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ˜Â˘ Ï˘ ÂÁÂ˙ÈÙ Í¯ÂˆÏ ˙ÈÁ¯Î‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÛÂÒȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙˙ÁÙ‰‰·ÂÁ ˙Ïˉ .‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ˙ȘÒÚ‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ‰ È˷ȉ Ïη ÌÈÈÈÚ˙Ó Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ˘ÈÏ‰Ó ÌÈÎÂÊ ‰Ï˘ ‰¯ÂÓ˙‰ ˙‡ ,ÔÈÈÚ ÈÏÚ· ÌÚ ˙‡˜ÒÚ ¯·„· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙‡ ˜¯ ˙ÂÏ‚Ï.‰¯·Á‰ ˙„‡ ÏÚ „·Ï· ȘÏÁ Ú„ÈÓ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÏ ˜ÙÒ˙ ÁÈ˘˜ Ú„ÈÓ ‰¯·Á‰˙ÂÈÂÏÈÚÙ‰ ÏÚ ‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ˙ÂȘÒÚ‰ ‰È˙ÂËÏÁ‰ ÏÚ ÌÈ˯ÙÏ ÌÈ˜Â˜Ê Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒÏ˘ ̄ȘÙ˙ ÈÎ Ìȯ·ÂÒ‰ .162„È˙Ú ÈÙ ‰Ùˆ‰ ͯ Ú„ÈÓÏ ÔΠ,‰Ï˘ ˙¢‰ ˙ÂȘÒÚ‰Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˜Â˘˘ ˙Â„Â‰Ï ÌÈ·ÈÈÁ „·Ï· ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ¯ÚÊÓÏ ‡Â‰ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„

.‰Ê „ȘÙ˙ Û‡ ‡ÏÓÏ È¢Ú

˙ÂÈ·ÂÈÁ ˙ÂȈÈÁ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰ .6

˙ÈÈ˘Ú˙ ÏÚ ڄÈÓ‰ ˜Â˘ ÏÚ ˙ÂÈ·ÂÈÁ ˙ÂȈÈÁ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰ ¯ˆÂÈ È˙¯Á˙ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ˜Â˘˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ „ˆÈÎ ¯È·Ò Âχ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰· Ô„ ÔÏ‰Ï˘ ÌÈÙÈÚÒ· .˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰ ˙‡˜·

.Ô˙‡ Ìȯ˘Ù‡Ó ͯÚ

Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˜Â˘ (‡)

˙ÂÚˆÓ‡· ,ÔÈÙȘڷ ͇ Ì˙¢¯·˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙‡ ÌÈÏ‚Ó Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÓ ˜ÏÁ˘ „ÂÚ·.È·ÓÂÙ· ̉ÈÁÂ˙È ̉ȇˆÓÓ ˙‡ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÓ ¯Á‡ ˜ÏÁ ÌÈÓÒ¯ÙÓ ,¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÂÚÙ

162‡¯ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ˙ÂÈÊÁ˙·˘ ˜ÂÈ„‰ ˙„ÈÓ ˙‡ ¯Ù˘Ó ȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ÈÎ ‰ÚË· ˙ȯÈÙÓ‡ ‰ÎÈÓ˙ÏA.J. Irani “The Effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure on the Relevance of Conference

.Calls to Financial Analysts” 22 Rev. Quant. Fin. & Account. (2004) 15

45

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

̉˘ ˙Â¯È˘‰ ÔÓ ˜ÏÁÎ Ú·˜ ÒÈÒ· ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ ÌÈÏ‚Ó Ï˘ÓÏ ÌȯÎÂÓ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ,˙‡Ê ˙ÓÂÚÏ ,ÌȘ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ ÌÈÈ‡ÓˆÚ ÌÈËÒÈχ .̉È˙ÂÁ˜ÏÏ ÌȘÙÒÓ˙‡ ÌÒ¯ÙÏ ÌÓˆÚ ˙‡ Ì„˜Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ ˙‡Ê ,Ì˙¢¯·˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÔÓ ˜ÏÁ ˜¯ ÌÈÏ‚Ó˜Â˘· ÍÓÂ˙ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ÌÈÚˆ·Ó˘ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯Â·Èˆ‰ ÛÂ˙È˘ Ï˘ ‰Ê ÍÈω˙ .163̉È˙Â¯È˘,˯Ëȇ ȯ˙‡Â ,ÂÈ„¯ ˙ÂÁ˙ ,‰ÈÊÈ·ÏË ÈˆÂ¯Ú ,ÌÈÂ˙ÈÚ ÌÈÓÈȘ ÌÈËÒÈÏ‡Ï ˙„‰ .Ú„ÈÓ‰

.164˘È‚ ÈÒÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ ·Á¯ ÔÂÂ‚Ó Z ÍÂÓ ÌÂÏ˘˙ ¯Â·Ú ‡ ÌÈÁ· Z ÌÈÚȈӉڄÈÓ‰ ˜Â˘ ,˙È˘‡¯ .˙ÂÙÒ ˙ÂÈ·ÂÈÁ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰ ¯ˆÂÈ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ÌȘÙÒÓ˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰‡È‰ ÂÓÓ˘ Ú„ÈÓ· Ô¯˙ȉ ˙‡ ‰Ï‚Ó‰ ˙ÈËÒÈχ ÏÎ .Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘ Ï˘ Â˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ˙‡ ¯Ù˘ÓÌ˙„Â·Ú ˙‡ ÍÈ¯Ú‰Ï Ì‰Ï ÚÈÈÒÓ‰ ,ÛÒ ڄÈÓ ÌȯÁ‡‰ ÌÈËÒÈÏ‡Ï ˙˜ÙÒÓ ,˙ȉÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ÏÎ ¯Â·Ú Z ÔÈ˘‰Ï È„Î ˘È Íη .ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ ¯ÂÁÓ˙ ˙·ÏÓ ˙‡ ¯Ù˘Ï‰ژ˘‰‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚ٠ۘȉ ˙‡ ÏÈ„‚Ó Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˜Â˘ ,˙È˘ .„ÂÓÈω ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ Z˙‡Â ÌÂÁË· ˙‡ ÒÒ·Ï ÚÈÈÒÓ ÂÈχ ÌÈÙ˘Á ˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒ˘ ÛÈ„Ú‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ .165Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘·.166˙ÂÈÓ È˘ÏÓÏ ˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒÏ ÍÂÙ‰Ï ÌÈ„ÈÁÈ ÏÚ Ï˜Ó ‰Ê Ú„ÈÓ ,ÛÒ· .˜Â˘· ÌÂÓ‡˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ‰˙ÈÁÙÓ ÌÈËÒÈÏ‡Ï ˘Â˜È·‰ ˙‡ ‰„ÈˆÓ ‰ÏÈ„‚Ó ˙¯·‚ÂÓ ‰Ú˜˘‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ

.˙¯·Á‰ Ï˘ Ô‰‰

˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰ ˙‡˜· ˙ÈÈ˘Ú˙ (·)

˙‡˜· ˙ÈÈ˘Ú˙ ÏÚ ˙ÂÈ·ÂÈÁ ˙ÂȈÈÁ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰ ¯ˆÂÈ È˙¯Á˙ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ˜Â˘˙‡ Ú·˜Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ ÌÈÈÒÈÙ ÌÈÁÂ˙È ÏÚ ÍÓ˙Ò‰Ï ÌÈ·ÈÈÁ ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ È˙· .˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰‰˜Ù‰‰ ·Ï˘· ˜ÒÚÂÓ‰ ËÒÈχ‰ .(IPO) ˙ÂÈ¢‡¯ ˙˜ى· ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ

163.˙ÂÈÓ È¯ÈÁÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ˙ˆÏÓ‰ ÔÈ· ˙ÂÈ˙Ù˜˙ ˙‡Â¢‰ ÌÈÓÒ¯ÙÓ ÌÈÈÒÈÙ ÌÈÂ˙ÈÚ ,‰Ó‚„Ï164J.A. Busse & T.C. Green “Market Efficiency in Real Time” 65 J. Fin. Econ. ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯

Ú„ÈÓ ÏÚ ÍÓ˙Ò‰· ÌȯÁÂÒ Ô‰‰ È˜Â˘· ÌÈÓÈÂÒÓ ÌȘÁ˘˘ ˙ȯÈÙÓ‡ ‰ÎÈÓ˙) (2002) 415, 416ÏÈÚÏ ,˜Ò˜ ¯· ‡¯ ;(CNBC ˙ÈÂÈÊÈÂÂÏˉ ˙¢„Á‰ ˙¯·Á ˙ÂÈÎÂ˙ È„È ÏÚ ˜ÙÂÒÓ‰ ÈËÒÈχ

.109 ‰¯Ú‰165Busse & Green, ibid ‡¯ ÌÈËÒÈÏ‡Ó ÚÙ˘ÂÓ ¯ÁÒÓ‰ ‰·˘ ˙¯ȉӉ ˙‡ „Ú˙Ó‰ ȯÈÙÓ‡ ¯˜ÁÓÏ

CNBC Ï˘ ÌÈȯ‰ˆ‰ ‡ ¯˜Â·‰ ˙ÈÎÂ˙· È·ÂÈÁ ¯˘˜‰· ¯Îʉ˘ ˙ÂÈÓ Ï˘ Ô‰È¯Ú˘ ÈÎ ÌÈÈȈÓ)‰Â˘‡¯Ï ‰¯Îʉ ‰ÈÓ‰˘ ¯Á‡Ï ˙ÂÈ˘ ˙ÈÏÎÏΠ˙ÈËÒÈËËÒ ‰ÈÁ·Ó ˙È˙ÂÚÓ˘Ó Â˙˘‰ TV

.(˙˜„ 15 Í¯Â‡Ï ‰Î˘Ó ,¯˙ÂÈ ˙È˙‚¯„‰ ‰˙Èȉ ÈÏÈÏ˘ ¯˘˜‰· ÁÂÂÈ„Ï ‰·Â‚˙‰ .˙ÈÎÂ˙·166P.J. Irvine “The Incremental Impact of Analyst Initiation of Coverage” 9 J. Corp. ‡¯

ÈÂÒÈΉ ۘȉ· ‰ÈÈÏÚ :˙ÂÏÈʉ ˙ÊÈ˙ÂÙÈ‰Ï ˙ȯÈÙÓ‡ ‰ÎÈÓ˙ ˜ÙÒÓ) Fin. (2003) 431, 432·Èί ˙‡ ‰ÈË˜Ó ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ ÌȯÁÂÒ ÔÈ· ˙¯·‚ÂÓ ˙¯Á˙˘ ÌÂ˘Ó ˙ÂÏÈʉ ˙‡ ˙¯Ù˘Ó ÈËÒÈχ‰Chung & Jo, supra note 134; D. Easley, M. O’Hara ;(bid/ask-‰ Á¯ӷ˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÚÙ& J. Paperman “Financial Analysts and Information-Base Trade” 1 J. Fin. Markets‰ÎÈÓ˙Ï .(Ú„ÈÓ ÒÈÒ· ÏÚ ‡Ï˘ ¯ÁÒÓ Í˘ÂÓ Ú„ÈÓ ÒÈÒ· ÏÚ ¯ÁÒÓ ÈÎ ÌÈÈȈÓ) (1998) 175, 177S.P. Hedge & J. B. McDermott “The Liquidity Effects of Ì‚ ‡¯ ‰¯È˘È ˙ÂÁÙ ˙ȯÈÙÓ‡Revisions to the S&P 500 Index: An Empirical Analysis” 6 J. Fin. Markets (2003) 413,·Á¯˙‰ Ô‰Ï˘ ÈËÒÈχ‰ ÈÂÒÈΉ˘ ˙ÂÈÓ Ï˘ ˙¯·‚ÂÓ ˙ÂÏÈÊ Ï˘ ‰ÚÙÂ˙‰ ˙‡ ÌȯȷÒÓ) 415

.(S&P 500-‰ „„ÓÏ ‰ÙÒ‰ ‰ÈÓ‰˘ ˙ÚÓ ˙È˙ÂÚÓ˘Ó

46

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

˜Ù‰˘ ͯډ ¯ÈÈ ¯Á‡ ·Â˜ÚÏ È„Î ¯·ˆ˘ Ú„ÈÓ· ÚÈÈ˙Ò‰Ï Í˘Ó‰· ÏÂÎÈ ˙È¢‡¯‰Û˜˘Ó ÌÈËÒÈχ ÌÈÚˆ·Ó˘ ÏÈÚÈ‰Â Í˘Ó‰ ¯ÂÁÓ˙‰ .Í˘Ó ÒÈÒ· ÏÚ Â˙‡ ¯ÁÓ˙ω˜Ù‰‰ ·Ï˘· ËÒÈχ‰ Ï˘ ˙È¢‡¯‰ ‰Ú˜˘‰‰ ,˙È˘‡¯ .Ô‚ÓÏÂ Ï„Â‚Ï Ô¯˙ȯ˘‡Ó ¯˙ÂÈ ˙ÈÂÎÒÁ ‰¯Âˆ· ̉È˙Âίډ ˙‡ Ô΄ÚÏ ÌÈÏÂÎÈ ÌÈËÒÈχ .˙Ê·Ê·˙Ó ‰È‡Ï˘ ˙ÈÏ¢‰ ˙ÂÏÚ· ͇ ˙‡˘Ï ÌÈÎȯˆ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰˘ ¯Á‡Ó ,ÌȯÁ‡‰ ˜Â˘‰ ȘÁ˘˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰ È˙· ˙‡ ˘Ó˘Ï ÈÂ˘Ú ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ È„È ÏÚ ¯·ˆ˘ ڄȉ ,˙È˘ .ÔÂ΄ډ‰ÊÏ ÌÈÓ„ ÌÈÈÈÙ‡Ó ÏÚ· Í¯Ú ¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ‰˘„Á ˙È¢‡¯ ‰˜Ù‰ Í¯ÂˆÏ ˙ÙÒ ÌÚÙ,˙È˘ÈÏ˘ .ÌÈÈ˙¯Á˙ Ìȇ˙· ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰ È˙·Ï ÚˆÂÈ ˙Â¯È˘‰ .¯·Ú· Ì‰È„È ÏÚ ˜Ù‰˘¯˘‡Î ¯˙ÂÈ ÏÂÊ ¯˙ÂÈ Ï˜ ‡Â‰ È˘Ó‰ ˜Â˘· ˙˜ى Ï˘ ÍÈω˙‰˘ ÂÏ‚È ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ È˙·Í¯Ú‰ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ Â·˘ ,ÏÈÚÈ ˜Â˘· ¯·ÎÓ ‰Ê ÌȯÁÒ ‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ˙¯ÈÈÏ ˙¢¯‰ ÂÏÈÙ‡ ,˙ÂÓÈÂÒÓ ˙·ÈÒ· ,ÌӇ .167Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ È„È ÏÚ ÌÈÚ·˜˙˜ى ˙¯‚ÒÓ· ‰·ÈˆÓ ‡È‰˘ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰Â ÌÂ˘È¯‰ ˙Â˘È¯„ ÏÚ ‰Ï˜Ó ˙ȯ·‰ ˙ˆ¯‡· ͯÚÂ¯Â˜Ó˘ ,È˘Ó‰ ˜Â˘· ‰˜Ù‰ Ï˘ ‰˙ÂÏÚ· ÔÂÎÒÈÁÏ ‰¯Â¯· ‰Ó‚„ ÂÊ .168È˘Ó‰ ˜Â˘·

.Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÌÈÚˆ·Ó˘ Í˘Ó ÏÈÚÈ ¯ÂÁÓ˙ ÍÈω˙·˙¯ÈÈ ÌÈ˘Î¯‰ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó ÌÓˆÚ Â„È¯ËÈ ,ÂÈ„ Á˙ÂÙÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ ˜Â˘· ,„ÂÚ ˙‡Ê.‰˙ω‰ ˙ÂÎȇ ‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ȘÒÚ‰ ‰„È˙Ú ˙χ˘· ˜¯ ˙È¢‡¯ ‰˜Ù‰ ˙¯‚ÒÓ· ͯÚȯÁÂÒ ˜Â˘ Ï˘ ÂÓÂȘ .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ È„È ÏÚ Â˜ÙÂÒÈ È˘Ó‰ ˜Â˘· ˙ÂÏÈÊ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ· ˙ÓÈȘ˙Ó ÂÂÎÓ ÏÚ „ÓÂÚ ˜Â˘‰˘ Ú‚¯Ó .‰Ê Ô·ÂÓ· Û‡ Ï„Â‚Ï Ô¯˙È ¯ˆÂÈ Ú„ÈÓ‰˙˜ى Ì‚ ÂÓÎ ,˙·¯ ˙ÂÈ¢‡¯ ˙˜ى ‚ÂÙÒÏ ÏÂÎÈ ‡Â‰ ,Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ÔÈ· ˙¯Á˙˙ÈÁÙÓ ,ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÍÂ˙Ï Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ ÏÈÚÈ ÌÂÏÈ‚ ÂÁÈË·‰· .È˘Ó‰ ˜Â˘· ˙·¯‰¯·Á‰ ÔÓ ÍÒÂÁ ˙¯·Á‰ ÏÎ ¯Â·Ú ˙ÂÈÓ Ï˘ Ô˙˜Ù‰ ˙ÂÏÚ ˙‡ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˜Â˘

.‰ÓˆÚ· ˙ÂÏÈÊ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ˜ÙÒÏ Í¯Âˆ‰ ˙‡ ˙„„·‰ÌȘ¢‰ Ô‰·˘ ˙ÂÈ„ÓÓ ˙¯·Á ‰„ÈˆÓ ˙΢ÂÓ ‰È„ ˙Á˙ÂÙÓ ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ È˙· ˙ÈÈ˘Ú˙˜Â˘‰ ̉·˘ ˙ÂÈ„Ó· ÌÓ˘Â¯ÏÂ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ˜ÈÙ‰Ï Ô‰Ï ˙ӯ‚ ,˙ÂÁÙ ÌÈÁ˙ÂÙÓÏÈ„‚‰Ï ȄΠ· ˘È :˙·¯ ˙·ˉ ÂÓÈÚ ‡˘Â ‰Ê ÍÈω˙ .169˙ȯ·‰ ˙ˆ¯‡· Ô‚Π,Á˙ÂÙÓ

167M.B. Fox “Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence:An Economic Analysis” 70 Va. L. Rev. (1984) 1005, 1008; Gordon & Kornhauser,

.supra note 2, at p. 810168"Û„Ó" ÌÂ˘È¯ Ï˘ ‰ÚÙÂ˙‰ ˙‡ ¯È·ÒÓ ˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ÏÂȈ¯ „ˆÈÎ Ìȇ¯Ó) Fox, ibid, at p. 1008

Gordon & Kornhauser, ibid, at p. 810 ;(1933-Ó Securities Act-‰ Ï˘ 415 ÏÏÎ ˙¯‚ÒÓ·.(ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙Â˘È¯„ ·ÂˆÈÚ Í¯ÂˆÏ ÏÈÚȉ ˜Â˘‰ ˙ÊÈ˙ÂÙȉ· SEC-‰ ‰˙˘Ú˘ ˘ÂÓÈ˘‰ ˙‡ ÌÈÁ·)

169ȘȯӇ‰ Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘· ¯Ï„ „¯‡ÈÏÈÓ ‰Ú·˘ ˜¯ 1989 ˙˘· ÂÒÈÈ‚ ˙ÂȘȯӇ ‡Ï ˙¯·Á˘ „ÂÚ·˙˘· ,˙ÂÈ„˜ Âȉ Է¯ ,˙ȘȯӇ‰ ‰Ò¯Â·· ¯ÁÒÓÏ ˙ÂÓ¢¯‰ ˙¯ʉ ˙¯·Á‰ 420 ÍÂ˙ÓÂL.C. Quinn ‡¯ .˙ȯ·‰ ˙ˆ¯‡· ¯Ï„ „¯‡ÈÏÈÓ 200-Ó ¯˙ÂÈ ÂÒÈÈ‚ ÌÈ¯Ê ÌȘÈÙÓ 1998“International Regulation of Cross-Border Offerings and Listings of Securities — A¯ÁÒÓÏ ˙ÂÓ¢¯ Âȉ 1999 ˙˘· .Window of Opportunity” 1141 PLIREF/Corp 7 (1999)

.Quinn, ibid ‡¯ .˙ÂÈ„Ó 56-Ó ˙¯·Á 1,100-Ó ¯˙ÂÈ ˙ȯ·‰ ˙ˆ¯‡·

47

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó ,Ì‰Ï ÌÈÁÙÒ‰ ÌȘ¢‰ Ï˘Â ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰ È˙· Ï˘ ÌÈÁ¯‰ ˙‡Â ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ‰ ˙‡Ï˘ ̉È˙Â¯È˘Ï ˘Â˜È·‰Â ‰Ú˜˘‰ ˙ÂÈÂӄʉ Ï˘ ¯˙ÂÈ ·Á¯ Ô‚ÓÓ Ìȉ ÌÈȘȯӇڄÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ˜Â˘ Ï˘ ÂÓÂÈ˜Ó Ú·Â ˙ÂÈ·ÂÈÁ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰ Ï˘ ‰Ê ÏÂÏÎÓ .Ï„‚ ÌÈËÒÈχ

.È˙¯Á˙

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ÏÚ ‰È¯Â‡È˙‰ ˙ÂÎÏ˘‰ .‚

Ï˘ ‰·ÈËÏ ¯˘‡· ÂÚÏ‚˙˘ ˙·¢Á ˙˜ÂÏÁÓ Ô¯˙ÙÏ ÏÈÚÈ ÈÏÎ ˜ÙÒÓ ÏÈÚÏ˘ ÔÂÈ„‰˙ÂÎÏ˘‰· ˯ÈÙ· Ô„ ‰Ê ˜¯Ù ˙¯‚ÒÓ· .Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„· ‰Èˆ¯‰ Á˜ÈÙ‰ ˙ÂÈÈ„Ó

.ÂÏ‡Î˘ ˙˜ÂÏÁÓ È˙˘ ÏÚ Â‚ˆ‰˘ ‰È¯Â‡È˙‰ Ï˘

ȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ .1

˙ÂÎȯˆ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙Â˘È¯„ ̇‰ ‰Ï‡˘· ˜ÒÂÚ Í¯Ú‰ ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„· ¯˙ÂÈ· ¯·Â„Ó‰ ‡˘Â‰ÌÈÚÂË ˙ÂȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ ˙ÏË‰Ï ÌÈ„‚˙Ó‰ .("˙ÂȯÂË„Ó") ˙·ÈÈÁÓ ˙ÂȉÏ˙‡ ˙ÂÏ‚Ï ÌȈȯÓ˙ È„ · ÌȯÁÒ Ô‰Ï˘ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ˘ ˙¯·ÁÏ ˜ÙÒÓ ˜Â˘‰ ÈÎÏÎÓ Ú¯‰" ÈÎ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰ ÂÁÈÈ Ú„ÈÓ ¯„Ú‰· ,ÔÎ ‡Ï ̇˘ ;È˙‰Ӊ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÏÎÈÂÏÈ‚ ÈÎ ,ÌÈ„‚˙Ó‰ ÌÈÚÂË „ÂÚ .170ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÍÂ˙Ï ÂÊ ‰Á‰ ÂÏϘ˘È ,"گȇÈÂˆÓ È˷ϯ‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÏΠ,ÌÈÏÈÚÈ ÌȘ¢‰ Ô΢ ,171˙ÏÚÂ˙ ¯ÒÁ ¯˜È ‡Â‰ ȯÂË„Ó

.173"‰˘¯Ó ÔÈ„" ÏÚ ÒÒÂ·Ó ˙ÂÈ‰Ï Íȯˆ ,‰Úˉ ÈÙ ÏÚ ÍÎ ,ÈÂÏÈ‚ .172¯·ÎÓ ‰Ê ̉·

170S.A. Ross “Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implication of Modern FinanceTheory and Signaling Theory” in Issues in Financial Regulation (New York, 1979)‰˜È˙˘ ÈÎ ÌÈÁÈÓ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó ˙ÂÏ‚Ï ıȯÓ˙ ˘È ˙·ÂË ˙¯·ÁÏ Â·˘ ˙Â˙ȇ Ï„ÂÓ ÚȈÓ)F.H. Easterbrook & D.R. Fischel “Mandatory Disclosure and the ;(˙ÂÚ¯ ˙¢„Á ‰˘Â¯ÈÙ

.Protection of Investors” 70 Va. L. Rev. (1984) 669171B.A. Banoff “Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registration: Ï˘ÓÏ Â‡¯

¯ÂÙÈ˘ ˙‚˘‰ ÈÎ ˙ÚÂË) An Analysis of Rule 415” 70 Va. L. Rev. (1984) 135, 176y184.(˙ȇ„Î ‰È‡ ÌÈÓ˙Á ÏÚ ¯˙ÂÈ ‰‰Â·‚ ˙ÂȯÁ‡ ˙Ïˉ È„È ÏÚ Í¯Ú‰ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ˜ÂÈ„·

172˙ȯ·‰ ˙ˆ¯‡· ˙ÂȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ Ô˙Ïˉ ˙ÚÙ˘‰ ˙‡ ˜„·˘ ÌÈÈ҇Ϙ‰ Ìȯ˜ÁÓ‰È˜Â˘ ˙‡ ‰ÏÚÈÈ ‡Ï ‰Ê ÔÈÈÚ· ‰˜È˜Á‰ ÈИÈ҉ ˙ӄ˜‰ ‰‡Ó‰ Ï˘ '30-‰ ˙¢· ÂίÚG.J. Stigler “Public Regulation of Securities Markets” 37 J. Bus. (1964) 117, ‡¯ .Ô‰‰122y124; G.J. Benston “Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An EvaluationÏÚ ˙¯Â˜È·Ï .of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934” 63 Am. Econ. Rev. (1973) 132M.B. Fox “Retaining Mandatory Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is not ‡¯ Âχ Ìȯ˜ÁÓ

.Investor Empowerment” 85 Va. L. Rev. (1999) 1335, 1369y1395173˙ÂÈ‰Ï ˙ÂÎȯˆ Ôȇ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙·ÂÁ ÈΠү‚ ,‰Ê ¯Ó‡Ó· ÔÂÈ„‰ ÌÂÁ˙Ï ıÂÁÓ ÈˆӉ ,‰Â˘ ÔÂÚÈË

Ï˘ ÈÙÂÏÁ È˙¯Á˙ ¯Ë˘Ó È„È ÏÚ ‡Ï‡ ,(ÈËÒÈÏÂÙÂÂÓ‰) Èχ¯„Ù‰ Ï˘ÓÓ‰ È„È ÏÚ ˙·˙ÎÂÓ˙¯·ÁÏ ¯˘Ù‡Ï ˘È ,‰Ê ÔÂÚÈË ÈÙÏ .(·"ˆÂÈΠ,˙Âү· ,˙ÂÈÁ‡-˙ÂÈ„Ó ,˙ÂÈ„Ó) Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„.ȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ Ï˘ ˙Ù„ÚÂÓ‰ ‰Ó¯‰ ˙‡ Ì‰Ï ˜ÙÒÈ˘ ,¯ÁÒÓÏ ÂÓ˘¯ÈÈ Â·˘ ̘Ӊ ˙‡ ¯ÂÁ·Ï

48

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

‰ÓÎ ˙ÂÓÈȘ ÈÎ ,„‚Ó ÂÚË ˙ÂȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ Ô˙ÏÁ‰· ÌÈÎÓÂ˙‰‡Â‰ Âχ ˙˜„ˆ‰ ÏÂÏÎÓÏ ÈÊίӉ ÔÂÈÚ¯‰ .174ȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ Ï˘ ¯Ë˘ÓÏ ˙˜„ˆ‰¯ˆÂÓ"· ¯·Â„Ó :˙ÈÏÓÈËÙ‡‰ Â˙˜ÙÒ‰ ˙‡ ÌÈÚÂÓ‰ ÌÈÈÈÙ‡Ó ÏÚ· ¯ˆÂÓ ‡Â‰ Ú„ÈÓ˘(‰¯·Á‰) ڈȉ‰ „ˆ· ˙„˜Ó˙Ó ˙˜„ˆ‰‰ ˙È·¯Ó .175"Ú„ÈÓ ˙ˆÁ‰" ¯ˆÂȉ "ȯ·Ȉ,˙È˘‡¯ .Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ ÈÏÓÈËÙ‡ ÈÂÏÈ‚Ï ‡È·‰Ï È„Î ˙¯Á˙· È„ Ôȇ ÚÂ„Ó ¯È·Ò‰Ï ԇ··ÌÈÓÈȘ ‡ ÌÈÈχȈËÂÙ Z ÌȯÁ˙Ó Ï˘ Ì˙ÈÁ·Ó Ì‚ Í¯Ú ˘È ‰Ï‚Ó ‰¯·Á‰˘ Ú„ÈÓωςӉ ‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ‰ÊÏ ‰‡Â¢‰· Ì·ˆÓ ˙‡ ÍÈ¯Ú‰Ï Ì‰Ï ¯˘Ù‡Ó ‡Â‰Â ,‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ Z˙ÂȂ˯ËÒ‡ ÈÂÈ˘ ,Ì˙ˆ‡‰ ‡ ÁÂ˙ÈÙ ¯˜ÁÓ ÈÎÈω˙ ˙¯ÈˆÚ È„È ÏÚ Ô‚Î) ̇˙‰· ·È‚‰ÏÂÌ‚ ·Â˘Á Ú„ÈÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ,˙È˘ .176(̉Èχ ‰ÒÈΠ‡ ÌȘÂÂ˘Ó ‰‡ÈˆÈ ,¯ÂÁÓ˙ ‡ ˜ÂÂÈ˘˙„ÓÚ Ì‰Ï ˜ÈÚÓ ‰Ï‚Ӊ Ú„ÈÓ‰ .‰È˙ÂÁ˜ÏÏ ‰È˜ÙÒÏ ,‰È„·ÂÚÏ ,‰¯·Á‰ È˘ÂÏÌ‚ ·Â˘Á ˙Ù˘ÂÁ ‰¯·Á‰˘ Ú„ÈÓ ,˙È˘ÈÏ˘ .177‰¯·Á‰ ÌÚ Ô˙Ó ‡˘Ó· ˙¯ÙÂ˘Ó Á˜ÈÓÌ‰Ï ¯˘Ù‡Ó ‡Â‰˘ ÌÂ˘Ó ,‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ˙ÂÈÓ ÈÏÚ· Ìȇ ÔÈÈ„Ú˘ ,ÌÈȯ˘Ù‡ ÌÈÚȘ˘ÓϘÈ˙ ·Èί‰Ï ,˙¯Á‡ ‰Ú˜˘‰ ˙ÂÙÂÏÁ ÌÚ ‰¯·Á· ‰Ú˜˘‰‰ ˙‡ ¯˙ÂÈ ·ÂË ÔÙ‡· ˙¢‰Ï‰¯·Á‰˘ ¯Á‡Ó .178· ÏÏÎÈ‰Ï ‡Ï˘ ‡ · ÏÏÎÈ‰Ï ˙ÂÈÂ˘Ú ‰¯·Á‰ ˙ÂÈÓ˘ ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰Â‡ ,ÌȯÁ‡Ï ÌȘÙÒÓ ‰Ï˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÈÈÂÏÈ‚˘ ˙ÂÏÚÂ˙‰ ¯Â·Ú ‰¯ÂÓ˙ ˙·‚Ï ‰ÏÂÎÈ ‰È‡Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÏ‚ÏÓ ÚÓÈ˙ ‡È‰ ,¯ÂӇΠ‰¯ÂÓ˙ ÌÏ˘Ï ·¯ÒÓ‰ ¯Á‡ ‡ ‰Ê Ì¯Â‚Ó ‰Ê Ú„ÈÓ ÚÂÓÏ˙ÂÏÚÂ˙‰ ÏÚ "˙ÈËÒÈÙÓ¯Ë" ˙ÂÈ‰Ï ÛÈ„Ú˙ ‰¯·Á ÏÎ ,‰˘ÚÓÏ .179ÈÏÓÈËÙ‡‰ ۘȉ·,˙ȈÓ˙· .‰„ÈˆÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ۘȉ ˙‡ ¯ÚÊÓÏ ,ÌÈ·ÈÓ ˙¯Á‡ ˙¯·Á „ˆÓ Ú„ÈÓ ÈÈÂÏÈ‚˘,ÂÏ˘ È˙¯·Á‰ ͯډ ÔÈ·Ï Ú„ÈÓÏ ˘È˘ È˯ى ͯډ ÔÈ· ,‰Ó‡˙‰‰ ¯ÒÂÁ ‡ ,¯ÚÙ‰

