A. N. Leontiev - Vontade (em inglês)

8/13/2019 A. N. Leontiev - Vontade (em ingls)

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76 JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN PSYCHOLOGY

Journal of Russian and East European Psychology,vol. 43, no. 4,JulyAugust 2005, pp. 7692. 2005 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved.ISSN 10610405/2005 $9.50 + 0.00.

76

A.N. LEONTIEV

Will

English translation 2005 M.E. Sharpe, Inc., from the Russian text, Volia. Firstpublished in Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, Seriia 14: Psikhologiia, 1993, no. 2,pp. 314. Published with the permission of Dmitry A. Leontiev.

Translated by Nora Favorov.

Published based on a tape recording, the text represents a 1978 home lec-

ture personally prepared for and read to the grandson of A.N. Leontiev

[Dmitry], at his request when he was a first-year student at the School ofPsychology of Moscow State University. The lecture was recorded on a tape

recorder that had recently been given to A.N. Leontiev on the occasion of his

seventieth birthday. In preparing the transcript for publication only stylistic

corrections were made; repetition and grammatical and syntactical dispari-

ties were eliminated, along with clarifying questions and their answers when

they added nothing to the main substance of the lecture.

Chronologically, the lecture Will is one of the last, if not the last, original

scholarly texts of A.N. Leontiev and it merits publication. It is significant inthat A.N. Leontiev did not specifically devote a single published work, manu-

script, or public lecture to the problem of will. Except for lecture notes and the

stenographic records of his courses in general psychology, the publication of

which would be possible only after extensive work, this lecture is the only

source of clarification of his views on this issue. The content of this lecture

probably does not require a special commentary, as it was designed for an

audience with minimal understanding of psychology, and is distinguished by

its exceptionally accessible explanations.

It is difficult to talk about the psychology of will, especially if it has to bediscussed briefly, although it is only as difficult as talking briefly about many


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other psychological processes. First, it will be necessary to say a few wordsabout the history of the very concept of will.

Will has long been treated as one of the mental faculties, so it was impos-sible to formulate any theory or to undertake any scientific analysis of it. Thesame was said at one point regarding thermogen. It was impossible to under-take an analysis of thermogenit represents a certain fundamental facultythat finds its own expression, the essence of which, however, is unknowablebecause it actually generates itself. The faculty of will generates the expres-sion of will. When we talk about a thermogen, there are no other faculties thatwe can use in our explanation. It is enough to indicate that heat is generated bythermogen. Reason, will, and sensationhere are three faculties. Up to thepresent time, the theory of mental faculties, dressed in a new guise, continues

to be applied specifically to will. Suffice it to say that even [William] Jamesin whose time extensive factual material had already been compiled, experi-ments were being conducted, measurements were being taken, and there wasquite a bit known about psychological research methodscontinued to holdto the position that certain special acts exist. He called them acts of fiatLetit be!using the famous Biblical fiat lux, Let there be light, and there was

light. . . .* Even when James wrote about ideomotor** movements or ac-tions, that is, when he examined the very important tenet that the emergence,the appearance of an idea of movement will of necessity be transformed intomovement, he did not leave behind the idea of fiat, because some prerequi-site was necessary for this transformation. And, he saw this prerequisite in thestrength that could not be further divided, in the renowned fiat, itself.

Nonetheless, an analysis of will was begun. There was discussion of somecharacteristics of volitional processes (I would prefer to say, of volitional acts),that distinguished these processes from other acts that are not volitional. Thisis a usual step in scientific analysis. The distinguishing features have to beidentified, or to put it another way, the specifics of what is being studied. Herebegan the great and long history of the search for these specifics. First, only

those actions or processes that serve a goal can justly be called volitional. Sofrom the start, volitional processes (I prefer to say volitional acts) are contrastedwith and distinguished from all those processes that do not have the attribute ofserving a goal. A goal is understood to be some conscious result to which anaction should lead. And processes were thus divided into two groups: involun-tary processes (including automatic actions, instinctive actions, impulsive

**James used fiat lux to describe the transition from decision to action.Eds.**Ideomotor is the sequential and immediate movement of notion inside the mind

of action, with little recognition between the conception of an idea and its execution-performance.Eds.