.˙ÂȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ ˙Ïˉ ˜È„ˆÓ˙Ïˉ· ‰¯Â‡ÎÏ ÌÈÎÓÂ˙ ̉˘ ¯Á‡Ó ,ËÚÓ ÌÈÓÊ‚ÂÓ Ìȇ¯ Âχ ÌÈÂÚÈË ,˙‡Ê ÌÚÛ‡ ˙ÂÈ˯٠˙¯·Á ÂÈÈÚ˘ Ú„ÈÓ .180˙ÂÈ˯٠˙¯·Á ÏÚ Ì‚ ˙ÂȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ

R. Romano “Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation” ‡¯107 Yale L. J. (1998) 2359; S.J. Choi & A.T. Guzman “Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking

.the International Reach of Securities Regulation” 71 South. Cal. L. Rev. (1998) 903174.˙¯ÙÒ· ÂÏÚ‰˘ ˙˜„ˆ‰‰ ˙¯È˜ÒÏ ,Kraakman et al., supra note 133, at pp. 204y207 ‡¯175Fox, supra note 172; D.A. Oesterle “The Inexorable March ‡¯ ÂÊ ‰˜„ˆ‰ Ï˘ ÁÂ˙ÈÏ

Toward a Continuous Disclosure Requirement: ‘Are We There Yet?’” 20 Cardozo L..Rev. (1998) 135, 198y201

176.Oesterle, ibid, at pp. 198y199; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 170, at p. 677177.Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note 42, at p. 480178.Oesterle, supra note 175, at p. 200179‰¯·Á ÏÎ Ï˘ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙ÂËÏÁ‰ ÈÎ ÌÈÈȈÓ) Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note 42, at p. 482

˙ίډ Í¯ÂˆÏ ˘Ó˘Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ¯˘‡Î ˙¯ˆÂ‰ ˙ÂȈÈÁ‰ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰‰ ˙‡ Ô·˘Á· ˙Â‡È·Ó Ôȇ.(ÏÈÚÈ Âȇ Ϙ˘Ó‰ ÈÂÂÈ˘˘ ÔÙ‡· ,˙¯Á‡ ˙¯·Á

180L.E. Ribstein “Private Ordering and the Securities Laws: The Case of General ‡¯Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ÚÂ„Ó ¯È·ÒÓ‰) Partnerships” 42 Case W. Res. L. Rev. (1992) 1, 22y24

.(˙ÂÈ˯٠˙¯·Á ÏÚ ÏÂÁÏ ÌÈÎȯˆ Ìȇ

49

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

˜Â˘‰ ̇ .˜Â˘‰ È„È ÏÚ ÈÏÓÈËÙ‡-˙˙ ÔÙ‡· ¯ˆÂÈÓ ˙ÂÈ‰Ï ÈÂÙˆ˘ "ȯ·Ȉ Ú„ÈÓ" ‡Â‰˙‡ ÏÈ·‚‰Ï ÚÂ„Ó ,Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ È˙¯·Á‰Â È˯ى ͯډ ÔÈ· ¯ÚÙ‰ ÌÂˆÓˆÓ ˙ÏÚÂ˙ ˜ÈÙÓÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ ˙Ïˉ˘ ‡È‰ ÍÎÏ ‰·Â˘˙‰ ?„·Ï· ˙Âȯ·Ȉ ˙¯·ÁÏ È¯ÂË„Ó‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰È¯Â·Èˆ ¯ÂÁÓ˙ ,˙ÂÏÈÊ Ô‚Π,˙ÂÙÒ ˙ÂÏÚÂ˙ ˙˜ÙÒÓ ˙Âȯ·Ȉ ˙¯·Á ÏÚ ˙ÂȯÂË„Ó.181˙ÂÈ˯٠˙¯·Á Ï˘ ‰¯˜Ó· ‡ˆÓ· Ôȇ˘ ˙ÂÏÚÂ˙ .‰¯·Á‰ ˙ω‰ ÏÚ Á˜ÈÙ ÏÈÚÈ˙¯·ÁÏ ‰·ÂÁ‰ ˙‡ ÏÈ·‚‰Ï ˘È ˙ȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ ˙Ïˉ· ‰Î¯Ή ˙ÂÏÚ‰ ÁÎÂÏ

.¯˙ÂÈ ‰·¯‰ ÂÊ ‰·ÂÁ ‰ÏÈÚÂÓ Ô‰Ï˘ ¯˘˜‰·˘ ,˙Âȯ·ȈZ ˘Â˜È·‰ „ˆ Ï˘ „Á‡ Ú˘ӷ ˙„˜Ó˙Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ· ˙ÎÓÂ˙‰ ˙¯Á‡ ‰˜„ˆ‰ÈÂ˘Ú ˙ÂȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ ¯„Úȉ· ÈÎ ˙ү‚ ÂÊ ‰˜„ˆ‰ .ÌȯÎÂÓ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰„ˆÓ .182ÈËÒÈχ ¯˜ÁÓ· È„Ó ‰Ï„‚ ‰Ú˜˘‰ ÔÎÂ È„Ó ‰Ë˜ ‰Ú˜˘‰ Ï˘ ·ˆÓ ̯‚ȉÏÔ¯ÎÂÓÏ ‰˘˜) ȯ·Ȉ ¯ˆÂÓ Ô‰ ÌȯÎÂÓ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ Ï˘ Ì˙Ú„ ˙ÂÂÁ˘ ¯Á‡Ó ,„Á‡,(ÌÈÓÒ¯Ù˙Ó Âχ˘ Ú‚¯Ó ˙ÂÁ„· ˘Ó˙˘‰ÏÓ Ô¯Â·Ú ÌÏ˘Ó Âȇ˘ ÈÓÓ ÚÂÓÏ ‰˘˜Â,¯ÓÂÏÎ) Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÏÚ ¯˜ÁÓ· ÌÈ·‡˘Ó È„Ó ˙ÂÁÙ ÌȯÎÂÓ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ ÂÚȘ˘È¯ˆÂÂÈ˙ ,¯Á‡‰ „ˆ‰ ÔÓ .183(ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ „ˆÓ ·˜ÚÓÏ ‡˘Â Â˘Ó˘È ˙¯·Á È„Ó ËÚÓ˙„‡ ÏÚ (ÂÏ‚ ‡Ï˘) Ú„ÈÓ ÈËȯ٠Ì˙‡ ‡ÂˆÓÏ ÔÂÈÒÈ· ÌÈËÒÈχ Ï˘ ÌÈˆÓ‡Ó ˙ÂÏÈÙÎÈ˙˘ È„ÓÓ ˙‡ ‰ÈË˜Ó ˙ȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ .184È˙¯·Á Ê·ʷ ‡È‰ ÂÊ ˙ÂÏÈÙΠ,‰¯·Á‰˙‡ ˙¯˙ÂÙ ,Â˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ ڄÈÓ‰ ÛÂÒȇ ÈˆÓ‡Ó ˙‡ ˙„Ò·ÒÓ ‡È‰ :ÂÏω ˙ÂÈÚ·‰

.Ú„ÈÓ ÛÂÒȇ· ‰Ú˜˘‰‰ ˙ÂÏÈÙÎ ˙ÈÈÚ·ÚÂ„Ó ‰¯È·ÒÓ ÂÏ˘ ‰È¯Â‡È˙‰ .¯Ó‡Ó· ‚ˆÂÓ‰ ÔÂÚÈˉ È„È ÏÚ ÍÓ˙ ‰Ê ÔÂȂȉ‰¯È‰·Ó ,˙Âȯ·Ȉ ˙¯·ÁÏ ÒÁÈ· ˜¯ Ï·‚ÂÓ Á¯Â‡· ˙ÂÏÁ ˙ÂȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁÈÎ ,‰ÏÂÚ ÂÏ˘ ‰È¯Â‡È˙‰ ÔÓ ,˙‡Ê ÌÚ .Ú„ÂÈÓ ¯ÁÒÓ ÔÈ·Ï ÈÂÏÈ‚ ÔÈ· ¯˘˜‰ ˙‡ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ Ï˘ „ÁÂÈÓ‰ ‰¯˜ÓÏ ˙Ï·‚ÂÓ ‰È‡ ˙ÂȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁÏ ‰˜„ˆ‰‰ÌÈÙˆ ,ÌÈÁ· ̉È˙˜ÒÓ ˙‡ ÏÏΠͯ„· ÌÈÓÒ¯ÙÓ Âχ ÌÈËÒÈχ ,Ô· .ÌȯÎÂÓ‰ÌÚ .185˙¯Á‡ ˙ÂȘÒÚ ˙ÂÈÂÏÈÚÙ ˙ÂÚˆÓ‡· ,ÔÈÙȘڷ ‰¯ÂÓ˙ Ì˙„Â·Ú ¯Â·Ú Ï·˜ÏÂχ ÌÈËÒÈχ .ÌȘ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ· ‡˜Â„ ÌÈ˘Ó˙˘Ó Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˙È·¯Ó ,˙‡ÊÈÙ· ÌÈ·ˆÈ Ìȇ ̉ ÔÎ ÏÚ .‰˙‡ ¯ÂÎÓÏ ÌÈÒÓ Ìȇ ,Ì˙„Â·Ú ˙‡ ÌÈÓÒ¯ÙÓ Ìȇ

181M.A. Utset “Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm” 80 Cornell L. Rev. ‡¯ÏÚ ¯·‚˙‰Ï ˙ÂÈÓ ÈÏÚ·Ï ÚÈÈÒÏ ÈÂ˘Ú È¯ÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ÈÎ ÔÚÂˉ) (1995) 540, 598y599K. Lo ;(˙ÂÈÓ‰-ÈÏÚ· Ï˘ Á˜ÈÙ‰ ˙‡ ¯Ù˘Ï ,ÌÈÏ‰Ó „ˆÓ Ȃ˯ËÒ‡ ÈÂÏÈ‚ Ï˘ ‰ÈÚ·“Economic Consequences of Regulated Changes in Disclosure: The Case of Executive¯Î˘ ˙‡ ˙ÂÏ‚Ï ˙¯·Á ·ÂÈÁ ÈÎ ˜ÈÒÓ) Compensation” 35 J. Acount. & Econ. (2003) 285

.(È„È‚‡˙‰ ¯Ë˘Ó‰ ÈÂ‚Ó ¯ÂÙÈ˘ È„È ÏÚ ˙ÂÈÓ‰ ÈÏÚ· ÌÚ ·ÈËȉ ÌÈωӉ182.Coffee, supra note 86 ‡¯183.Coffee, ibid, at pp. 731y732184Oesterle, supra note 175, at pp. 202y210; Coffee, ibid, at pp. 733y734; Easterbrook &

.Fischel, supra note 170, at p. 682185.107 ‰¯Ú‰ ÏÈÚÏ Â‡¯

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Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

ÌÈËÒÈχ :ÍÙÈ‰Ï ‡Ï‡ ,Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ÁÂ˙È ˙Â„Â·Ú ˙ÈÈÙ‡Ó‰ ȯ·Ȉ‰ ¯ˆÂÓ‰ ˙ÈÈÚ·¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÂÚÙÓ Áȯ‰Ï ÌÈÒÓ Ì„ÂÚ· ,Ì˙„Â·Ú ˙ÂÈ„ÂÒ ÏÚ ˙„٘· ÌȯÓ¢ Âχ˙„Â˜Ó Ì‚ ˙˜„ˆÂÓ ˙ÂȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ ˙ÏÁ‰ ,Ìχ .̉È˙˜ÒÓ ÏÚ ˙ÂÒÒ·Ӊ

.ÌȘ‰ ÌÚËÓ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ Ï˘ ÌË·Ó¯˙ÂÈ ÏÂÊ˘ ÌÚˉ ÔÓ ˙‡Ê ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÛÂÒȇ ˙ÂÏÚ ˙‡ ˙ÈÁÙÓ È¯ÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ,˙È˘‡¯¯˙‡Ï ˘˜·Ó‰ ȈÈÁ Ì„‡ ‰Ï ˘¯„ÈÈ˘ ‰Ú˜˘‰Ï ‰‡Â¢‰· ,Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÏ‚Ï ‰¯·ÁϯˆÂ˙ ‡Â‰ ‰¯·Á‰ ˙„‡ ÏÚ ÈÙȈÙÒ Ú„ÈÓ ¯ÂˆÈÈ ,Ô· .‰¯·Á‰ ÏÚ ÈÙȈÙÒ Ú„ÈÓÚ„ÈÓ‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚· ‰Î¯Ή ˙ÙÒÂ˙‰Â ,‰¯·Á ÏÂ‰È Ï˘ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ‰ ÔÓ „¯Ù È˙Ï· ȇÂÂÏÏ˘ ‰Ï„‚ ‰Ú˜˘‰· Ì‚ ,Ì˙ÂÏ‚Ï Ô˙È ‡Ï˘ Ú„ÈÓ ÈËȯ٠ÌÈÓÈȘ ,˙È˘ .186˙ÈÏ¢ ‡È‰,ÌÚ·ËÏ ,ÌÓÂȘ ̈ÚÏ ¯˘‡· ˙Âίډ ÏÚ ÒÒÂ·Ó ‰Ê΢ Ú„ÈÓ ¯ÂÁÓ˙ .ÌÙÂÒȇ· ÌÈ·‡˘Ó.ÏÈÏÚ· ˜ÈÂ„Ó ˙ÂÁÙ ˙ÂÈ‰Ï ÈÂÙˆ ‰ÊÎ Á¯Â‡· ¯ÂÁÓ˙˘ ‡Ï‡ .Âχ Ú„ÈÓ ÈËÈ¯Ù Ï˘ ÌίÚω¯˜Ó· .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÏÎ ¯Â·Ú ˘ÂÙÈÁ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ „Ò·ÒÓ ‰¯·Á‰ „ˆÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ,˙È˘ÈÏ˘‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ‰Ë˜‰ ‰Ú˜˘‰‰ :˜Â˘Ï ÌÈÏÈÚÂÓ È¯Â·Èˆ ¯ˆÂÓÎ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÈÈÈÙ‡Ó ,‰Ê

.Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÏÏÎ Ï˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÛÂÒȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ· ÌÂˆÚ ÔÂÎÒÈÁ ˙¯¯Â‚ Ú„ÈÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚·ÈÂÏÈ‚ .˙ÂȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ ÔÓÂÈ˜Ï ˙ÙÒ ‰˜„ˆ‰ ˜ÙÒÓ ÂÏ˘ Ï„ÂÓ‰‰Ó„· .Ú„ÈÓ ÁÂ˙È· Ô‚ÓÂ Ï„Â‚Ï ˙¯˙È ÏˆÏ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÏ ¯˘Ù‡Ó ȯÂË„ÓÏ˘ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ˙ίډ Í¯ÂˆÏ ˘Ó˘Ï ˜Â˘‰ ÏÚ ÈÏÏÎ Ú„ÈÓ ÈÂ˘Ú Â·˘ ÔÙ‡Ï˙ίډ Í¯ÂˆÏ ˘Ó˘Ï ÈÂ˘Ú ˙„„·‰ ‰¯·Á‰ ÏÚ ÈÙȈÙÒ Ú„ÈÓ Ì‚ ÍÎ ,˙·¯ ˙¯·Á‡ ‰Â˘‡¯‰ ‰¯·Á· ˙¯Á˙Ó‰ ˙¯·Á ˙ӂ„ ,˙¯Á‡ ˙¯·Á Ï˘ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ¯˘Ù‡Ó‰ ‡Â‰ ˜Â˘· ˙¯·Á‰ ÏÏÎ „ˆÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ÌˆÚ .‰ÓÈÚ ÌÈȘÒÚ Ìȯ˘˜ ˙ÂÓÈȘÓ,Ô‡ÎÓ .187Ú„ÈÓ ÁÂ˙È· Ô‚Ӊ τ‚‰ Ï˘ ̉È˙¯˙È ˙‡ ˘ÓÓÏ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÏË·Ó‰ ˙„Â˜Ó ¯˙ÂÈ· ·Âˉ ÔÙ‡· ÔÁ·È˙ ˙ÂȯÂË„Ó‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ Ô˙ÏÚÂ˙˘

.188˙„„·‰ ‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ‰Ë·Ó ˙„Â˜Ó ‡Ï ,˜Â˘‰ Ï˘ ˙ÈÏÏΉÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ Ôȇ ˙¯·Á ‰‡Ó Ô· ˜Â˘· ÈÎ ÁÈ ,ÂÊ ‰„˜ ˘ÈÁÓ‰Ï ˙Ó ÏÚÚ„ÈÓ ˙ÂÏ‚Ó ˙¯·Á‰ ¯˙È ÂÏȇ ,‡ÏÓ ÔÙ‡· Ú„ÈÓ ‰Ï‚Ó ˙Á‡ ‰¯·Á .˙ÂȯÂË„Ó˙„‡ ÏÚ Ì˙¢¯·˘ Ú„ÈÓ· ˘Ó˙˘‰Ï ÌÈÏÂÎÈ Ìȇ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ .„·Ï· ȘÏÁ ÔÙ‡·

186ÏÂÊ ‰È‰È ‰¯·ÁÏ ,‰¯Èη‰ ‰˙ω‰Ï ÁÂÂ„Ó ‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ÏÏÂΉ ˙¯ÈÎÓ‰ ÍÒ ÏÚ ÔÂ˙‰ ,Ï˘ÓÏ ÍÎ˙ÂÁ˜ÏÓ ÌÈ·¯Ï ¯˘˜˙‰Ï ̉ÈÏÚ ‰È‰È ‰Ê ÔÂ˙· ˆ¯È ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ̇ ,˙‡Ê ˙ÓÂÚÏ .Â˙ÂÏ‚Ï „‡Ó¯·Â„Ó ,˙ÈËÒÈËËÒ ‰Î¯Ú‰ ¯ÂˆÈÏ ˙Ó ÏÚ ˙‡Ê ,˜˘ ˙ÂÈÂÓΉ Ô‰Ó Ì˙‡ χ˘Ï Ȅη ‰¯·Á‰

.„‡Ó ¯˜È ÍÈω˙· Ô·ÂÓÎ187˙ÏÈÊÓ ˙ÂÚ·Â ˙ÂÈ·ÂÈÁ ˙ÂȈÈÁ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰ ÈÎ Ìȇ¯Ó) Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note 42

.(˙¯Á‡ ˙¯·Á „ˆÓ ¯ÙÂ˘Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚· Ì„ÂÒÈ˘ ,˙ÂÏÈʉ ÏÚ ‰ÚÙ˘‰Â Ú„ÈÓ188˙¯·Á 1999 ˙˘Ó ÏÁ‰ ·ÈÈÁ ¯˘‡ ȯÂËÏ‚¯ ÈÂÈ˘ ˜„·) Bushee & Leuz, supra note 42

Securities Exchange Act,-‰ Ï˘ ÁÂÂÈ„‰ ˙Â˘È¯„Ï ˙ÈÈˆÏ OTC Bulletin Borad-· ˙ÂÓ¢¯‰ÏÚ ˙ÂÈ·ÂÈÁ ˙‡¢˙Ó Â‰ Âχ ÁÂÂÈ„ ˙Â˘È¯„· „ÓÚ ÔÎÏ Ì„Â˜ „ÂÚ˘ ˙¯·Á ÈΠ‡ˆÓ , 1934˙ÂȈÈÁ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰ Ï˘ ÔÓÂȘ ÌÚ ·˘ÈÈ˙Ó ‰Ê ‡ˆÓÓ .˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÏÈÊ· ‰Ú·˜ ‰ÈÈÏÚÓ ԉÈ˙ÂÈÓ

.(ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ÌÂÁ˙· ‰ÈˆÏ‚¯Ó ˙Âڷ‰

51

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ˙‡ ÍÈ¯Ú‰Ï È„Î ,˜Â˘‰ ÏÚ ÈÏÏΉ Ú„ÈÓ‰ Ì‚ ÂÓÎ ,‰Ï‚Ó‰ ‰¯·Á‰¯˙È ˙„‡ ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ ÛÂÒȇ· ÌÈ·‡˘Ó ‰ÏÈÁ˙ ÚȘ˘‰Ï ÈÏ·Ó ˙¯Á‡‰ ˙¯·Á‰ Ï˘ÛÂÒȇ Ï˘ ‰‰Â·‚ ˙ÂÏÚ Ï˘ ‰ÓÂȘ Ô˙ȉ· .˜Â˘· ˙ÂÏÚÂÙ‰ ˙¯·Á‰ Ú˘˙ ÌÈÚ˘˙Ï˘ ËÚÂÓ ¯ÙÒÓ· ˜Â˘‰ ÍÂÓ˙È ,Ô‚ÓÏÂ Ï„Â‚Ï Ô¯˙È ÏˆÏ ˙Ï·‚ÂÓ ˙ÏÂÎÈ ڄÈÓ‰˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ,‰ËÚÂÓ ‰È‰˙ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÔÈ· ˙¯Á˙‰ ,ÍÎ˘Ó .„·Ï· Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ‰˙Ú ÁÈ .˙ÂÈ·ÂÈÁ ˙ÂȈÈÁ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰ ¯ˆÂÂÈ ‡Ï ,˙ÂÎÂÓ ˙ÂÓ¯ ÏÚ Â„ÓÚÈ Â˙ÂÏÈÊÂÂÊ ‰¯·Á È·‚Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÛÂÒȇ ˙ÂÏÚ .‡ÏÓ ÔÙ‡· Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÏ‚Ï ‰ËÈÏÁÓ ‰ÈÈ˘ ‰¯·Á ÈΉ¯·Á‰ ˙„‡ ÏÚ ,ÏÏη ˜Â˘‰ ˙„‡ ÏÚ ¯·Î ‚˘Â‰˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ,ÛÒ· .Ô·ÂÓÎ ,ÍÒÁÈ˙,‰ÈÈ˘‰ ‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ͯډ ¯ÈÈ ÁÂ˙ÈÏ ‡Â‰ Ì‚ ˘Ó˘È ,˯ٷ Ú„ÈÓ ‰˙ÏÈ‚˘ ‰Â˘‡¯‰ÈÂ˘Ú ‰ÈÈ˘‰ ‰Ï‚Ó‰ ‰¯·Á‰ ÏÚ ˘Î¯ÈÈ˘ ڄȉ ,„ÂÚ ˙‡Ê .˙ÙÒ ‰Ë˜ ˙ÂÏÚ· ˙‡ÊÂ˙ÂÏ‚Ó‰ ˙¯·Á‰ ¯ÙÒÓ˘ ÏÎÎ .‰Â˘‡¯‰ ‰Ï‚Ó‰ ‰¯·Á‰ ÏÚ ÌÈȘ‰ ڄȉ ˙‡ ¯Ù˘ÏÏ„Â‚Ï Ô¯˙ȉ ˘ÓÂÓÈ ÍΠ,Ú„ÈÓ ÛÂÒȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ· ÔÂÎÒÈÁ‰ Ï„‚È ÍÎ ,Ï„‚È ‡ÏÓ ÔÙ‡·Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ¯˙ÂÈ ÂÒÎÈÈ ,˜Â˘· ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙Ó¯ ¯Ù˙˘˙˘ ÏÎÎ .¯˙ÂÈ ·ÂË ÔÙ‡· Ô‚ÓÏÂ˙Ó¯ ˙‡ ¯È·‚˙ ,‰„ÈˆÓ ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÔÈ· ‰˜ÊÁ ˙¯Á˙ .¯·‚˙ ˙¯Á˙‰Â ,˜Â˘Ï˙ÂÈ˙ÂÚÓ˘Ó ˙ÂÈ·ÂÈÁ ˙ÂȈÈÁ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰ ¯ÂˆÈ˙ ۇ ,Â˙ÂÏÈÊ ˙Ó¯ ˙‡Â ˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ

.‰ÏÎÏΉ ÏÚÏÚ ÍÂÓÒÏ Ôȇ ÚÂ„Ó ,‰Ï‡˘Ï ڂ· ˘„Á ¯·Ò‰ ˜ÙÒÓ Â‚ˆ‰˘ Ï„ÂÓ‰ ,ÍÎÓ ·Â˘Á(„ÈÒÙ‰Ï Â‡) Áȯ‰Ï ˙ÈÂÏÙ ‰¯·Á ‰ÈÂ˘Ú ‰Ó .‡ÏÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚ Ôˆ¯Ó ˜ÙÒÈ˘ ˙¯·ÁÂÓÂÈ˜Ó („ÈÒÙ‰Ï Â‡) Áȯ‰Ï ˙ÈÂÏÙ ‰¯·Á ‰ÈÂ˘Ú ‰Ó ,˙¯Á‡ ÌÈÏÈÓ· ?‡ÏÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚Ó˙¯Á·‰ ‰¯·Á ˜ÈÙ‰Ï ‰È¢ڢ ˙Á‡ ˙ÏÚÂ˙ ?Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ Ï˘˙‡ ‰˙ÈÁÙÓ ˙¯·‚ÂÓ ˙ÂÏÈÊ .189‰Ï˘ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ˙¯·‚ÂÓ ˙ÂÏÈÊ ‡È‰ ‡ÏÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚·Ì‡˙‰·Â ,Ì‰Ï˘ ‰Ú˜˘‰‰ ÈÂÎÈÒ ˙‡Â ‰¯·Á· ÚȘ˘‰Ï ¯Á·È˘ Âχ Ï˘ ‰˜ÒÈÚ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚÏÈÚÈ ¯ÂÁÓ˙· ˙‡Ë·˙Ó ‰ÈÈ˘ ˙ÏÚÂ˙ .190‰¯·Á‰ ˙‡˘Â ‰·˘ Ô‰‰ ÒÂÈ‚ ˙ÂÏÚ Ì‚ ‰Ë˜˙ίډ ÚÂÓ ‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ÏÈÚÈ ¯ÂÁÓ˙ .‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ Ï˘È˙Ï· ˙ÂËÏ˙˘‰Ï ‡˘Â ‰È‰˙ ‰¯·Á‰˘ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ÔÈË˜Ó ÍΠ,‰¯·Á‰ È¢ Ï˘ ¯ÒÁÌÈωӉ ÈˆÓ‡Ó Ô„ÓÂ‡Ï ÏÈÚÈ ÔÂ‚Ó Ï˘ Â˙¯ˆÂÂȉ· Û‡ ˙‡Ë·˙Ó ÂÊ ˙ÏÚÂ˙ .191˙˜„ˆÂÓ

189˙ÈÈˆÏ OTC Bulletin Board-· ˙ÂÓ¢¯‰ ˙¯·Á ·ÂÈÁ ÈΠ‡ˆÓ) Bushee & Leuz, ibid˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÏÈÊ· ˙ÂÈ˙ÂÚÓ˘Ó ˙ÂÈÏÚÏ ‡È·‰ Securities Exchange Act, 1934-‰ ˙Â˘È¯„Ï

.(˙Â˙ÈȈӉ ˙¯·ÁÏ190D.W. Diamond & R.E. Verrechia “Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital” 46 J.

D. ;(¯˙ÂÈ ˙ÂÎÂÓ Ô‰ ÒÂÈ‚ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚÏ ˙¯·‚ÂÓ ˙ÂÏÈÊÏ ÏÈ·ÂÓ ¯·‚ÂÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚) Fin. (1991) 1325Easley & M. O’Hara “Information and the Cost of Capital” (November 2001) (workingpaper series), available at: URL:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=˙ÂÎÂÓ Ô‰ ÒÂÈ‚ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚÏ ‡È·Ó ¯˙ÂÈ ·Á¯ ۘȉ· ÈÂÏÈ‚ ÈÎ ‰‡¯Ó‰ Ï„ÂÓ ÌȂȈÓ) 300715

.(¯˙ÂÈ191M.B. Fox “Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance” 62 L. & Contemp. ‡¯

.Probs. (1999) 113

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Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

˙‡Ë·˙Ó ‡ÏÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚Ó ˙È˘ÈÏ˘‰ ˙ÏÚÂ˙‰ .192Ì‰ÈˆÓ‡Ó ¯Â·Ú Ì‰Ï ‰ÚÈ‚Ó‰ ‰¯ÂÓ˙‰ÂÁ˜ÈÙ È„È ÏÚ ˙‡Ê ,‰¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó ˙ÂÏÈÚÙÓ ˙Âڷ‰ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ Ï˘ ˙ÙÒ ‰˙ÁÙ‰·Ï„Ȃ ,193̉· ‰ÚȘ˘Ó ‰¯·Á‰˘ ÌÈ˘È¯ى ÏÚ ‰¯·Á‰ ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ „ˆÓ ¯ÙÂ˘Ó˜¯ ·ÈËÈÈ ÏÈÚÏ ˙¯‡Â˙Ó‰ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰‰ ,̯· .194‰¯·Á· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ̉È˙ÂÚ˜˘‰·˜Â˘ ˙¯ˆÂÂȉ ‡ÏÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ,ÌÈÏÈÚÈ È˙Ï· ÌÈÏ‰Ó Ï˘ Ì˙ÈÁ·Ó .ÌÈÏÈÚÈ ÌÈÏ‰Ó ÌÚÚ„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ .ÌÈÈÓÂȘ ÌÈÓÂȇ ‰˘ÚÓÏ ÌÈ‚ˆÈÈÓ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ÏÈ„‚È˘ ÔÙ‡· ,‰¯·Á‰ ˙ÂÈÓÏ ¯˙ÂÈ ÌÈÎÂÓ ÌȯÈÁÓ· ˙Èωȉ ˙ÂÏÈÚȉ ¯ÒÂÁ ˙‡ Û˜˘ÈÏ˘ ÌÈÏÈÚÈ È˙Ï·‰ ‰ÈÏ‰Ó ˙‡ Û¢ÁÈ ;195˙ÂÈÂËÏ˙˘‰Ï‡˘Â ‰È‰˙ ‰¯·Á‰˘ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ÌÈÏ˘ÂΉ ÌÈωӉ ˙‡ Û¢ÁÈ ;196ÌÈÂӇ ˙Â¯È‰Ê ˙·ÂÁ ˙¯Ù‰ ÔÈ‚· ˙ÂÚÈ·˙Ï ‰¯·Á‰Ô·˘Á ÏÚ ‰‡‰ ˙·ÂË Í¯ˆÏ ÌÈωӉ ˙ÏÂÎÈ ˙‡ ÏÈ·‚È ;197(proxy) ‰Ú·ˆ‰ ˙·¯˜ÏÌÈÓÚËÓ .198‰¯·Á‰ ÔÂȯ¢¯È„ ÔÂÂÈÎÓ ÌÈωӉ ÏÚ ıÁω ˙‡ ÌȈÚÈ ˙ÂÈÓ‰ ÈÏÚ·

.199˙ÂȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ ¯„Úȉ· ‡ÏÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˜ÙÒÏ ˙ÂÈÂÙˆ ˙¯·Á‰ ÏÎ ‡Ï ,ÂχÈÎ ,ÏÈÚÏ˘ ˙ÂÚËÏ ‰·Â‚˙· ÌÈÚÂË ˙ÂȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ ˙ÏË‰Ï ÌÈ„‚˙Ó‰¯˘‡· "¯˙ÂÈ· Ú¯‚‰" ˙‡ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰ ÂÁÈÈ ,(elective) ‰˘¯Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ¯Ë˘Ó ˙Á˙ÔÂÚÈˉ ÒÈÒ·· .200‰Ï˘ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ· ˙‡Ê ÂÏϘ˘È ,Ú„ÈÓ ‰Ï‚Ó ‰È‡˘ ‰¯·ÁÏ̯‚È ‰¯·Á‰ ˙‡ ˘ÈÚÈ ˜Â˘‰˘ ‰Á‰‰ ‰ÈÂˆÓ "¯˙ÂÈ· Ú¯‚‰" ˘ÈÁ¯˙‰ ˙Á‰ ¯·„·¯ÒÂÁ ˙‡ ÍÂÙ‰È˘ ·ˆÓ ,‰¯·ÁÏ ¯ÒÁ ˙ίډ È„Î „Ú ,˘¯„‰ ÔÓ ‰Ï„‚ ¯ÈÁÓ ˙ÁȈÏ

.‡ÏÓ Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÏ‚Ï ‰¯·Á‰ ˙‡ ÚÈÈ ȇ„Î È˙Ï·Ï ÈÂÏÈ‚‰