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actionsi.e., actions based on direct stimulation, affective actions, actionsinfluenced by affect, by passion), and on the other hand, actions that are delib-erate, voluntary, that is, actions serving a goal. It is completely obvious thatwhen we talk about will, even intuitivelyor as they sometimes say now, onan intuitive levelwe always include these processes among voluntary pro-cesses. True, there has been a certain confusion of terminology here, becausecertain other movements that follow a circular pattern also came to be calledvoluntary. For instance, the term voluntary movement began to be coupledwith descriptions of classical physiological experiments, of Pavlovs experi-ments with dogs, which were conducted in the following way: they raised adogs paw and then they reinforced it, they fed it. As a result, the dog started toraise its paw on its own. It was a type of voluntary action. . . . Of course, there

was no voluntary action here, everything was still at the reflex level.Identifying ideas about there being goal-oriented actions, that is, intend-

ing some presumed conscious result, turned out to be insufficient becausethere are very many actions that are goal-oriented, that is, that serve a goal.That is, they are even voluntary in the higher sense, but nonetheless do nothave the attributes that we would agree to recognize as specific to these

kinds of actions in particular. Goal-oriented actions were divided into twogroups. Some of them, in the language of psychology, cannot be called voli-tional, and are never called volitional. The second group consists of goal-oriented actions that, nonetheless, we clearly separate from the others, andthis namevolitionalapplies to them. In the classical Marxist tradition, ac-tions that are subordinate to a conscious goal, or especially to a rational goal,

are called volitional acts. This goal is not only conscious, but it is seen asessential and rational. Then, for example, work activity is volitional. Thus, inthe classical traditions of Marxism will is assigned a broader meaning thanis the same term in psychology. Therefore, in psychology the search continuesfor the characteristics that distinguish these volitional goals from actions thatare the same, but still somehow different, having special elements, special

traits, special features.Choice is often singled out as first among these features. Will is thereand

it is only presentwhen a goal-serving action takes place under conditions ofchoice between two possible or many possible actions. For example, HerbertSpencer is faced with a dilemma: either to go to Australia or to get married andstay in England. Spencer makes his decision on the basis of what he calls the

moral arithmetic he devised: he evaluates the consequences either of leavingor of marrying and staying in England, assigning each alternative a value us-ing a number of points; he then calculates the number of points. It turns outthat the decision to go to Australia gets more points, but he stays in England


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goal is not required, and when there are no obstacles, then the action isnonvolitional? If one rises up in a pretend attack and not in a war setting (I justgot up, before I was lying down, and now I am standing or running), nobodywill recognize this action as an act of will. It is voluntary, goal serving, it mayeven be an alternative, for instance, under conditions of a war game, but it isnot an act of will in the narrow sense, described in saying: a man of will, ora great force of will is needed, or that is truly an act of will. If we say thatwe are maintaining a goal orientation and knowledge of what we are doing,that is, a rational goal orientation, then it is natural that we just have to find thespecifics. We can also allow for indecisiveness when it is a matter of whetherit is best to put sevruga or osetra sturgeon on the plate. That is a choice. Butsomething is missing. Maybe there is not enough effort? And so, the third

feature is the overcoming of obstacles, that is, the presence of obstacles. If anaction is carried out without obstacles, it cannot be volitional, even if there isa choice and a decision is made.

First, it must be said that we cannot think only of external obstacles. Anexternal obstacle gives us nothing. To return to the same example, while it isknown that serious drug addicts are capable of overcoming any obstacle to get

drugs, this is not an expression of will, but of lack of will. A well-known rulein psychiatric clinics that deal with serious addicts is the following: do nottake your eyes off them, they will always find some way to get drugs and willexert colossal energy to do it. So, external obstacles are eliminated. Here,another complication emerges. Volitional acts are not always acts. Even medi-eval writers described three types of volitional phenomena. There is facera,

that is, activity, volitional action; and there is nonfacera, inactivity, very diffi-cult, it turns out, abstention from action; for example, I am holding a militarydetachment under artillery fire, it is very difficult not to run, and it is hard forme and it is hard for the unit, but that is what we have to do. To stand on a roofunder bombardment, on a roof outpost, something almost all adult Muscovitesof a certain age have done. There is whistling in the air, you want to run from

the attic downstairs, but nobody runs, they hold themselves back. And, finally,the third aspect: the most subtle, the most elevatedvati. It is simple to trans-late this word using the concept of patience, but that does not mean this isthe most exact word. This is something that a very interesting psychologist,the author of the first Russian military psychology, General Dragomirov, calledresilience, which he attributed as the greatest quality of the Russian troops.