192V. Nagar et al. “Discretionary Disclosure and Stock-Based Incentives” 34 J. Account.̉ȈȯÓ˙ ÔÈ·Ï ÌÈÏ‰Ó Ï˘ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÈÚÙ ÔÈ· ¯˘˜‰ ˙„‡ ÏÚ ¯˜ÁÓ) & Econ. (2003) 283˙¯Ȅ˙ È„È ÏÚ Ô‰ ˙„„Ó‰ ,ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ ÈÎ ‰Ï‚Ó‰ ,‰¯·Á‰ ˙ÂÈÓ È¯Ú˘ ÏÚ ÌÈÒÒ·Ӊ˙˜È˘¯Ù ˙‡ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ Ï˘ È·È˘ÈÈ·ÂÒ‰ ‚¯Ȅ‰ È„È ÏÚ Ô‰Â ÌÈωӉ Ï˘ Á¯‰ ˙ÂÈÊÁ˙È¯Ú˘Ó ÚÙ˘ÂÓ‰ ÌÈÈÏÏΉ ÌÈωӉ Ï˘ Ì¯Î˘ ¯ÂÚÈ˘Ï È·ÂÈÁ ÔÙ‡· ÌÈ¯Â˘˜ ,‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰

.(ÌÈÏ‰Ó Ì˙‡ È„È ÏÚ ˙˜ÊÁÂÓ‰ ˙ÂÈÓ‰ È¢Ӡ‰ÈÓ‰193M.B. Fox “The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in

‰˙‡ ‰Ó¯ ÈÎ ÔÚÂË) Globalizing Market for Securities” 97 Mich. L. Rev. (1998) 696, 732ÌÈ˘Èȯٷ ‰¯·Á‰ ˙¯ÈÁ·Ï ‰¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó ÈˆÈ¯Ó˙ ·ÂˆÈÚÏ ˙ÈÁ¯Î‰ ˜ÈÙÓ‰ „ˆÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚ Ï˘

.(ÚȘ˘˙ ̉·˘194„ˆÓ ¯˙ÂÈ Ï„‚ ۘȉ· ˙˜ÊÁ‰Ï ÏÈ·ÂÓ ¯·‚ÂÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚) Diamond & Verrechia, supra note 190

.(ÌÈÏ„‚ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó195.Fox, supra note 191 ‡¯196.Ibid197.Ibid198.Gordon, supra note 134 ‡¯199W.O. Jung & Y.K. Kwon “Disclosure When the Market is Unsure of Information ‡¯

ÌÈÈÂÙˆ ÌÈÏ‰Ó ÈÎ ÌÈÚÂË) Endowment of Managers” 26 J. Account. Research (1988) 146.(˙·ÂË ˙¢„Á Ì˙¢¯· ˘È ¯˘‡Î ¯˜ÈÚ· ˙ÂÏ‚Ï

200Thompson & King supra Ì‚ ‡¯ .Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 170, at p. 683 ‡¯.(¯Á‡ ¯˘˜‰· ÂÊ ‰Á‰ ÌÈÓ˘ÈÈÓ‰) note 123

53

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

¯·ÒÂÓÎ ,˙È˘‡¯ :˙·¯ ˙·¢˙Ï ‰ÎÊ "¯˙ÂÈ· Ú¯‚‰" ˘ÈÁ¯˙‰ ˙Á‰ ¯·„· ÔÂÚÈˉ˙„Â˜Ó ÈÎ ˙ÂÏ‚Ï ‰ÈÂ˘Ú ‰ÏÈÚÈ ‰Ï‰‰ Ì‚ ,ȯ·Ȉ ¯ˆÂÓÎ Ú„ÈÓ‰ Ï˘ ÂÈÙ‡ ¯Â‡Ï ,ÏÈÚÏ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ „‚ΠϘ˘È‰Ï ‰ÏÂÎÈ ‰È‡ Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ ‡ÏÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚· ‰ÓÂÏ‚‰ ˙ÏÚÂ˙‰ ,‰Ë·ÓÂÚÓÈÈ ÌÈÏÈÚÈ ÌÈÏ‰Ó Ì‚ ,ȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ÏÏÎ ¯„Úȉ·Â ,ÂχΠÌȯ˜Ó· .201Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰Ï‰‰‰ Ï˘ ‰˙ÏÂÎÈ ,˙È˘ .202‰¯·Á‰ ˙„‡ ÏÚ Ì˙¢¯· ÌÈȘ‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÏÎ ˙‡ ˙ÂÏ‚ÏÓ˜Â˘‰ ˙·Â‚˙ ˙‡ ˙ÎÙ‰ (MBO ‡ ,Management Buyouts) ‰¯·Á‰ ÏÚ ËÏ˙˘‰Ï‰¯·Á‰ ÈωÓÏ ¯˘Ù‡È˘ Ȃ˯ËÒ‡ ÈÏÎÏ ,(¯ÒÁ‰ ˙ίډ ˙‡ ,¯ÓÂÏÎ) ÏÈÚÈ È˙Ï· ÈÂÏÈ‚Ï˙‡ ˘ÂÎ¯Ï Ê‡Â È„Ó ‰Ï„‚ ¯ÈÁÓ ˙„ȯȷ ·È‚‰Ï ˜Â˘Ï ̯‚Ï ,‡ÏÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚Ó ÚÓȉÏ˙Ò¯Ó‰ ‰ÚÙ˘‰‰ ÔÓ ˜ÂÓÁÏ ÌÈÈÂ˘Ú ‰¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó ,˙È˘ÈÏ˘ .203ÍÂÓ ¯ÈÁÓ· ‰¯·Á‰ÏÚ ˙‡Ê ,"¯˙ÂÈ· Ú¯‚‰" ˙‡ ÌÈÙ˜˘Ó ‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ Ì‡ Ì‚ ˜Â˘‰ Ï˘ıÂÓȇ È„È ÏÚ ˜Â˘· ˘„Á Ô‰ ÒÂÈ‚Ï ‰ÈÈÙ ÛÏÁ Ìȯ·ˆ ÌÈÁÂÂ¯Ó ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ‰ ÔÂÓÈÓ È„È

.˙ÂËÏ˙˘‰ ÈÙÓ ˙‚‰,Û˜Â˙ ˙ÂÏÚ· Ô‰ ˙ÂȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ ˙ÏË‰Ï ÌÈ„‚˙Ó‰ Ï˘ ˙ÂÚˉ˘ Ì‚‰Ú¯‚‰" ˘ÈÁ¯˙‰ ˙Á‰ ¯·„· ÔÂÚÈˉ ÔÈÚ¯‚ ˙‡ ‰Â‰Ó ̄ÂÒÈ· ˙„ÓÂÚ‰ ‰Á‰‰˙ÁȈ ˙ÂÚˆÓ‡· ˜Â˘‰ È„È ÏÚ ‰˘Ú˙ Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÏ‚Ó Ôȇ˘ ˙¯·Á ÈÎ ‡È‰ "¯˙ÂÈ·„ÂÒÈ ˙Á‰ ‰Á„‰ ,˘„Á ÔÂÚÈË ‰ÏÚÓ ÂÏ˘ ‰È¯Â‡È˙‰ .ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ȇ Ï˘· ˙ÓÊ‚ÂÓ ¯ÈÁÓÚ„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ :˙ÂȯÂË„Ó‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙·ÂÁ ˙‡ ˘„Á ¯Â‡· ‚ȈÓ ,ÂÊ˘ÈÁ¯˙‰ ˙Á‰ ıÂÓȇ È„È ÏÚ ‡ÏÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙¢ Ôȇ˘ ˙¯·Á ˘ÈÚ‰Ï ÏÂÎÈ Âȇ˙ÓÊ‚ÂÓ ¯ÈÁÓ ˙ÁȈ Í¯ÂˆÏ .˙ÓÊ‚ÂÓ ¯ÈÁÓ ˙ÁÈˆÏ ÏÈ·ÂÈ˘ ÔÙ‡· "¯˙ÂÈ· Ú¯‚‰"‰ÏÂÚÙ ÛÂ˙È˘ ‡ ,"ÌÈÂÓÈÏ ˜Â˘" ˙¯ˆÂÂÈ‰Ï ÂÏÈ·ÂÈ˘ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÚÙ ÂÓÈȘ˙È˘ ˘¯„˜Â˘· ¯ÁÒÓ‰ ˙‡ ÌÈÈÈÙ‡Ó Ìȇ Âχ Ìȇ˙ È˘ ,Ìχ .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÔÈ· ÈËÒÈÏ˯˜

.È˘Ó‰ÌÈÎȯˆ Ú„ÈÓ‰-ȯÚÙ ,"ÌÈÂÓÈÏ ˜Â˘" Ï˘ Â˙¯ˆÂÂÈ‰Ï ÂÏÈ·ÂÈ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÚÙ˘ ˙Ó ÏÚ˙¯·Á „ˆÓ È˘Ó‰ ˜Â˘· ÈÂÏÈ‚ ¯„Úȉ ,̯· .204ÌȘ‰ ÔÈ·Ï ÌȯÎÂÓ‰ ÔÈ· ÌÈȘ˙‰Ï

201H.S. Scott “Internalization of Primary Public Securities Markets” 63 L. & Contemp. ‡¯ÈÂÏÈ‚˘ ÌÂ˘Ó ˙ÂÏ‚Ï ‡Ï˘ ÌÈ˙ÚÏ ÌȯÁ· ‰¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó ÈÎ ÌÈÈȈÓ) Prob. (2000) 71, 76

.(ÌȯÁ˙ÓÏ ÚÈÈÒÈ202,Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ È„È ÏÚ ˘¯„‰ ÔÓ ¯˙ÂÈ ·¯ Ú„ÈÓ Ìˆ¯Ó ÌÈÏ‚Ó ÌÈ·¯ ÌÈÏ‰Ó ÈÎ ¯·„‰ ÔÂÎ

ÌÈÈÈÂÚÓ‰ ÌÈÏ‰Ó˘ ÍÎÓ Ú·Â ¯·„‰ ÈÎ ¯˘Ù‡ ,Ô· .ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ „ˆÓ ˘Â˜È·Ï ‰·Â‚˙· ˙‡Ê˜Á˘ ÈÒÈÒ·‰ ȯÂË„Ó‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰˘ ¯Á‡Ó ‡ ˙ÂȈÈÁ‰ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰‰ ÔÓ ÌÈÚ˙¯ Ìȇ Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÏ‚Ï

.˙¯·Á‰ ÏÎ ¯Â·Ú ˙ÂȈÈÁ‰ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ¯·ÎÓ ‰Ê203S.E. Perry & T.H. Williams “Earnings ‡¯ .ÂÏ‡Î˘ ˙˜ÈË˜Ë ÌÈÓ˘ÈÈÓ ÌÓ‡ ÌÈωÓ

Management Preceding Management Buyout Offers” 18 J. A Account. & Econ. (1994)157; D. Millon “Why Is Corporate Management Obsessed With Quarterly Earnings˙„Ú) and What Should Be Done About It?” 70 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (2002) 890, 911‰˘· discretionary accruals ÂÈÈÚ˘ ÔÂ˙‰ ÏÚ ‰¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó Ï˘ ‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓÏ ˙ȯÈÙÓ‡

.(‰¯·Á· ‰ËÈÏ˘‰ ˙˘Èί· Û˙˙˘‰Ï ÌÈωӉ ˙ÂÂÎ ÏÚ ˙È·ÓÂÙ‰ ‰Ê¯Î‰Ï ˙ӄ˜‰204Ìȇ ÌȘ‰˘ ¯Á‡Ó .ÌÈÂ˜Ï ÌȯÎÂÓ ÔÈ· Ú„ÈÓ ¯ÚÙ ÌÈȘ˘ ‰Ú˘· ÌÈȘ˙Ó "ÌÈÂÓÈÏ ˜Â˘"

54

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

ÌÈ„„ˆ‰ È˘ ˙‡ ¯È˙ÂÓ ‡Ï‡ ,ÌȘ ÔÈ·Ï ÌȯÎÂÓ ÔÈ· Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÚÙ ¯ˆÂÈ Âȇ ˙Âȯ·ȈÈÂÏÈ‚Ó ÚÓÈ‰Ï ‰ÏÂÏÚ ‰¯·Á‰ .¯ÁÒÓÏ „ˆ ‰È‡ ÛÈ„Ú‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÏÚ· ‰¯·Á‰ .‰Î˘Á·˙‡ˆÂ˙ ÏÚ Â‡ ,‚ÂÊÈÓ ˙‡¯˜Ï Ô˙Ó ‡˘ÓÏÚ Ô‚‰Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ ,Ï˘ÓÏ) ÌȘ„ˆÂÓ ÌÈÓÚËÓ‡ÏÓ˙ÂÂÏ˘ÈÎ ¯È˙Ò‰Ï È„Î ,Ï˘ÓÏ) ÌȘ„ˆÂÓ È˙Ï· ÌÈÓÚËÓ Â‡ (Í¯Ú ˙ÂÏÚ· ÁÂ˙ÈÙ ¯˜ÁÓÌÈÈχȈËÂÙ ÌȘ ‰Ê Ìȯ·„ ·ˆÓ· .205(‰Ú¯Ï ‰Ï‰‰‰ Ï˘ ‰ÁÂÎ ÏÂˆÈ Â‡ ÌÈȘÒÚÌÈÏÂÎÈ Ìȇ ÌÈÈχȈËÂÙ ÌȯÎÂÓ˘ Ì˘Î ,"¯˙ÂÈ· Ú¯‚‰" ˙‡ ÁÈ‰Ï ÌÈÏÂÎÈ Ìȇ ˜Â˘·,‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ È˙ÈÓ‡‰ È¢‰ Â‰Ó Ú·˜Ï ÂÒÈ ÌÈ„„ˆ‰ È˘ ."¯˙ÂÈ· ·Âˉ" ˙‡ ÁȉÏ˙Âȯ·˙Ò‰ ÒÂÁÈÈ È„È ÏÚ Ì‡Â ‰Ù˘Á ‡Ï ‰¯·Á‰˘ Ú„ÈÓ ÛÂÒȇ· ‰Ú˜˘‰ È„È ÏÚ Ì‡Ì˙ίډ ˙‡ Û˜˘Ó‰ ˜Â˘ ¯ÈÁÓ Ú·˜È˘ ¯·„ ,Û˘Á ‡Ï˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ Ï˘ ·ÈËÏ ˙ÂÓȇ˙Ó˘È‡ ,ÌȘ ·¯˜·Â ÌȯÎÂÓ ·¯˜· ˙¯Á˙‰ ÁÎÂÏ .206‰¯·Á‰ È¢ ˙‡ ¯˙ÂÈ· ‰·ÂË‰Ï˘ ·ˆÓ ÏÏÎÏ Ò¯˜È ‡Ï ˜Â˘‰ ÔÎÏ ,ÍÎ Ì˙Ò "¯˙ÂÈ· Ú¯‚‰" ˙‡ ÁÈ‰Ï ÏÂÎÈ ÂÈ‡Ï˘ Â˙ÏÂÎÈ ˙‡ ÌÈÏÏ¢ ˜Â˘· ÌÈÈ˙¯Á˙‰ ˙ÂÁÂΉ ,˙¯Á‡ ÔÂ˘Ï .207"ÌÈÂÓÈÏ ˜Â˘"ÈÂÏÈ‚ ȇ ˙˘Ú‰ ͯ„ ÏÚ ‡ÏÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚ Ï˘ ‰È‚˯ËÒ‡· ¯ÂÁ·Ï ˙¯·Á ÈωÓÏ Ì¯‚Ï ˜Â˘‰

.208˙ÂÂÎÓ ¯ÒÁ ˙ίډ·

¯ˆÂÓ‰˘ ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰ ˙‡ Û˜˘Ó‰ ÍÂÓ ¯ÈÁÓ ÌÏ˘Ï ÌÈÎÂÓ Ì‰ ,ÌȯˆÂÓ‰ Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÎȇ È‰Ó ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÌÂ˘Ó „¯˘Ï ÌÈÏÂÎÈ Ìȇ ÌÈÈ˙ÂÎȇ‰ ÌȯˆÂÓ‰ ȯˆÈ .Ú¯‚ ¯ˆÂÓ‰˘ ˙¯·˙Ò‰Ï ÒÁÈ· È˙ÂÎȇÍÎÓ ‰‡ˆÂ˙Î .˜Â˘‰ ÔÓ ÌȇˆÂÈ Ì‰ ÔÎÏ ̉ȯˆÂÓ ˙ÂÎȇ ˙‡ Û˜˘Ó‰ ¯ÈÁÓ Ï·˜Ï ÌÈÏÂÎÈ Ìȇ˘¯ˆÂÓ Ï·˜Ï ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰˘ Ì¢Ó) ÌÏ˘Ï ÌÈÎÂÓ Ì‰˘ ¯ÈÁÓ‰ ˙‡ ¯˙ÂÈ „ÂÚ ÌÈίˆ‰ ÌÈ˙ÈÁÙÓÌȯˆÂÓ‰ ˜¯ ˜Â˘· Ìȯ‡˘˘ „Ú ,ÌÈÈ˙ÂÎȇ ÌȯˆÈ „ÂÚ ˜Â˘‰Ó ÌȇˆÂÈ ·Â˘Â ,(‰„¯È È˙ÂÎȇ‡ÂˆÓÏ Ì‰ÈÏÚ ˜Â˘· „¯˘Ï ÂÏÎÂÈ ÌÈÈ˙ÂÎȇ‰ ÌȯˆÂÓ‰ ȯˆÈ˘ È„Î ."ÌÈÂÓÈÏ" ȯ˜ ,ÌÈÚ¯‚‰¯ÈÁÓ Ì‰È¯ˆÂÓ ¯Â·Ú ÌÏ˘Ï ÌȘ‰ ˙‡ Ú΢Ï ÌÈÚ¯‚‰ ÌȯˆÂÓ‰ ÔÓ ÌÓˆÚ ˙‡ Ï„·Ï ÌÈί„G.A. Akerlof “The Market ‡¯ .ԉȯˆÂÓÏ ,"˙ÂȯÁ‡ ˙„ÂÚ˙" Ô˙Ó È„È ÏÚ ,Ï˘ÓÏ .¯˙ÂÈ ‰Â·‚for ‘Lemons’: Quality, Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism” 84 Q. J. Econ. (1970)488; H.E. Leland “Quacks, Lemons and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality

.Standards” 87 J. Pol. Econ. (1979) 1328205R.E. Verrecchia “Discretionary Disclosure” 5 J. Account. & Econ. (1983) ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯

J. Ronen & V. (Lewinstein) Yaari “Incentives ;(ÈÂÏÈ‚-È‡Ï ˙¯Á˙Ó‰ ˙·ÈÒ‰ È˙˘· ÔÂÈ„) 179,ÈÒÂÙÈË ÔÙ‡· ÈÎ ÌÈÚÂË) For Voluntary Disclosure” 4 J. Fin. Markets (2001) 309, 311È„È˙Ú‰ ‰·ˆÓ ˙„‡ ÏÚ ÈÙˆ Ô‚Π,Ì˙Ó‡Ï Ô˙È ‡Ï˘ ÌÈÂ˙ ÏÏÂÎ Â˙ÂÏ‚Ï ‰·ÂÁ Ôȇ˘ Ú„ÈÓ.(˙ÂÚ¯ ˙¢„ÁÎ ˘¯Ù˙‰Ï ÏÂÎÈ Âȇ ¯„Úȉ˘ Ú„ÈÓ ËÈ¯Ù Â‰Ê .‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ˙ȘÒÚ‰ ‰·È·Ò‰ Ï˘

206J. Hirshleifer È„È ÏÚ ÚˆÂ‰˘ ,Ú„ÈÓ ¯Á‡ ÈÊ·Ê· ˘ÂÙÈÁ ‰‡¯Ó‰ ÌÒ¯ÂÙÓ‰ Ï„ÂÓ‰ Ï˘ ͯÚÓ‰ ‰ʓThe Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity” 61

.Am. Econ. Rev. (1971) 561207·˜ÚÓ‰ ‡˘Â ̉ Ô‰È˙ÂÈÓ˘ ,˙ÂÏ„‚ ˙¯·Á Ï˘ ¯˘˜‰· ¯˙ÂÈ· ‰ÊÚ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ·¯˜· ˙¯Á˙‰

Ï˘ ˙ÓÊ‚ÂÓ ‰˙ÁÙ‰ È„È ÏÚ Z Ï‚ÂÒÓ‰ „„· ËÒÈχ ‡ˆÓ· Ôȇ ,Ìχ .ÌÈ·¯ ÌÈËÒÈχ Ï˘‰È˙ÂÈÓ˘ ,‰Ï„‚ ‰¯·Á ÔÒ¯Ï Z Âχ ˙ÂÈÓ ¯Á‡ ·˜ÚÓÓ ˙ÂÚÓȉ È„È ÏÚ Â‡ ˙ÂÈÓ‰ ¯ÈÁÓ

.ÌÈ·¯ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó Ï˘ ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰ ȘÈ˙· ˙ÂÏÂÏÎ208‰¯·Á‰ ¯˘‡Î .˙ÂÈ¢‡¯‰ ˙˜ى‰ ˜Â˘· ÌÈÓÈȘ "ÌÈÂÓÈÏ ˜Â˘"Ï ÏÈ·Â‰Ï ÌÈÏÂÏÚ‰ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÚÙ

˙È҇Ϙ‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÚÙ ˙ÈÈÚ· ˙‡ Ú„ÈÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚Ó ˙ÂÚÓȉ ˙¯ˆÂÈ ,¯Â·ÈˆÏ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ‰˜ÈÙÓÏÚ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ˙‡ ˙ÈÁÙ‰Ï ˜Â˘‰ Ï˘ Â˙ÏÂÎÈ ,‰Ê ‰¯˜Ó· .ÌȘ ÔÈ·Ï ¯ÎÂÓ ÔÈ·A.R. Palmiter “Toward ‡¯ .˙È˙ÂÚÓ˘Ó ‡È‰ Z ˙ÂÏ‚Ï Ìω ıȯÓ˙ ˜ÈÙÓÏ ˜ÙÒÏ ÍÎ È„È

55

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

‰ÓÎÒ‰ È„È ÏÚ ‡È‰ ÂÊ ‰ÈÚ· ÏÚ ¯·‚˙‰Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÌÈÏÂÎÈ ‰·˘ ‰„ÈÁȉ ͯ„‰,Ìχ .‰¯·Á‰ „ˆÓ ‡ÏÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ¯„Úȉ ÁÎÂÏ "¯˙ÂÈ· Ú¯‚‰" ˙‡ ÁÈ‰Ï ˙È·È˘Ï˜‰¯Ù‰ È„Î ‰ÏÂÚ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ȇ ÔÈ‚· ˙ÈÂÏÙ ‰¯·Á ˙˘Ú‰ ¯·„· ÂÊÎ ˙ÈÙÚ ÏÏÎ ‰ÓÎÒ‰Ú¯‚‰" ˙‡ ÌÈÁÈÓ Âȉ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÏΠ̇ .209ÌÈȘÒÚ‰ ÌÈÏ·‚‰‰ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ‰Ë·

ÁÂÂË Û¯Á) Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings” 1999 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. (1999) 1Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙Â˘È¯„˘ ÍÎÏ ‰˜ÊÁ ˙ȯÈÙÓ‡ ‰ÎÈÓ˙ ˙ÓÈȘ ,IPO-‰ ·Ï˘· ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙Â˘È¯„· ˙ÂϘ‰‰ÂÊÓ ‰‰Â·‚ ‰Ó¯· ˙ÂÏ‚Ï ,˙ÈÊÂÁ-˙È˯٠˙¯‚ÒÓ· ,ÌȘÈÙÓ ˙·ÈÈÁÓ ˙·¯ ÌÈÓÚÙ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó Ï˘˙¯ÊÚȉ È„È ÏÚ "ÌÈÂÓÈÏ ˜Â˘" ˙¯ÈˆÈÓ ÚÓÈ‰Ï ÌÈÒÓ ÌȘÈÙÓ ,Ô΢ .(ÔÈ„‰ È„È ÏÚ ˙·˙ÎÂÓ˘˙È˙ÂÚÓ˘Ó ÌÈ˙ÚÏ) ‰Á‰ ÌÈÙ˜˘Ó ˙ÂÈ¢‡¯ ˙˜ى· Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÔÈÈ„Ú ,ÌÈÓ˙Á·S.M. Tinic “Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock” 43 J. ‡¯ .(„‡Ó˙ÏËÂÓ ‡ÂÙ‡ ÚÂ„Ó .(ÁÂËÈ· Ï˘ ‚ÂÒÎ ¯ÂÁÓ˙-˙˙· ˘ÂÓÈ˘Ï ¯·Ò‰) Fin. (1988) 789, 797y800‡È‰ ÂÈ„È ÏÚ ÚˆÂÓ‰ Ï„ÂÓ‰ ÔÓ ˙¯Ê‚‰ ‰·Â˘˙‰ ?˙È¢‡¯ ‰˜Ù‰ Ï˘ ·Ï˘· Ì‚ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁÌÈȘ˙È ˙È¢‡¯‰ ‰˜Ù‰‰ ¯Á‡Ï „ÈÈÓ .È˘Ó‰ ˜Â˘Ï ÚÈÈÒÓ ˙È¢‡¯‰ ‰˜Ù‰‰ ·Ï˘· ÈÂÏÈ‚˘Ú¯ȇ) ÚÈÙ˘˙ ‰Â˘‡¯‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙·ÂÁ ¯˘‡ „Ú ,È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘· ÌȘ ÔÈ·Ï ÌȯÎÂÓ ÔÈ· ¯ÁÒÓȯ˘ ‰È‰È È˘Ó‰ ˜Â˘‰ ‰·˘ ÔÓÊ ˙Ù˜˙ ¯ˆÂÂÈ˙ (Ô¢‡¯‰ ÔÂÚ·¯‰ ÛÂÒ· ÏÏΠͯ„· ˘Á¯˙Ó‰R. Rajan & H. Servaes “Analyst Following of Initial Public Offering” 52 ‡¯ .‰ËÏÚ·ÌÈÒÎÓ‰ ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ ¯ÙÒÓÏ È·ÂÈÁ Á¯Â‡· ¯Â˘˜ ¯ÂÁÓ˙ ˙˙ ÈÎ ÌȇˆÂÓ) J. Fin. (1997) 507M. Li, T.H. McInish & U. Wongchoti ;(IPO-‰ ¯Á‡Ï˘ ˜Â˘· ˙¢„Á‰ ˙˜ى‰ ˙‡“Asymmetric Information in the IPO Aftermarket” (August 2003) available at: URL:http://207.36.165.114/Denver/Papers/Evolution%20of%20asymmetric%20information˙È¢‡¯ ‰˜Ù‰ Ï˘ ¯ÂÁÓ˙‰ ˙˙˘ ÏÎÎ ÈÎ ÌȇˆÂÓ) %20after%20firms%20go%20public.pdf¯Á‡Ï „ÈÓ ¯˙ÂÈ· ‰ÎÂÓ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÚÙ ˙Ó¯ ÈΠ,ÌÈÏÏÂΉ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÚÙ ÌÈÓˆÓËˆÓ ÍÎ ,¯˙ÂÈ ˜ÊÁ.(seasoning) ÌÈÂÒÓ ÔÓÊ ÛÂÏÁ ¯Á‡Ï ‰˙Ó¯Ï ‰‡Â¢‰· ,˜Â˘Ï ‰ÚÈ‚Ó ˙È¢‡¯‰ ‰˜Ù‰‰˘·Ï˘· ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙·ÂÁ ˙‡ ˙ÎίӉ Z ˙ȘȯӇ‰ SEC-‰ Ï˘ ‰˙ÂÈÈ„Ó ÈÎ ,¯Ê‚ ÂÊ ‰˜ÒÓÓ.˙˜„ˆÂÓZ È˘Ó‰ ˜Â˘· Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÚÙ Ï˘ ‰ÚÙÂ˙ Ôȇ ¯˘‡Î ÌȯÂËÙ ‰˜ÈÚÓ ˙È¢‡¯‰ ‰˜Ù‰‰˙Ή· ͯˆ ‡ÏÏ ¯Â·ÈˆÏ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ˙˜Ù‰ ¯È˙Ó‰ ,SEC-‰ ‰ˆÓȇ˘ A144 ÏÏÎ ,Ï˘ÓÏ ÍÎËÂËȈ ˙ίÚÓ·Â ÌÈÈ„ÒÂÓ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó ·¯˜· ˜¯ ¯ÁÒÓ ¯˘Ù‡Ó ,SEC-‰ ψ‡ ÌÓÂ˘È¯·Â ÛȘ˘˙ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ ˙‡ ÔÂÁ·Ï „ˆÈÎ ÌÈÚ„Âȉ ,Âχ ÌÈÓÎÁÂ˙Ó ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó ·¯˜· ,ÌӇ .ÍÎÏ ˙„ÚÂÈÓ‰˙ÂϘ‰‰ ÏÎ ˙‡ ˯ÙÓ) Palmiter, ibid ‡¯ .„·Ï· ÌÈÈÏÓÈÈÓ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÚÙ ÌÈÓÈȘ ,Ì‰Ï ÌÈÚˆÂÓ‰‡Â‰ È˙ÂÚÓ˘Ó ÔÙ‡·˘ ¯„Ò‰ ‡È‰ ‰‡ˆÂ˙‰ ÈÎ ÔÚÂË ,˙È¢‡¯‰ ‰˜Ù‰‰ ·Ï˘· ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙Â˘È¯„·‰¯ÈÁ· Ï˘ ‰ÈÚ· ¯ˆÂÂÈ‰Ï ‰ÏÂÏÚ ˙È¢‡¯‰ ‰˜Ù‰‰ ·Ï˘·˘ ‡Â‰ ¯Á‡ ¯·Ò‰ .(‰ÙÂÎ ˙ÂÁÙÚÂˆÈ·Ó ÂÚÓÈÈ ÌÈÓÎÁÂ˙Ó ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó .ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó Ï˘ (adverse selection) ˙ÈÚËÂÓÈ˙Ï·‰ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰ ˙‡ Í¢ÓÏ ÏÂÎÈ ÔÈÈ„Ú ˜ÈÙÓ‰ ͇ ,˙È¢‡¯‰ ‰˜Ù‰‰ ·Ï˘· ˙‡˜ÒÚ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ˙˜ÙÒÓ˘ ‰‚‰‰ ÔÓ ‰‰ Ú„ÂÈÓ È˙Ï· ÚȘ˘Ó ·˘ ,È˘Ó‰ ˜Â˘Ï „‚ȷ Ìχ .ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓÈÂÏÈ‚ ·ÈÈÁÏ Í¯Âˆ‰ ¯¯ÂÚ˙Ó ÔÎ ÏÚ .ÂÊ΢ ‰‚‰ Ôȇ ˙È¢‡¯‰ ‰˜Ù‰‰ ·Ï˘·˘ ȯ‰ ,˜Â˘‰ÍΠ,adverse selection ÚÂÓÏ ,ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ‰ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰ ˙‡ Í¢ÓÏ ,˙È¢‡¯‰ ‰˜Ù‰‰ ·Ï˘·

.ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ È˙Ï·‰ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰ ÏÚ Ô‚‰Ï Ì‚209B.D. Shaffer “In Restraint of Trade: Trade Associations and the Emergence of ‘Self ‡¯

˙ȯ˘Ù‡‰ ˙ÂȘÂÁ‰ ȇ ˙‡ ÔÈȈÓ) Regulation’” 20 Sw. U. L. Rev. (1991) 289, 298y299J.C. Coffee Jr. “Gatekeeper ¢‰Â ‡¯ .(¯ÁÒÓ È‚‰Â ÔÈÈÚ· ÌÈÈÙÚ ÏÏÎ Ìȯ„Ò‰· ‰ÂÓˉFailure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms” 84 B. U. L. Rev.Ô·˘Á ˙Èȇ¯ ÛÚ ¯˜ÈÚ· Z ˙¯Â˜È·‰ ÈÙÚ· ÌȘ‰·ÂÓ ˙ÂÁÙ Ìȯ„Ò‰ ¯È„‚Ó) (2004) 301, 351

.(ÌÈÏ·ÂÎ Ìȯ„҉ΠZ

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Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