Let us retreat, but not weaken the pressure of resistance, we again retreat, butwe do not weaken resistance. This is a taut rubber band; it is not yet knownwhen you stretch it to a certain length whether it will propel you, like theelastic on a slingshot. Maintaining a certain calm, if you likethat is what is


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of work that is needed in certain interrelationships with the strength of themotivation, or rather the motive. It takes place and does not fall within thecategory of volitional actions. Imagine the opposite situation: behind thegoal lies a negative motiveinaction, where action simply does not occur. Asimple set of alternatives: a positive motiveaction occurs; a negative mo-tiveaction does not occur. It could not be simpler.

However, the point is that actions are alwaysand this must be rememberedpolymotivated. When I carry out some sort of action, I enter into a relationshipnot only with one thing, but with several things that may be motives in and ofthemselves. Using the simplest forms of polymotivation, we will take a look attwo motives, actually we can keep in mind three, or any numberthis doesnot play a crucial role in the schematic analysis. Let us again look at an ordi-

nary caseboth negative. Nothing at all will happenwhy should anythinghappen. And now let us look at this: one motive is positive, and the other isnegative. We create a situation where something is done. This is not simply anaction. This is a volitional action. Furthermore, it makes no difference at allwhether both motives are conscious or one motive is conscious or neither isconsciouswhat is important is that they both be motives. Let us get away

from whether or not motives are conscious. For example, if I am giving anexamination, I have a dual relationship. I am relating to my professional re-sponsibilities, to my duties, and I cannot not relate to the examinee, I have nocontrol over this. In conducting an examination, I cannot not deal with theexaminee, when conducting the examination, and I cannot not deal with theprogram, with the requirements. What happens? There is a negative situation.

I cannot give the student a B, because the answer was not a B answer, and Icannot give him a C, because then he, who clearly needs it, would lose hisstipend. Whatever decision I make and whatever I do under these circum-stances, my behavior will be volitional, my action will be volitional. In the endI gave a Cor I gave him a B. This is the definition of action I introduced atfirst, of something that is not necessarily volitional in the sense that it may be

simply an action by choice, but rather a volitional deedthis is a volitional actin the true sense. So, a volitional act is an act carried out under conditions ofpolymotivation, when different motives have different affective signs, that is,some are positive and others are negative. So, here is the first definition; likeany definition, it is crude, insufficiently developed, pointing only to a generalcharacteristic, to a general approach to the problem.

Now, naturally, a certain question arises: if we accept this formula, then wedo not require that a motive necessarily be conscious. However, there is some-thing else we do not require: we do not require a characterization of thesemotives, but this characterization must be required. Why, after all, does a person


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act this way and not another way? Why can he not simply draw lots or whydoes he not want to draw lots? If it is suggested to me that I give a B or a Cbased on lots, I would rather listen to myself, to what is happening inside me.Some process is taking place inside me; this is my willthis internal processis very subtle and very complex. This is a framework over which I lay myanalysis, a crude diagram, a vector summation, and the most primitive sort, atthat. Because they enter into very complex relations with one another. So,delving into the problem of will has required us to delve into the motivationalsphere of personalityand this is why will is a deeply personal process. Andif we do not examine the relationships that arise inside consciousness, gener-ated through its development, if we do not examine these internal processes asself-generating processes, we cannot solve the problem of will. So, we have to

conduct a further analysis, along much more complex and difficult lines. Somesteps have already been taken in this regard.

We have arrived at a certain scheme of any action that can be called voli-tional action. Again to repeat this scheme: action objectively realizes two dif-ferent relationships, that is, two different activities are included and carriedout, and, consequently, this action obeys two different motives. When one of

these motives is negative, while the other is positively and emotionally charged,then a situation arises that is typical for the volitional action being carried out.If both motives are positive, then the action is carried out, but is not excludedfrom the category of volitional actions. The same is true of negative motives,where the action is simply not carried out, and there is no action. Certainly, itis possible to determine that any motive has a positive or a negative coloration,

and unquestionably, there exist such alternatives by which it is possible toclassify them with certainty. A simple criterion is that if there is no other mo-tive and the action takes place, then this is a positive motive; if the action doesnot take place, then the motive is negative or there is no motive at all. This waythere is always a very strict criterion: does the given motive have motivationalforce? Either it does not have itthen it is not a motive; or it has a positive,

motivating force to act or a motivating negative force, not to act. If there is acooking flame or a lit candle before me, then the action of putting my hand init will not take place under usual circumstances. To the contrary, there is atendency to draw my hand away, but if we have Mucius Scaevola, then to thecontrary, the action takes place, because then we have, let us say, a supermotive(I am introducing a conditional term, not giving it any terminological signifi-

cance), and then we have a typical act of will.Now, with respect to testing this thesis, there is something I can discuss in

this connection: the coexistence of two motives, that is, the incorporation ofaction in two different activitiesand that means two different relationships


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to the world, to the object required, that is, to the motivehas, as one of itscharacteristic features different levels at which action is constructed, realizingone relationship and another. It is necessary to separate these levels and todevise an experimental design that could be a subject of study. I will nowspeak about such a design.

I conducted the experiment I will tell you about now as a member of teamof researchers (there were a number of us), several years before the war as partof a process to answer certain pressing questions about parachute jumping.We had received a request through the All-Union Institute of ExperimentalMedicine (AIEM) to conduct research on parachute jumps. The subject of thisexperiment was to analyze jumps from a parachute tower that exists to thisday in the Park of Culture and Recreation. The height of this tower is approxi-

mately that of a seven-story building. A person went up this tower, and a so-called system was fastened to him, that is, what ties the person jumping withthe parachute to the actual parachute canopy, and then he was told he couldtake a step forward off the platform of this tower, that is, take a step, so tospeak, from the seventh floor into space. It should be said that sometimesthese jumps went smoothly, and sometimes certain problems arose, that is, the

person refused to jump. These cases were called refusals. These were veryrare cases on the parachute tower. What we were interested in was the ques-tion of why, first of all, these cases were rather rare; and second, what were therefusals to jump associated with? Why were these cases rare? That is easy toexplain. This was a tower that was offered as an amusement ride to the parksvisitors. One had to pay some fee, say, a ruble, get a ticket, and go down to the

base of the tower, where the equipment was put on you, and you climbed uptop with this equipment attached, and then the process went as follows: youwere quickly led to the barrier, and they fastened your equipment to the para-chute canopy with a large snap hook, then they opened the gate to the towerand the instructor gave the command, warning, You do not have to jump, juststep forward. And, as we observed, the subject would give a slight push in the

physical sense. The jump was completed with a slight sense of excitement anda feeling of satisfaction, pleasure.

We observed these jumps. I usually sat on the barrier, next to the part thatopened, and watched in profile, with a camera in my hands, a Leica as theycalled them then. Then we changed the situation a bit. Instead of an instructorwe put our man in and changed the circumstances in the following way. After

the next visitor came to this tower, the barrier was already open. He was in-vited to walk up to the edge, which was now not separated by any barrierfrom, we shall conditionally say, the abyss. . . . The instructor hit the snaphook against the ring that the hook was supposed to fasten to several times,


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making it appear that it was not fastening right away. He stepped aside for amoment, during which this supposed instructor had a conversation along thelines of, Look at that, down below a dog ran right here, right onto the landingplatform. And the subject, naturally, looked down. And then the instructorstepped back a half step and repeated the same instructions, You do not haveto jump, just step over there, downward. It is not dangerous because the para-chute is already balanced and you will descend smoothly. Here, it turned out,refusals became much more frequent.