ȯÈÁÓ ÍÂ˙Ï ÂÊ ‰Á‰ ÌÈÏϘ˘Ó ,˙ÂÈËÒÈÏ˯˜ ˙˜ÈË˜Ë ıÓ‡Ï ˙ÏÂÎÈ ¯„Úȉ· "¯˙ÂÈ·ÍÈ¯Ú‰Ï ÔÂÈÒÈ· Ú„ÈÓ ÛÂÒȇ· ÚȘ˘‰Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÏ ıȯÓ˙ ¯ˆÂ ‰È‰ ,ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈÈ˙Ó ˙ÂÏ‚Ï ÏÎÂÈ Ú„ÈÓ· ÚȘ˘È˘ Ú„ÈÓ ¯ÁÂÒ .‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ È˙ÈÓ‡‰ È¢‰ ˙‡ ¯˙ÂÈ ·Âˉ¯·Á‰ ˙ÂÈÓ ˙‡ ˙Â˜Ï ÏÎÂÈ ‰Ê ¯ÁÂÒ .˙ÓÊ‚ÂÓ ‡È‰ ˙ÓÈÂÒÓ ‰¯·Á Ï˘ ¯ÈÁÓ‰ ˙„ȯÈÌÊ‚ÂÓ ÔÙ‡· ÌÈÏϘ˘Ó Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ¯˙È ÏÎ ‰ÈÓ‰ ˙ÈȘ ˙Ú·˘ ¯Á‡Ó) ÍÂÓ ¯ÈÁÓ·‰Â·‚ ¯ÈÁÓ· ‰ÈÓ‰ ˙‡ ¯ÂÎÓÏ (‰ÈÓ‰ ¯ÈÁÓÏ "¯˙ÂÈ· Ú¯‚‰" ˘ÈÁ¯˙‰ ˙Á‰ ˙‡ÂÚȘ˘È˘ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ˘ ¯Á‡Ó .(ÌÈ·¯· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ‰Ï‚˙È ‰ÈÓ‰ ˙¯ÈÎÓ ˙Ú·˘ ¯Á‡Ó)ıÂÓȇ ˙ÂÚˆÓ‡· ·È‚‰Ï ÌȯÁ‡‰ ˆχÈÈ ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ¯˙È ˙‡ ˙ÂÚÈ·˜· ÂÒÈ·È Ú„ÈÓ·¯˙ÂÈ ‰·ÂË ‰¯Âˆ· ÍÈ¯Ú‰Ï È„Î Ú„ÈÓ ÛÂÒȇ· ̉ Û‡ ÂÚȘ˘È ,¯ÓÂÏÎ ,‰Ó„ ‰È‚˯Ë҇ȯÁÂÒ Ï΢ ÍÎÏ Ì¯‚˙ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÔÈ· ˙¯Á˙‰ .‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ È˙ÈÓ‡‰ ‰È¢ ˙‡È˙ÈÓ‡‰ ÔÈÈ¢ È·‚Ï Ì‰Ï˘Ó ˙ÂÈ˘È‡ ˙Âίډ ˘Â·È‚·Â Ú„ÈÓ ÛÂÒȇ· ÂÚȘ˘È Ú„ÈÓ‰ÔÈ‚· ˙¯·Á ˘ÈÚ‰Ï ˜Â˘‰ ÏÎÂÈ ‡Ï ÍÎÓ ‰‡ˆÂ˙Î .ÈÂÏÈ‚Ó ÚÓÈ‰Ï ˙¯Á·‰ ˙¯·Á Ï˘‚È˘‰Ï ̘ӷ .‡ÏÓ Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÏ‚Ï ÌÈÏÈÚÈ È˙Ï· ÌÈωÓÏ ıȯÓ˙ ¯ˆÂÂÈ ‡Ï ,¯ÒÁ ÈÂÏȂȯÁÂÒ „ˆÓ ‰Ú˜˘‰ ÏÙÎ ¯¯Â˘ ·˘ ·ˆÓÏ ˜Â˘‰ ÚϘÈÈ ,˙¯·Á‰ Ï˘ Ô„ÈˆÓ ‡ÏÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚ÏÚ ‡ÂÙ‡ ‰„È·ÎÓ ‡ÏÓ Ú„ÈÓ ‰Ï‚Ó ‰È‡˘ ‰¯·Á ÏÎ .Â˙ÂÓȇ·Â Ú„ÈÓ ÛÂÒȇ· Ú„ÈÓ‰Ï˘ ̯ÙÒÓ ˙ÂËÚÓ˙‰Ï ̯‚‰ ÔÙ‡· ,Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ Ï˘ Â˙ÂÁ˙Ù˙‰

.ÈËÒÈχ‰ ¯˜ÁÓ‰ Ï˘Â Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂҘ„‰ ÈËÒÈχ ÈÂÒÈÎ ¯ˆÈÈÓ ‡Â‰ ,Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ Á˙Ù˙‰˘Ó ,Ô·Á˜ÈÙ·Â ˙ÂÏÈÊ· ,Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ÏÈÚÈ ¯ÂÁÓ˙· ˙‡Ë·˙Ó‰ ,‰·¯ ˙ÏÚÂ˙ ÂÓÈÚ ‡È·Ó˘ıȯÓ˙ ‰È‰È ,ÂÊ ˙ÏÚÂ˙ ˜ÈÙ‰Ï ˙˘˜·Ó‰ ,‰·ÂË ‰Ï‰‰Ï .‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ÏÚ ¯˙ÂÈ ·ÂË.ÌÈÓȇ˙Ó ÌÈ„ÚÂÓ·Â ˜ÂÁ· ˘¯„‰Ó ¯˙ÂÈ Û‡ ˯ÂÙÓ ‡ÏÓ Ú„ÈÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚· ‰Âˆ¯Ó ˜ÂÒÚÏ.˙‡ȈӉ Á¯ÂÎ ÔÈÈ„Ú Ô‰ ˙ÂȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ ,‰Ê΢ Ìȯ·„ ·ˆÓ· Ì‚ Ìχ¢ÈÚ‰Ï ÌÈÏÂÎÈ Ìȇ ÔÎÏ ,È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘· ¯ÂӇΠÌÈ„„ÂÓ˙Ó Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ,˙È˘‡¯ÈÂÒÈΉ ÔÓ ˙‰ÈÏ ˙„ÓÂÚ‰ ˙·ÂË ˙Âω‰ ˜¯ .‡ÏÓ Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÏ‚Ó Ôȇ˘ ˙¯·Á˜¯ ‡ÏÓ Ú„ÈÓ ÂÏ‚È ˙¯Á‡ ˙Âω‰˘ „ÂÚ· ,Ôˆ¯Ó ‡ÏÓ Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÏ‚Ï Â¯Á·È ÈËÒÈχ‰,˜ÙÒÓ ÈËÒÈχ ÈÂÒÈÎÓ ˙‰ Ôȇ ˙·¯ ˙¢ ˙¯·Á ,˙È˘ .Ô˙‡ ·ÈÈÁÈ ˜ÂÁ‰ ̇ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˜È„ˆ˙˘ ˙ÏÚÂ˙ ˜ÈÙ‰Ï ˙¯˘Ù‡‰ ˙‡ Ô‰Ó ÏÏ¢‰ ·ˆÓ ,‰˘ÏÎ ÈÂÒÈÎÓ Û‡ ‡,‡ÏÓ Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÏ‚Ï ‰·ÂÓ ıȯÓ˙ Ô‰Ï Ôȇ˘ ˙¯·Á È„È· ÈÂÏÈ‚ .210‡ÏÓ Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ ȯËÂÏÂÂ

210M.H. Lang, K.V. Lins & D.P. Miller “Concentrated Control, Analyst Following, ‡¯and Valuation: Do Analysts Matter Most When Investors Are Protected Least?” 42 J.ÔÙ‡· ¯Â˘˜ ÈËÒÈχ ÈÂÒÈÎ ÈÎ ÌÈ„ÓÏÓ‰ ÌÈȯÈÙÓ‡ ÌȇˆÓÓ) Account. Research (2004) 589‰Ï‰‰‰ ˙ˆÂ·˜ ˙Âȉ ˙χ˘Ï ‰¯·Á· ˙È˙ÁÙ˘Ó ‰Ï‰‰ ˙ËÈÏ˘ Ï˘ ˙ÏÏÂΉ ‰Ó¯Ï ÈÏÈÏ˘R. Bhushan “Firm Characteristics ;(‰¯·Á· ¯˙ÂÈ· Ï„‚‰ ‰ËÈÏ˘‰ ÔÈÚ¯‚ ÈÏÚ· ˙È˙ÁÙ˘Ó‰ÌÈ˙˘Ó ÔÁ·) and Analyst Following” 11 J. Account. & Economics (1989) 255, 256y257ÚÈÙ˘Ó ,¯˙ȉ ÔÈ· ,‰¯·Á‰ τ‚ ÈÎ ˜ÈÒÓ ,˙¯·Á Ï˘ ÈËÒÈχ‰ ÈÂÒÈΉ ۘȉ· ÌÈÏ„·‰ ÌȯˆÂȉ

.(ÈËÒÈχ ÈÂÒÈÎÏ ÚˆÈ‰‰Â ˘Â˜È·‰ ÏÚ

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(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

ȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ¯Ë˘Ó Ï˘ ‰Ó¯˙‰ ‡Â‰ ,‰Ú¯‚ ‰Ï‰‰ ˙ÂÏÚ· ˙¯·Á ˙¢ ˙¯·Á Ô‚ÎÛÒ ÈÂÏÈ‚Ï Ì¯‚Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙ÏÂÎÈ ,Ô· .Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ ˜Â˘ ˙ÂÁ˙Ù˙‰Ï˙ÂȯÂË„Ó‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙·ÂÁ· ˙‚ÂÚÓ‰ ˙ÂÈÒÈÒ·‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙Â˘È¯„· ‰ÈÂÏ˙ Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘Ï˘ ÒÈÒ·‰ ˙Â˘È¯„˘ ¯Á‡Ó ˙‡Ê .‰ÚËÓ Â‡ ȘÏÁ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ÔÈ‚· ˙ÂÈËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ÂȈ˜Ò·ÂÏ„Â‚Ï ˙¯˙ȉ ˙‡ ˜ÈÙ‰Ï ˙¯˘Ù‡Ó‰ Ô‰ ˙¯·Á‰ ÏÏÎ ÏÚ ˙ÂÏËÂÓ‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙·ÂÁÌȯ˘Ù‡Ó ڄÈÓ‰ ˙ÈÈ˘Ú˙ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ÌÈÏÈÊÂÓ˘ ˙¯˙È ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÈÈ˘Ú˙ Ï˘ Ô‚ÓÏÂ

.Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˜Â˘ Ï˘ Â˙Áȯ٠˙‡È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ë·Ó‰ ˙„Â˜Ó Û‡ ȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ Ï˘ ¯Ë˘Ó ˜È„ˆ‰Ï Ô˙È ,ÛÂÒ·ÏÈÙȈÙÒ Ú„ÈÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚Ï ˙ÂÒÁÈÈ˙Ó Ô‰˘ ÏÎÎ ,˙ÂȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ ,Ô· .˙ÂÏÈʉ‰È˜‰ ˙ÂËÏÁ‰ .˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ ¯Â·Ú ˙ÂÈ˷ϯ È˙Ï· ‰¯Â‡ÎÏ ˙‡¯ ,‰¯·Á‰ ÏÚ.ÌÈÓÈÂÒÓ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ˙„‡ Ú„ÈÓ ÏÚ ˙ÂÒÒÂ·Ó Ôȇ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ‰¯ÈÎÓ‰ÂÌÈÂÓˉ ÌÈÂÎÈÒ‰ ÈÙÓ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ ÏÚ ˙Â‚Ó Â˙˜ÊÁ‰Â ÔÂÂ‚Ó ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ ˜È˙ ˙ÈȘ¯ÁÒÈÈ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈÓ ˜ÏÁ˘ ÔÎ˙ÈÈ ˙ÂȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ ¯„Úȉ· .‰ÚËÂÓ ¯ÂÁÓ˙·ÔÂÂ‚Ó ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ ˜È˙· ˜ÈÊÁÓ ,˙‡Ê ˙¯ÓÏ .È„Ó ‰Â·‚ ¯ÈÁÓ· ˜ÏÁÂ È„Ó ÍÂÓ ¯ÈÁÓ·ÂÏÈÙ‡ .ÂÊ ˙‡ ÂÊ ‰ÏË·˙ ˙„‚ÂÓ‰ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰‰ È˙˘˘ ¯Á‡Ó ,˙ÚˆÂÓÓ ‰‡Â˘˙ Ï·˜È¯ÁÒÈ‰Ï Í¯Ú‰ ˙¯ÈÈ ÏÏΠȯÈÁÓÏ Ì¯Â‚ ‰È‰ ˙ÂȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ Ô¯„Úȉ ̇ÂÈ‰È ,ÈÂÏÈ‚ ȇ Ï˘·˘ ,ÁÈ .ÍÎÓ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ Â„¯ËÂÈ ‡Ï ,È„Ó ÍÂÓ Â‡ ‰Â·‚ ¯ÈÁÓ·˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ ˜È˙ ‰Â˜ ‡Â‰˘ ÌÂ˘Ó Ú‚Ù Âȇ ˙ÂÏÈÊ ¯ÁÂÒ .È„Ó ÌÈÎÂÓ ÌȯÈÁÓ‰ ÏÎÌȉ·‚ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ ÏÏΠȯÈÁÓ˘ ‰˙Ú ÁÈ .ÍÂÓ ¯ÈÁÓ· Â˙‡ ¯ÎÂÓ ÍÂÓ ¯ÈÁÓ·Ô‚Ӊ ˜È˙‰ ˙‡ ‰Â˜ ‡Â‰˘ ÌÂ˘Ó Ú‚ÙÈÈ ‡Ï ˙ÂÏÈʉ ¯ÁÂÒ ,·Â˘ .ÈÂÏÈ‚ ȇ Ï˘· È„Ó˙ÂȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ Ô¯„Úȉ ̇ ,‰Ó„· .¯˜ÂÈ· Â˙‡ ¯ÎÂÓ ÍÎ ¯Á‡Â ¯˜Âȷʇ ÈÎ ,˘Ú¯‰ ÔÂÎÈÒ ˙‡ ‡ ˜Â˘· ˙¯ÁÒ‰ ˙¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ÈÙȈÙÒ‰ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ÏÈ„‚Ó

.Âχ ÌÈÂÎÈÒÓ ¯ËÙÈ‰Ï Â¯˘Ù‡È Â˙˜ÊÁ‰Â ÔÂÂ‚Ó ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ ˜È˙ ˙ÈȘ˙ÂÏÈÊ ÌÈ„„ÂÚÓ Âχ ÌÈÈ„˘ ÏÎÎ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„· ÌÈÈÈÚ˙Ó ˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ ÌχÂ˙È·ÂÈÁ ‰ÚÙ˘‰ ˘È ȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ¯Ë˘ÓÏ .ÌÁÂÙȘ ˙ÂÈÓ‰ ÈÏÚ· Ï˘ ˜˘ÂÚ ÌÈÚÂÓÂÏÎÎ .Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÚÙ ÌÂȘ Ï˘ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ Ï„‚ ÍÎ ,¯˙ÂÈ ‰ÎÂÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙Ó¯˘ ÏÎÎ .˙ÂÏÈÊ ÏÚ˙Ó¯ ˙˙ÁÂÙ ÍΠ,bid/ask-‰ ÁÂÂ¯Ó ·Á¯˙Ó ÍÎ ,Ï„‚ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÚÙ ÌÂȘ·˘ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰˘Ï˘ ˜˘ÂÚ ˙ÚÈÓ ÏÚ ˙È·ÂÈÁ ‰ÚÙ˘‰ Ì‚ ˘È ȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ¯Ë˘ÓÏ .˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÏÈÊ˙ÂÏÈÚÙÓ ˙Âڷ‰ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ˙Â˙ÈÁÙÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙·ÂÁ .ÌÁÂÙȘ ˙ÂÈÓ ÈÏÚ·˙ÂÈÓ‰ ÈÏÚ· ˙‡ ÁÙ˜Ï Ì˙ÏÂÎÈ ˙‡ ˙Â˙ÈÁÙÓ ÂÊ Í¯„·Â ,‰ËÈÏ˘‰ ÈÏÚ·Â ‰¯·Á‰ ÈωÓZ ÌÈÂÎÈÒ‰ È˘Ó ¯ËÙÈ‰Ï ÌÈÏ‚ÂÒÓ Ìȇ ˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ ,Ô· .̘˘ÂÚÏ ‰¯·Á·È„È ÏÚ Z ‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ Ï˘ ÔÓÂÈ˜Ó Ú·Â‰ ‰Ê Ô‰ ,Ú„ÈÓ-ȯÚÙ ÌÂÈ˜Ó Ú·Â‰ ‰Ê ԉȯÁÂÒ ,ÂÈȉ„ .ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÍÂ˙Ï Âχ ÌÈÂÎÈÒ ÏϘ˘Ï ÌÈÏÂÎÈ Ì‰ ͇ ,ÔÂÂÈ‚˙ÂÏÚ ˙‡ ÏÈ„‚˙ ÂÊ ‰ÏÂÚÙ .ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ ¯Â·Ú ˙ÂÁÙ ÌÏ˘Ï ÌÈÎÂÓ ÂÈ‰È ˙ÂÏÈʉ˙·ÂÁ .˜˘Ó· ÌÈ·‡˘Ó Ï˘ ‰ÏÈÚȉ ‰‡ˆ˜‰· Ú‚Ù˙ ,˙¯·Á‰ ÏÏÎ Ï˘ Ô‰‰ ÒÂÈ‚

58

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

˙ÂÓ„˜Ó ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ ÏÚ Ô˙‚‰·Â ,ÂÊ ÌÈÚ¯ȇ ˙¯˘¯˘ ˙ÂÚÂÓ ˙ÂȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚.˙È˙‡ˆ˜‰‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚȉ ˙‡

˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙Èȯ‡È˙· ˘„ÁÓ ÔÂÈÚ .2

-˙ÈÓ¯˙"‰ ˙Èȯ‡È˙ ıÂÓȇ ‡È‰ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„· ¯˙ÂÈ ˙·¢Á‰ ˙ÂÈÂÁ˙Ù˙‰‰ ˙Á‡˙˙ȉ ‰˜ÊÁ ˙ÚÈ·˜ È„È ÏÚ ˙‡Ê ,(Fraud-on-the-Market-‰ ˙Èȯ‡È˙) "˜Â˘‰-ÏÚÏÚ ,ÏÏΠͯ„· .Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ· ˙ÈÓ¯˙ Ï˘ Ìȯ˜Ó· ˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰ Ï˘ ‰ÓÂȘ ¯·„· ,‰¯È˙ÒÏ‰Ê ‚ˆÓ ¯ˆÈ Ú·˙‰ ÈÎ ;211‡Â¢ ‚ˆÓ ¯ˆÂ ÈÎ ÁÈÎÂ‰Ï ÔȘÈÊ· ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ˙ÚÈ·˙· Ú·Â˙‰‚ˆÓ ÏÚ ÍÓ˙Ò‰ Ú·Â˙‰ ÈÎ ;212ÂÈχ ‰Ù‰ ‡Â¢‰ ‚ˆÓ˘ Ì„‡‰ ˙‡ ˙ÂÂ‰Ï ‰ÂÂÎ ÍÂ˙ÓÛ˘Á Ú·Â˙‰˘ ‰ÁΉ ‰ÎȯˆÓ ˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰ ˙ÁΉ .214ÍÎÓ ‰‡ˆÂ˙Î ˜ÂÊÈ ÈΠ213‡Â¢‰˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰‰ ˙ÁΉ ,Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ· ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ˙ÚÈ·˙· .215ÂÈÏÚ ÒÒ·˙‰· ÏÚÙ ‡Â¢‰-‚ˆÓÏ˘È ;ÂÈÏÚ ÒÒ·˙‰· ÂÏÚÙ ‡Â¢‰ ‚ˆÓÏ ÂÙ˘Á˘ ˘È :ÚȘ˘Ó‰ ‚ÂÒÏ Ì‡˙‰· ‰˙˘Ó‡Â¢‰ ‚ˆÓÏ ÂÙ˘Á ‡Ï˘ ˘È ;216ÂÈÏÚ ÒÒ·˙‰· ÂÏÚÙ ‡Ï ‡Â¢‰ ‚ˆÓÏ ÂÙ˘Á˘‰Ú·Â˙ ˙¯‚ÒÓ· Ú·Â˙‰ ˘¯„ÈÈ Ì‡ .‰ÊÎ ‚ˆÓ ÌÈȘ ÈÎ ÏÏÎ ÂÚ„È ‡Ï˘ ˘È ;ÂÏÚ٠͇„¯Ù· ÚȘ˘Ó ÏÎÏ ˙Âڂ‰ ˙˜ÂÏÁÓ‰ ʇ ÈÎ ,˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰‰ „ÂÒÈ ˙‡ ÁÈÎÂ‰Ï ˙ȂˆÈȉڷÂ˙‰ ˙‡ ¯˘‡Ï ‰È‰È Ô˙È ‡Ï ÏÏΠ,ÌÏÂÎÏ ˙ÂÙ˙¢Ӊ ˙˜ÂÏÁÓ‰ ÏÚ ÂÏÈÙ‡È,Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ· ˙ÈÓ¯˙ Ï˘ Ìȯ˜Ó· ˙ÂȂˆÈÈ ˙ÂÚ·Â˙ ˙˘‚‰ „„ÂÚÏ ˙Ó ÏÚ .217˙ȂˆÈÈί·„· ‰˜ÊÁ ÂÚ·˜Â ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙Èȯ‡È˙ ˙‡ ˙ȯ·‰ ˙ˆ¯‡· ËÙ˘Ó‰ È˙· ˆÓȇÂÙ˜˘È ,· ÌȯÁÒ‰ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÍÂ˙Ï Ú„ÈÓ ÌÏ‚Ó ˜Â˘‰˘ ¯Á‡Ó .218˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰‡È‰ ˜Â˘‰ ¯ÈÁÓ Ï˘ Â˙¯˘ÂÈ ÏÚ ˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰ ÔÎ ÏÚ ,‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ Ì‚ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ

211Rudolph v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 800 F.2d 1040, ;ÔȘÈʉ ˙„˜ÙÏ 63- 56 ÌÈÙÈÚÒ Â‡¯.1043 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987)

212Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 ;ÔȘÈʉ ˙„˜ÙÏ 63- 56 ÌÈÙÈÚÒ Â‡¯(1976); L. Loss & J. Seligman Fundamentals of Securities Regulation (Boston, 4th

.2000) 949y961213.Loss & Seligman, ibid, at pp. 1200y1210 ;ÔȘÈʉ ˙„˜ÙÏ 63- 56 ÌÈÙÈÚÒ Â‡¯214.Loss & Seligman, ibid, at pp. 1210y1219 ;ÔȘÈʉ ˙„˜ÙÏ 63- 56 ÌÈÙÈÚÒ Â‡¯215List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462y463 (2nd ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯ ȘȯӇ‰ ËÙ˘ÓÏ

ÈÙÏ ˙ÂÈÁ¯Ê‡ ˙ÂÚÈ·˙· ˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰Ï ‰˘È¯„‰) Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).(10by5 ÏÏÎ

216.Gochnauer v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, 810 F.2d 1042 (11 Cir. 1987) ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯217ÌÈÈËÈÓ„‰ ÂÈ‰È ÌÈÙ˙¢Ӊ Ìȇ˘Â‰˘ ‰˘È¯„‰ Ô‚ÈÚÏ .317 'Ú· ,30 ‰¯Ú‰ ÏÈÚÏ ,ÔÈÏ„È Â‡¯

1999yË"˘˙ ,˙¯·Á‰ ˜ÂÁÏ (2)(‡)210 ÛÈÚÒ Â‡¯ ,„¯Ù· Ú·Â˙ ÏÎÏ ˙„ÁÂÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÈ‚ÂÒ‰ ˙ÓÂÚÏȘȯӇ‰ ËÙ˘Ó· ÂÊ ‰˘È¯„Ï .297y296 'Ú· ,276 (5)‰ „"Ù ,˯ÎÈȯ ' ˘Ó˘ 8332/96 ‡"Ú¯Â

.Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2), 23(b)(2) ‡¯218Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯

.(1976)

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(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

‡Ï˘ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó Ì˙‡ Ì‚˘ ,‡È‰ ‰‡ˆÂ˙‰ .219‡Â¢‰ ‚ˆÓ ÏÚ ‰¯È˘È ˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰Ï ÛÈÏÁ˙.220Ú·˙Ï ÌȇÎÊ ˙È˷ϯ‰ ‰Ù˜˙· ͯډ ¯ÈÈ· ¯ÁÒ Í‡ ‚ˆÓ‰ Ï˘ ÂÓÂȘ ÏÚ ÏÏÎ ÂÚ„Èȯ‰ ,‰Ó¯Ӊ ÈÙÏÎ ˙Â¯È˘È ‡Â¢ ‚ˆÓ ȇӯ‰ ¯ˆÂÈ ˙È҇Ϙ‰ ˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ÈÙ ÏÚ˘ „ÂÚ·ÔÈ·Ï È‡Ó¯‰ ÔÈ· ˜Â˘‰ ıˆÂÁ ÂÈÙÏ˘ ÔÂÈÚ¯‰ „ÓÂÚ ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ Ï˘ ‰ÒÈÒ··˘,(ÌȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ÌÈÂÒÓ È˙Ï· ω˜ ,ȯ˜) ˜Â˘‰ ÈÙÏÎ ‡Â¢ ‚ˆÓ ¯ˆÂÈ È‡Ó¯‰ .‰Ó¯Ӊۘ˘Ó ¯ÈÁÓ‰˘ ÍÎ ÏÚ ÌÈÎÓÂÒ‰ ÌȯÎÂÓ ÌȘ ,¯ÈÁÓ· ‡Â¢‰ ‚ˆÓ ˙‡ ÌÏ‚Ó ˜Â˘‰ÏÚ ‡Â¢‰ ‚ˆÓ ÚÈÙ˘Ó ,¯‡È˙˘ Ï„ÂÓ‰ ÈÁÂÓ· .ÌÈÚ‚Ù ÌÈ˙ÂÂÚÓ È˙Ï· ˘Â˜È·Â ڈȉÌȯÁÂÒ .ͯډ ¯ÈÈ ¯Ú˘· ÈÂÈ˘Ï Ì¯Â‚Â ,ÂÈχ ÌÈ·È‚Ó‰ ˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÏÚ ڄÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ.˜Ê Ì‰Ï Ì¯‚ÈÈ ˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ‰Ï‚˙˙˘ÎÏ ,˜Â˘· Ú·˜ÈÈ˘ ¯ÈÁÓ‰ ÏÚ ÒÒ·˙‰· ÂÏÚÙÈ ÌÈ·¯˙Â‰Ê ‰È‰˙˘ Á¯Î‰ Ôȇ˘ Íη ‰¯ÈÎÓ ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙Èȯ‡È˙ ÈÎ ˘È‚„‰Ï ·Â˘ÁÌȯÁÂÒ‰ ÔÈ·Ï ,ͯډ ¯ÈÈ ¯Ú˘· ÈÂÈ˘Ï ÂÓ¯‚ ‡Â¢‰ ‚ˆÓÏ Â·È‚‰˘ ÌȯÁÂÒ‰ ÔÈ·,˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ Ï˘ ‰È¯Â‡È˙‰ ÈÙ ÏÚ .˜Ê ‚ÙÒ ÛÂÒ·Ï ڷ˜˘ ¯ÈÁÓ‰ ÏÚ ÂÎÓÒ˘

.˜Â˘‰ ¯ÈÁÓ Ï˘ Â˙¯˘ÂÈ ÏÚ ˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰· ‡Â¢‰ ‚ˆÓ ÏÚ ˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰‰ ˙ÙÏÁÂÓıÂÓȇ ÏÚ ÂÎÙ˘ ÔÈÈ„Ú ,221˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙ȯ‡È˙ ıÂÓȇ· ÌÈÎÓÂ˙ ÌÈ·¯˘ Ì‚‰˙˘¯Ù· ËÂÚÈÓ‰ ˙Ú„· ¯·Î ,˙È˘‡¯ .222‰ÏÁ˙‰‰ ÔÓÏ ˙¯Â˜È· Ï˘ ˙ÂÂ˙Ș ÂÊ ‰È¯Â‡È˙˙‡ ȘȯӇ‰ ÔÂÈÏÚ‰ ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙È· ıÓȇ ·˘ ÔÈ„‰ ˜ÒÙ Z 223 Basic Inc. v. Levinson.224‰˜ÊÁÏ ˙˜˜Êȉ‰ ˙‡ ˜È„ˆ‰Ï È„Î ÌÈÈ„ ÌÈÏÈÚÈ Ìȇ ÌȘ¢‰ ÈÎ ÔÚË Z ‰˜ÊÁ‰

219Ú·Â˙ ÈÎ ÔÈȈÓ) Gebhardt v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824, 831 (8th Cir. 2003) ‡¯ÌÈÚ·˙‰˘ ‰Úˉ È„È ÏÚ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ· ڈȷ˘ ‰˜ÒÚÏ È˙·ÈÒ ¯˘˜ ÒÒ·Ï ‰˘È¯„· „ÂÓÚÏ È¢Ú

.(ÂÏÏη ˜Â˘‰ ÏÚ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ Âڈȷ220ÏÈÁ‰Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ ÈÎ Ú·˜) Nathenso v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 415 (5th Cir. 2003) ‡¯

.(ÏÈÚÈ ˜Â˘· ¯ÁÒ Ìȯ·Â„Ó‰ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÎ ÁÈÎÂ‰Ï Ú·Â˙‰ ÏÚ ,‰˜ÊÁ‰ ˙‡221J.A. Herzog “Fraud Created the Market: An Unwise and Unwarranted Extension ‡¯

˙‡ ˙ÈȈÓ) of Section 10(b) and Rule 10by5” 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (1995) 359, 369.(˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙Èȯ‡È˙ ‰˙ÎÊ Ì‰Ï˘ ÌÈ·¯‰ ÌÈÁ·˘‰

222D.R. Fischel “Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving ‡¯;(˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ˙‡ ÁÂÊÏ ÚȈÓ) Actively Traded Securities” 38 Bus. Law. (1982) 1, 11J. A. Grundfest “Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities˙ÂϘ‰ ÏÚ ˙¯Â˜È·) Laws: The Commission’s Authority” 107 Harv. L. Rev. (1994) 961˙ȇ¯Á‡ Ô˙¯ˆÂÂÈ‰Ï˘ ˙ÂÓˆډ ˙ÂÈÈ„˙‰‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ÏÚ ¯Á˘ ˙¯ÒÁ ˙ÂÚÈ·˙ ˙¢‚ÂÓ ‰·˘

.(˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰223.485 U.S. 224 (1988)224“[W]hile the economists’ theories which ÈÎ ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙È· ÔÈȈ ,Basic v. Levinson ˙˘¯Ù·

underpin the fraud-on-the-market presumption may have the appeal of mathematicalexactitude and scientific certainty, they are — in the end — nothing more than theorieswhich may or may not prove accurate upon further consideration. ... Thus, while themajority states that, for purposes of reaching its result it need only make modestassumptions about the way in which ‘market professionals generally’ do their jobs, andhow the conduct of market professionals affects stock prices. ... I doubt that we are

60

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

‰ÚÈ·˙‰ ‰˘‚‰ ÂÈËÚ·˘ ‡Â¢‰ ‚ˆÓ ˙‡ ˜È„ӷ Û˜˘Ó Âȇ ÏÈÚÈ Âȇ ˜Â˘‰ ̇ÏÚ ˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰‰ ˙ÙÏÁ‰Ï ‰˜„ˆ‰‰ ˙ÓÏÚ Ê‡ ÈÎ ,· ÌȯÁÒ‰ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ·ÔÂÂÈÎÓ ˙¯Â˜È·‰ ‰˘„ÂÁ ‰Â¯Á‡Ï .˜Â˘‰ ¯ÈÁÓ Ï˘ Â˙¯˘ÂÈ ÏÚ ˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰· ‡Â¢‰ ‚ˆÓÌ˙ÚÙ˘‰ ˙‡ ÔÁ·‰ ÌÂÁ˙· ÂÎ¯Ú˘ Ìȯ˜ÁÓ ¯Â‡Ï ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ÏÚ ‰ÊÏÚ ;(behavioral finance) ÔÂÓÈÓ‰ ˙¯Â˙ ÏÚ Ì„‡ È· Ï˘ ÌÈÈ·ÈËȂ˜ ÌÈÏ˘Î Ï˘¯˘‡Î Ì‚ ÈÎ ,ÔÚË ‰˜ÊÁ‰ ıÂÓȇ „‚Î ,˙È˘ .225˜Ë-Èȉ‰ ˙Ú· Ï˘ ‰˙ˆˆÂÙ˙‰ Ú˜¯˜ÈÚÓ ,226¯˙È ˙Ú˙¯‰ ¯ˆÂÈ ‡Â‰˘ ¯Á‡Ó ˜„ˆÂÓ Âȇ ‰˜ÊÁ‰ ıÂÓȇ ÌÈÏÈÚÈ Ì‰ ÌȘ¢‰˙ÂÚË È˙˘ ,ÔÏ‰Ï ‰‡¯˘ ÈÙÎ .228˙ȯˆÈ‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚȉ ˙‡ ˙ÂÂÚÓ 227˜ÂÊÈ ‡Ï˘ ÈÓÏ ÈˆÈÙ