Then, we made another step forward, and the last board of the surface, onwhich the subject was standing, was made moveable, and this board was builtonto hidden sensors so that the displacement of the center of gravity of thehuman body was recorded. Then, we observed a phenomenon, an occurrence

that was rather curious. This was the phenomenon of the backward push, aswe provisionally called it, giving it a temporary, working term for our ownuse. It turned out that after the first impulse forward, the board correspond-ingly inclined a fraction of a millimeter, so that the sensor was activated. The

jumper himself did not feel this leaning, it was a micro-inclination. Then, therewas a push back; it seemed that the emptiness pushed him back and the board

inclined, but in the opposite direction, that is, the center of mass moved back.First, movement a little forward and then even more significantly backward,as if declining in essence. After that there was either a refusal or an inclinationforward and finally a step, called a parachute jump.

What was going on here? We needed to do further experiments. We thenconstructed an arrangement consisting of two planks with very fine tissue pa-

per stretched between them on this same tower. It was translucent, that is, itwas obviously very delicate. But it was opaque in the sense that it gave off adiffuse light. It was not possible to see objects through it or determine dis-tances, and so on. It was a rather large frame obscuring a rather large portionof the field of vision. Furthermore, the whole construction was equipped witha mechanism such that when someone jumped, that is, when the boards were

freed of the pressure of the jumper, this frame automatically flipped down-ward, that is, it bent and dropped down and became vertical, parallel with thetower. This was how we managed not to have to replace new tissue paperevery time. It worked. One and the same sheet until the first rain. We ex-plained to the subjects: Now, please, step onto this sheet of tissue paper. You,of course, understand that it is a very thin sheet and it cannot stop your jump,

the paper is too thin. On the sides, of course, there was no partition. We usedthis device specifically with the refusersno refusals were repeated. We thenmade a proposition: there is, evidently, a lower levelneurologically this levelis subcorticalthat gives the command, Dont! Stop! Back!a push back


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and refusal. There is a higher, cortical level, of course, a level that repeats thecommand to jump, since on that higher level there is no effect from height, butthere is an effect from the idea of complete security. And, incidentally, thiswas completely correct because the jumps were absolutely safe. We had onlyone single accident the whole time we were working there.

I must comment on certain details. The first detail: Of course, we did notcontent ourselves with working with the public, with random subjects. Andwe also took measures to gather groups of subjects. First, we had at our dis-posal a platoon of soldiers from the Moscow garrison. You would be wrong tothink that we did not get any refusals from them. Without instructions therewere quite a few refusals. With these circumstances in mind, we took an inter-est in the question of how grown men, trained and disciplined, were not fol-

lowing an order. Then, we decided to take professional parachutists, and wereceived refusals from them, and often with statements claiming that it waslousy to jump from a parachute tower, worse than from a wing (then they

jumped from a biplane; they did not have hatches then, where they pour outlike bullets, one after the other). . . . Why is it lousy? Because it is unpleasantto step into nothingness, and there is no boldness, consciousness of height,

courage, or risk. There is no equilibrium: at the higher level, the commander,is not commanding, because he is very weak, and the lower level is cryingloudly: I do not want to do this. Here is a very interesting situation: We raisedthe number of refusals among professional parachutiststhose parachutistswho had a lot of jumpsto 100 percent with one modification. We said, Soyou have had a look, yes; now turn around and take a step backward, falling.

Nobody could stand this, although it is not a tricky task. I did not try it myself,jumping backward. Otherwise, I jumped rather well, I did not have any par-ticular problems. But, I understand what a push is. I cheated. I did this veryquickly and then I did not get a push back, I simply knew in advance and actedimmediately, like a shot.