.¯ÒÁ· ˙˜ÂÏ Âχ

in much of a position to assess which theories aptly describe the functioning of theC.R. Goforth “The Efficient ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯ ÔÎ .securities industry”. (ibid, at pp. 245y255)Capital Market Hypothesis — An Inadequate Justification for the Fraud-On-The-MarketPresumption” 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. (1992) 895, 910y911; J.R. Macey & G.P. Miller“Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-On-The-Market Theory”Ú„ÈÓ È‚ÂÒÏ ÒÁÈ· ‰˙˘Ó ÌȘ¢‰ Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÏÈÚÈ) 42 Stan. L. Rev. (1990) 1059, 1077y1091J.R. Macey, G.P. Miller, M.L. Mitchell & J.M. Netter “Lessons From Financial ;(ÌÈ¢Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson” 77 Va.Ìȯ˜ÁÓÓ ˙Âڷ‰ ˙˜ÒÓ‰ ˙χ˘· ̉ÈÈ· ÌȘÂÏÁ ÌÈ„ÓÂÏÓ) L. Rev. (1991) 1017, 1018I. Ayres “Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations ;(˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈÏ Ú‚Â· ÌÈȯÈÙÓ‡

.Speak to the Market” 77 Va. L. Rev. (1991) 945, 967225A. Brav & J.B. Heaton “Revisiting the Mechanisms of Market Efficiency: Market ‡¯

Indeterminacy” 28 Iowa J. Corp. L. (2003) 517, 518y519; Ferrillo et al., supra noteM.C. ;(ÏÈÚȉ ˜Â˘‰ ˙ÊÈ˙ÂÙȉ ÈÙ· ÌÈ„ÓÂÚ‰ ÌÈ¢‰ Ìȯ‚˙‡‰ ¯Â‡È˙) 29, at pp. 107y116Findlay & E.E. Williams “A Fresh Look at the Efficient Market Hypothesis: How theIntellectual History of Finance Encouraged a Real ‘Fraud-On-The-Market’” 23 J. Post‰˘ÚÓÏ ÏÈÚȉ ˜Â˘‰ ˙ÊÈ˙ÂÙȉ· ˙ÂÎÓÂ˙‰ ˙Âȇ¯‰ ÈÎ ÌÈÚÂË) Keyesian Econ. (2001) 181

.(˙˜ÊÁ Âȉ ‡Ï ÌÏÂÚÓ226Mahoney, supra note 31; J.C. Alexander “Rethinking Damages in Securities ‡¯

Class Actions” 48 Stan. L. Rev. (1996) 1487, 1495; J.A. Mackerron “The PriceIntegrity Cause of Action Under Rule 10By5: Limiting And Expanding the Use of theFraud-On-The-Market Theory” 69 Or. L. Rev. (1990) 177, 177y178; D.C. Langevoort“Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud” 38 Ariz. L. Rev. (1996) 639,

.643227B. Black “Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing With Reliance ‡¯

Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions” 62 N. C. L. Rev. (1984) 435,460; F.H. Easterbrook & D.R. Fische “Optimal Damages in Securities Cases” 52U. Chi. L. Rev. (1985) 611, 642; Langevoort, ibid, at p. 646; M.Y. Scudder “TheImplications of Market-Based Damages Caps in Securities Class Action” 92 Nw. U. L.̉ ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙ÏÚÙÂÓ Ô‰·˘ ˙ÂȂˆÈÈ ˙ÂÚ·Â˙· ÌÈȈÈÙ) Rev. (1997) 435, 442, 465

.(1995 ˙˘· Private Securities Litigation Reform Act-‰ ˙˜È˜Á ˙·˜Ú· ‰˙Ó ¯„‚·228J.R. Macey & G.P. Miller “The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory Revisited” 77 Va. L. ‡¯

ÈÈȘ‰ Ò¯Ëȇ‰ ˙‡ ÔÈÈ‡Ï ‰ÏÂÏÚ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ· ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÔÈ‚· ˙ÂȯÁ‡) Rev. (1991) 1001, 1015

61

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

ÏÈÚÈ-È˙Ï· ˜Â˘ ÁÈÓ‰ ÔÂÚÈˉ (‡)

‰˜ÊÁ‰ ıÂÓÈ‡Ï ÒÈÒ· Ôȇ ‰ÈÙÏ˘ ,˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ÏÚ ‰Â˘‡¯‰ ˙¯Â˜È·‰˙ÒÒÂ·Ó ˙¯Â˜È·‰ ,˙È˘‡¯ .ÌÈÈÊÎ¯Ó ÌÈÓ‚Ù È˘Ó ˙Ï·ÂÒ ,˜Â˘‰ Ï˘ ˙ÂÏÈÚȉ ¯ÒÂÁ Ï˘·ÈÎ ,ÁÈÎÂÓ ÏÈÚÏ Â‚ˆ‰˘ Ï„ÂÓ‰ ,˙È˘ .Basic ˙˘¯Ù· ‰˜ÈÒÙ‰ Ï˘ ˙ÈÚËÂÓ ‰‡È¯˜ ÏÚ‰ÏÂÚ ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ Ï˘ ‰˙Â·È˘Á ,˙ÂÈ·È˘ه· ÌÈÏÚÂÙ ÌȘ¢‰ ¯˘‡Î

.ÏÈÚÈ Âȇ ¯ÂÁÓ˙‰ ¯˘‡Î‰ÈȈ ,Ú„ÈÎ .˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ÏÚ ˙¯Â˜È·‰ ‰˜ÂÏ Â·˘ Ô¢‡¯‰ Ì‚Ù· Á˙Ù˙‡¯‰Ï Ú·Â˙‰ ÏÚ ÈÎ Z ˙ÓÒ¯ÂÙÓ ‰ÎÙ‰˘ ‰¯ÈÓ‡· Z Basic ˙˘¯Ù· ·Â¯‰ ˙Ú„relied on the integrity of the market) "˜Â˘‰ ¯ÈÁÓ Ï˘ Â˙¯˘ÂÈ ÏÚ ÍÓ˙Ò‰" È΢¯ÙÏ ÌÈί„ È˙˘ ˙ÂÓÈȘ .229˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ˙ÏÁ‰Ï Ì„˜ÂÓ È‡˙Î (priceÚ·Â˙ ˙·ÈÈÁÓ Z "¯ÈÁÓ" ‰·È˙‰ ˙‡ ‰˘È‚„Ó‰ Z ‰Â˘‡¯‰ ˙¢¯Ù‰ .230ÂÊ ‰ÚÈ·˜¯ÈÈ È¢ ˙‡ ‰ÂÎ Û˜˘Ó ˜Â˘‰ ¯ÈÁÓ˘ ÔÈÓ‡‰ ÈÎ ˙‡¯‰Ï ,‰˜ÊÁ‰ ÏÚ ÍÓ˙Ò‰Ï ˘˜·Ó‰¯ÂÁÓ˙"Ï ˙¯Á‡ ‰¯„‚‰ ËÂ˘Ù ‡È‰ "˜Â˘‰ ¯ÈÁÓ Ï˘ Â˙¯˘ÂÈ" ‰Ê ˘Â¯ÈÙ ÈÙ ÏÚ .Í¯Ú‰Ï˘ ÂÈ¢ ˙‡ ‰ÂÎ Û˜˘Ó ¯ÈÁÓ‰˘ ÔÈÓ‡‰ ‡Ï ÈÎ ÂÈ·‚Ï ˙‡¯‰Ï Ô˙È˘ Ú·Â˙ ."˜È„ÓÍÓ˙Ò‰Ï ÏÎÂÈ ‡Ï ,"È„Ó ‰Â·‚" ‡ "È„Ó ÍÂÓ" ¯ÈÁÓ˘ ¯Â·Ò ‡Â‰˘ ÌÂ˘Ó Ì‡ ,ͯډ ¯ÈÈ˙‡ ·ÈÈÁÓ Âȇ Z "˜Â˘" ÁÂÓ‰ ˙‡ ˘È‚„Ó‰ Z ȯ˘Ù‡‰ È˘‰ ˘Â¯ÈÙ‰ .‰˜ÊÁ‰ ÏÚÂ˙¯˘ÂÈ ÏÚ ‡Ï‡ ,ͯډ ¯ÈÈ ¯ÈÁÓ· ‰ÓÂÏ‚‰ ˜ÂÈ„‰ ˙„ÈÓ ÏÚ ÍÓ˙Ò‰ ÈÎ ÁÈÎÂ‰Ï Ú·Â˙‰È˘‰ ˘Â¯ÈÙ‰ ,˙¯Á‡ ÔÂ˘Ï .Ô‰‰ ˜Â˘· ÌȯÈÁÓ‰ ÌÈÚ·˜ Â˙ÂÚˆÓ‡·˘ ÍÈω˙‰ Ï˘Z "È·È˘ه ˜Â˘" ¯Ó‡Ó· ÏÈÚÏ ‰Â΢ ‰Ó Ï˘ ÂÓÂȘ ˙‡ ÒÒ·Ï Ú·Â˙‰ ˙‡ ·ÈÈÁÓÏÚ ÍÓ˙Ò‰Ï Ú·Â˙‰ ÏÂÎÈ ÂÊ ˙¢¯Ù ÈÙÏ .ÌȯÈÁÓ‰ Ô˜È˙Ï ÔÂ‚Ó Â· ÏÚÂÙ˘ ˜Â˘

M. Kahan “Games, Lies, and Securities Fraud” 67 N. Y. ;(‰˙ÂÏÚ··˘ Ú„ÈÓ· ‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘‰¯·Á‰ ÏÚ ˙ÂȯÁ‡ ÏÈË‰Ï ˙¯˘Ù‡Ó ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ) U. L. Rev. (1992) 750, 761C.H. Steen “The Econometrics of ;(˙¯Á˙‰ Í¯ÂˆÏ Â‡ Ô˙Ó ‡˘Ó Íωӷ Ìȯ˜˘ ÔÈ‚·„‚Î ÔÚÂË) Fraud-On-The-Market Securities Fraud” 4 J. Legal Econ. (1994) 11, 36y37˙„ÓÚ‰˘ ÌÂ˘Ó ,ÔÂÎÈÒ· Ì‰È„È ÏÚ Ú˜˘ÂÓ‰ Ô‰‰ ˙‡ ÌÈ„ÈÓÚÓ Ìȇ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó ‰¯„È‚·˘ ‰‡ˆÂ˙‰·Âˉ ˘ÂÓÈ˘Ï ÌÈ·‡˘Ó ˙ˆ˜‰Ï ˜Â˘Ï ¯˘Ù‡Ó‰ ÍÈω˙‰ ˙‡ ‰ÚÈÓ ‰Ê ÔÙ‡· ÔÂÎÈÒ· Ô‰‰,˙È˙¯·Á‰ ˙ÏÚÂ˙‰ ˙‡ ÏÈ„‚‰Ï ˙ÂÙ‡Â˘ Ô‰È˙˘˘ Ì‚‰Â ,˙È˙‡ˆ˜‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈÓ ‰Â˘· .(̉· ¯˙ÂÈ·Ï˘ ̉È˙ÂÏÂÚÙ· ‡ÂÙ‡ ˙„˜Ó˙Ó ,‰Â˙ ‡È‰ Ô‰‰ ˙Â¯Â˜Ó ˙‡ˆ˜‰ ÈÎ ‰ÁÈÓ ˙ȯˆÈ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ

.295y294 'Ú· ,30 ‰¯Ú‰ ÏÈÚÏ ,ÔÈÏ„È Â‡¯ .ÌÓˆÚ ¯ÂˆÈȉ Èӯ‚229.Basic Inc. v. Levinson, supra note 223, at pp. 226, 250 ‡¯230D.C. Langevoort ‡¯ ÂÏ Â˙È˘ ˙¢‰ ˙ÂÈ¢¯Ù‰Â Basic ˙˘¯Ù· ÔÈ„‰ ˜ÒÙ Ï˘ ÔÈÂˆÓ ÁÂ˙ÈÏ

“Theories Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited” 140Recent Cases: Tort Law — Indirect Reliance — ‡¯ ÔÎ .U. Pa. L. Rev. (1992) 851, 903New Jersey Supreme Court Rejects Fraud-On-The-Market Theory — Kaufman v. i-startÈ˘ ÔÈ· ‰Á·‰‰) Corp., 754 A.2d 1188 (N.J. 2000) 114 Harv L. Rev. (2001) 2550, 2553È¯Ú˘˘ ‰˘Â¯ÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ .˙È˙Â‰Ó ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ڄÈÓ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ :ÏÈÚȉ ˜Â˘‰ ˙ÊÈ˙ÂÙȉ È˷ȉڄÈÓ‰ Ô˙ȉ·˘ ,‰˘Â¯ÈÙ ˙È˙Â‰Ó ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ˘ „ÂÚ· ,ÌÈÓÈÂÒÓ Ú„ÈÓ È‚ÂÒ ÌÈÙ˜˘Ó ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ

.(ÌÈÈ„È˙Ú‰ ˙¯·Á‰ ÈÁ¯ Ï˘ ÈÁΉ ͯډ ˙‡ ÂÙ˜˘È ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯Ú˘ ,ÌÈȘ‰

62

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

ÏÚ ÂÏÚÙ˘ ˘Â˜È·‰Â ڈȉ‰ ˙ÂÁÂÎ ÈÙ ÏÚ Ú·˜ ¯ÈÁÓ‰˘ ÔÈÓ‡Ó ‡Â‰ „ÂÚ ÏÎ ,‰˜ÊÁ‰Ï·˜˙‰˘ ¯ÈÁÓ‰˘ ‰Ú„· ‡Â‰ ̇ ÂÏÈÙ‡ ,ÌȯÁÂÒ‰ ÏÏÎ ˙¢¯·˘ ÔÈÓ‡ Ú„ÈÓ ÒÈÒ·

.("È„Ó ‰Â·‚" ‡ "È„Ó ÍÂÓ" Â˙Ú„Ï ¯ÈÁÓ‰) ÔÂÎ Âȇ ˜Â˘‰ Ï˘ ¯ÂÁÓ˙‰ ÍÈω˙·.¯ÒÁ· ‰¯ÈÎÓ Ï˘ ‰ÏÂÚÙ ‡Ó‚„ΠÂÏË ,ÌÈ˘Â¯ÈÙ‰ È˘ ÔÈ· Ï„·‰‰ ˙‡ ÔÈ·‰Ï È„Î,ÂÈȉ .˙„¯Ï ÈÂÙˆ ¯ÈÁÓ‰˘ ÍÎÓ ‰‡ˆÂ˙Î Á¯ ˜ÈÙ‰Ï ÔÂÂÎ˙Ó ¯ÒÁ· ¯ÎÂÓ‰ ÚȘ˘Ó¯ÎÓ˘ Ú·Â˙ ,Ô¢‡¯‰ ˘Â¯ÈÙ‰ ÈÙ ÏÚ .ÂίÚÏ ÏÚÓ ¯ÁÒ Í¯Ú‰ ¯ÈÈ˘ ¯Â·Ò ¯ÎÂӉ̈ÚÓ ,¯ÒÁ· ‰¯ÈÎÓ˘ ÌÂ˘Ó ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ÏÚ ÍÓ˙Ò‰Ï ÏÂÎÈ Âȇ ¯ÒÁ·¯ÈÈ È¢ ˙‡ ‰ÂÎ Û˜˘Ó ˜Â˘‰ ¯ÈÁÓ˘ ÔÈÓ‡‰ ‡Ï Ú·Â˙‰˘ ÍÎ ÏÚ ˙„ÓÏÓ ,‰˙¯„‚‰¯ÒÁ· ‰¯ÈÎÓ˘ Ì‚‰ .ÏÈÏÚ· ‰Â˘ ‰‡ˆÂ˙Ï ÏÈ·ÂÓ ,˙‡Ê ˙ÓÂÚÏ È˘‰ ˘Â¯ÈÙ‰ .231ͯډ¯ÂÎÓÏ ‰ËÏÁ‰‰˘ ȯ‰ ,ÂÈÂÂ˘Ï ÏÚÓ ¯ÁÒ Í¯Ú‰ ¯ÈÈ˘ ‰Ú„· ‰È‰ ¯ÎÂÓ‰ ÈÎ ˙„ÓÏÓÍÈω˙Ï ¯Â˘˜‰ Ïη È·È˘ه Âȇ ˜Â˘‰˘ ¯·Ò ¯ÎÂÓ‰ ÈÎ ÏÚ ˙„ÓÏÓ ‰È‡ ¯ÒÁ·˙‡Ê ,˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÈ·È˘ه ÏÚ ÍÓ˙Ò‰Ï ·ÈÈÁ ¯ÒÁ· ¯ÎÂÓ :ÔÂΉ ‡Â‰ ÍÙȉ‰ .¯ÂÁÓ˙‰ÚÈ‚È ˜Â˘‰ ¯ÈÁÓ˘ ‰ÂÓ‡‰ ÏÚ ˙ÒÒÂ·Ó ¯ÒÁ· ‰¯ÈÎÓ‰ Ï˘ ‰˙ÂÈÁ¯ ÌˆÚ˘ ÌÚˉ ÔÓÏ˘ ˙È„Ù˜ ‰‡È¯˜ .ͯډ ¯ÈÈ Ï˘ È˙ÈÓ‡‰ ÂÈ¢ ˙‡ ‡Ë·Ó‰ ͯÚÏ ¯·„ Ï˘ ÂÙÂÒ·Ú·Â Ô¢‡¯‰ ˘Â¯ÈÙ‰ .232ÔÂΉ ‡Â‰ È˘‰ ˘Â¯ÈÙ‰ ÈÎ ‰Ï‚Ó Basic ˙˘¯Ù· ·Â¯‰ ˙Ú„

231Basic Inc. v. Levinson, supra ÔÈÈÚ· ËÂÚÈÓ‰ ËÙ¢ È„È ÏÚ ‰˙È ¯ÒÁ· ¯ÎÂÓ‰ Ï˘ ‰Ó‚„‰Zlotnick v. TIE Communications, ˙˘¯Ù· ÔÈ„‰ ˜ÒÙ· ‰Ú¯Î‰Ï ‰‡·Â‰Â note 223, at p. 251.˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰‰ ˙˜ÊÁÓ ˙‰ÈÏ È‡ÎÊ Âȇ ¯ÒÁ· ¯ÎÂÓ ÈÎ Ú·˜ ‰·˘ 836 F.2d 818 (3rd Cir., 1988)

232˘ÈÁÓ‰Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ Basic ˙˘¯Ù· ·Â¯‰ ÈËÙ¢ ˜ÙÈÒ˘ ‰Ó‚„‰ ÔÓ ¯Â¯È·· ˙Ú·Â ÂÊ ‰˜ÒÓ“For example, a plaintiff who believed that Basic’s :˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ¯˙ÒÈ˙ ·˘ ‰¯˜Óstatements were false and that Basic was indeed engaged in merger discussions, and whoconsequently believed that Basic stock was artificially underpriced, but sold his sharesnevertheless because of other unrelated concerns, e.g., potential antitrust problems, orpolitical pressures to divest from shares of certain businesses, could not be said to haveBasic Inc. ÔÈÈÚ· ‡¯ relied on the integrity of a price he knew had been manipulated.”˙„·ÂÚ‰ Ô‰Ó Ú„È ÚȘ˘Ó‰ ÈÎ ˘¯„ .¯È„ ‰¯˜Ó· ¯·Â„Ó ÈÎ ,ȯ· .v. Levinson, ibid, at p. 249‡ ,˙Âȯ˘Ù‡ ÌÈȘÒÚ ÌÈÏ·‚‰ ˙ÂÈÚ·') ÂÈÏÚ ‰ÙÎ ¯ÁÒÓ‰ „‡Ó ˙„ÁÂÈÓ‰ ˙·ÈÒ·Â ˙ÂÈ˙ÈÓ‡‰‡Â‰˘ Íη È„ ‡Ï ÌÂÏÎ ?˙ÂÈ˙ÈÓ‡‰ ˙„·ÂÚ‰ Ô‰Ó ˙Ú„Ï ÚȘ˘Ó‰ ÏÚ ÚÂ„Ó .('ÌÈÈËÈÏÂÙ ÌȈÁÏÂȇ ‡Â‰˘ Íη È„ ‡Ï ÌÂÏÎ ?‰ÈÂÙÎ ˙ÂÈ‰Ï ‰¯ÈÎÓ‰ ÏÚ Ú„Ó ?¯˙È· ‰Î¯Ú‰ ‰ÈÓ‰ ÈÎ ¯Â·Ò¯ÒÁ· ¯ÎÂÓ‰ Ï˘ ‰·¯‰· ‰ËÂ˘Ù‰ ‰Ó‚„· ÌÈËÙ¢‰ ¢Ó˙˘‰ ‡Ï ÚÂ„Ó ?¯ÈÁÓ‰ ÏÚ ÍÓÂÒ˙‡ ÌÈÏ·˜Ó Ìȇ ·Â¯‰ ÈËÙ¢˘ ÌÂ˘Ó ‡Ï‡ ˙‡Ê Ôȇ ,Ô· ?ËÂÚÈÓ‰ ËÙ¢ È„È ÏÚ ‰˙È˘¯ÈÁÓ‰˘ ÂÈÓ‡È ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰˘ ‰ÎȯˆÓ ˜Â˘‰ ¯ÈÁÓ Ï˘ Â˙¯˘ÂÈ ÏÚ ˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰ ÂÈÙÏ˘ ˘Â¯ÈÙ‰re Western Union Sec, Litig., 120 F.R.D. ˙˘¯Ù· ,ÌÓ‡ .‰ÈÓ‰ Ï˘ È˙ÈÓ‡‰ ͯډ ˙‡ Û˜˘Ó¯Â‡Ï Zlotnick ˙Îω Ï˘ ‰Ù˜Â˙· ˜Ù˜ÙÏ ˘È ÈÎ ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙È· ¯ÈÚ‰ ,629, 637 (D.N.J. 1988)Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 132 F.R.D. 359, 371 (D. ˙˘¯Ù· ,‰Ó„· .Basic ˙˘¯Ù˜˜ÊÈ‰Ï ÌȇÎÊ ÔÈÈ„Ú Ì‰ ,¯ÈÁÓ ˙„Â˙ ÏÚ ÌÈ¯Ó‰Ó ˙ÂȈÙ‡ ȯÁÂÒ˘ Ì‚‰ ÈÎ ˜ÒÙ Del. 1990)Langevoort, supra ‡¯ ‰Ê ˘Â¯ÈÙ· ÌÈÎÓÂ˙‰ ÌÈÙÒ ÌÈ„ÓÂÏÓ ˙ÂÚ„Ï .˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰‰ ˙˜ÊÁÏD.R. Fischel “Efficient Capital ;Ì˘ ‰ÂÂÏȉ ·Â˙ÈΉ note 230; Black, supra note 156Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the Market Theory” 74 Cornell L. Rev. (1989)

.907

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(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

ÔÙÂ‡Ï ˙˜˜Êȉ· Basic ˙˘¯Ù· ·Â¯‰ ˙Ú„ Ï˘ ‰¯È˘È‰ ‰‡È¯˜‰ ˙‡ ÛÈÏÁ‰Ï ‰ÈËÓ.233·Â¯‰ ˙Ù˜˘‰ ˙‡ ‰˘¯Ù ‰˙‡· ËÂÚÈÓ‰ ˙Ú„ ‰‚Ȉ‰ ·˘ ‰ÚËÂÓ‰

̇ ‰ËÏÁ‰ Í¯ÂˆÏ ˙È˷ϯ ÏÈÚÈ ˜Â˘‰ ̇‰ ‰Ï‡˘‰ ,Ô¢‡¯‰ ˘Â¯ÈÙ‰ ÈÙ ÏÚÌÈÙ˜˘Ó Ìȇ ÌȯÈÁÓ‰ ÏÈÚÈ Âȇ ˜Â˘‰ ̇ ,Ô΢ .˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ˙‡ ıÓ‡ÏÌÈ˘¯„ ‰˜ÊÁ· ˘Ó˙˘‰Ï ÌÈ˘˜·Ó‰ ÌÈÚ·Â˙ .ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ÌÈÈ¢ ˙‡ ‰ÂÎ.ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¢ ˙‡ ‰ÂÎ Û˜˘Ó Ô· ˜Â˘‰ ¯ÈÁÓ˘ ÍÎ ÏÚ ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰ ̉˘ ÔÂÚËωȇ˘ ÚÂ„È ˜Â˘‰ Ï˘ ˙ÂÏÈÚȉ ¯ÒÂÁ ¯Â‡Ï˘ ‰ÚË ÔÂÚËÏ ÌÈÚ·Â˙Ï ¯˘Ù‡Ï Ôȇ ,ÌχÏÚ ˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰‰ ˙ÚË ˙‡ ÏÏ¢ ÏÈÚÈ ‡Ï ˜Â˘ Ï˘ ÂÓÂȘ ÌˆÚ ,ÂÊ ‰˘È‚ ÈÙÏ .‰ÂÎ.‰˜ÊÁ· ˘ÂÓÈ˘Ï ÒÈÒ·‰ ˙‡ ËÈÓ˘Ó ÌÈȯ˘Ù‡‰ ÌÈÚ·Â˙‰ ÏÏÎÓ ˜Â˘‰ Ï˘ Â˙¯˘ÂÈÔÈÈÚ· ÔÈ„‰ ˜ÒÙ ÈÎ ÌÈÚÂË ÏÈÚÈ Âȇ ˜Â˘‰˘ ‰ÚË· ‰˜ÊÁ· ˘ÂÓÈ˘Ï ÌÈ„‚˙Ó‰ ,Ô·

.234Ô¢‡¯‰ ˘Â¯ÈÙ· ÍÓÂ˙ BasicÏ˘ ˙ÂÏÈÚȉ ˙χ˘ ÔÎÏ ,È˘‰ ˘Â¯ÈÙ‰ ‡Â‰ ÔÈ„‰ ˜ÒÙÏ ÔÂΉ ˘Â¯ÈÙ‰ ÌχÈÙ ÏÚ˘ ¯Á‡Ó ˙‡Ê .235˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ˙ÏÁ‰ ÏÚ ÏÏÎ ‰ÚÈÙ˘Ó ‰È‡ ˜Â˘‰.236ÏÈÚÈ Âȇ ̇ ÂÏÈÙ‡ ,‰˜ÊÁ‰ ˙ÏÁ‰ Í¯ÂˆÏ È·È˘ه ˜Â˘‰ ÈÎ ˙‡¯‰Ï È„ ,‰Ê ˘Â¯ÈÙ:˙¢ ˙·ÈÒÓ ÏÈÚÈ ‡Ï ͇ È·È˘ه ˙ÂÈ‰Ï ÏÂÎÈ ˜Â˘ ,‰‡¯Ó ‚ˆ‰˘ Ï„ÂÓ‰˘ ÈÙÎȯÁÂÒ ,ÌÈÒ¯Ëȇ Ȅ‚ÈÓ ÌÈÚÙ˘ÂÓ˘ ÌÈËÒÈχ ,¯ÈÁÓ‰ ˙‡ ÌÈ˙ÂÂÚÓ˘ ˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒ.ÁÂÂË ¯ˆ˜ ¯ÂÁÓ˙Ï ÌȈȯÓ˙Ó ÌÈÚÙ˘ÂÓ‰ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Â‡ ̉È˙Âίډ· ÌÈÚÂˢ Ú„ÈÓ˘Â˜È·‰Â ڈȉ‰ ˙ÂÁÂÎÏ ·È‚Ó ˜Â˘‰ „ÂÚ ÏÎ .˙ÂÏÈÚȉ ¯ÒÂÁÏ ‰·ÈÒ‰ È‰Ó ‰˘Ó ‰Ê Ôȇۘ˘Ó Âȇ˘ ¯ÈÁÓ ·È‰ ÍÈω˙‰˘ ‰„·ÂÚ‰ ,¯ÂÁÓ˙‰ ÍÈω˙· ÔÈÓ‡ Ú„ÈÓ ÒÈÒ· ÏÚÏÚ ÍÓ˙Ò‰˘ ÈÓ ,Ô΢ .‰˜ÊÁ· ˘ÂÓÈ˘‰ ˙‡ ˙ÏÏ¢ ‰È‡ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¢ ˙‡ ‰ÂÎ

.Ú‚Ù ¯ÈÁÓ‰ ˙ÚÈ·˜ Ï˘ ÍÈω˙‰ Ï˘ Â˙¯˘ÂÈ

233Basic Inc. v. Levinson, supra note ÔÈÈÚ· :·Â¯‰ ˙Ú„ ˙‡ White ËÙ¢‰ Ï˘ ¯‡È˙ ˙‡ ‡¯˙˜ÊÁ ¯˙ÒÈ˙ ̉·˘ Ìȯ˜ÓÏ ˙‡·‰ ˙‡ӂ„‰ ˙‡ ˜ÙÈÒ ËÂÚÈÓ‰ ËÙ¢ .223, at pp. 255y256“a plaintiff who decides, months in advance of an alleged misrepresentation, :˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰‰to purchase a stock; one who buys or sells a stock for reasons unrelated to its price;one who actually sells a stock ‘short’ days before the misrepresentation is made —surely none of these people can state a valid claim under Rule 10by5” (ibid, at p.‰È¢ ˙‡ Û˜˘ÓÎ ‰ÈÓ‰ ¯ÈÁÓ· ‰‡¯ ‡Ï ÚȘ˘Ó‰˘ ‰„·ÂÚ‰ ÏÚ ˙ÂÒÒÂ·Ó Âχ ˙‡ӂ„ .251)J.R. Macey “The Fraud on the Market ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯ ‰Ê ˘Â¯ÈÙ· ÌÈÎÓÂ˙‰ ÌÈ„ÓÂÏÓÏ .È˙ÈÓ‡‰

.Theory: Some Preliminary Issues” 74 Cornell L. Rev. (1989) 923, 925y926234.Macey, ibid ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯235“By accepting this rebuttable presumption, we do not intend conclusively :Ú·˜ ÍÎÂ

to adopt any particular theory of how quickly and completely publicly available.Basic Inc. v. Levinson, ibid, at p. 249 ‡¯ information is reflected in market price”.

236“For purposes of accepting the presumption of reliance in this case, we need :Ú·˜ ÍÎÂonly believe that market professionals generally consider most publicly announcedmaterial statements about companies, thereby affecting stock market prices” (Basic Inc.