At this point, something started to become clear. Another detail that is very

important came to light here. We had some refusals among visitors, and oncea group from some facility came and they all went to jumpthere were ten ofthem with one woman refusing. A refusalnothing out of the ordinary. How-ever, on the next day when I came to the parachute tower and sat down on mybarrier, suddenly I saw the woman who would not jump the day before. Thiswas the very woman who had refused yesterday. And then a conversation with

her took place, or actually an interview. It was natural to ask her, Why didyou come back? And after becoming a bit embarrassed she replied as fol-lows: the fact that she had not been able to force herself to jump made anunpleasant impression, left her with a kind of regret. When she returned to


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work, someone who had not been to the parachute tower asked her if she hadjumped and she replied, Yes. And then the regrets became even worse. Shehad said yes, when it was actually no, and, therefore, she decided to cometo the park alone after work today and jump without fail. We helped her andshe jumped and left entirely pleased: we helped by simply switching to theusual instruction, without any holding back; to the contrarylook at the para-chute and jump. That is, we switched off the visual field at the critical mo-ment, when the struggle was going on. We thus arrived at a hypothesis thatwas complicated by the fact that this is a very subtle and higher regulation; forinstance, social factors intervene: she did not want to be deceptive, or admitthat it was awful, very unpleasant to jump from the parachute tower, because itlacks boldness, this is not for professionals. The question arose, of course:

would it not be possible to first of all construct a physiological hypothesis andthen test this physiological hypothesis?

We constructed the following physiological hypothesis and this is how wesaw things. What is it exactly that the lower level, we will say the subcorticallevel of the brain, does during movement? Its function consists in preparingthe execution of objective movement, that is, the actual movements of the

appropriate extremitiesin this case the arms and the legs, which have toexecute the jump, and so on. In short, it has to prepare the skeletal muscula-ture. This function is usually called tonic function, in keeping with Bernshteinsideas. The level referred to here is a baseline level, that is, one that must forma certain baseline on which physical movement will develop. From this emergedthe following conjecture: perhaps on this lower level of the organization of

movements, only this unique tonic preparation is carried out. As far as thephysics of movement are concerned, they are evidently [produced] by upper,higher cortical processes. This assumption is highly probable from the pointof view of our physiological knowledge about the organization of movement,about the levels of the structure of movement, as they were called by NikolaiAleksandrovich Bernshtein. From this perspective the assumption is highly

likely that if you are evaluating the height from which you have to jump, theemptiness into which you have to step, then the initial evaluation prompts aninstantaneous adjustment, a preadjustment, that is, tonic measurements withinthe musculature preparing movement not forward, that is, a movement to jump,or, to put it more precisely, a step that must be made into nothingness, butpreparing a movement in the opposite direction, that is, a movement of mov-

ing away from the edge of this apparent abyss. At the same time, the commandforward is issued, which is formulated on a high level. We wind up with alack of coordination, a discrepancy between the tonic preparation and the physi-cal movement that is starting to be realized. The tonic elementaway from


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the edge; the physics elementover the edge. Under these circumstances onecan understand how the actual experience of volitional effort emergessimplyput, why it is difficult to lift the arm when the arm, as they usually say, will notbe lifted. Why it is difficult to unclench the fist holding onto the strut of abiplane up in the air before a jump when it is time to jump? The hand contin-ues to squeeze this strut, it works against the jump, so the muscles of the handare following the path continued by this preparation, happening instantaneouslyas soon as the person goes out onto the surface (the wing) of the plane. Andexecuting the jump can be figuratively compared with a movement against thegrain, against the flow. The flow is already happening, and the real actionrequires movement of the opposite muscle group.

Let us assume that the group executing the drawing away of the hand has

been brought to readiness in this direction, that is, the phasic movement of theextensor group has been prepared. But the command, or self-command in thiscase, goes to the flexor group. What do we wind up with? We wind up withhaving to relax the tension of the first group of flexors and complete a move-ment executed using the extensor group despite the absence of tonic prepara-tion. We wanted very much to experimentally test this proposition, this

explanation of volitional effort, metaphorically speaking, as being an inordi-nate effort due to the incongruity of the effect of tonic preparation and thecontent of the movement itself. This could be done fairly simply. For this itwas necessary to design an experimental task in such a way that some musclegroup would execute a movement that was demanded by a defensive reaction,let us say protecting against an electric shock; another group had to act in the

direction of contact with the source of the electric shock, with the electrode.Then, according to the assumption, under the influence of previous experi-ence of electric shock or electric stimulation under these conditions of movingtoward the electrode a reaction will be prompted of drawing away the handfrom the source of this electric shock. And what will the instructions demand?Moving closer to this source, that is, an opposite action.