.v. Levinson, ibid, at p. 247)

64

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

,¯˜ÈÚ‰ ‡Â‰Â ,˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ÏÚ ˙¯Â˜È·‰ ‰˜ÂÏ Â·˘ È˘‰ Ì‚ÙÏ ¯˘‡·Â˘Á ,ÌÈÏÈÚÈ È˙Ï· ͇ ÌÈÈ·È˘ه ÌȘ¢‰ ¯˘‡Î ‡˜Â„ ÈÎ ÁÈÎÂÓ Â‚ˆ‰˘ Ï„ÂÓ‰Ô‚Ӊ ̉ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ˘ ¯Á‡Ó ˙‡Ê .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÏ ÌÈÁ Ìȇ˙ ˜ÙÒÏ „ÁÂÈÓ·Ô˙È ÌÈÏÈÚÈ ÌÈÈ·È˘ه ̉ ÌȘ¢‰ ¯˘‡Î .˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ È‡ Ô˜È˙Ï ¯˙ÂÈ· ·ÂˉςÂÒÓ ,˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÏÚ ¯·Â‚‰ ,Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ ÂÈ„ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ ÌÈȘ˘ ÍÎÓ ˜ÈÒ‰Ï˙ÂÈÂÏÚÓ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ìȉ ‰ÊÎ ˜Â˘· .ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ÌȘÈÂ„Ó ÌȯÈÁÓ ÁÈË·‰ÏÌȘ¢‰ ¯˘‡Î ,„‚Ó .˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ‰È‚Ó Ô‰ÈÏÚ˘ ,˙ÂÎÂÓ Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÓȇԘ˙Ï ÌÈÁÈÏˆÓ Ìȇ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ˘ ÍÎÓ ˜ÈÒ‰Ï Ô˙È ÌÈÏÈÚÈ È˙Ï· ͇ ÌÈÈ·È˘ه ̉˙¯Á‡ ˙ÂÏ·‚Ó Ï˘· ‡ ˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒ È·ȯ Ï˘· ˙‡Ê ,˙ÂÈ·È˘ه· ˜Â˘‰ ȯÈÁÓ ˙‡‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓÓ Á¯ ˙˜Ù‰Ï ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰ ,‰ÊÎ ˜Â˘· .¯ÈÁÓ ˙ÂÈËÒ Ô˜˙Ï Ì˙ÏÂÎÈ ÏÚȯÈÁÓ ÏÚ ‡Â¢‰ È‚ˆÓ Ï˘ Ì˙ÚÙ˘‰ ˙‡ ÌÈÓȈÚÓ ˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒ˘ ÌÂ˘Ó ,‰‰Â·‚ ‡È‰Ï˘ ‰˜ÊÁ‰ Ì˙ÚÙ˘‰ .‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ ¯ÂˆÈÏ ıȯÓ˙‰ Ï„‚ ÍÎÓ ‰‡ˆÂ˙Î .ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈÏ˘ Ì˙ÏÂÎÈ ˙‡ ‰˘ÈÏÁÓ ‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ ¯ÂˆÈÏ ıȯÓ˙· ‰ÈÏÚ ÌÚ „ÁÈ ˜Â˘· ˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰˘ ¯Á‡Ó ,ÌÈÂÂ˘Ï Í¯Ú‰ ˙¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ¯ÈÁÓ‰ ÔÈ· ˙ÂÈËÒ Ô˜˙Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒȯÁÂÒ ÌÈÙ¢Á Âχ Ìȇ˙· .¯˙ÂÈ ‰Ë˜ ‡È‰ Ô˜È˙‰ ˙ÏÂÚÙÓ Á¯‰ ˙‡ "ÒÂÙ˙"ÏÈ‚ˆÓ È·ȯ Ï˘· ‰Ë˜ ˙È˙ÈÓ‡ ¯ÈÁÓ ˙ÈÈËÒ ÈÂÏÈ‚Ï ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰ :‰Â·‚ ÔÂÎÈÒÏ Ú„ÈÓ‰˙‡„‰ ȇ Ï˘· ‰Ë˜ ‰¯˙‡˘ ‰ÈÈËÒ‰ ÔÓ Á¯‰ "˙ÒÈÙ˙"Ï ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰ ;‡Â¢‰Ï˘· ÌÈÏ„‚ ÌÈÈχȈËÂÙ‰ ÌȘʉ ;˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ˙¯·Â‚‰ Ì˙ÂÏÈÚÙ· ‰Î¯Ή‰·Â‚˙· .‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ ˙·˜Ú· ¯ÈÁÓ‰ ÈÈÂÈ˘ ˙‡ ÌÈÓȈÚÓ‰ ˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙ÚÙ˘‰Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ Ï˘ ˙‰·‚ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ· ˙‡˘Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÂÎ¯ËˆÈ ÔÂÎÈÒ· ‰ÈÏÚω˙ÏÂÁ˙ ˙ÏÈÏ˘ ˙ÂÚÓ˘Ó .ÌȯÈÁÓ‰ Ô˜È˙ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ ˙‡ ÏÈ·‚Ó‰ ÔÙ‡· ,ÛË¢ ÔÙ‡·˜Â˘· ˙ÂȂˆÈÈ ˙ÂÚÈ·˙ ˘È‚‰Ï ˙¯˘Ù‡‰ ˙ÏÈÏ˘ ‰È‰ ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ Ï˘˙¯·˙Ò‰‰ Ï„‚˙ ˙ÂȂˆÈÈ ˙ÂÚÈ·˙ ÈÙÓ ˘˘Á‰ ÔÓ ˙ڷ‰ ‰Ú˙¯‰ ¯„Úȉ· .‰ÊÎÏ˘ ˙ÂÈËÒ ¯˙‡Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÏÚ ¯˙ÂÈ „ÂÚ ‰˘˜È˘ ·ˆÓ ,‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ Ï˘ ÌÓÂȘÏÔ‚ӷ ˘ÂÓÈ˘Ï ˙¯˘Ù‡‰ ¯„Úȉ· ,ÔÎ ÂÓÎ .Ô˜˙Ï ÌÈÈÂÂ˘Ó Í¯Ú‰ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ.Ì‰Ï ÂÓ¯‚ÈÈ˘ ÌȘʉ ÏÚ ÌÈȈÈÙ Ï·˜Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÏÚ ‰˘˜È ,˙ȂˆÈȉ ‰ÚÈ·˙‰¯˘Ù‡Ï ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ˙‡ ÏÈÁ‰Ï ÈÂÈÁ ,ÏÈÚÈ Âȇ˘ È·È˘ه ˜Â˘· ,ÔÎ ÏÚÚ„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˙ÂÏÈÚ٠ۘȉ ˙‡ ¯È·‚‰Ï È„Î ˙ȂˆÈȉ ‰ÚÈ·˙‰ ÔÂ‚Ó Ï˘ Â˙ÂÏÈÚÙ ˙‡

.237˙ÂÏÈÚÈ Ï˘ ·ˆÓÏ ˜Â˘‰ Ï˘ Â˙ÂÒÎ˙‰ ÍÏ‰Ó ˙ÂÎȇ ˙Â¯È‰Ó ˙‡ ¯Ù˘Ï ÍηÂ

ÏÈÚÈ ˜Â˘ ÌÈÁÈÓ‰ ÌÈÂÚÈˉ (·)

.ÔÈËÂÏÁÏ ‰Â˘ ÔÂÚÈË ÏÚ ˙ÒÒÂ·Ó ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ÏÚ ‰ÈÈ˘‰ ˙¯Â˜È·‰˜Â˘‰ ÈÎ ‡ÂÙ‡ ÁÈ .ÌÈÏÈÚÈ Ì‰ ÌȘ¢‰˘ ‰Á‰‰ ÏÚ ÌÈÚ˘ ˙¯Â˜È·‰ Ï˘ ‰È˘¯Â˘

237ÔÂÈ„ ‰ÎȯˆÓ ÂÊ ‰Ï‡˘˘ ¯Á‡Ó ,˜Ê‰ ˙ÈÁ·Ï ‰È‡¯‰ ‰„ÈÓ‰ ˙Ó‡ ˙χ˘Ï ԇΠÌÈÒÁÈÈ˙Ó Âȇ.„¯Ù

65

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

ÏÚ .· ÌȯÁÒ‰ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ· ‡Â¢‰ È‚ˆÓ ˙‡ ˜È„ӷ Û˜˘Ó ,ÏÈÚÈ ÌÓÂ‡È„È ÏÚ Ì¯‚˘ ˜Ê‰ ˙‡ ÌÏ˘Ï ÌÈÚ·˙ ·ÈÈÁÏ ˘È ‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ ˙¯ÈˆÈ ÈÙÓ ÚÈ˙¯‰Ï ˙Ó„ÈÁȉ ˜Ê‰ ÈΠү‚ ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ÏÚ ˙¯Â˜È·‰ ÔÂÚÈË .238¯ˆÈ˘ ‡Â¢‰ ‚ˆÓÈÎ ,·ˆÓ‰ Â‰Ê Ì‡ ;¯˙ÂÈ ˙‰·‚ Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÓȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ· ‡Ë·˙Ó ‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ È„È ÏÚ Ì¯‚‰Ì‡ ,Ô· .239‰„ÈÓ‰ ÏÚ ¯˙È Ú·˙‰ ˙‡ ˘ÈÚÓ ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ· ˘ÂÓÈ˘‰ ʇ,¯˙ÂÈ ˙‰·‚ Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÓȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙¯ÈˆÈ ‡Â‰ ‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓÓ Ú·Â‰ È„ÈÁȉ ˜Ê‰˘ ÌÈÁÈÓÔ˙È ‰˜ÊÁ‰ ÁÂÎÓ˘ ‰„·ÂÚ· ‰¯Â˜Ó ¯˙ȉ ˙˘ÈÚ :˜„ˆÂÓ ÏÈÚÏ˘ ˙¯Â˜È·‰ ÔÂÚÈˢ ȯ‰ÔÙ‡· ͯډ ¯ÈÈ· ¯ÁÒ˘ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ ˙·¯Ï ,˜Â˘· ¯ÁÒ˘ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰ ÏÎÏ ÈˆÈÙ‰˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ ,Ìχ .‡Â¢ ‚ˆÓ Û˜È˘ ¯ÈÁÓ ‰·˘ ÔÓʉ ˙„˜· ˜ÂÈ„· È¯Ó‚Ï È¯˜ÓÏÏÎ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó Ìȇ ̉˘ ÌÂ˘Ó Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÓȇ Ï˘ ˙Â¯È‰Ê ÈÚˆÓ‡ ˙ËȘ· ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó Ìȇȯ˜Ó Á¯Â‡· ˙˙ÂÂÚÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ̇ .‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓÓ Ôȯ˘ÈÓ· ÌÈÏ·ÂÒ Ìȇ Û‡ ̉ ;Ú„ÈÓ·¯ÈÁÓ· ̘ÏÁÂ È„Ó ‰Â·‚ ¯ÈÁÓ· ÌȯÁÒ Ì˜ÏÁ) ÌÈ¢‰ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ Ï˘ ̯ÈÁÓ ˙‡.240˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰ ˙‡ ÏË·˙ Â˙¯ÈÎÓ ÔÂÂ‚Ó ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ ˜È˙ ˙ÈȘ ʇ ÈÎ ,(È„Ó ÍÂÓÌȯÈÁÓ· ÌȯÁÒ Í¯Ú‰ ˙¯ÈÈ ÏΠ·˘ ˜Â˘Ï ‰ÏÈ·ÂÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ̇ ÂÏÈÙ‡ ,ÍÎÓ ‰¯˙ȘÈ˙ ÌȯÎÂÓ ÌȘ ̉˘ ÌÂ˘Ó Â˜ÊÈÈ ‡Ï ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ ,È„Ó ÌÈÎÂÓ Â‡ È„Ó Ìȉ·‚ÔÂÚÈË ÍÈ˘ÓÓ Z ÔÎ ÏÚ .241‰Ó‡˙‰· È„Ó ÌÈÎÂÓ Â‡ È„Ó Ìȉ·‚ ÌȯÈÁÓ· ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰˙Ó ‡Ï‡ Âȇ ˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒÏ ÈˆÈÙ Ô˙Ó Z ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ „‚Î ˙¯Â˜È·‰

.Ú·˙‰ Ï˘ ¯˙È ˙˘ÈÚÏ ˙ӯ‚ ¯˘‡ ,ÌÈÏ·˜Ó ̉˘¯Â¯‚˙ ¯˙ȉ ˙˘ÈÚ ÈÎ ˙ү‚ ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ÏÚ ˙¯Â˜È·‰ ,„ÂÚ ˙‡Ể˘ ȯËÂω ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ۘȉ ˙‡ ˙¯·Á ÈÏ‰Ó ÂÈË˜È ‰È˙·˜Ú·˘ ,¯˙È ˙Ú˙¯‰Ì˜ӷ .242Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÏ ÌÈÁ ÔÈÓʉ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÓÎ ˙‡ ˙ÈÁÙÈ˘ ÔÙ‡· ,˜Â˘Ï ÌȘÙÒÓÚ„ÈÓ ˜¯ ˜Â˘Ï ÌÈωӉ ÂÏ‚È ,ÌÈωӉ È„È· ˘È˘ ˙ÓÂ‡Ó È˙Ï·Â ·¯ Ú„ÈÓ ˜Â˘Ï ˙Âςω‡ˆÂ˙Î) Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÛÂÒȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙˙ÁÙ‰ ÔÈ· ˙¯ˆÂ˘ ‰ÙÂÏÁ˙‰ .˙Ï·‚ÂÓ ˙ÂÓη ˙Ó‡ÓÏ˘ Â˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙˙ÁÙ‰ ÔÈ·Ï (˙ÓÂ‡Ó ‡Ï Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ ‰Ï„‚ ˙ÂÓÎ ÈÂÏÈ‚ÓÔ΢ .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÏ ‰˜ÈÊÓ (˙ÓÂ‡Ó Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ ˙Ï·‚ÂÓ ˙ÂÓÎ ÈÂÏÈ‚Ó ‰‡ˆÂ˙Î) Ú„ÈÓ‰‡È‰ ‰¯·Á‰ ÏÚ ÈÙȈÙÒ Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ ÌÈ˘„Á ÌÈËȯ٠ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙ÂÏÚ ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˙ÈÁ·Ó¯˙È ˙Ú˙¯‰ .ÂÏ‚˙ ¯·Î˘ Ú„ÈÓ ÈËÈ¯Ù Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ ˙ÂÏÚ ¯˘‡Ó ¯˙ÂÈ ‰‰Â·‚

238ÏÈÙÎ‰Ï ˘È (ÌÈÒÙ˙ ÌÈÈȯ·Ú‰ ÏÎ ‡Ï ,ÂÈȉ„) 1 ‰È‡ ÔÈȯ·Ú‰ ˙ÒÈÙ˙Ï ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰˘ Ì¢ÓÒÙ˙È‰Ï ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰ ,Ï˘ÓÏ Ì‡ .ÔÈȯ·Ú‰ ˙ÒÈÙ˙ È‡Ï ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰ ˙‡ ÏϘ˘È˘ Ì„˜Ó· ˜Ê‰ ˙‡Ì‡ .˙Óω ‰Ú˙¯‰ ÂÏÂÓ ‰‡¯È ÔÈȯ·Ú‰˘ È„Î ,˜Ê‰ ÔÓ ÏÂÙÎ ‡Â‰˘ ȈÈÙ Ú·˜Ï ˘È 0.5 ‡È‰Ì‡ .50 È¢· ÔÂÎÈÒ ÂÏÂÓ ‰‡¯È ÔÈȯ·Ú‰ 0.5 ‡È‰ ÒÙ˙È‰Ï ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰Â 100 ‡Â‰ ÈÂÙˆ‰ ˜Ê‰

.ÏÚÂÙ· ˜Ê‰ ‡Â‰˘ 100 È¢· ÔÂÎÈÒ ÂÏÂÓ ‰‡¯È ÔÈȯ·Ú‰ ,200 ,ÌÈÈ˘· ÏÙÎÂÈ ˜Ê‰239.Mahoney, supra note 31, at pp. 625, 626y641 ‡¯240.Ibid241.Ibid242.Ibid, at pp. 650y655

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Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ̉È˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ‡ÂÙ‡ ÏÈ„‚˙ ȯËÂÏ ڄÈÓ Ï˘ ˙Ï·‚ÂÓ ˙ÂÓÎÏ ‰ÏÈ·ÂÓ‰.Ú„ÈÓ Ï˘ Â˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ· ̘ӷ Ú„ÈÓ ÛÂÒȇ· ÚȘ˘‰Ï ¢¯„ÈÈ Ì‰˘ ÌÂ˘Ó ,Ú„ÈÓ‰

˙ÂÓÈȘ‰ ˙·¢˙‰ (1)

Ï˘ Â˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ÏÚ ˙ÒÒ·Ӊ ˙¯Â˜È·Ï ‰·Â‚˙· ˙ÂÚˆÂÓ‰ ,˙·¢˙ ‰ÓÎ ˙ÂÓÏ Ô˙ȘÈ˙ ˙ÈȘ Ï˘ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ÏÈ„‚‰Ï ‰ÏÂÏÚ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÈÎ ÌÈÚÂˉ ˘È ,˙È˘‡¯ .˜Â˘‰Ô˙È ‡Ï˘ ÔÂÎÈÒ Â‰Ê .È„Ó ÌÈÎÂÓ ÌȯÈÁÓ· Â˙¯ÈÎÓÂ È„Ó Ìȉ·‚ ÌȯÈÁÓ· ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰˙¯Ȅ˙ ˙˙ÁÙ‰· ÂÈχ Â·È‚È ˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ ,˙ÂÚ˜˘‰‰ ˜È˙ ÔÂÂÈ‚ È„È ÏÚ ÂÓÓ ¯ËÙȉÏ˙¯ÈÈ ÏÎ ¯Â·Ú ÌÏ˘Ï ÌÈÎÂÓ Ì‰˘ ÌȯÈÁÓ‰ Ï˘ ˙ٯ‚ ‰˙ÁÙ‰· ‡ Ì‰Ï˘ ¯ÁÒӉȯÁÂÒÏ ‰˜ÈÊÓ ˙˙ÁÙÂÓ ˙ÂÏÈÊ .˙˜ÈÊÓ Âχ ˙ÂÏÂÚÙ È˙˘ .243˜Â˘· ÌȯÁÒ‰ ͯډ.244Ô‰ ÒÈÈ‚Ï ˙¢˜·Ó‰ ˙¯·Á‰ ÏÚ ‰„È·ÎÓ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ˙˙Áى ,˙ÂÏÈʉ˙¯·ËˆÓ‰ ‰ÚÙ˘‰‰˘ ¯È·Ò ‰Ê Ôȇ ˙È˘ÚÓ˘ ȯ‰ ,˙È˯‡È˙ ÒÒÂ·Ó ‰Ê ÔÂÚÈˢ Ì‚‰˙‡ ÏÈ„‚È˘ ,̇Â˙Ó ÔÙ‡· ÌȘ¢‰ ÏÚ ÏÚÙ˙ ˙ÂÈχ„ȷȄȇ ˙¯·Á· ˙ÂÈÓ¯˙ Ï˘˜Â˘· ‰¯ÈÎÓÏ ÍÎ ¯Á‡Â È„Ó Ìȉ·‚ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ Â·˘ ˜Â˘· ‰˘ÈÎ¯Ï ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰

.245È„Ó ÌÈÎÂÓ Í¯Ú‰ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ Â·˘È¯ÁÂÒ˘ ˙¯ÓÏ˘ ˙ү‚ ,‰˜ÊÁ‰ ÏÚ ˙¯Â˜È·Ï ‰·Â‚˙· ‰˙ÏÚ‰˘ ˙¯Á‡ ‰ÚˉÚÙ˘‰ ÂÏ ˘È˘ ÏÎÎ Ú„ÈÓÓ Ì‰Ï ˙Ù· ,Ú„ÈÓ ÏÚ ÒÒ·˙‰· ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó Ìȇ ˙ÂÏÈʉbid/ask ÈÁ¯ӷ ˙‡˷˙Ó‰ ‰˜ÒÚ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚÓ ˙Ù· ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒÏ .246˙ÂÏÈʉ ÏÚȯÁÂÒ˘ ¯Á‡Ó ,Ú„ÈÓ È¯Ú٠ψÈÏ ˙ÂÈÂӄʉ ¯ˆÂÈ ‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ Ï˘ ÌÓÂȘ .ÌÈÏ„‚„ÂÚ·Ó ¯˙‡Ï ÂÁÈÏˆÈ Ì‰˘ ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰ ˙‡ ÌÈÏÈ„‚Ó ˙Â¯È‰Ê ÈÚˆÓ‡· ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰,ÌÏÂÓ ¯ÁÒÓ· „ÈÒÙÈ ˜Â˘‰ È˘ÂÚ˘ ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰ ‰Ï„‚ ÍÎÓ ‰‡ˆÂ˙Î .247‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ „ÚÂÓÈÙÓ ÌÓˆÚ ÏÚ Ô‚‰Ï È„Î bid/ask-‰ ÈÁÂÂ¯Ó ˙‡ ÏÈ„‚‰Ï ˜Â˘‰ È˘ÂÚÏ Ì¯‚È˘ ·ˆÓ˜È˙ ÌȘ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ Ì‡ Ì‚ ,Í΢ ÔÂÂÈÎ .ÌÈÚ„ÂÈÓ ÌȯÁÂÒ ÌÚ ¯ÁÒÓ·˘ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰.ÌÈÏ„‚ bid/ask ÈÁÂÂ¯Ó Ï˘ ˙ÂÏÚ· ‡˘ÈÈ ÔÈÈ„Ú Ì‰ ,· ÌȘÈÊÁÓ ÔÂÂ‚Ó ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ÈˆÈÙ ÌÈÏ·˜Ó ˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ ÚÂ„Ó ¯È·ÒÓ ‡Â‰ Ôȇ ,ÌÈÂÒÓ ˜„ˆ ˘È ‰Ê ÔÂÚÈË·˘ Ì‚‰Ì‰Ï˘ ıȯÓ˙‰ ˙‡ ÔÈË˜È „·Ï· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÏ ÈˆÈÙ Ô˙Ó .˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ÁÂÎÓÌÓ‡ ̇ ,˙¯Á‡ ÌÈÏÈÓ· .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÚÙ ˙‡ ˙ÈÁÙÈ˘ ÔÙ‡· ,˙Â¯È‰Ê ÈÚˆÓ‡· ÚȘ˘‰ÏÚÂ„Ó ,‰¯ÚÊÓÏ Â‡ ‰ÈÚ·‰ ˙‡ ÌÈˆÚ‰Ï ‰ÏÂÎÈ˘ ÂÊ ‡È‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ì˙‚‰˙‰˙È˯٠‰ÙÈ· ÏÚ ÈÎ ‡È‰ ‰Ê ÔÂÚÈËÓ ˙ڷ‰ ‰˜ÒÓ‰ ,Ô· ?„·Ï· Ì˙‡ ˙ˆÙÏ ‡Ï˘

243A.C. Pritchard “Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions ‡¯with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers” 85 Va. L. Rev. (1999) 925, 938y940;

.Georgakopoulos, supra note 57, at pp. 702y711244.Pritchard, ibid, at p. 945; Georgakopoulos, ibid ‡¯245.Pritchard, ibid, at pp. 940y941; Georgakopoulos, ibid246.Georgakopoulos, ibid, at pp. 703y707 ‡¯247.Pritchard, supra note 243, at pp. 941y942 ‡¯

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(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

˙ÙÏÁÂÓ ˙ÂÈ‰Ï ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙ Ï˘ ‰˜ÊÁ‰ ÏÚ ˙ÒÒ·Ӊ ˙ȂˆÈÈ ‰ÚÈ·˙ ˙ÂÚˆÓ‡·.248Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈÏ ˙Âү·‰ Ï˘ ˙ȯ·Ȉ ‰ÙÈ··

‰˜ÊÁ‰˘ Íη ‰„ÂÓ ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ÏÚ ˙¯Â˜È·‰ ÔÂÚÈËÏ ‰Â˘ ‰·Â˘˙˙Ú˙¯‰ ˙¯ˆÂÈ ‡È‰ Ôȇ ˙‡Ê ˙¯ÓÏ ÈÎ ˙ү‚ ͇ ,˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒÏ ‰˙Ó ‰˜ÈÚÓ ÌÓ‡ÏÎ Ôȇ ,‰ÂÂη ˙ڈ·Ӊ ‰¯È·Ú ‡ÂÙ‡ ‡È‰Â ,˙ÂÚ„ÂÓ ‰ÎȯˆÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙˘ ¯Á‡Ó .¯˙È˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒÏ Ô˙ȉ ȈÈÙ‰ ÈÎ Û‡ .˙Â¯È·Ú ÈÚˆ·Ó ÏÚ ÌÈÈ˘ÂÚ ÌÈȈÈÙ ˙Ïˉ· È˘Â˜ÏÚ .˙ÂÓ¯ÏÓ ÚÓÈ‰Ï ‡Â‰ ˙¢ÚÏ Ì‰ÈÏÚ˘ ÏÎ ,249È˘ÂÚ ÈˆÈÙ· ÌÈÚ·˙‰ ·ÂÈÁÏ Ï˜˘ÔÂ‚Ó ,‰˘ÚÓÏ ‰Îω˘ Íη ¯ÈΉÏÓ ˙ÚÓ ‡È‰˘ ¯Á‡Ó ,˙¯Â˜È· ‰Á˙Ó ÂÊ ‰·Â˘˙ÌÈÈÏ˘¯ ‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ ÔÈ· ÔÈÁ·Ó Âȇ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ· ˙ÂÚÈ·˙· ˘Ó˘Ó‰ ˙ȂˆÈȉ ‰ÚÈ·˙‰ÌÈÏ‰Ó ÏÚ (˙ÂÚË·) ˙ÂȯÁ‡ ˙ÏËÂÓ ÌÈ˙ÚÏ ,250˙ÈÓ¯˙· Ì„ÂÒÈ˘ ‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ ÔÈ·ÏÍÂ˙Ó ‡Â¢ ‚ˆÓ Ï˘ ÂȯˆÂÈ È·‚Ï ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ· ˘ÂÓÈ˘‰ ,ÔÎÏ .ÌÈÏ˘¯È„Î È„Ó ˙ÂÏ„‚ ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ ÂÚȘ˘È Âχ ÌÈÏ‰Ó˘ ¯Á‡Ó ,¯˙È ˙Ú˙¯‰Ï ̯‚È ,˙ÂÏ˘¯ÈÎ ÌÈÚÂˉ ˘È ,˙‡Ê ÌÚ .˙ÂȯÁ‡ Ï˘ ÔÂÎÈÒÏ Ì˙‡ ÂÙ˘ÁÈ˘ ÌÈ·ˆÓÏ ‰ÒÈÎÓ ÚÓ‰ÏԄ˜Ù˙ ˙‡ ¯ÙÈ˘ ȘȯӇ‰ Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995-‰˙ÂÈÓ¯˙ ÔÈ· ¯˙ÂÈ ·ÂË Ì‡˙ÈÓ ¯ˆÈ ,˙ȯ·‰ ˙ˆ¯‡· ¢‚‰˘ ˙ÂȂˆÈÈ ˙ÂÚ·Â˙ Ï˘,Ô· .251‰¯˘Ù ȯ„Ò‰ ˙¯‚ÒÓ·Â ËÙ˘Ó È˙· È„È ÏÚ ÔÈ‚· Ïˉ˘ ˙ÂȯÁ‡‰ ۘȉ ÔÈ·Ï

248.Pritchard, ibid, at pp. 983, 1019y1020 ‡¯249M.F. Johnson, K.K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard “In Re Silicon Graphics Inc.: ‡¯

Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting from the Interpretation of the Private Securities‰¯·Á‰) Litigation Reform Act’s Pleading Standard” 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. (2000) 773, 781.˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ÔÓ ÌÈÁ¯ ‰˜ÈÙ‰ ‡Ï Ì‚ ‰‡ˆÂ˙Π,‰Ï˘ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ ˙‡ ‰¯ÎÓ ‡Ï ‰˙˜ ‡Ï ˙Ú·˙‰‰¯·Á‰ ÔÓ Ï·˜Ï ÌÈÚȘ˘ÓÏ ˙¯˘Ù‡Ó ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ „ÂÒÈ ÏÚ ˙ÂÚÈ·˙ ,˙‡Ê ˙¯ÓÏ˙ÂȂˆÈÈ ˙ÂÚ·Â˙ ,ÔÎ ÏÚ .‰¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó Ï˘ ‡Â¢‰ È‚ˆÓ ÏÚ ÒÒ·˙‰· ˙‡Ê ̉ȄÒÙ‰ ÏÚ ÈˆÈÙ

.(˙ÈÓ¯˙ Úˆȷ ÈÙÓ ˙È˙ÂÚÓ˘Ó ÚÈ˙¯˙˘ ˙ÈχȈËÂÙ ˙È˘ÂÚ ‰Èˆ˜Ò ¯„‚· Ô‰250„ÂÒȉ ˙˘È¯„ ÔÎÂ˙ ·È·Ò ÏÂÙ¯Ú‰ ˙‡ ÔÈȈÓ) Johnson et al., ibid, at pp. 782y783 ‡¯

K.R. Johnson “Liability for Reckless Misrepresentations and Omissions under ;(È˘Ù‰Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934” 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. (1991) 667.‰ÊÈÊÙ ‡Â¢ ‚ˆÓ ˙„ÓÚ‰ È„Î ˙Ú‚Ó‰ ˙‚‰˙‰‰ ˙‡ ˜ÈÂ„Ó È˙Ï· Á¯Â‡· ¯Ȅ‚‰ ËÙ˘Ó‰ È˙·)ÏÏΠ10(b) ÌÈÙÈÚÒ „ÂÒÈ ÏÚ ˙ÂÚÈ·˙Ï Z ÌÈÈχȈËÂÙ ÌÈ„„ˆ ÏÏÂÎ Z ÌÈ„„ˆ˘ ‡È‰ ‰‡ˆÂ˙‰ÌȘÁ˘ .˙ÂȯÁ‡ ̉ÈÏÚ ÏËÂ˙ ̇‰Â Ì˙‚‰˙‰ ˙‡ ‚ÂÂÒÈ „ˆÈÎ ˙ÂÊÁÏ ÌÈÏÂÎÈ Ìȇ 10by5¯ÚÊÓÏ È„Î ÌÈ˘¯„‰ ÌÈÚˆÓ‡‰ ˙‡ ÌÈ˘ ÌÓ‡ ̉ ÈÎ ÁÈË·‰Ï ‡ÂÙ‡ ÌÈÏ‚ÂÒÓ Ìȇ Ì‚ ˜Â˘·

.(˙ÂȯÁ‡Ï Ì˙ÙÈ˘Á ˙‡251E.J. Weiss “Complex Litigation At the Millennium: Pleading Securities ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯

ÏÚ ˜ÂÁ‰ Ï˘ ˙ÂÈ·ÂÈÁ‰ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰‰ ¯Â‡È˙) Fraud” 64 L. & Contemp. Prob. (2001) 5M.A. Perino “Did the Private Securities ;(˘ÓÓ ÏÎ Ô‰· Ôȇ˘ ˙ÂȂˆÈÈ ˙ÂÚ·Â˙ Ï˘ Ô˙˘‚‰˙Â„Ú ˙ÓÈȘ) Litigation Reform Act Work?” 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. (2003) 913, 947y950˘¯ÙÓ‰ ËÂÙÈ˘‰ ÊÂÁÓ· ¯ÚˆÓÏ ,˙ÏÏÂΉ ÌȘÈ˙‰ ˙ÂÎȇ ˙‡ ¯ÙÈ˘ ˜ÂÁ‰˘ ˙ÊÓ¯Ó‰ ˙È˙ÂÚÓ˘ÓJ.L. Oldham “Taking ‘Efficient Markets’ Out of the ;(˜ÂÁ‰ ˙‡¯Â‰ ˙‡ ‰¯˙È ‰„Ù˜‰·‘Fraud-On-The-Market’ Doctrine After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act”;(˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ÏÚ ˜ÂÁ‰ ˙ÚÙ˘‰ ¯Â‡È˙) 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 92003) 995, 1030

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Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

˜¯ ˜ÈÂ„Ó ÈˆÈÙ ˜ÂÒÙÏ ˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ȯ˜Ó ÏÎ ˙‡ ˜È„ӷ ˙‰ÊÏ ÂÏÎÂÈ ËÙ˘Ó‰ È˙· ̇.ÌÏÚÈ˙ ¯˙È ˙Ú˙¯‰ Ï˘ ‰ÈÚ·‰ ,(˙ÂÏ˘¯ Ï˘ Ìȯ˜Ó· ‡ÏÂ) ÂÏω Ìȯ˜Ó·

ÚÈˆÓ ˘„Á‰ Ï„ÂÓ‰˘ ˙·¢˙‰ (2)

ÌÈ˜Ê Ï˘ ÌÏ˘ Ûˆ¯ (‡)

.˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ˙ÏÁ‰Ï ¯˙ÂÈ ˙ÚÎ˘Ó ‰˜„ˆ‰ ÚÈˆÓ ¯Ó‡Ó· ‚ˆ‰˘ Ï„ÂÓ‰ÌȯÁÒ‰ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÌÂÏÈ‚ ÍÈω˙· ˙„˜Ó˙‰ È„È ÏÚ ÔÎ ‰˘ÂÚ Ï„ÂÓ‰˙¯ÈÈ· ˙ÈÓ¯˙Ï ÔÚÂˉ Ú·Â˙ ÏÚ ,‰˜ÊÁ‰ ¯„Úȉ· ÈÎ ˘È‚„‰Ï ˘È ‡ˆÂÓ ˙„˜Π.˜Â˘·Ï˘ ÏÚÂÙ· Úˆȷ (·) ;‡Â¢‰ ‚ˆÓ ÏÚ ˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰ (‡) :‰Ï‡ È˙˘ ˙‡ ÁÈÎÂ‰Ï Í¯ÚÚ„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÏÎ ‡Ï Ìχ .‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ‰ ÔÓ ÂÚÙ˘Â‰˘ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ· ¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÂÚÙÔÙ‡· ¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÂÚÙ ÌÈÚˆ·Ó Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÓ ˙ˆ˜Ó .¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÂÚÙ ÏÚÂÙ· ÌÈÚˆ·Ó„ÁÂÈÓ·Â ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÓ ˜ÏÁ Ìχ .˙ÂÓ‡ ˙¯˜ ‡ ÌÈÈ„ÒÂÓ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó Ô‚Π,¯È˘È˙ÂÏÂÚÙ ÌÈÚˆ·Ó Ì„ÈˆÓ˘ ,ÌȯÁ‡Ï ÈÚˆ˜Ó ˙ÂÚ˜˘‰ ıÂÚÈÈ ˙Â¯È˘ ÌȯÎÂÓ ,ÌÈËÒÈχ˜Â˘‰ ÈÙ· ÌÈÙ˘ÂÁ‰ ÌÈËÒÈχ Ì‚ ˘È .Â˘Î¯˘ ÈËÒÈχ‰ ¯ˆÂÓ‰ ÏÚ ÒÒ·˙‰· ¯ÁÒÓÒÒ·˙‰· ¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÂÚÙ Úˆ·Ï ÌÈÓÈÂÒÓ ˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒÏ Ìȯ˘Ù‡Ó ,ÌÈÁ· Ì˙„Â·Ú ˙‡ıȯÓ˙ Ï˘ ÂÓÂÈ˜Ó ˙ڷ‰ ‰ÈÚ·‰ ÔÓ ÌÏÚ˙‰· .ÌÈËÒÈχ‰ È„È ÏÚ ‰Ï‚˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÏÚÌÈÚˆ·Ó‰ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ,‰Ë˜ Ú·Â˙‰ Ï˘ Â˙˜ÊÁ‰ ̉·˘ Ìȯ˜Ó· Ú·˙Ï Ìȇ˙Ó È˙Ï·‡ÏÏ ‡Â¢‰ ‚ˆÓ ÏÚ ˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰ ÁÈΉϠ‰ÚÈ·˙ ˘È‚‰Ï ÌÓ‡ ÌÈÏÂÎÈ ¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÂÚÙÌÈÓÈÈ˜Ó Ìȇ ˙Â¯È˘È ¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÂÚÙ Âڈȷ ‡Ï˘ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ,„‚Ó .‰˜ÊÁ· ͯˆ,ÍÎÓ ‰¯˙È .‰ÚÈ·˙ ˘È‚‰Ï ˙ÏÂÎȉ Ì‰Ó ÏÏ˘È˙ ÔÎ ÏÚ ,ÏÚÂÙ· ¯ÁÒÓ Ï˘ ȇ˙‰ ˙‡¯ˆÂÓ‰ ÏÚ ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰˘ ÌȯÁ‡‰ ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰ ÏÎÓ Ì‚ ÏÏ˘È˙ ‰ÚÈ·˙ ˘È‚‰Ï ˙¯˘Ù‡‰,‡Â¢‰ ‚ˆÓ ÏÚ ˙ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰ ÁÈÎÂ‰Ï ÂÏÎÂÈ ‡Ï˘ ¯Á‡Ó ,¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÂÚÙ Âڈȷ ÈËÒÈχ‰ÂÎ¯Ú ÏÚ Ô‚‰Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ ÈÎ ,¯·„‰ ˘Â¯ÈÙ .ÂÓÓ ÚÙ˘Â‰ ÈËÒÈχ‰ ¯ˆÂÓ‰˘ Û‡ ÏÚÏ˘ ‰¯˜Ó Ïη ˙ÏÁÂÓ ˙ÂÈ‰Ï ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ÏÚ ,ÈËÒÈχ‰ ¯ˆÂÓ‰ Ï˘˙Á‡ ‰ˆÂ·˜ ÔÈ· ÔÈÁ·‰Ï È˘Â˜‰ ÔÓ ÌÏÚ˙‰· .ÈËÒÈχ‰ ¯ˆÂÓ‰ ÏÚ ÍÓ˙Ò‰˘ ¯ÁÂÒ‰ÊÎ ¯·Ò‰ ˜ÙÒÏ È„Î ?ȈÈÙ ÌÈÏ·˜Ó ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ ÚÂ„Ó ¯·Ò‰ Ôȇ ÔÈÈ„Ú ,˙¯Á‡Ï˙ËȘ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚÏ Ï·‚ÂÓ Âȇ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ· ˙ÈÓ¯˙ È„È ÏÚ Ì¯‚‰ ˜Ê‰ ÈÎ ÔÈ·‰Ï ÈÂÈÁ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ· Ìȇ˷˙Ó‰ ,ÌÈÙÒ ÌȘÊÏ ˙ӯ‚ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ .Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÓȇ ˙Â¯È‰Ê ÈÚˆÓ‡

.¯˙ÂÈ ˙‰·‚ ‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ·Â ¯˙ÂÈ ˙‰·‚ ˙ÂÏÈʉÏÈ„‚Ó ÔÎ ÏÚ ڄÈÓ È¯ÚÙ ˙¯ˆÂÈ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ· ˙ÈÓ¯˙ .˙ÂÏÈʉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ· Á˙Ù¯ÙÒÓ ,˙ˆÂÙ ˙ÂÎÙ‰ ˙ÂÈÓ¯˙ ¯˘‡Î .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ˙¯ȉʉ ÈÚˆÓ‡ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ·¯˜· ˙˙ÁÙÂÓ ˙¯Á˙ .˙ÁÙ˙ ̉ÈÈ· ˙¯Á˙‰Â ˙ÁÙÈ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ

D.S. Escoffery “A Winning Approach to Loss Causation Under Rule 10By5 in Lightof the Private Securities Reform Litigation Act of 1995” (“PSLRA”) 68 Fordham L.

.Rev. (2000) 1781

69

(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

.ÛÈ„Ú Ú„ÈÓ ÈÏÚ· ÌȯÁÂÒ ÌÚ ¯ÁÒÓÏ ˜Â˘‰ È˘ÂÚ ÈÙ· „ÓÂÚ‰ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ‰ÏÈ„‚Ó˙¯·˙Ò‰‰ ˙‡ Û˜˘Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ bid/ask-‰ ÁÂÂ¯Ó ˙‡ ˜Â˘‰ È˘ÂÚ ÂÏÈ„‚È ,‰·Â‚˙·˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒÏ ˙ÚÈÈÒÓ ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ .˙ÂÈÓ¯˙ Ï˘ ÔÓÂÈ˜Ï ¯˙ÂÈ ‰‰Â·‚‰bid/ask-‰ ÁÂÂ¯Ó ÏÚ ÈˆÈÙ ÌÈÏ·˜Ó ˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ .̉ȄÒÙ‰ ˙‡ ÌÓˆÚÏ ¯ÈÊÁ‰Ï˙‡ ˙ÈÁÙ‰ÏÂ Ì‰Ï˘ ¯ÁÒÓ‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚ٠ۘȉ ˙‡ ̈ӈÏÓ Ì‰Ó ÚÂÓÏ È„Î ,Ï„‚‰‰Ú˙¯‰Ï ̯‚˙ Âχ ÌÈ˜Ê ÔÈ‚· ȈÈÙ ˙˙ÏÓ ˙ÂÚÓȉ .ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ ÏÏÎ Ï˘ ÌȯÈÁÓ‰ÂÎÊÈ ÈËÒÈχ‰ ¯ˆÂÓ‰ ÏÚ ÂÎÓ˙Ò‰˘ Âχ ڄÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ì‡ ÂÏÈÙ‡ .‰Óȇ˙Ó ‰È‡˘Ô΢ ,ȈÈÙÏ ÌÈÎÂÊ Ìȇ ˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒ˘ ÍÎÓ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÂÚ‚ÙÈÈ ÔÈÈ„Ú ,ȈÈÙÏÌÈÏ„‚ bid/ask ÈÁÂÂ¯Ó ÁÎÂÏ Â˜Á˘ÈÈ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ÌÈÈχȈËÂÙ‰ ̉ÈÁ¯

.˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ ˙ÓˆÓÂˆÓ ¯ÁÒÓ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙÂ˙ÂÎÈ‡Ï ÌÈ¯Â˘˜ ‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ ¯ÂˆÈÏ ÌÈωÓÏ ÌȈȯÓ˙‰ .252‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚÏ ‰˙ÚÂ.‰‡‰ ˙·ÂË ÌÓˆÚÏ ˜ÈÙ‰Ï ÌÈωӉ ˙ÂÂÈÒÈÏ Â‡/ ‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ˙ȘÒÚ‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ‰˙‡ ÏÈ„‚‰Ï È„Î ,‰·È‚ ‡ ÈÂ˜Ï ÏÂ‰È ÈÂÏÈ‚Ó ÚÓ‰Ï È„Î ¯˜˘Ï ÌÈÏÂÏÚ ‰¯·Á‰ ÈωÓÍÂ˙ ÌÈÁ¯ ¯ˆÈÈÏ È„Î ,‰¯·Á‰ ˙ÂÈÓ È¯ÈÁÓ ÏÚ ‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ È„È ÏÚ ÂÏ·˜È˘ ȈÈÙ‰˙ÂÈÂÏÈÚÙ .253ÌÈÁÙÂÓ ÌȯÈÁÓ· ˙¢„Á ˙ÂÈÓ ˙˜Ù‰ „„ÂÚÏ È„Î ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ˘ÂÓÈ˘Â˙‡ˆ˜‰· ˙ÂÂÈÚ ,‰ÈÒΠ‰¯·Á‰ È¢· ÔÂËȘ :˙ÂÈ˙ÂÚÓ˘Ó ‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚÏ ˙Âӯ‚ ÂχÌȘʉ ÁÎÂÏ ÌȘ¢‰ Ï˘ Ì˙ÂÈÓ‡·Â ‰ÏÈÚȉ Ì˙ÂÏÈÚÙ· ‰ÚÈ‚Ù Ô‰ Ï˘ ‰ÏÈÚȉ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰ ˙¯·Â‚˘ ÏÎÎ .˙ÂÏÈʉ ȯÁÂÒÏ ,˘Ú¯‰ ȯÁÂÒÏ ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÏ ÌÈÓ¯‚‰˙ÂίΉ ‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ Ï˘ χȈËÂÙ‰ ¯·Â‚ ÍÎ ,Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ· ¯ÁÒÓ· ˙ÈÓ¯˙ Ï˘ ‰ÓÂȘÏ:˜Â˘· ıÂÁ‰ ȘÁ˘ ÏÏÎ Ìȇ˘Â Âχ ‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ· .˙¯ÁÒ‰ ˙¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ·˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÏÏÎ ÍÂ˙Ï ÂÏϘ˘È ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰ ÏÎ .˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒ ˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ˙¯·Á‰ ÏÎÏ Ô‰‰ ¯ÈÁÓ˙ÈÈÏÚÏ Íη ÂÓ¯‚È ,ÌÈωӉ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ· ÔÂÓˉ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ ˙‡ ͯډ„ÂÚ ÔÈ˘˙ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ Ï˘ ‰ÓÂÈ˜Ï ¯˙ÂÈ ‰‰Â·‚ ˙¯·˙Ò‰ ,„ÂÚ ˙‡Ê .Ô‰ ÒÈÈ‚Ï ˙¢˜·Ó‰ÔÙ‡· ,ÌÈωӉ ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Á˜ÈÙ‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙÏ ˘È˘ ˙ÂÈ·È˘ه‰ ˙‡ ¯˙ÂÈ˙„„ÂÚÓ ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ˙ÏÁ‰ .Ô‰‰ ˙ÂÏÚ ˙‡ ¯˜ÈÈ ˜Â˘‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ· Ú‚ÙÈ˘˙˜ÙÒÓ ˙ÂÈÓ¯˙ ˙ÙÈ˘ÁÏ ˙¯·˙Ò‰‰ ˙‡ ‰ÏÈ„‚Ó ,˙ÂȂˆÈÈ ˙ÂÚ·Â˙ Ï˘ Ô˙˘‚‰ ˙‡˙‡ ‰¯È·‚Ó ‰ÏÈÊÂÓ ˙¯ÙÂ˘Ó ‰Ú˙¯‰ .˙ÈÓ¯˙ Ï˘ ‰ÓÂÈ˜Ó ÌÈڷ‰ ÌȘʉ Ô‚ÓÏ ÈˆÈÙ.ÌÈÏ‰Ó ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ· ˙ÂίΉ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ÌÈÈË˜Ó Ì„ÈˆÓ˘ ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ

?ÂÙÂÒȇ ˙ÂÏÚ ÏÂÓ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ ˙ÂÏÚ (·)

˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ˘ ‰Á‰· ,ÔÂÚËÏ ÔÂÎ ‰Ê Ôȇ ÚÂ„Ó Ì‚ ¯È·ÒÓ ÂÏ˘ Ï„ÂÓ‰ÍÎÓ ‰‡ˆÂ˙ΠȯËÂω ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙Ó¯ ˙‡ Â˙ÈÁÙÈ ÌÈÏ‰Ó˘ ,¯˙È-˙Ú˙¯‰Ï ˙ӯ‚

252.Pritchard, supra note 243, at pp. 937y938 ‡¯253J.H. Arlen & W.J. Carrey “Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: ‡¯

ÈÂËÈ·Î ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÌȂȈӉ) Theory and Evidence” 1992 U. Ill L. Rev. (1992) 691, 692.(‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚÏ

70

Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

ÈÂÏÈ‚Ï ¯˘‡· ÌÈÏ‰Ó ˙ÂËÏÁ‰ .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ÛÂÒȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ Â¯˜ÈÈ˙È˙ÂȯÁ‡· ‰‡È˘ ,„Á‡‰ :ÌȯÁ˙Ó ÌÈÓÂȇ È˘ ÈÙÓ ˙¢˘Á‰ ˙Á˙ ˙·ˆÂÚÓ Ú„ÈÓ˙ÂȯÁ‡‰˘ Ì‚‰ .ÈÂÏÈ‚ ¯„Úȉ Ï˘· ˙ÂȯÁ‡· ‰‡È˘ ,È˘‰Â ,˜ÈÂ„Ó È˙Ï· ÈÂÏÈ‚ ÔÈ‚·ÏÎ Ôȇ ,˜ÈÂ„Ó È˙Ï· ÈÂÏÈ‚ ÔÈ‚· ˙ÂȯÁ‡Ï ˙ÈÒÁÈ ˙ÓˆÓÂˆÓ ‡È‰ ÈÂÏÈ‚ ¯„Úȉ Ï˘·Ôȇ .ÈÂÏÈ‚Ó ˙ÂÚÓȉ· ‡˜Â„ ˙Úˉ ¯˙ȉ ˙Ú˙¯‰Ï Â·È‚È ÌÈÏ‰Ó ÈÎ ÁÈ‰Ï ‰·ÈÒÈ˷ϯ Âȇ ¯˙ȉ ˙Ú˙¯‰ ÔÂÚÈË ,˙ÈÓ¯˙ Úˆ·Ï ÌÈÂÂÎ˙Ó‰ ÌÈωÓÏ ÒÁÈ· ÈÎ ˜ÏÂÁÈ˷ϯ ¯˙È ˙Ú˙¯‰ Ï˘ ÔÂÚÈˉ˘ ¯Á‡Ó .˙ÂÂÎÓ ˙Ú„ÂÓ ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ· ¯·Â„Ó˘ ¯Á‡Ó̇‰ ,˙ȯÈÙÓ‡ ‰Ï‡˘ ˙¯¯ÂÚ˙Ó ,(˙ÈχȈËÂÙ ÌÈÏ˘¯ ÈΠ̇) Ìȯ˘È ÌÈωÓÏ ˜¯¯˜ÁÓ ,Ô· .¯ÒÁ ÈÂÏÈ‚ Ï˘ ‡ ¯˙È ÈÂÏÈ‚ Ï˘ ˙È˙‚‰ ‰È‚˯ËÒ‡· ¯Á·È ÌÈωӉÈÈÏÚ ‡ˆÓ ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ıÂÓÈ‡Ï Âȉ˘ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰‰ ˙‡ ÔÁ·˘ ȯÈÙÓ‡˙‡ ˙¯ȉÊÓ ˙ÂÚ¯ ˙¢„Á Ô‰Ï ˘È˘ ˙¯·Á ÈΠ,˙ÂÚ¯ ˙¢„Á Ï˘ ȯËÂω ÈÂÏÈ‚·

.254„ÚÂÓ „ÂÚ·Ó ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó‰ÏÚ ·˙ÎÂÓ‰ ‰Ê ¯˘‡Ó ¯˙ÂÈ Ï„‚ ۘȉ· Ú„ÈÓ ÌÈÏ‚Ó ÌÈÏÈÚÈ ÌÈÏ‰Ó ,„ÂÚ ˙‡ÊÏÎÎ .‰ÊÎ Ú„ÈÓÏ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ·¯˜· ˘Â˜È· ÌÈȘ˘ ¯Á‡Ó ,Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ È„ÈÌÈωӉ ÏÚ ıÁω ¯·Â‚ ÍÎ ,Ú„ÈÓÏ Ì‰Ï˘ ˘Â˜È·· ¯˙ÂÈ ÌÈÈ·È˘ه Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ˘ÌÈωÓÓ ÚÂÓÏ ÌÈÏÂÎÈ Ìȇ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ìχ .¯˙ÂÈ Ô΄ÂÚÓ ˜ÈÂ„Ó Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÏ‚ÏÏ˘ ÔÂÚÈˉ ÌÈÏÈÚÈ È˙Ï· ÌÈωÓÏ ÒÁÈ· .ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ۘȉ ˙‡ ˙ÈÁÙ‰ÏÓ ÌÈÏÈÚÈ È˙Ï·Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÏ‚Ï ÌȈȯÓ˙ ‰ÏÈÁ˙ÎÏÓ Ì‰Ï Ôȇ˘ ¯Á‡Ó ,È˷ϯ Âȇ ‡ÏÈÓÓ ¯˙È ˙Ú˙¯‰ÌÈ˘˜·Ó‰ ÌÈÏÈÚÈ ÌÈωÓÏ ÒÁÈ· ˜¯ ÌÈȘ ¯˙È ˙Ú˙¯‰ ÈÙÓ ˘˘Á‰ .È΄Ú ‡ÏÓÌÈÏÈÚÈ ÌÈÏ‰Ó ,ÈÂÏÈ‚ ¯„Ú‰ Ï˘· ˙ÈËÙ˘Ó ˙ÂȯÁ‡ Ï˘ ÔÂÎÈÒÏ ÛÒ· .Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÏ‚ÏÏ˘ „ÒÙ‰Ï ÔÂÎÈÒ‰ :˙ÙÒ ˙ÂÏÚ ÌÏÂÓ Ìȇ¯ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ۘȉ ˙‡ ÔÈ˘‰Ï ÌȯÁ·‰Ï˘ ÏÈÚÈ ÌÂÏÈ‚ Ô‚Π,‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ÈËÒÈχ ÈÂÒÈÎÓ ˜ÈÙ‰Ï Ô˙È˘ ˙ÂÏÚÂ˙‰ ÏÂÏÎӉχ˘· ¯ÂӇΠ¯·Â„Ó .˙Â˙ÁÙÂÓ ‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙ÂÏÈÊ ,‰¯·Á‰ ˙ÂÈÓ È¯ÈÁÓÏ Ú„ÈÓ˘È˘ ‰ÚÙ˘‰‰ ÏÚ ˙¯·Â‚ Âχ ˙ÂÏÚÂ˙ „ÒÙ‰ Ï˘ ‰ÚÙ˘‰‰ ̇‰ ‰ÈÈÚ˘ ,˙ȯÈÙÓ‡

.255‡ÏÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚Ï ıȯÓ˙‰ ˙‡ ¯Ó˘Ó‰ ÔÙ‡· ,¯˙ȉ ˙Ú˙¯‰Ï

254ÌȇˆÓÓ ,¯˘·Ï ˙·ÂË ˙¢„Á Ô‰Ï˘ ˙¯·Á Ï˘ Ô˙‚‰˙‰· È¢ ‡ˆÓ ‡Ï ¯˜ÁÓ‰˘ Ô˙ȉ·,ȯËÂω ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙„ÈÓ ˙‡ ‰˙ÈÁÙ‰ ‡Ï ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙ȯ˘„ ÈÎ ‰ÚË· ÌÈÎÓÂ˙ ÂχS. Dutta & J. Nelson “Shareholder Litigation and Market ‡¯ .ÔÂΉ ‡Â‰ ÍÙȉ‰ ‡Ï‡Information: Effects of the Endorsement of the Fraud-on-the-market Doctrine on MarketInformation” (March 1997) (working paper series) available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/D.J. ‡¯ .ÂÊ ‰ÚË· ̉ Û‡ ÌÈÎÓÂ˙ ÌȯÁ‡ Ìȯ˜ÁÓ .sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=69036Skinner “Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News” 32 J. Account. Research (1994)ÌÈ„˜Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ Úˆ·Ï ¯˙ÂÈ ˙ÂË Ìȉ·‚ ÌÈ„ÒÙ‰ ˙ÂÓ„· ‰Ú˙Ù‰ ÈÙ· ˙„ÓÂÚ‰ ˙¯·Á) 38J. Francis, D. Philbrick & K. Schipper “Shareholder Litigation and ;(̉ÈÁ¯ ÔÈÈÚ·ÈÙÓ ÚÈ˙¯Ó Âȇ ÈÂÏÈ‚˘ Ì‚‰) Corporate Disclosure” 32 J. Account. Research (1994) 137

.(‰ÈÚ·‰ È„ÓÓ ˙‡ ÌˆÓˆÏ ÈÂ˘Ú ˙‡Ê Ïη ‡Â‰ ˙ÂÈÂÈÈ„˙‰ ÌÂȘ255.Francis et al., ibid ‡¯

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(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

˙ȂˆÈÈ ‰Ú·Â˙ ˙¯‚ÒÓ· ˘¯„‰ È˘Ù‰ „ÂÒȉ (‚)

‰È¯Â‡È˙·˘ Ì‚‰ ÈΠү‚ ,ȘȯӇ‰ ÔÈ„‰ Ú˜¯ ÏÚ ‰ÏÚ‰˘ ,‰Â˘ ¯˙È ˙Ú˙¯‰ ÔÂÚÈËÏ˘ Ìȯ˜Ó· (scienter) ˙ÂÓ¯Ï Ú·˙‰ ˙ÂÂÎ ˙‡ ÔÂÁ·Ï ËÙ˘Ó‰ È˙· ÌȯÂÓ‡ÍÎÓ ‰‡ˆÂ˙Î .256˙ÂÏ˘¯ ˙Á·‰ ‰„ÈÓ ˙Ó‡ ÌÈÓ˘ÈÈÓ Ì‰ ÏÚÂÙ·˘ ȯ‰ ,˙ÈÓ¯˙Û‡ ‡ ˘ÓÓ ‰ÈÈÓ¯· ˙ÂÓ˘‡ Ôȇ˘ ˙¯·ÁÓ Ì‚ ÌÈȈÈÙ Ï·˜Ï ÌÈÚ·Â˙ ÌÈÁÈψÓÈÎ ÌÈ„ÓÂÏÓ ‰ÓÎ ÂÚË ¯˙È ˙Ú˙¯‰ Ï˘ ÂÊ ‰ÈÚ·Ï ‰·Â‚˙· .257(recklessness) ˙ÂÊÈÊÙ·

.˙ȂˆÈȉ ‰Ú·Â˙‰ ÔÂ‚Ó ˙‡ Ì‚ ‰ÓÚ ,˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ˙‡ ÏË·Ï ˘ÈÌÈ˙ÚÏ ÌÈÓ˘ÈÈÓ ˙ȯ·‰ ˙ˆ¯‡· ËÙ˘Ó‰ È˙· ÈÎ ‰Úˉ ÏÚ ÌȘÏÂÁ ‡ Ôȇ˘ Û‡ÈÎ ÌÈÚÂË Â‡ ,Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ· ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÔÈ‚· ˙ÂÚÈ·˙· ˙ÂÏ˘¯ Ï˘ ˯„ËÒ ˙ÂÚË·ÈËÙ˘Ó ÏÏÎÏ ‰‡Â¢‰· .‰ÂΉ ‰„ÈÓ‰ ˙Ó‡ ˙ÂÈ‰Ï ‰Ê ‰¯˜Ó· ‰ÈÂ˘Ú ˙ÂÏ˘¯˙‡ ÏÈ„‚Ó (‡) :„·Ï· ˙ÂÏ˘¯ ˙ÁΉ ÍȯˆÓ‰ ÏÏ΢ ȯ‰ ,‰ÂÂÎ ˙ÁΉ ˘¯Â„‰˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ÏÈ„‚Ó (·) ;ÈËÂÙÈ˘‰ ¯Â¯È·‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ÔÈ˘Ó ˙¢‚ÂÓ‰ ˙ÂÚÈ·˙‰ ¯ÙÒÓ˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ˙ÈÁÙÓ (‚) ;˙¯·Á ˙‡˘Â Ô‰·˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇÏΠ˯٠ÔÏ‰Ï .˜Â˘Ï Ú„ÈÓ ÈÈÂÏÈ‚ ‰‰˘Ó („) ;Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ìȇ˘Â Ô‰·˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰

.Âχ Ìȇ˘ÂÓ „Á‡˙˘È¯„˘ ¯Á‡Ó :ÈËÂÙÈ˘‰ ¯Â¯È·‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙˘‰Â ˙¢‚ÂÓ‰ ˙ÂÚÈ·˙‰ ¯ÙÒÓ ˙Ï„‚‰‰˘È¯„ È„È ÏÚ ·ˆÂÓ‰ Û¯Ï ‰‡Â¢‰· ‰ÚÈ·˙‰ ˙Áψ‰Ï ¯˙ÂÈ ‰Â·‚ Û¯ ‰·ÈˆÓ ‰ÂÂÎÏ˘ ¯Ë˘Ó· ˙¢‚ÂÓ‰ ˙ÂÚÈ·˙‰ ¯ÙÒÓ· ‰ÈÈÏÚÏ ˙ÂÙˆÏ ˘È ,„·Ï· ˙ÂÏ˘¯ ˙ÁΉÏ˙ÂÈÈ„˙‰‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ˙ÈÁÙÓ „·Ï· ˙ÂÏ˘¯ ˙ÁΉ ÍȯˆÓ‰ ÏÏÎ ,„ÂÚ ˙‡Ê .˙ÂÏ˘¯Ë¯„ËÒ ¯Ù‰˘ ,Ú·˜Ï ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙È· ˙‡Â ,ÁÈÎÂ‰Ï ÌÈÚ·Â˙ ·ÈÈÁÓ ‡Â‰˘ ¯Á‡Ó˙ÁΉ ˘¯Â„‰ ‰ÂÂÎ ˙ÁΉ ÍȯˆÓ‰ ÈËÙ˘Ó ÏÏÎÏ ‰‡Â¢‰· ,È·È˘Èȷ‡ ˙¯ȉÊ

.˙ÂÊÈÊ٠‡ ˙ÂÓ¯Ï ˘ÓÓ Ï˘ ˙ÂÂÎ˙ÂÏ˘¯ Ï˘ ¯Ë˘Ó :˙¯·Á ˙‡˘Â Ô‰·˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙Ï„‚‰ÏÚ ˙‡ˆÂ‰ ÔÈ· (trade-off) ‰ÙÂÏÁ˙ Û˜˘Ó Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ· ‡Â¢ ‚ˆÓ ÔÈ‚· ˙ÂÚÈ·˙·˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ‰Ú˜˘‰ ÔÈ·Ï ˙¯·Á ˙‡ȈÂÓ˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÓȇ˙ÁΉ ÍȯˆÓ‰ ÏÏÎ ,ÌȯÁÒ Ô‰Ï˘ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ˘ ˙¯·Á‰ Ï˘ ÔË·Ó ˙„Â˜Ó .Ú„ÈÓ‰˙ÁΉ ÍȯˆÓ‰ ÏÏÎÏ ‰‡Â¢‰· .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÓȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ÏÈ„‚Ó „·Ï· ˙ÂÏ˘¯¯˙ÂÈ ÌÈ·¯ ˙Â¯È‰Ê ÈÚˆÓ‡ ËÂ˜Ï ‰¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó ˙‡ ·ÈÈÁÓ ˙ÂÏ˘¯ Ï˘ ÏÏÎ ,‰ÂÂÎÏ˘ ˙ÂËÏÁ‰‰ ,ÔÎ ÏÚ ¯˙È .˜Â˘Ï ÌÈÏ‚Ó Ì‰˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ Ï˘ ˜ÂÈ„‰ ˙„ÈÓ ˙‡ ˙Ó‡Ï È„Î

256.˙ÈÙ¯ÂÓ‡ ‡È‰ È˘Ù‰ „ÂÒȉ ˙˘È¯„) Johnson et al., supra note 249, at pp. 782y783 ‡¯‰˘˜ ˙ÈÂÈÚ ‰ÈÁ·Ó Û‡ ,˙ÂÏ˘¯ ˙ÁÎÂ‰Ï ˙˘È¯„ ¯˘‡Ó ¯˙ÂÈ ‰¯ÈÓÁÓ ‰˘È¯„· ¯·Â„Ó˘ Ì‚‰˙ÎÙ‰ ‰¯„‚‰‰ ˙ÓÈ˘Ó Ê‡˘ ,‰˜È˘¯Ù· Ô΢ ÏÎ ‡Ï ,‰¯ÓÁ‰‰ ˙‡Ë·˙Ó ‰Ó· ˜ÂÈ„· ¯È„‚‰Ï

.(˙ȯ˘Ù‡ È˙Ï·257J.A. Grundfest “Why Disimply?” 108 Harv. L. Rev. (1995) 727, 742y743 ,Ï˘ÓÏ ,‡¯

‰¯˘Ù· ˙ÂÓÈÈ˙ÒÓ Â˘‚‰˘ ˙ÂÚÈ·˙‰ ÔÓ 60% ÔÈ·Ï 22% ÔÈ· ÂÈÙÏ˘ ȯÈÙÓ‡ Ú„ÈÓ ˜ÙÒÓ).(ÌÈÎÂÓ ÌÈÓÂÎÒ·

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Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

ÔÂÂÈÎÓ ,ȘÒÚ ˙Ú„ ÏÂ˜È˘ ˙·ÈÈÁÓ˘ ˙ÂËÏÁ‰ Ô‰ ÂÎÂ˙ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ „ÚÂÓ ¯·„· ÌÈωӉÒÁÈ· ˙˜ÒÓ ˙˜Ò‰Â „·ÈÚ ·ÈÈÁÓ ‰¯·Á‰ ÈÙ‚‡ ÏÎÓ ÌÈωӉ χ ̯Âʉ Ú„ÈÓ‰˘˙‡ Ô·ÂÁ· ˙‡˘Â ,·Ï ÌÂ˙· ÂÏ·˜˙ ̇ Û‡ ,Âχ ˙ÂËÏÁ‰ ,Ô·ÈË ÌˆÚÓ .Â˙‰ÓÏ,ÍÎÈÙÏ .˙ÂÈÏ˘¯ Âȉ Ô‰˘ ‰˜ÒÓÏ ÚÈ‚‰Ï ÏÂÏÚ „·ÚÈ„· Ô˙‡ ÔÁ·È˘ ÈÓ˘ ÔÂÎÈÒ‰.˜Â˘Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙‡ ¯¯Á˘È ̯˷ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÓȇ· ¯˙ÂÈ ÌÈ·¯ ÌÈ·‡˘Ó ÂÚȘ˘È ÌÈωÓÌÈ·¯ÂÚÓ ˙ÂÈ‰Ï Ô‰ÈωÓÓ ÚÂÓÏ È„Î ÌÈ·‡˘Ó ÚȘ˘‰Ï ˙ÂÎȯˆ ÔÓˆÚ ˙¯·Á‰ ,ÛÒ·‰¯·Á‰ ÏÚ ˙ÂȯÁ‡ ˙ÏË‰Ó ‰‡ˆÂ˙Î ÂÏ„‚È Âχ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ .‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÈÈÚ· Ï˘· ˙ÈÓ¯˙·