We built a setup so that we could record an electromyogram. The design ofthe recording was such that we could record both the actual tonic processes,changes in muscle tone, and, naturally, the tension and reaction of the antago-nistic muscles. To put it simply, one electrode of the sensitive electromyogramwas attached to one muscle group and the other electrode to the antagonistmuscle group. The experiments were not conducted well. One important point

in the instructions for using the setupwhich was very well done in terms ofits electrical and biomechanical aspectswas neglected. The following pic-ture emerged: the subject had to bend his arm together with the bar that thehand was holding toward the source of the electric shock. He felt this shock.


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During the following attempts to repeat the same thing we observed a changein the electromyogram. There arose rather sharply expressed bioelectric ef-fects from the tonic state, the state of the tone of the muscles drawing the handaway, these were flexors, and almost no tonic preparation in the antagonistmuscles, that is, under our conditions, in the extensor group. But the point is,I repeat, that the experiments themselves were not very well constructed. Iwas not very attentive in supervising them, because it seemed to me that thegreatest difficulty was in setting up the apparatus, and the apparatus was set upby one of our workers who was very highly qualified, very experienced. I wasnot worried, and the experimenter, who worked under my supervision, a formergraduate student, botched the order of the experiment: for instance, only whenI insisted did he figure out that he should measure the very same movements,

the very same electromyograms with the same calibration, with the same ap-paratus under conditions where there had not been a trialjust simple instruc-tions: bend and unbend (the arm) using that same setup. Then we got the firstset of tonic and phasic recordings. I had in my hands samples of these record-ings, but I repeat, they were not adequately thought through. In short, all ofthis is still subject to study, to a repeat study, perhaps with better equipment.

So, for now my answer is hypothetical, but still rather reliable: if you arelifting weights and the weights seem heavy, then you have to apply effort outof proportion to what the actual number of pounds of the weights would re-quire, because on some levels there is a process taking place with an oppositeorientation. I say weights metaphorically, as they say I cannot move amuscle, I cannot let go. Here we have the explanation.

Now, briefly, the last question about the ontogenic development of voli-tional acts in the true sense, when you have to force yourself to do something.This is a dissertation, a well-thought-out, completely finished, and defendedwork by my now successful, former graduate student, K.M Gurevich, a personwho is now no longer young. He was set the task of catching the moment ofthe generation and initial development of volitional behavior in children. Us-

ing a number of criteria, children of preschool age were selected; or, to put itanother way, children of early, young, middle, and older preschool age. Theexperiments went as follows: They were all conducted using games, withKonstantin Markovich first familiarizing himself with life in a nursery school,working there as a teaching assistant, so the children grew accustomed to him.The experiment used children who for one reason or another were being kept

inside, not as a punishment, but in some cases because of a runny nose, othershad something else. Konstantin Markovich brought them toys, which wereactually the main research tool in this study. We chose the toys very carefully,and we looked for them in stores in order to create a selection that we could


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work with, keeping in mind the goals of the experiment. I remember some ofthe toys; they were mostly toys of the sort that Konstantin Markovich and Icalled silly, but they were very appealing. For instance, I recall a mechanicaltoy: a pole and on the pole there was a plastic figure of a man with arms andlegs that swiveled. The mechanism made the pole move in such a way that theacrobat on the pole turned this way and that and back again, then again to theother sidein short, this was a monotonous movement, although when youstarted it, it immediately drew your attention and seemed very appealing, andit had a great demanding quality, to use Kurt Lewins terminology. At the sametime, it had the marvelous quality that it was impossible to play with itit isimpossible to play intelligently with this kind of toy; in two, or at most, fiveminutes it will become boring, so the experiment did not drag on, and if that

toy got into somebodys hands, it lost its appeal so quickly that it was no effortto take it away.

The first experiments followed this scheme: the child had to do somethingunpleasant, uninteresting, and tedious and it was stipulated that after complet-ing this tedious activity, he could play with one of the toys displayed beforehim. One version of this experiment was that (just as in the first case it was

verified that the child did not have any other motive for completing the task)the toy was not placed before him but was shown to him and put away in acabinet. In one case this appealing object was within the field of perception; inthe other case it was not. The results pertaining to will were unexpected, al-though not very unexpected. The result was that this volitional action, perhapsvoluntary to start with, first proceeded in the absence of the motivating object,

and then also in its presence. We verified this conclusion with the mothers byasking one simple question: if your child does not eat well and you have prom-ised him that after he eats, say, cream of wheat, you will give him a candy,what do you have to dopromise it or also place it in front of him? Themothers answered unanimously that of course you cannot put the candy infront of him or he will completely stop eating his cream of wheat and will only

look at the candy. We received similar, analogous results. It is easier to have adecisive motive in the imagination than physically in viewthis is rather para-doxical. Development, it would seem, proceeds from the external to the inter-nal; but here it is the other way around, it coordinates better with the internalimage than when it is not an image, but a real object. This is the first paradoxi-cal aspect.

Second, we had toys that were appealing from a procedural perspective; itwas possible to play with them for a long time, in any event to repeat actionsover and over with these things, with these objects. The toy worked by releas-ing a spindle, where balls placed on little platforms were then knocked around


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JULYAUGUST 2005 91

it. Naturally, in order to play the game again you had to replace the balls, fourof them (three and one ball on top) on the little platforms, and they were flat,and the balls would rollthis was quite monotonous. This was an observationor an experiment based on the idea, if you like to ride, youd better enjoycarrying the sled. And another experiment, which contrasted with this onewas of a social type, that is, it was not the physical setting that objectivelydetermined the experiment, but the experimenters requirement, in this case,Gurevich. It turned out that objective necessity is weaker than social neces-sity. If the first situation could fit the formula if you like to ride, youd betterenjoy carrying the sled, the second situation fits the anecdote about the of-ficer and the orderly. The orderly is puttering about and keeps moaning andgroaning. The officer asks, Ivan, what are you groaning about? I am really

thirsty. Go get yourself a drink. I dont want to go. A few minutes passand the officer says to him in an official tone, Ivan. Yes, your honor, theorderly answers. Go and bring a glass of water. He runs and brings a glass ofwater. The officer says, Drink. The fellow drinks the glass of water andcalms down.

We conclude with a general rule that genetically, voluntary action appears

first of all, earlier, and consequently, more simply, if we can put it that way,with an ideal stimulus than with a real stimulus; and the second paradox: it ismore likely to appear in social subordination than in objective subordinationto material conditions. That is all. Then things begin to become somewhatclear. For instance, when there is no social setting, that is, no demands fromthose around, we replace that with a self-command: one-two-three-jump, which

is often practiced in volitional actions. In general, I would put it this way:keeping in mind several hypotheses that I have stated here, one could say thaton the basis of these hypotheses, or rather, using these hypotheses, even insome sense using them as a point to start from, many essential facts becomeclear that have long been known in psychology. They acquire a certain regu-larity, a certain possibility of grasping these diverse facts with a narrow circle

of concepts, without going outside those concepts, without calling for anyexternal forces to explain them. Here the nature of volitional effort is alsoexplained, which is very original. There has always been the problem: whenwe are talking about carrying out a volitional act, why do I show all the signsof having done some work, while in fact the actual job I have done was quitesmall. It is against muscle tone, it involves muscles that have not been pre-

pared with the necessary tonethis is very difficult. For instance, in earlymotor development in children it has been established for a long time that itdevelops first along the line of development of tonic muscle contractions. Unlessmuscle tone has been exercised, no movement can be executed, it does not


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happen; therefore, for instance, the medical idea that an infant, they say,should not be carried aroundlet them lie in their cribsthis is an incorrectidea. What happens then is a lag in motor development, because when youcarry a baby, he does not lie there like a sack, he is always working hismuscle tone, his muscles are tensing and this tension of muscles preparesthem to execute movements. It is an ordinary rule of physiology. So I haveput this outline together very roughly. In summing up this entire subject Icould say just one thing, that this very crude analysis of the facts from thearea of volitional actions in the narrow sense of this term, of course, cer-tainly does not exhaust the psychological problem of will. To the contrary, itis no more than an introduction.

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A. N. Leontiev - Vontade (em inglês)