.˙ÂÏ˘¯ Ï˘·Ï˘ ¯Ë˘Ó :Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ìȇ˘Â Ô‰·˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙˙ÁÙ‰‰Ú˜˘‰‰ ˙ÙÒÂ˙ ,Ìȯ·„‰ Ú·ËÓ .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ· ÔÂÎÒÈÁÏ ‡È·È ˙ÂÏ˘¯Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ ȈӇÓÓ ˙ˆ˜Ó ÍÂÒÁ˙ ˙¯·Á‰ È„È ÏÚ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÓȇ·ÂÊ ‰ÏË·˙ Á¯Î‰· ‡Ï ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰‰ È˙˘ ÈÎ ÔÈÈˆÏ ·Â˘Á ,̯· .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÂÚȘ˘È˘ÔÓ ¯˙ÂÈ ‰ÎÂÓ ˙ÂÈ‰Ï ‰¯ÂÓ‡ ˙¯·Á ‰‡˘È˙ ‰·˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÓȇ ˙ÂÏÚ ˙ÙÒÂ˙ .ÂÊ ˙‡Ì˙Âȉ· Z ÌÈÏ‰Ó ,ÏÈÚÏ ¯·ÒÂÓÎ ,˙È˘‡¯ .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˙ÈÁ·Ó ÏÈ·˜Ó‰ ÔÂÎÒÈÁ‰.Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ¯˘‡Ó ¯˙ÂÈ ˙ÈÂÎÒÁ ‰¯Âˆ· Ú„ÈÓ ˙Ó‡Ï ÌÈÏ‚ÂÒÓ Z ÌÈÙ È˘‡‰Ú˜˘‰‰ ˙ÙÒÂ˙ ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ· ÌÈÚȘ˘Ó Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï΢ ¯Á‡Ó ,˙È˘

.Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ „ˆÓ ‰Ú˜˘‰ ÏÙÎ ˙ÚÂÓ ‰¯·Á‰ Ï˘¯Â¯Á˘· ÌÈÂÒÓ ·ÂÎÈÚÏ Ì¯‚Ï ÈÂÙˆ ˙ÂÏ˘¯ Ï˘ ¯Ë˘Ó :˜Â˘Ï Ú„ÈÓ ÈÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙Èȉ˘‰¯˙ÂÈ ·¯ ÔÓÊ ÚȘ˘‰Ï ¢¯„ÈÈ ‰¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó˘ ‰„·ÂÚ· „ÂÒÈ ‰Ê ·ÂÎÈÚ .˜Â˘Ï Ú„ÈÓÊʘ˙È ˙¯·Á‰ „ˆÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚· ·ÂÎÈÚ‰ ,˙‡Ê ÌÚ .¯Â·ÈˆÏ ‰¯¯Á˘È ̯˷ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÓȇ·,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ „ˆÓ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓÏ Ú„ÈÓ‰ Ï˘ ¯˙ÂÈ ¯È‰Ó ÌÂÏÈ‚ ÁÎÂÏ Ì˙Ò‰ ÔÓ˙ÂÓȇ ÍÈω˙ ¯˙ÂÈ ˜ÈÂ„Ó ‰È‰È Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ È„ÈÏ ˙¯·Á‰ ÔÓ ÚÈ‚È˘ Ú„ÈÓ‰˘ ¯Á‡Ó

.¯ˆ˜˙È Â˙ÂÈÓ‡˙·ÂÁ ˙ÏË‰Ó ˙Âڷ‰ ˙ÂÏÚÂ˙‰˘ ‰Ó„ ?Âχ ˙ÂÚÙ˘‰ Ï˘ ˙ÏÏÂΉ ‰‡ˆÂ˙‰ ‰Ó.˙ÂÏ˘¯ Ï˘ ¯Ë˘Ó· ˙ÂίΉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ‰ „‚Î ˙ÂϘ˘ ˙¯·Á ÏÚ ˙ÂÙÒ ڄÈÓ ˙ÂÓȇڄÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÈÓ‡ ˙ÂÓȇ· Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ Ï˘ ‰Ú˜˘‰‰ ÏÙÎ ˙‡ ÛÈÏÁÓ ˙ÂÏ˘¯ Ï˘ ÏÏΉ¯·Á‰ ÔÈ· ‰‡Â¢‰·˘ ‰Á‰· .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ˙ÂÓȇ· ‰¯·Á‰ „ˆÓ ‰ÏÂÊ ‰„ÈÁÈ ‰Ú˜˘‰·˙ÂÓȇ ˙ÂÏÚ ÈÎ ˙ÂÏÈÚȉ ˙˘¯Â„ ,¯˙ÂÈ ÏÂʉ ÚÂÓ‰ ‡È‰ ‰¯·Á‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ÔÈ·ÏÏÚ ÌÈ˘‰ ˙¯ȉʉ ÈÚˆÓ‡ ÔÈ· ÔÊ‡Ó ˙ÂÏ˘¯ Ï˘ ÏÏÎ .‰¯·Á‰ ÏÚ ÏËÂ˙ Ú„ÈÓ‰Ï˘ ¯Ë˘Ó ,Ô· .Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ È„È ÏÚ ÌÈ˘‰ ˙¯ȉʉ ÈÚˆÓ‡ ÔÈ·Ï ˙¯·Á‰ È„ÈÈ‚ˆÓ ÌÈÓÈȘ˘ ‰„·ÂÚ‰ ˙‡ Û˜˘Ó ,˙ËÏÁÂÓ ˙ÂȯÁ‡ Ï˘ ¯Ë˘ÓÓ ÏÈ„·‰Ï ,˙ÂÏ˘¯‰Á‰ .¯˙‡Ï Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÏ ¯˙ÂÈ Ï˜˘ ‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ ÚÂÓÏ ‰¯·ÁÏ ¯˙ÂÈ Ï˜˘ ‡ÂÂ˘Ï˘ ¯Ë˘Ó Ï˘ ‰Ù„Ú‰Ï ÏÈ·Â˙ ‡Â¢‰ È‚ˆÓ ˙‡ ÚÂÓÏ ‰¯·ÁÏ ¯˙ÂÈ ÏÂÊ „ÈÓ˙ ‰ÈÙÏ˘

.˙ËÏÁÂÓ ˙ÂȯÁ‡ÔÈ„Ï ÒÁÈ· ‰Ï‡˘‰ ˙χ˘ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÏÚ ‰ÙÈ„Ú ˙ÂÏ˘¯ ‰ÈÙÏ˘ ‰˜ÒÓ‰ ¯Â‡Ï

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(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

‰˘È¯„· ˙ÂȯÁ‡Ï ÒÈÒ·Î ˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˘È¯„ ÛÏÁÂ˙˘ ‡Ï˘ ÚÂ„Ó ,˙ȯ·‰ ˙ˆ¯‡·ÈÎ ,„ÓÏÓ ÔÂÈÒȉ .‰Ê΢ ÈÂÈ˘· ÌÈÎÓÂ˙ ‡ Ôȇ ‰˘ÚÓÏ ?„·Ï· ˙ÂÏ˘¯ ˙ÁΉÏÌÈÏÈËÓ) ˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˘È¯„ Ï˘ ¯˙È ˙ÙÈ· ÌÈ˙ÚÏ ÌÈÚˆ·Ó ˙ȯ·‰ ˙ˆ¯‡· ËÙ˘Ó‰ È˙·˙ÙÈÎ‡Ï ˙ÈÊίӉ ‰·ÈÒ‰ .(‰ÂÂÎ ˙ÁΉ ˙˘¯„ ·˘ ̘ӷ ˙ÂÏ˘¯ ÔÈ‚· ˙ÂȯÁ‡10by5 ÏÏΠSecurities Exchange Act of 1934-Ï 10(b) ÛÈÚÒ˘ Íη ‰ˆÂÚ ¯˙ÈÌÈÙ· ˙ÂȯÁ‡Ï ÒÈÒ· ÌȉӉ ,Securities and Exchange Commission-‰ Ï˘˙ÂÏÈÚÈÓ" Ï·ÂÒ ˙ȯ·‰ ˙ˆ¯‡· ˙ȂˆÈȉ ‰ÚÈ·˙‰ ÔÂ‚Ó .˙ÂȂˆÈÈ ˙ÂÚÈ·˙ ˙ÂÚˆÓ‡·ÒÈÒ·Î ‰ÚÈ·˙‰ ·˙η ÔÚˉ ˙ÈÁ·Ï ÌÈÏ·‚ÂÓ ËÙ˘Ó‰ È˙·˘ ‰„·ÂÚ‰ Ï˘· :"¯˙È˙ÂÚÈ·˙ ˙¢‚ÂÓ ,259‰ÙÂ‚Ï ‰ÚÈ·˙‰ ÈÈÂÎÈÒ ˙‡ ÔÂÁ·Ï Ìȇ˘¯ ̉ Ôȇ 258‰¯Â˘È‡Ï˙ÂÚÈ·˙ ÈÂ·È¯Ï ÌÈӯ‚˘ ÌÈÙÒ ˙¯ÒÁ ˙ȂˆÈȉ ‰ÚÈ·˙‰ Ô‚ÓÏ ,ÛÒ· .˙·¯‰¯˘Ù· ÍÈω‰ ˙‡ ÌÈÈÒÏ ÌÈÈÈÂÚÓ˘) ‰ˆÂ·˜‰ Ï˘ ÔÈ„‰ ÈίÂÚ „ˆÓ ‚Ȉ ˙ÂÈÚ· Ï˘·˙ÂȯÁ‡ Ú·˜È˙˘ ÈÏ·Ó ¯˘Ù˙‰Ï ÌÈÈÈÂÚÓ˘ ˙ÂÚ·˙‰ ˙¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó „ˆÓ (˙Ó„˜ÂÓ˙ÂÚÈ·˙‰ Ï˘ "¯˙ȉ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ" Ï˘ ıÁω ÔÓ ‰‡ˆÂ˙Î .(ÁÂËÈ·· ‰ÒÂÎÓ ‰È‡˘) ˙ÈÓ¯˙·.˙ÂÏ˘¯ Ï˘ Ìȯ˜Ó· Ì‚ ˙ÂȯÁ‡ ÌÈ˙ÚÏ ˙ÏËÂÓ ‰ÈËÚ·˘ ¯˙È ˙ÙÈ· ˙Ó¯‚ ,˙ÂȂˆÈȉ˙ÂÏ˘¯Ï ˙ÈÓ¯˙Ó ˙ÂȯÁ‡‰ ÈÂÈ˘ ¯È·‚È ,˙ȂˆÈȉ ‰ÚÈ·˙‰ ÔÂ‚Ó Ï˘ ÂÈ˙¯ÒÁ ¯Â‡ÏıÂÓȇ ÏÂÏÚ ÍÎÓ ‰‡ˆÂ˙Î .˜¯Ò‰ ˙ÂÚÈ·˙ ˙‡ Ì‚ ÔÎÂ˙·Â ˙ÂȂˆÈȉ ˙ÂÚÈ·˙‰ ˙˘‚‰ ˙‡‡È·‰Ï ,ÂÈ˙ÂÚ¯‚Ó ÏÚ ˙ȂˆÈȉ ‰ÚÈ·˙‰ ÔÂ‚Ó ¯ÂÓÈ˘ Û¯Ȉ· ,˙ÂÏ˘¯ Ï˘ ˯„ËÒ

.260˙ËÏÁÂÓ ˙ÂȯÁ‡ Ï˘ ‰„ÈÓ ˙Ó‡ ÔÂÂÈÎÏ ÈËÙ˘Ó‰ ¯Ë˘Ó‰ ˙˘ÈÏ‚Ï,(˙ÈÓ¯˙ Ï˘) È„Ó ‰¯ÈÓÁÓ ‰„ÈÓ ˙Ó‡ ıÂÓȇ ͯ„ ÏÚ ‚˘ÂÓ‰ ÈËÙ˘Ó‰ ÔÂÊȇ‰261˙ȂˆÈȉ ‰ÚÈ·˙‰ ÔÂ‚Ó ˙ÏÚÙ‰· ˙ÂίΉ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ÁÎÂÏ˘ Íη ‰¯Î‰ ÍÂ˙Z (˙ÂÏ˘¯ Ï˘) ‰Èˆ¯‰ ‰Ó¯‰ ÔÂÂÈÎÏ ÌÈ˙ÈÚÏ ˘ÂÏ‚˙ ÏÚÂÙ· Ì˘ÂÈ˙˘ ‰„ÈÓ‰ ˙Ó‡‰Ú˙¯‰‰ ˙‡Â ˙È˯٠‰ÙÈÎ‡Ï ˙˜˜Êȉ‰ ˙‡ ¯Ó˘Ó ‰Ê ÔÂÊȇ ,˙È˘‡¯ .262ÏÈÚÈ ‡Â‰ÈÎ ‰‡¯‰ ȯÈÙÓ‡ ¯˜ÁÓ .˙¯·Á‰ ÏÚ ‰„ÈÓ‰ ÏÚ ¯˙È „È·Î‰Ï ÈÏ·Ó ,‰˙¯ÊÚ· ˙‚˘ÂÓ‰‰ÓÂȘ ‡Â‰ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ· ¯ÁÒÓ Ï˘ ‰¯„Ò‰· ˙˜ÒÂÚ‰ ˙ίÚÓ· ¯˙ÂÈ· ·Â˘Á‰ ·Èί‰

258.ÛÒ‰ ÏÚ ‰ÚÈ·˙ ˜ÂÏÈÒÏ ‰ÚË Ï˘ ‰¯˜Ó· ˙ÓÈȘ˙Ó‰ ‰ÈÁ·Ï ‰Ó„·259‰˘˜·‰ ·Ï˘· .ÌÈÚ·˘ÂÓ ‡ÏÏ ˙¯˙ÂÓ ‰È‡˘ ˙„·ÂÚ ˙ÚÈ·˜ ˙·ÈÈÁÓ ‰ÚÈ·˙‰ ÈÈÂÎÈÒ Ï˘ ‰ÈÁ·

.ÍÈω· ÌÈÚ·˘ÂÓ ÔÈÈ„Ú Ôȇ ‰ÚÈ·˙‰ ¯Â˘È‡Ï260˙Â¯È‰Ê ÈÚˆÓ‡· ÚȘ˘‰Ï ˙¯·Á ÏÚ ‰ÙÎÈ ˙ËÏÁÂÓ ˙ÂȯÁ‡ Ï˘ ¯Ë˘Ó ,˙È˯‡È˙ ‰ÈÁ·Ó

.̉˘ÏÎ ˙Â¯È‰Ê ÈÚˆÓ‡ ËÂ˜Ï Í¯Âˆ‰ ÔÓ Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˙‡ ¯¯Á˘È ,‡Â¢‰ È‚ˆÓ ÏÎ ˙‡ ÂÚÓÈ˘Ôȇ ,̯Â˙ȇ· ˙ÂÙÈ„Ú Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒÏ ˙ÏÚÂ˙ ÏÂÓ ˙ÂÏÚ ÏÂϘ˘·˘ ‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ ˘È˘ ¯Á‡Ó ,Ìχ˙ËÏÁÂÓ ˙ÂȯÁ‡ Ï˘ ¯Ë˘Ó· ‡Â¢‰ ˙ÂÚÈ·˙ ¯ÙÒÓ ,ÔÎ ÏÚ ¯˙È .‰Ê΢ ȈȘ ¯Ë˘ÓÏ ‰˜„ˆ‰Ô‰Â ˙¯·ÁÏ Ô‰ ˙ÂÈ˙ÂÚÓ˘Ó ˙‡ˆÂ‰Ï ̯‚˙ Âχ ˙ÂÚÈ·˙ ÌÚ ˙„„ÂÓ˙‰‰Â ,„‡Ó ‰Â·‚ ‰È‰È

.ËÙ˘Ó‰ È˙·Ï261J.C. Coffee Jr. “Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implication of Economic ‡¯

Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions” 86.Colum. L. Rev. (1986) 669

262.R.A. Bierschbach and A. Stein “Overenforcement” 93 Geo. L. J. (2005) 1743 ‡¯

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Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ (Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜

‰ÂÂÎ ÔÈ· ‰Á·‰‰ ˙‡ ÌÚÓÚÓ‰ ÈËÙ˘Ó ¯Ë˘Ó˘ Ì‚‰ ,˙È˘ .263˙È˯٠‰ÙÈ· Ï˘‰Ï˘·˘ ˙‚‰˙‰‰ ÔÈ·Ï ˙ÏËÂÓ‰ ˙ÂȯÁ‡‰ ÔÈ· ÌÏ˘ÂÓ Ì‡˙Ó ¯ˆÂÈ Âȇ ˙ÂÏ˘¯ ÔȷωÚ˙¯‰ ˙¯ÈˆÈ Í¯ÂˆÏ ‰˘Â¯„‰ ˙ÙÒ‰ ‰Èˆ˜Ò‰ ˙‡ ˜ÙÒÓ ˜Â˘‰ ,˙ÂȯÁ‡‰ ‰Ïˉ˙¯‚ÒÓ· ˙¯·Á ˙·ÈÂÁÓ Â·˘ ÌÂÏ˘˙‰ „·ÏÓ .Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ· ˙ÈÓ¯˙ Úˆȷ ÈÙÓ ˙ÓÏÂ‰Ï˘ ¯˙ÂÈ ‰·Â˘Á‰ ‰Èˆ˜Ò‰ ÔÓ Ì‚ ˙ÈÓ¯˙· ˙ÂÓ˘‡‰ ˙¯·Á ˙ÂÏ·ÂÒ ,‰¯˘Ù ȯ„Ò‰˙ÂÈËÙ˘Ó ˙ÂÚÈ·˙· ‰ÓÂÏ‚‰ ˙ÏÚÂ˙‰ ˙‡ "ËÙ¢" ˜Â˘‰ .264Ô‰È˙ÂÈÓ È¯ÈÁÓ· ‰„ȯÈ,Âχ ˙¯·Á Ï˘ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ˙Ó‡˙‰ È„È ÏÚ ,˙¯·Á „‚Î ˙¢‚ÂÓ‰ ˙ÂÈ˯Ù

.265˙ÈÓ¯˙ Úˆȷ ÈÙÓ ¯˙ÂÈ ˙˜ÈÂ„Ó ‰Ú˙¯‰ ˜ÙÒÓ‰ ÔÙ‡·˙ÒÒÂ·Ó ,˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÏÚ ˙ÒÒ·Ӊ ˙ÂȯÁ‡ ÏÈËÓ‰ ,˙ȯ·‰ ˙ˆ¯‡· ÔÈ„Ï ‰‡Â¢‰·Ú·˙‰ χ ‰ÁΉ‰ ÏË ÍÂÙȉ ÌÚ ˙ÂÏ˘¯ ÏÚ ‡Â¢ È‚ˆÓ ÔÈ‚· Èχ¯˘È‰ ÔÈ„· ˙ÂȯÁ‡‰¯·Ò‰˘ ÈÙÎ ?˙ÂȯÁ‡‰ ˙‡ Èχ¯˘È‰ ˜˜ÂÁÓ‰ ¯ÈÓÁ‰ ÚÂ„Ó .266Ï˘¯˙‰ ‡Ï˘ ÁÈΉÏ.‰ÙÈ·‰ ˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ÔÈ·Ï È˙‰Ӊ ÔÈ„‰ ÔÈ·˘ ÒÁÈ· ˘ÙÁÏ ˘È ÍÎÏ ‰·Â˘˙‰ ˙‡ ,ÏÈÚÏ.Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„· ˙ÂȂˆÈȉ ˙ÂÚÈ·˙‰ ÌÂÁ˙· ‰ÙÈ· ˙˙ ˙ÚÙÂ˙· ˙ÈÈÙ‡˙Ó Ï‡¯˘È,˙ȂˆÈȉ ‰ÚÈ·˙‰ Ô‚ÓÏ ËÙ˘Ó‰ È˙· Ï˘ ˙„‰Â‡ È˙Ï·‰ ‰˘È‚· ÂÊ ‰ÚÙÂ˙ Ï˘ ‰„ÂÒÈ„ÁÓ Ì‰Ï˘ È„Ó ¯ÈÓÁÓ Ì¢ÈÈ ˜ÂÁ‰ ȇ˙ Ï˘ È„Ó ‰¯ÈÓÁÓ ˙¢¯Ù· ˙‡Ë·˙Ó‰Í„È‡Ó ,ÌÈÚ·Â˙‰ Ï˘ ‚ˆÈȉ „ˆÓ ÈÚˆ˜Ó ˜Â˘ Ï˘ ˙˜ÙÒÓ ˙ÂÁ˙Ù˙‰ ȇÓ ,‡ÒÈ‚˙¯ÈÈ ˜ÂÁ ÏÚ ˙Â¯È·Ú ÔÈ‚· ˙¢‚ÂÓ‰ ˙ÂȂˆÈÈ ˙ÂÚ·Â˙ ËÂÚÈÓ ‡È‰ ‰‡ˆÂ˙‰ .‡ÒȂȂˆÈȉ ‰ÙÈ·‰ Ô‚Ӣ Íη ·˘Á˙‰· .267˙¢‚ÂÓ‰ ‰Ï‡ Ï˘ Ô¯Â˘È‡· ËÂÚÈÓ ,ͯÚÌÂ˘Ó ˙ÂȯÁ‡Ï ˯„ËÒÎ ˙ÂÏ˘¯‰ ˙‡ ˜˜ÂÁÓ‰ ıÓȇ ,"˙ÂÏÈÚÈ ¯ÒÂÁ"Ó Ï·ÂÒ Ï‡¯˘È·˜˜ÂÁÓ‰ ,ÔÎ ÏÚ ¯˙È .Ô˘ ‡Â‰ ˙ËÏÁÂÓ ˙ÂȯÁ‡ Ï˘ ˯„ËÒ ¯·ÚÏ ‰˘ÈÏ‚Ï ˘˘Á‰˘

263R. La-Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silane & A. Shleifer “What Works in Securities Laws?” ‡¯(July 2003) (working paper series), available at: URL: http://papers.ssrn com/sol3/.

.papers.cfm?abstract_id=425880264D.O. Cloninger & E.R. Waller “Corporate Fraud, Systematic Risk, and Shareholder

Ï˘ ‰ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·˜Ú· ˙ÂÈÓ‰ È¯Ú˘· ÈÂÈ˘‰) Enrichment” 29 J. Socio-Econ. (2000) 189ÏÚ ÏÚÂÙ· ÌÈÏËÂÓ‰ ÌÈ˘Âډ ˙‡ˆÂ‰‰ ,˙ÂÒ˜‰ ÏÚ ‰ÏÂÚ ÏÏΠͯ„· ˙ȘÂÁ È˙Ï· ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ

.(˙¯·Á‰265C. Loh & R.S. Rathinasamy “Do All Securities Class Actions Have the Same Merit?

A Stock Market Perspective” 6 Rev. Pacific Basin Fin. Markets & Policies (2003) 167ÈÎ ‡ˆÓ 1998y1996 ÌÈ˘‰ ÔÈ· 10by5 ÏÏÎ „ÂÒÈ ÏÚ Â˘‚‰˘ ˙ÂÚÈ·˙ 290 ˜„·˘ ¯˜ÁÓ)˙˘‚‰ ˙ÚÓ Í¯Ú· ˙¯ÎÈ ‰¯Âˆ· „¯È ˙ÂÚ·˙‰ ˙¯·Á‰ Ï˘ Ô‰È˙ÂÈÓ È¯Ú˘ ÏÏÂÎ ÌÂÎÈÒ·˘ Ì‚‰˙ÂÚ·Â˙ ˙˘‚‰Ï ‡ȷ‰˘ ˙·ÈÒ‰ ÔÂÂ‚Ó ÔÈ· Ô΢ ,ÌÈÓ„ Ìȯ˜Ó‰ ÏÎ ‡Ï ,‰Â˘‡¯‰ ‰ÚÈ·˙‰ÌÈ‚ˆÓ ÌÂÒ¯Ù ,˙ÈÓ¯˙ ,˙‡·˘Á È˙ÂÂÈÚ ÔÈÈÚ˘ Âχ Z ˙·ÈÒ Ï˘ ˙ˆ·˜ Ú·¯‡ ˜¯ ,˙ÂȂˆÈȯÂӇΠ˙ÂÈ˙ÂÚÓ˘Ó ˙„ȯÈÏ ˙Â‡È·Ó ÌÓ‡ Z ÈÏÈÏ˘ Ú„ÈÓ ÈÂÏÈ‚Ó ˙ÂÚÓȉ ,È„Ó ÌÈÈÓÈËÙ‡

.(˙ÂÈÓ‰ È¯Ú˘·266(1)(‡)31 ÌÈÙÈÚÒ ˙‡¯Â‰ χ ‰ÙÓ‰ ,1968yÁ"΢˙ ,Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ˜ÂÁÏ (‡)‚38 ÛÈÚÒ Â‡¯

.Ï"‰ ˜ÂÁÏ (1)33-Â267.(˙ÂÚÈ·˙ Ï˘ ‰˜ÈËÒÈËËÒ ‚ȈÓ) (2004) χ¯˘È· ˙ȂˆÈȉ ‰Ú·Â˙‰ ¯„Ș 'Ó ,‡¯

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(Â"Ò˘˙)  ËÙ˘Ó‰ ˙ȯ˜ ȘҷÂÓÁ¯Ù ÔÂÚ„‚ Ԣ‚ ¯‰ÂÊ

ÏÒÂÁÈ ‰˜ÊÁ‰ È„ÚÏ· ,Ô΢ ,268Èχ¯˘È‰ ˜Â˘· ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ˙‡ Ì‚ ıÓȇ.χ¯˘È· ˙ȂˆÈȉ ‰ÚÈ·˙‰ ÔÂ‚Ó ÏÈÏÎ

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.˙ÂÏÈʉ ˙ÂÏÈÚȉ ¯ÂÙÈ˘Ï ‰ÏÈ·ÂÓ ˜Â˘‰

ÌÂÎÈÒ

Â˙ÂÁ˙Ù˙‰ ˙‡ „„ÂÚÏ :Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ Ï˘ ÈÊίӉ ̄ȘÙ˙ Â‰Ó Â¯·Ò‰ ‰Ê ¯Ó‡Ó·.ÌÈÏÈÊ ÌÈÏÈÚÈ Ô‰ È˜Â˘ ‚È˘‰Ï ‰Ùȇ˘ ÍÂ˙Ó ˙‡Ê ,Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ Ï˘:˙ÂÓÈ˘Ó È˙˘ Ï˘ ÔÚÂˆÈ·Ï ‚‡„Ï ˘È ,ÌÈÏÈÊ ÌÈÏÈÚÈ ÂÈ‰È ÌȘ¢‰˘ ˙Ó ÏÚ˙ÂÏÈÊ ˙˜ÙÒ‡ ,‰È˘‰Â ,˜Â˘· ÌȯÁÒ‰ ͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ ÍÂ˙Ï Ú„ÈÓ ÌÂÏÈ‚ ,˙Á‡‰,Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ,ÌÈÙ È˘‡ Z ˜Â˘· ˙ÂÏÚÂÙ‰ ˙¢‰ ÌȘÁ˘‰ ˙ˆ·˜ ÔÈ·Ó .¯ÁÒÓ·È„È· Âχ ˙ÂÓÈ˘Ó „È˜Ù‰Ï Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ¯Á· Z ˘Ú¯ ȯÁÂÒ ˙ÂÏÈÊ È¯ÁÂÒ˙‡ „„ÂÚÏ È„Î .ÌÈÙ Ú„ÈÓ· ¯ÁÒÓ ÏÚ ¯ÂÒȇ ˙Ïˉ Ï˘ ͯ„ ÏÚ ˙‡Ê ,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ˙ÂίΉ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ‰ ˙‡ Ì‚ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ÌÈ˙ÈÁÙÓ ,Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ ˜Â˘ Ï˘ Â˙ÂÁ˙Ù˙‰˙ÂÏ·‚Ó ˙ÂȯÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ˙·ÂÁ ˙Ïˉ Ï˘ ͯ„ ÏÚ ˙‡Ê ,¯ÁÒÓ·Â Ú„ÈÓ ÌÂÏÈ‚·,Ú„ÈÓ‰ ȯÁÂÒ ˜Â˘ Ï˘ ÂÎÂÂÈ˙·Â ,ÍÎÓ ‰‡ˆÂ˙Î .Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ· ‰ÈˆÏÂÙÈÓ ˙ÈÓ¯˙ ÏÚͯډ ˙¯ÈÈ È¯ÈÁÓ· ÌÈȘ‰ Ú„ÈÓ‰ Ï˘ ÂÓÂÏÈ‚ ÍÈω˙ ˙‡ Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„ ÌÈÓ„˜Ó‰¯ËÓ‰ ˙‡ ÌÈ„„ÂÚÓ Ì‚ ͢Ӊ·Â ,˜Â˘· ¯ÁÒÓ‰ ˙ÂÏÈÊ ˙‡ Ìȯȷ‚Ó ,˜Â˘· ÌȯÁÒ‰

.ÌÈÏÈÊ ÌÈÏÈÚÈ Ô‰ È˜Â˘ ˙‚˘‰ Ï˘ ˙ÈÙÂÒ‰Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ÈÈ„· ˙·¯ ˙Âχ˘ ÌÚ „„ÂÓ˙‰Ï ¯˘Ù‡Ó ¯Ó‡Ó· ‚ˆ‰˘ Ï„ÂÓ‰˙ÂίΉ ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ˙‡ ÔÈ˘‰Ï ˙Ó ÏÚ ,˙È˘‡¯ .˙ÂÈÈ„Ó Ï˘ ‰Ú¯Î‰ ˙ÂÎȯˆÓ‰ÒÁÈ· ˜¯ ‡Ï ͯ Ú„ÈÓÏ ÒÁÈ· Ì‚ ÏÂÁÏ ÈÂÏÈ‚‰ ˙·ÂÁ ÏÚ ,‰¯·Á‰ ÈÏ‰Ó ˙ÂÏÈÚÙ·˙ÂÏÈÚÈ· Á˜ÙÈ Â„ÈˆÓ˘ ,Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘ „„ÂÚÏ ˘È Íη .ÁÈ˘˜ Ú„ÈÓÏ.(˙¯ȉʉ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ ԉ ÌÈÂÓ‡‰ ˙·ÂÁ Ï˘ Ô‰ ÔÓÂȘ ˙‡ ‡„ÂÂÈ) ‚Ȉ‰ ˙ÂÈÂÏÚ ÏÏÎ ÏÚ˜ÙÒÏ ÏÂÎÈ Âȇ Ú„ÈÓ È¯ÁÂÒ Ï˘ È˙¯Á˙ ˜Â˘˘ ¯Á‡Ó ˜„ˆÂÓ È¯ÂË„Ó ÈÂÏÈ‚ ,˙È˘,˙È˘ÈÏ˘ .‡ÏÓ ÔÙ‡· Ú„ÈÓ ˙ÂÏ‚Ï ¯ÁÒÓÏ ˙ÂÓ¢¯‰ ˙¯·Á‰ ÏÎÏ ÌȘÈÙÒÓ ÌȈȯÓ˙¯Â·Ú Ì‚ ‡Ï‡ ,ÏÈÚÈ ˜Â˘ ȯ„‚· ˜¯ ‡Ï ,˜„ˆÂÓ ˜Â˘‰-ÏÚ-˙ÈÓ¯˙‰ ˙˜ÊÁ ıÂÓȇ˜Â˘ Ï˘ Â˙ÂÁ˙Ù˙‰Ï ̯Â˙ ·Á¯ÂÓ ÈËÒÈχ ÈÂÒÈ΢ ¯Á‡Ó ˙‡Ê ,ÏÈÚÈ Âȇ˘ ˜Â˘

.È·È˘ه

268ÂÏÁ‰˘ ÈÙÎ ,Ï"‰ ˜ÂÁÏ (1)33 ÛÈÚÒ 1968yÁ"΢˙ ,Í¯Ú ˙¯ÈÈ ˜ÂÁÏ (1)(‡)31 ÛÈÚÒ Â‡¯.È˘Ó‰ ˜Â˘· „È‚‡˙ Ï˘ ÌÈÁÂÂÈ„ ÏÚ ÏÈÚÏ˘ ˜ÂÁÏ (1)(‡)‚38 ÛÈÚÒ ÁÂÎÓ

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